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Abstract 
 
 
How do regulatory reforms happen, and what are their roles in the economy and 
society? What are the connections between institutional reforms of economic governance and 
neoliberalism? The purpose of this research is to answer these questions through a case study 
of the politics of competition regulation reform in Brazil, as crystallized in the reform of the 
Brazilian competition authority – CADE, the Administrative Council for Economic Defence – 
in 1994, and the regulatory practice inaugurated since then. Antitrust laws were imported in 
several countries of the global South as an integral part of the neoliberal agenda of state 
transformation and economic liberalization of the 1990s. In the narratives of legal doctrine, 
economics and even in the social sciences, competition policy reform is often depicted as an 
evolutionary development and a successful technological solution propelled by experts and 
adopted by governments to avoid the undesirable consequences of a new economic model in 
construction and to protect consumers. Competition regulation is frequently presented as 
counter-evidence to the very existence of neoliberalism as a political and economic 
phenomenon, and to its utility as an analytical concept. In this dissertation, through 
conceptual tools derived from the sociology of law, economic sociology and a critical 
political economy, I argue that this regulatory model is both rooted in and functional for the 
neoliberal project of transforming economies and societies. 
Based on a trajectory study of and interviews with lawyers and economists involved in 
the reform and production of competition regulation, on documentary analysis, and on a 
quantitative and qualitative inquiry of decisions enacted by CADE between 1994 and 2010, I 
argue that the linkage between competition regulation and neoliberalism in Brazil can be 
visualized from three perspectives. First, from that of the roles of the concrete agents who 
performed reform and monopolized the practice of competition regulation: mostly corporate 
lawyers and neo-institutional economists whose educational backgrounds, professional 
trajectories, and political views are consistent with neoliberal theoretical and political tenets, 
and who shaped reform and instituted a mode of production of competition regulation 
accordingly. Second, from that of the profiles of economic concentrations and corporate 
conduct regulated through CADE’s decisions, and of how they are regulated, as well as in the 
disputes to determine competition policy’s jurisdiction over financial capital. In this sense, I 
describe how competition regulation has historically facilitated and legitimized several of the 
defining phenomena of a neoliberal economy: the concentration and expansion of foreign 
capital into a recently liberalized economy, the hegemony and concentration of financial 
capital, and a disciplinary attitude toward local and regional market agents, as opposed to 
global ones. Third, from the angle of how competition policy contributes to neoliberalism as a 
project that advocates for the destruction of social collectives – as exemplified in the 
protection of workers and employment – and for the parallel constitution of a regime of 
consumer citizenship. In this dimension, I assess how competition policy has defined 
consumers as the main and only subjects protected by regulation, while simultaneously and 
selectively excluding labor concerns and workers from its normative domain, even though 
they are directly affected by economic concentrations regulated by antitrust policy. 
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Ya se sabe: por una línea razonable o una recta noticia hay leguas  
de insensatas cacofonías, de fárragos verbales y de incoherencias. 
Jorge Luis Borges 	
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INTRODUCTION	
 
This much is known: For every rational line or forthright statement there are leagues 
of senseless cacophony, verbal nonsense, and incoherency. Besides being part of the well-
known piece “Ficciones” – one of those books to which one comes back several times in life 
–, this quote from Jorge Luis Borges provides an epigraph for this work that can serve as an 
elegant metaphor to introduce the object and purposes of the research presented here. Borges’ 
words, although belonging to the literary (and certainly much more interesting) universe, are 
helpful keys to open the doors of this text through the explanation of how this research project 
came about, and what it is about.  
This is because the present dissertation stems from an intellectual concern motivated 
by what I perceive as “cacophonies” that emerge from the knowledge currently available to 
understand the transformations of law and the economy in the wake of globalization. These 
“incoherencies” arise when what can be roughly seen as two bodies of literature are put 
together: studies of the relationship between economic globalization and regulatory reform, 
and research that approaches globalization as being predominantly oriented by neoliberalism. 
 
Economic globalization and regulatory reform 
 
One of the sources of the mentioned cacophonies are the narratives that emanate from 
legal and economic scholarship, as well as from studies in the social sciences interested in 
explaining and evaluating the creation of institutional and legal arrangements of economic 
governance in the 1980s and 1990s. These are studies about the processes and products of 
“regulatory reform”, which highlight the modernizing and evolutionary trends implied by the 
inauguration and reform of regulatory agencies, such as competition authorities, to govern the 
economy. 
In the dominant “lines” and “statements” present in this scholarship, during this 
period, collapsing welfare states were transformed in the global North, and in the global 
South developmental and interventionist institutions in place throughout most of the twentieth 
century were dismantled. Privatization and deregulation were promoted in many countries as 
solutions for the fiscal and inflation crises and for stagnation, with the objective of inducing 
economic development. Accompanying these measures were innovative institutional and legal 
forms of economic governance, of which competition or antitrust policy, as well as other 
types of regulatory agency, are emblematic examples. In many countries of the South, 
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regulatory agencies, including competition authorities, were created for the first time as part 
of the liberalizing impulses, or existing laws were reformed. 
The worldwide spread of regulatory agencies and antitrust authorities, which 
intensified in the 1990s, is often explained as the adoption, by governments, of modern 
technologies to avoid the potential undesirable outcomes of a “free market” opened through 
liberalizing measures. The process of reform is described in evolutionary and functionalist 
terms, as a necessary technical move toward “better” legal and institutional models, a 
modernization to fill a gap, and to solve the problems of other forms of economic governance, 
and hence to adapt to a new economic reality. The construction of these new forms of 
economic regulation is portrayed as largely consensual, and as part of a global phenomenon 
of institutional convergence. Governments, international organizations and technical experts 
are said to be the major proponents and implementers of reform. 
The diffusion of such institutional and legal mechanisms is said to have consolidated a 
new paradigm of economic regulation, which has been frequently called the “regulatory 
state”, or even more broadly, “regulatory capitalism”. This would be a model of economic 
governance that is essentially technical, autonomous from politics, and which produces the 
moderation and socialization of the capitalist economy. In regulating the economy and 
promoting competition, regulatory agencies and antitrust authorities would exercise roles in 
the economy and society, by promoting competition and protecting consumers, respectively. 
In doing so, benefits of universal interest would be generated: for market agents, the state, and 
society as a whole. 
Embedded in these narratives are assumptions about how the process of reform 
occurs, and what are its roles for both the economy and society. Local conditions, concrete 
agents and political struggles are obfuscated by the idea that reforms entail a technological 
advancement. The process of reform is thus depoliticized. The roles of regulatory institutions 
and competition authorities are equally removed from political conflicts, as they are assessed 
through an often impressionistic empirical basis, and a formal view of the law that takes for 
granted the objectives it states as sufficient evidence of its practice. 
 
What about neoliberalism? 
 
These “forthright statements” about regulatory reform have either simply ignored, or 
more directly contested what a body of literature has affirmed to be a central phenomenon 
underlying economic globalization: neoliberalism. In approaches that study the political and 
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economic meanings of neoliberalism, the emphasis is directed to the political aspects and 
hence the power relations that underlie the transformations of the capitalist economy in the 
last quarter of the 20th century.  
In these views, economic globalization is propelled by a political project to solve a 
crisis of capitalist accumulation, and the institutional and legal reforms that operationalize it 
are part of a set of measures directed to lift the blockages to the concentration and expansion 
of capital, especially the free circulation of financial capital. In simplistic terms, neoliberal 
globalization is said to have implied the subjection of the state to market forces, and for this 
purpose reversing prior forms of political and social organization in which the state was more 
interventionist in the economy – be it the welfare state in the global North, or the 
developmentalist one of the global South. 
In this context, the destruction of political, legal and social institutions that could 
hamper such impulses, and their substitution by other institutional forms, such as technocratic 
instruments of economic governance, deregulation, and privatization, are a reflection of the 
neoliberal project to assure the prevalence of the market over the state. As a political agenda, 
neoliberalism is also hardly seen as a modernizing, evolutionary, or consensual phenomenon, 
but rather as actively constructed and disputed. The identification of the “problems” to be 
solved and the “gaps” to be filled in the context of economic globalization are part of these 
disputes, and so are the institutional and regulatory “solutions” articulated. 
When not entirely ignored by studies on regulatory reform, the critical accounts about 
economic globalization as predominantly neoliberal often lead to a tension with the diagnoses 
proposed by that literature. This is because the very existence of regulation, or its 
“improvement” through reform, are pointed to as counter-evidence of neoliberalism as a 
social phenomenon, and thus of its utility as an analytical concept. The presence of 
mechanisms to regulate the economy, and the occurrence of regulatory reforms would refute 
the veracity of the elements that are said to be the defining traces of neoliberalism. Regulatory 
reforms would neglect the idea that market regulation is absent, or that there is a hegemony of 
market forces over the state, and hence the interpretation that neoliberalism constitutes a 
defining trace of economic globalization. That the liberalization of the economy through 
privatization and deregulatory measures has been accompanied by the consolidation of 
regulatory agencies and competition authorities becomes naturalized in studies about 
economic globalization and regulatory reforms. 
Here is precisely where the cacophonies lay. That the move towards more open 
economies was paralleled by legal reforms that at first sight constrict the free market seems 
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puzzling, not at all a natural or obvious process in a context of economic globalization. It 
looks odd, and even quite paradoxical that a mechanism for regulating the market was part of 
the same agenda that sought to liberate it by reducing the presence of the state in the 
economy. Moreover, the rebuttal of the existence of neoliberalism as a political and economic 
phenomenon based solely on the presence of these regulatory novelties is hardly convincing 
from a sociological view point. How could the formal enactment of laws and the reform of 
institutions to govern the economy be taken as assurances of the inexistence of certain 
political and economic practices that are said to be characteristic of neoliberalism? 
Making sense of the coincidence between neoliberal economic globalization and the 
creation of new regulatory institutions is thus the central objective of this dissertation. This 
endeavor is herein translated as an attempt to grasp why and how such legal reforms happen, 
and what are their roles in the announced task of reforming states and economies. Since the 
exclusion of neoliberalism from the “rational lines” of studies on regulatory reform sounds as 
a cacophony, my purpose in this work is to assess if and how the transformations in the forms 
of interaction between the state and the economy, as articulated through law and policy, fit 
into the broader phenomenon of neoliberal globalization. If a profanation of Borges’ piece is 
here authorized, this is a work that intends to grasp the possible “incoherencies” within the 
“forthright statements” about regulatory reforms and its linkages to neoliberalism. Contrary to 
Borges, however, and be it because this connection, with a few exceptions, has not been 
explored, or due to its explicit contestation in certain narratives, I believe that within the arid 
terrain of academic research those cacophonies are still not “much known”. 
 
The research problematique 
 
To explore the cacophonies observed in the linkages – or better said, in the absence of 
linkages – between regulatory reform and neoliberalism, this dissertation focuses on the 
construction and practice of a particular regulatory arena that was part of the agenda of 
reforming states and economies within economic globalization in a concrete setting: 
competition policy in Brazil. I deploy conceptual and methodological instruments of the 
sociology of law, economic sociology and of a critical political economy to develop a 
sociologically informed analysis of regulatory reform and regulatory practice. In departing 
from these references, the study of the possible connections between reform and 
neoliberalism is translated into the analysis of both the process of construction of this arena of 
economic regulation, and the roles it exercises in the economy and society. It is precisely in 
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the production of functionalist or formalist “rational lines” about both of these dimensions – 
the construction and the roles of regulatory reform – that those linkages are ignored, or 
explicitly neglected by the dominant narratives on regulatory reform. The research question 
that guided this inquiry was thus the following: how was competition regulation constructed 
in Brazil, and what are its roles in the economy and society? 
The research problematique herein addressed was in turn translated into a more 
specific and operational set of questions to explore each of the two dimensions approached by 
the dominant “rational lines” about regulatory reforms. On the side of the process of reform 
or construction of this regulatory arena, the dissertation sought to identify “Who are the 
agents that construct competition regulation in Brazil, and how did they shape the reform and 
practice of this regulatory arena?”. Through a question that calls for the analysis of concrete 
agents that structure this regulatory arena, I seek to re-politicize regulatory reform, and thus 
circumvent the often agentless, functionalist and evolutionary perspectives that enable erasing 
its potential links to neoliberalism. 
On the side of the roles or outcomes produced by competition policy in the country, 
two specific questions were formulated. With respect to the roles of competition policy in the 
economy, I ask “What economy competition policy facilitates and for whom, and how 
economic interests both affect regulation and are impacted by it?” In this sense, instead of 
accepting the “forthright statements”, as Borges would say, about the universally beneficial 
roles of competition regulation to the economy, I seek to scrutinize how regulation actually 
impacts the economy, and if and how it differs with respect to distinct economic agents and 
interests.  
Finally, with respect to its roles in society, I enquire: “What society is constituted 
through competition policy? What social groups are protected and affected by regulatory 
practice?” Similarly to that concerning the outcomes of competition regulation for the 
economy, this question aims to problematize the discourses of the roles of regulatory reform 
in protecting society. By inquiring about which are the actual social groups involved in 
regulation, and how are they affected by it, I construct an empirically-based narrative about 
the society that regulatory reform helps to constitute. In both cases, differently from what can 
often be found in the “rational lines” about regulatory reform, these are questions to be 
answered empirically, beyond the crude text of the laws that institutionalize competition 
policy. 
The circumscription of the object in such terms is motivated by two distinct but 
interconnected reasons. First, the focus on competition policy constitutes an entry point to 
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discuss the relationship between neoliberalism and regulatory reform. Besides being an arena 
of economic regulation at the core of the intersection between the state and the economy, as 
the worldwide spread of competition or antitrust laws in the 1990s evidence, it emerged in 
parallel to and as part of the agenda to reform states and economies under the auspices of 
neoliberalism. In Brazil, the landmark of this process was the enactment of law number 8.884 
of 1994, which reformed the Brazilian antitrust authority – the Administrative Council for 
Economic Defence (CADE) – accordingly to international standards. Since then, together 
with the regulation of corporate conduct, Brazilian competition policy also started to 
supervise economic concentrations in the form, for instance, of mergers and acquisitions, 
becoming a “modern” regulatory arena. 
Through this case study, although I don’t expect to generate results of universal 
validity either about competition policy reform, or regulatory reforms in general, I believe it is 
possible to identify and discuss indicators of the connection of regulatory reform with 
neoliberalism. The circumscription of the research to the particular domain of the construction 
of competition policy as exemplary of regulatory reform is thus oriented to enable an in-depth 
study about the topic, from which conclusions can be extracted to engage with the specialized 
literature and to propose what I see as a different view about reform and its connections with 
neoliberalism. Additionally, the approach to neoliberalism as an object of study through 
regulatory reform, and more specifically through competition policy reform, is far from well 
explored, and thus constitutes an attractive research field, with potential contributions for 
those interested in understanding this political and economic phenomenon. 
The focus on the Brazilian experience responds to yet another reason for the 
delimitation of the object, in turn connected to my personal trajectory. Although the 
dissertation aims to contribute to the academic debate about regulatory reform, the actual 
attraction of this object of study comes from beyond this particular domain. It is rather 
inseparable from the political and social surroundings in which I have been historically 
inserted, and hence from my formation as an academic and political subject. Since the 
beginning of my graduate studies, my research interests have orbited the relationship between 
law and the economy in globalization. Such interests are unavoidably rooted in the context in 
which I have been formed as an academic: growing up in a semi-peripheral country such as 
Brazil in the 1990s, and particularly in the city that hosted several meetings of what is reputed 
as an emblematic initiative of criticism and resistance to neoliberal globalization – the World 
Social Forum –, attending law school, and then “converting” to the sociology of law in the 
first decade of the 21st century. During this period, I have been socially, politically and 
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academically exposed to the deep transformations motivated by economic globalization that 
occurred in the world, substantively affecting the legal, political and economic domains of 
Latin American countries such as Brazil, and that had already started to be scrutinized by 
academics. 
As a student of the law and society tradition, this context induced a curiosity about the 
role played by law in neoliberal globalization, i.e. to understand how neoliberalism has both 
affected and been affected by the law, especially in countries of the so-called global South, 
and notably in Brazil. The study of the connections between competition policy reform and 
neoliberalism in Brazil is thus also an attempt to contribute to the understanding of the 
broader transformations that occurred in this country, and hence to respond to a sort of 
subjective calling to the task. Although according to the canons of scientific inquiry the 
distinction between research and politics is not only recommended but established as a 
condition, I don’t see these realms as entirely separable. However, as I tried to accomplish in 
my writing through a constant methodological awareness, I understand that such distinction 
can and must be practised. In any case, and although the very presentation of the purposes 
underlying this dissertation demands such disclaimer, only by the end of the reading of the 
pages that follow will be possible to judge if this distinction has been successfully respected 
or not. 
 
The argument in a nutshell 
 
Based on the answers empirically delineated for each of the questions elaborated to 
guide the research, the central claim of this dissertation is that the construction of competition 
regulation in Brazil, the economy it facilitates, and the society it helps to constitute through its 
practice have contributed to the structuring and legitimization of the economic and political 
tenets of neoliberalism in Brazil. In this work I thus propose an alternative narrative to 
understand the connections between regulatory reform and neoliberalism, sustaining that the 
regulatory model of competition policy, as institutionalized and practiced in Brazil, is both 
rooted in and functional for the neoliberal project of transforming economies and societies. 
I explore these connections through two complementary strategies. On one side, a 
trajectory study of the agents who were the architects of reform and who were recruited to 
produce competition regulation in the state apparatuses between 1994 and 2012, their capitals, 
positions and political stances toward the state and the market. On this dimension of the 
construction of competition regulation, I argue that the linkage between reform and 
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neoliberalism can be visualized in the role of concrete agents who actively shaped the reform 
and practice of competition regulation: mostly corporate lawyers and neo-institutional 
economists whose educational backgrounds, professional trajectories, and political views are 
consistent with neoliberal theoretical and political tenets, and who shaped reform and 
regulatory production accordingly. Instead of an agentless process of institutional 
modernization, competition policy reform was disputed to be made compatible with the 
parallel trends of economic liberalization through privatization and deregulation, and to the 
expansion and concentration of capital. Such trends were strongly institutionalized in 
competition policy, managing to last for years after the first initiatives of reform, and even 
despite broader political changes in the country. 
The second research strategy departs from the approach of a critical political economy 
of neoliberalism and applies a study of the “law in action” produced by these agents. On this 
dimension of the outcomes of competition regulation in Brazil, I base the dissertation’s 
overall claim about the connection between this reformed regulatory arena and neoliberalism 
upon two main indicators. One the one hand, through a study of the profiles of economic 
concentrations and corporate conduct regulated through CADE’s decisions, and of how they 
are regulated, as well as of disputes to determine competition policy’s jurisdiction over 
financial capital, I argue that competition regulation has historically facilitated and 
legitimized several of the defining phenomena of a neoliberal economy: the concentration and 
expansion of foreign capital into a recently liberalized economy, especially through 
privatizations, the hegemony and concentration of financial capital, and a disciplinary attitude 
toward local and regional market agents, as opposed to global ones. Instead of interpreting the 
roles exercised by competition regulation as what the competition act states – to “promote 
competition” –, I base this analysis on an empirical and systematic study of decisions. 
The argument about competition regulation’s roles is complemented by its outcomes 
on a societal dimension. In this sense, I argue that competition policy contributes to 
neoliberalism as a project that advocates the destruction of social collectives – best 
exemplified in labor protection – and for the parallel constitution of a regime of consumer 
citizenship. This hypothesis is based on empirical findings showing that the delimitation of 
consumers as the main and only subjects protected by competition policy has simultaneously 
and selectively excluded labor concerns and workers from its normative domain, even though 
they are directly affected by economic concentrations regulated by antitrust policy. 
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Structure of the thesis 
 
The argument is developed in two steps. Part I of this dissertation is dedicated to 
describe in detail the construction of the problematique herein addressed, the theoretical 
debate in which it is inserted, and the conceptual and methodological contours of the 
alternative approach to regulatory reform that I propose. In Chapter 1, I review the dominant 
“rational lines” available to understand how does regulatory reforms occur, with the focus 
directed to the reform of competition regulation in Brazil, and what are its roles in the 
economy and society, and point to what I see as shortcomings underlying these approaches. In 
Chapter 2, I present the conceptual and theoretical foundations from which I departed to 
construct an alternative narrative about regulatory reforms and its linkages to neoliberalism. 
These are, the actor-centered approach as well as the theories about the roles of lawyers and 
economists in neoliberalism applied in the study of the construction of competition regulation 
in Brazil, combined with the “law in action” perspective and the critical political economy of 
neoliberalism deployed for the study of the outcomes of competition regulation in the 
economy and society. In Chapter 3, I describe the methodological strategies derived from this 
conceptual framework, and explain how the research questions elaborated to guide the inquiry 
were translated into an empirical study. 
Part II comprises the presentation and discussion of the results of the empirical 
material gathered through the conceptual and methodological instruments sketched in the 
previous chapters. In Chapter 4, I present the reconstruction of the historical process of 
construction of competition policy as a “modern” regulatory arena in Brazil focused on the 
agents directly involved in reform. Chapter 5 also entails the actor-centered approach to 
competition regulation, but focuses on assessing the mode of production of competition 
regulation since its inauguration in the early 1990s as a modern regulatory arena until 2012. 
Together, these chapters portray the political clashes that underlie competition regulation, and 
enable visualizing the roots of this regulatory arena in neoliberalism. In Chapter 6, I describe 
the regulatory outcomes produced by competition policy in the economy and society through 
both quantitative and qualitative data about CADE’s decision-making. At the end of each of 
these three chapters, I contrast the empirical findings with the dominant narratives about 
regulatory reform mapped in Chapter 1, and connect them to the theoretical background of 
this dissertation, as described in Chapter 2. 
In the Conclusions of the dissertation, I discuss the broader implications of the 
findings of the empirical study about the politics of competition regulation in Brazil for the 
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body of literature with which I engaged in Part I. I also present an appraisal of the narrative 
that I herein offer about regulatory reform and neoliberalism, pointing to what I see as new 
“cacophonies” generated by this “rational line”, and suggesting ways in which they can be 
turned into new research endeavors. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Dominant narratives about competition policy reform  
 
As described in the introduction, making sense of the coincidence between the 
construction of a legal and institutional regime to regulate competition and the occurrence of 
neoliberal reforms, understanding the relation between regulatory reforms and the attempts at 
transforming economies and states is the central objective of this dissertation. I want to 
understand why and how such legal reforms happened, and what are their roles in the 
announced task of reforming states and economies, that is: what is the role of competition 
policy in neoliberalism. With these objectives in mind, I looked for explanations to 
understand why and how an institutional framework to govern competition was developed 
within the agenda of state reform and economic liberalization, and what roles it performs. 
I identified three main sources of knowledge available to tackle these questions. The 
first and most obvious place to look for answers is in the very institutions that were created or 
reformed. My initial attempt was thus to see how the Brazilian competition authority  – the 
Administrative Council for Economic Defense (CADE) – describes its functions and its 
history. A second candidate as a source of knowledge to understand reforms are two fields 
that are directly imbricated in the production of the content of these reforms and in its practice 
– law and economics. Lawyers and economists are not only professionals who work as 
regulators and practitioners in these new regulatory environments. Through specialized legal 
doctrine and economic studies, they also offer explanations and justifications for the creation 
of these institutions and legal reforms and accounts about their roles.  Finally, explanations 
that are “external” to this policy domain can also be found in a growing literature in the social 
sciences. These are attempts in sociology and political science to understand the creation of 
regulatory models such as competition law. 
In this chapter, I therefore present the narratives currently available to explain the 
process of reform of competition law in Brazil and its roles in transforming the state and the 
economy. I believe it is not arbitrary to point to these streams of narratives as exemplary of 
the existing explanations for the questions raised by this research. To my knowledge, they 
constitute the available discourses about regulatory reform of competition policy, and thus 
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provide a fairly comprehensive view of what can be considered the dominant model for 
describing competition law reform and its implications1. 
In many cases, the literature found in each of these streams is not explicitly or entirely 
interested in responding to the questions of how reform occurred and what impacts have been 
produced by this institutional framework. Nevertheless, a tacit narrative about these issues is 
often present, underlying institutional definitions, studies which are policy-oriented or even 
those with analytical intentions. These are the narratives available to understand the causes, 
meanings and consequences of the establishment of an institutional framework for producing 
competition law in Brazil. 
The use of the term narrative here is deliberate, and it is chosen as an alternative to the 
notion of theory. Treating the different accounts about how reform happens and what are the 
goals of competition policy as narratives enables me to simultaneously assess descriptions 
and explanations of different types and analytical levels. In a hardcore positivistic definition, 
theory would be a system of universal laws (or hypotheses), a model of explanation of “how 
[certain] conditions cause an outcome” (Mjøset 2001). In this sense, there are theories about 
how legal reform happens and about the roles of competition policy that are applied to the 
Brazilian case, explanations that put forward a systematic set of assertions of causal relations 
to describe and explain certain empirical phenomena. 
Nevertheless, other types of assertions are equally influential as forms of knowledge 
to explain the phenomena in question, but which could be hardly called scientific theories. 
These are descriptive and even normative propositions that entail an explication of how 
certain phenomena happened and what are their impacts, even if tacitly or in an unsystematic 
and unempirical way – that is, even if not departing from or suggesting an explicit system of 
hypotheses. Exemplary of this strand are the official histories constructed by the very 
institutions that are reformed, and accounts in legal doctrine, which often does not have the 
explication of reform and its outcomes as its central concern. Although not properly scientific 
according to certain criteria, these assertions have intentions that are – to some degree – 
																																																								
1 Türem’s (2010) study about the reform of competition policy in Turkey – which in many senses served as 
reference and inspiration to my research – also identifies these narratives as the available sources of knowledge 
about competition law reform. As he puts it, “[k]nowledge production about regulatory agencies point to a rather 
regular pattern: what we know about these agencies and their creation, our way of thinking about them are 
shaped most heavily by the disciplines of law, economics, business, or public administration, disciplines which 
are mostly prescriptive and normative,  rather  than  critical  and  questioning” (Türem 2010, p. 17). Together 
with these academic disciplines, the narratives of institutions which act as “reformers”, such as the OECD and 
UNCTAD, and “social scientific works”, most notably in political science, are also approached by Türem as part 
of the existent descriptions about the reform of competition policy. 
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similar to a theory’s purpose: “to catch what we call ‘the world’: to rationalize, to explain, and 
to master it” (Popper 2005). 
By grouping these different types of assertions under the name of narratives I do not 
intend to dissolve the notion of theory into the former, equalizing it with other forms of 
propositions2. Rather, by calling them narratives, I aim to avoid the confusion of calling all 
types of propositions theory, and to simultaneously address different types of explanations 
that despite their distinct analytical structures and explanatory intentions are potential sources 
of knowledge about the object of investigation. The concept of narrative thus enables the 
grouping of different types of assertions about the reform of competition policy: official 
discourses, legal doctrine, economic studies and properly scientific theories. What these 
different types have in common is that they are forms of knowledge available to address the 
questions initially formulated, i.e. to understand why and how reform of competition law 
occurred, and what are its roles and outcomes. The extent to which the different narratives 
identified are valid, useful or limited cannot be determined beforehand by their type. 
Assessing these questions is precisely what I will tackle in this chapter.  
In reviewing each of these streams, I also don’t aim at providing an exhaustive survey 
of the descriptions of competition law in Brazil, or regulatory reform in general. Rather, my 
objective is to illustrate what I consider to be a tendency found in each set of narratives when 
it comes to explaining how reform occurred and what are the roles and outcomes of this 
institutional arrangement devised to transform the state and the economy. The chapter is 
structured around the narratives constructed by these different sources in two dimensions: 
why and how reform occurs, and what are the roles and outcomes performed by the reformed 
institutions. Section 1.1 reviews the narratives found in official institutional descriptions, 
focusing on the stories told by CADE, the very institution that was object of the process of 
reform in Brazil. In section 1.2, I describe how scholars in the fields of law and economics 
explain the emergence and roles of these regulatory mechanisms. In section 1.3, I present a 
review of approaches developed in the social sciences to study regulatory reform, and 
competition policy reform in particular – what can be called “diffusion studies”. In section 
1.4, I close the chapter by drawing out the similarities that can be identified among these 
narratives, and discussing what I believe to be shortcomings in their approaches. 																																																								
2 While the differentiation between scientific theory and other forms of knowledge intends to avoid a post-
modern conception of theory, it does not necessarily imply an “epistemological hierarchy” between them. In 
affirming this distinction, I only aim to make explicit the awareness of the different analytical character of the 
types of propositions about competition policy reform. What I will argue is that despite these differences, these 
narratives share many important assumptions and conclusions in explaining legal reform and its roles. 
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1.1 Institutional stories 
 
The first set of narratives from where the “cacophonies” that motivate this research 
emerge can be found in official institutional descriptions – the stories told by the very 
institution that was the object of the process of reform. In March 2012, the Brazilian 
Competition Authority launched a commemorative celebration of the 50th anniversary of 
competition policy in Brazil. As part of the campaign, several conferences involving lawyers, 
economists, policy-makers, and academics were organized, a new institutional logo was 
issued, and a “hotsite” of the project entitled “CADE 50 years” was released.3 The objectives 
of these celebrations were to diffuse information about CADE’s main attributions and to 
“promote competition defense and preserve institutional memory” of a governmental 
institution created in 1962. 
In such cabalistic moments of celebration, discourses and evaluations about the 
history, objectives and roles of an institution proliferate. The preservation of “institutional 
memory” demands the production of a narrative about this institution, the choice of a form 
and content to consolidate this memory as history. CADE’s 50th anniversary campaign was no 
different. The initiatives promoted in this celebration entailed the production of several 
narratives about the historical evolution of competition law in Brazil. These narratives also 
define the role of competition policy, how it has developed in Brazil, and how it is practiced. 
They appear, therefore, as a potential source of knowledge for understanding this arena of 
economic governance, its transformations and implications. It also helps to introduce the 
object of study and specific elements about the institutional and legal structures of 
competition policy in Brazil.  
To depict the institutional narratives about competition law in Brazil, I analyze how 
the institution responsible for producing competition policy which was reformed in the 1990s 
describes its transformation and roles. I rely on institutional materials and official documents 
produced at different moments of time, such as the 50th anniversary commemorative 
campaign launched in 2012, which includes the “hotsite” and a book published in 2013, as 
well as the “Practical Guide” published by CADE in 2007, and CADE’s permanent website.4 
My objective in surveying these sources is to portray the themes of the institutional narratives 
about the nature of competition law, and its account of the historical developments in Brazil, 
the goals it  pursues and roles it performs. 																																																								
3 Available at: http://www.cade.gov.br/50Anos/. Last access on April 28th 2013. 
4 Available at: www.cade.gov.br 
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1.1.1 Once “small” but now “super” 
 
The commemorative website organized by CADE is a fruitful entry point to observe 
how an institution of economic governance describes its history and defines its roles, since it 
offers a schematic and historical overview of competition law in Brazil.  
 
Figure 1. “CADE 50 years” hotsite printscreen 
 
Source: http://www.cade.gov.br/50Anos/. Last access on April 28th, 2013. 
 
At the top of the page, there are four links to information about “What is CADE” (“O 
que é”), “What does it do” (“O que faz”), its 50 years’ history, and a recent process of 
“Restructuring” (“Reestruturação”). At the bottom of the page, a timeline of competition 
policy’s history in Brazil is depicted as a racing track for a stylized athlete, beginning in 1945 
and finishing in 2011. At the lower right side, the logos of the Brazilian Ministry of Justice 
and of the Brazilian national government complete the page’s composition. As the campaign 
targeted a wide public through insertions in websites, magazines and national newspapers, its 
concern was to be didactic, to communicate the content in a succinct, jargon-free form.  
In telling the history of its 50 years, CADE’s commemorative website points to five 
landmarks. In 1945, the promulgation of the first legal mechanism of competition regulation 
in Brazil: a decree enacted by president Getúlio Vargas5 that penalized “acts against the moral 
and economic order” and created “CADE’s first version”, with a slightly different name: the 																																																								
5 In Annex I, I list the presidents mentioned in this dissertation in chronological order. 
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Administrative Commission for Economic Defense, instead of what would become a Council. 
In CADE’s most recent institutional publication (CADE 2013), a book based on several 
testimonies of former officials of the Council, the first landmark of antitrust policy in Brazil is 
identified even before the 1945 decree. The book mentions a provision of the 1937 
Constitution, which established in article 141 the protection of the “popular economy” as a 
principle. One year later, decree 869 of 1938 concretized this principle by establishing 
provisions to combat crimes against the popular economy (CADE 2013, p. 36). 
The 1945 act was different from the 1938 provisions, as it had an administrative 
character, rather than a criminal one. The establishment of the 1945 schema is depicted as a 
conflictual episode. The provisions instituted by Vargas were accused of being 
“interventionist”, and of “making the development of the country difficult” (CADE 2013, p. 
37 Ch 1), especially in the view of foreign corporations. This institutional arrangement lasted 
for only five months, as in 1946 a new government revoked the decree that instituted 
competition regulation. The polemics around the 1945 law would have nevertheless opened 
room for “upgrading a previous antitrust legislation in Brazil and contributed directly to 
including the fight against the abuses of economic power in a Constitution for the first time” 
(CADE 2013, p. 14). 
A second landmark in CADE’s official history of competition law is the year of 1962, 
the initial point for its 50th anniversary celebration. Presented in Congress in 1948 through the 
law project number 122/1948, the creation of CADE was approved only after 14 years, 
through the enactment of law number 4.137/1962, inspired by the Sherman Act of 1890 
(CADE 2013, p. 40). According to the website’s presentation, the statute that created CADE 
aimed to operationalize a provision of the 1946 Constitution. CADE, then a Council, would 
have the role of enforcing this norm. Again, the most recent institutional publication provides 
a more contextualized view of this period. According to this book (CADE 2013), the project 
of what would eventually become the law of 1962 was blocked at least twice in Congress. It 
was only in 1961, in reaction to another project presented in Congress by president Jânio 
Quadros, that the antitrust act proposed in 1948 moved forward. The project presented by 
Quadros in 1961 also aimed to regulate the provision of the 1946 Constitution, but was 
considered “much worse” than the 1945 provisions (CADE 2013, p. 42). In face of the 
presidential proposal, political leaders that until then opposed the 1948 project ended up 
approving it as Law number 4.137 of 1962. 
The 1962 Competition Law did not have much “expressive” effect, according to the 
institutional narratives, due to two factors: the “rigid control of economic activity by the 
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government”, and the frequent overruling of its decision by the Judiciary (CADE 2013, p. 
48). Economic policy adopted by the military governments initiated in 1964 was 
“incompatible with the spirit of the antitrust law”, as it promoted price control6 and stimulated 
the formation of big economic groups, which “sometimes were born out of mergers and 
acquisitions” (CADE 2013, p. 44).  
 The third moment mentioned in this institutional official history dates in the 1990s, 
and is contextualized within the legal framework inaugurated by the Constitution of 1988. 
The Constitution established “free competition” and “consumer protection” as two pillars of 
the Brazilian economic order7. As repeated in CADE’s “Practical Guide” (CADE 2007a), 
“free trade is considered one of the basic foundations for the repression of any economic 
abuse that may intend to eliminate competition, dominate markets or arbitrarily increase 
profit”. Competition law thus appears in CADE’s official narrative as the translation of these 
principles into concrete institutions and enforcement mechanisms.  
The first initiatives that stemmed from this legal framework date from the beginning 
of the 1990s, when the government of Fernando Collor de Mello promoted the “first 
modifications in the competition law” since 1962, through two laws enacted in 1990 and 
1991. The law number 8.137 of 1990 “defined crimes against the fiscal and economic orders 
and against consumer relations” (CADE 2013, p. 51). Through the law 8.158 of 1991, the 
government created the National Secretariat of Economic Law (SNDE), an agency of the 
Ministry of Justice responsible to enforce competition policy in cooperation with CADE. 
According to CADE’s latest publication, the law of 1991 also gave CADE the “responsibility 
of analyzing merger reviews”, which differed from the sole focus on competitive conducts of 
the 1962 law (CADE 2013, p. 51). Although CADE was “practically abandoned between 
1989 and 1991”, as no commissioners were appointed, and despite the lack of resources, 
infrastructure and staff in the initial years of the 1990s, the Council “managed to keep its 
jurisdictional activity and decided important cases when it resumed its activities, in 1993” 
(CADE 2013, p. 53).  
																																																								
6 Two examples of price control mechanisms are mentioned in CADE’s latest publication: the National 
Superintendence of Provision – SUNAB (Superintendência Nacional de Abastecimento), created in 1962, which 
had the role of “promoting a national policy of supplying essential products” and could “fix quotas of 
production, imports and exports”, and the National Commission for Price Stabilization – CONEP (Comissão 
Nacional para Estabilização de Preços), created in 1967, which controlled the prices of the manufacturing 
industry (CADE 2013, p. 46). 
7 The Federal Constitution of 1988 has a chapter dedicated to the General Principles of Economic Activity 
(articles 170 through 181). In article 170, the Constitution describes, among others, “free competition” and 
“consumer protection” as “principles” to be protected by the economic order. 
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In 1994, during the government of Itamar Franco, another and more decisive 
landmark: law number 8.884 was sanctioned, replacing the law of 1991 and instituting the 
control of mergers and acquisitions and the repression of anticompetitive behavior. The 
project of the 1994 law was “elaborated by a commission of jurists and economists” (CADE 
2013, p. 55), and faced pressures from different sides. On the one hand, at first it was opposed 
by “some entrepreneurs that feared the return of price and production control” (CADE 2013, 
p. 56). On the other hand, the institutional history also points to attempts at including 
mechanisms of price control in the new antitrust law (CADE 2013, p. 56). Presented in 
Congress in 1993 and approved in 1994, the law would have nevertheless constructed a 
“modern institutional framework responsible for dealing with competition defense” (CADE 
2007).  
The 1994 law inaugurated the Brazilian System of Competition Defense – SBDC 
(Sistema Brasileiro de Defesa da Concorrência), integrated by CADE, now entitled to give 
the “final word in decisions on merger reviews and anticompetitive conduct”, and two 
governmental secretariats. These were the Secretariat for Economic Law of the Ministry of 
Justice – SDE (Secretaria de Direito Econômico), which replaced the SNDE with the roles of 
investigating conduct and presenting reports on cases decided by CADE; and the Ministry of 
Finance’s Secretariat for Economic Monitoring – SEAE (Secretaria de Acompanhamento 
Econômico), created in 1995 with the role of “providing assistance and opinions in cases 
judged by CADE” (CADE 2013, p. 60). Through the law of 1994, “an objective filter” for 
merger reviews was established, and notification to CADE became mandatory in cases 
involving corporations with annual revenues equal or superior to 400 million Reais or 
implying market concentration of at least 20% (CADE 2013, p. 71). 
In this narrative, the creation of the SBDC is connected to the economic 
transformations that occurred in the period, notably privatizations and deregulation: 
 
[t]he stability of the currency as well as privatization and deregulation of 
trade that started in the 1990’s made it vital to develop competition defense 
policy capable of responding to the market’s new reality, considering the 
fact that enterprises need clear and stable rules to follow in a competitive 
market (CADE 2007). 
 
 
The reform of competition policy in 1994 is seen as fulfilling the needs of a recently 
liberalized market and the struggle against inflation. The context of the legislation enacted in 
the 1990s was one “marked by economic crises and by the exacerbation of the defense of 
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economic liberalization and of the opening of the market as instruments to tackle the 
inflationary process” (CADE 2013, p. 51). 
With the reform, CADE, which had so far “exercised only a marginal role in the 
country’s economic life”, was granted more powers and autonomy from the national 
government, becoming “the main institutional guardian of free competition” (CADE 2007a). 
Through the law of 1994, it was transformed into an “independent”, “adjucative agency”, as 
mandates were conferred on its commissioners. In these official narratives, CADE is 
described as part of a set of institutions with a similar “duty”: “to ensure that enterprises with 
market dominance do not abuse such power in order to harm free competition” (CADE 
2007a). These institutions are the regulatory agencies created throughout the 1990s in a 
variety of privatized sectors. 
A more recent landmark of competition policy’s official history dates from 2011. In 
this year, during Dilma Rousseff’s government, law number 12.529 was enacted, and came 
into force in May 2012. The new law restructured the SBDC, extinguishing the SDE and 
merging its functions into CADE, and giving the SEAE the role of “diffusing the knowledge 
about the benefits of competition to society, businessmen, legislators and regulators” (CADE 
2013, p. 140). The role of economic analysis until then performed by SEAE was given to a 
Department of Economic Studies created within CADE’s organizational structure. 
Some of the “most radical changes” brought by the 2011 law concern the merger 
control regime (CADE 2013, p. 140). The law instituted a pre-merger control system, by 
which proposed mergers and acquisitions must be authorized by CADE before they are 
concretized. As is portrayed on the topic on “Restructuring” of CADE’s commemorative 
website, until 2011 Brazil was one of the only countries in the world in which corporations 
submitted a merger operation after concretizing it, which would be a “inefficient from the 
economic point of view, and ineffective in protecting the public interest”. Since this recent 
reform, antitrust legislation thus became a “modern and adequate law” to the “increasingly 
open and dynamic” Brazilian economy, giving birth to a “new CADE”. The foreword of 
CADE’s most recent book, signed by a journalist who has covered the Brazilian competition 
authority for many years, states that due to these changes CADE ceased to be a “small” organ 
and became a “super” institution (Basile 2013). 
That reforms and the roles of these institutions are part of a “a historical evolution of 
more than 50 years in economic law”, as CADE’s current president claims in the presentation 
of the commemorative book launched in 2013 (Carvalho 2013, p. 14), is an explicit element 
that permeates institutional narratives. The opening paragraph of this book’s first chapter – 
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entitled “A retrospective look” – informs how the reader should interpret the history that is 
about to be told:  
 
[...] the various legislations that marked the interest in competition issues in 
Brazil shall not be seen as ruptures with the past, but as new steps in the path 
of consolidation of the Brazilian institutions entitled of imposing healthy 
limits to economic relations. Each of the succeeding laws added up to the 
legacy left by the preceding ones (CADE 2013, p. 35) 
 
 
In this history, CADE presented “methodological, managerial and, above all, 
institutional advances” that result from the “initiatives adopted in those year of inexpressive 
activity of the Brazilian antitrust authority, before the 1990s” (CADE 2013, p. 181). 
“Structural changes” such as the opening of the domestic market, economic globalization and 
financial stability, were the “engines that gave impulse to the development of [competition 
policy] in the country” (CADE 2013, p 181-182).  
 
1.1.2 Who wins: “You, corporations, and Brazil” 
 
The same sources that provide a history of competition policy in Brazil and its reforms 
also describe the roles performed by this model of economic governance since the 1990s. If 
someone wants to know “What is CADE”, the commemorative website offers a concise 
definition: “The Administrative Council for Economic Defense – CADE is an independent 
entity of the Ministry of Justice that promotes competition defense in Brazil”. When it comes 
to describing “What does it do”, the official website explains that CADE is “responsible for 
analyzing acts of economic concentration, such as mergers and acquisitions of corporations, 
and for investigating and judging anticompetitive conduct in the market”.  
These are what CADE defines as its “preventive” and “repressive” roles, respectively: 
it prevents mergers and acquisitions that may “jeopardize” the market, and represses conducts 
that may “harm free competition”8, such as the formation of cartels and predatory pricing 
practices. In the first case, CADE evaluates if “an operation may involve an abuse of 
economic power by one corporation or group”. If so, the merger or acquisition may be 
rejected in totality or partially. These roles are justified by what is reported to be “the pattern 
of natural behavior in a great part of entrepreneurial strategies”: seeking concentration 
																																																								
8 Definitions available at CADE’s permanent institutional website. Last accessed on April 28th 2013.  
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(Carvalho 2013, p. 14). Given this pattern, the “mission” of CADE would be to “avoid these 
forms of abuse” (CADE 2013, p. 14). 
In institutional narratives, the practice of CADE’s preventive and repressive roles is 
depicted according to two historical moments since 1994, in which the Council would have 
had different emphases. Initially, the emphasis was on “economic efficiency” and the analysis 
of mergers (CADE 2013). The latest institutional publication mentions six emblematic merger 
reviews that would illustrate an active role of CADE in this area, and calls to attention that 
since the 1994 law the Council has “continued its analysis, even imposing total vetoes on 
some operations” (CADE 2013, p. 71-85). As a result of the “improvement of competition 
policy in Brazil over the years”, since 2003 CADE would have focused on repressing cartels 
and other anticompetitive behaviors (CADE 2013, p. 89). Again, CADE’s latest book 
mentions 8 cases that would be exemplary of such repressive activity. In face of this practice 
and due to the 1994 reform, “Brazilian society in general started to acknowledge the 
importance of these organs, and particularly corporations began to accept the reality of a legal 
obligation to submit mergers to the Council” (CADE 2013, p 75). 
Beside the preventive and repressive functions, there is also an “educational” role 
often mentioned in institutional narratives. Such pedagogical activity comprises CADE’s 
tasks to “instruct the general public” about conduct that may compromise competition, and to 
“stimulate studies and academic research on the topic”. In doing so, CADE performs its role 
to “foment” and “disseminate” a “competition culture”. Another example of such promotion 
of a “competition culture” is given in CADE’s recent book: an internship program instituted 
in 1999 through which undergraduate and graduate students spend a period of time in CADE, 
participating in the daily work of the institution, and engaging in classes and debates about 
competition policy9. 
CADE is a council in charge of decision-making, and is comprised by six 
commissioners and one president, all appointed by the President of the Republic. These 
commissioners, chosen from citizens over 30 years old and with “notable legal and economic 
knowledge”, once approved by the Federal Senate, enjoy a two-year term, and may be re-
appointed for another one. Mandates assure that commissioners “can be removed only under 
very special circumstances”, which would in turn confer “autonomy of CADE’s Board 
members, which is essential for guaranteeing the technical and impartial tutelage of the 
diffusion of competition rights” (CADE 2007a, p. 130). Since its enactment until 2012, the 																																																								
9 This is PinCADE, CADE’s Internship Program (Programa de Intercâmbio do CADE). 
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1994 Law for the Defense of Competition was the framework that defined “the way to 
implement competition policy in the country, establishing the jurisdiction and powers of the 
authorities in charge of its defense, with the goal of repressing the abuse of economic power” 
(CADE 2007a, p. 125). 
 In describing what it does, CADE also narrates the goals of competition policy, the 
roles it performs for the economy and society. The hotsite that celebrates 50 years of 
competition law in Brazil is illustrative of the institutional narratives about the outcomes of 
this model of economic governance. The website portrays the starting line of an athletic 
contest between five runners. Highlighted on the lower left side, the campaign’s slogan 
presents a question in reference to the photograph – “Do you know who wins in a competition 
like this in the market?” – to which it provides an immediate answer: “You, corporations, and 
Brazil”. Competition law is thus depicted as a mean to provide gains for a broad spectrum of 
subjects: individuals, corporations and the country as a whole. 
Competition appears in the institutional narratives of the website as a way “to avoid 
increasing prices and the loss of quality of products and services”. Anti-competitive conduct 
attacked by CADE would “jeopardize economic development, harm small corporations and 
consumers”.  In protecting competition, CADE therefore works for the “economic welfare of 
society”. This would be so because “when there is competition, corporations struggle to offer 
higher products and services with lower prices”. In doing so, “the citizen pays less and has 
access to a wider variety of products and services”. Competition law is seen not only as 
producing welfare for consumers, but also as generating “opportunity for corporations to enter 
a market and develop its businesses”, as it would “stimulate innovation, increase efficiency 
and productivity”. Together, these elements would “help to create a healthy economic 
environment, generating growth for the country”. 
CADE’s performance in producing competition policy since the latest reforms is 
praised in institutional narratives. In the introduction to the book published by the Council in 
2013, CADE’s president calls attention for the international recognition achieved by the 
institution, as it received – for the first time in its history – “four out of five possible stars” in 
the annual ranking of the specialized British journal Global Competition Review (Carvalho 
2013, p. 15). A similar idea about CADE’s roles is put forward by the journalist who signs the 
foreword full of metaphors in the same book. In this text, the role of CADE in regulating the 
market is portrayed as the struggle between David and Goliath, where the first has “always 
managed to surprise the second, imposing setbacks or ‘remedies’” (Basile 2013, p. 21). 
Because of “strong vetoes and remedies” imposed on corporations, he continues, the organ 
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“gained muscle” since the 1994 reform, and is now a “lion with permanent teeth” (Basile 
2013, p. 30). 
 
1.2 Legal and economic scholarships 
 
The second set of narratives about the reform of competition policy and its outcomes 
comes from the knowledge produced by two fields that are directly connected to policy-
making in the area of competition regulation: law and economics. Lawyers and economists 
practice competition law and perform roles in the institutions responsible for competition 
policy, both defending the interests of corporations before CADE and as regulators. They also 
produce knowledge about how competition policy is or should be practiced. Very often, the 
same individuals develop these two tasks – professional practice and knowledge production.10 
Legal and economic scholarships thus constitute potential sources of knowledge to understand 
the reform of competition policy. 
The narratives that are here taken as exemplary of the knowledge produced by 
lawyers11 about competition policy reform are present in the particular model of scholarship 
traditionally developed in the legal field.12 At the core of this scholarship are attempts to 
identify, define, organize and criticize the rules that legal institutions apply or which regulate 
their behaviors (Abel 1973). These are studies that aim to “rationalize” legal rules and 
institutions, be it through parameters that are “internal to the legal system”, or by connecting 
“the rule with some social goal” (Abel 1973, p. 175). This form of knowledge is what 
constitutes “law books” (Abel 1973), or “legal scholarship” (Rubin 2001).13 
																																																								
10 The coincidence of the roles of practitioner and scholar can be seen as a defining characteristic of the Brazilian 
legal field. While in European countries and to some extent in the US there would be a more clear-cut separation 
between the role of knowledge production and practical activity, law schools in Brazil have not become 
professionally autonomous from the “world of practitioners” (Engelmann 2008, p. 71). This phenomenon is to a 
great extent confirmed in the area of competition law, as I will illustrate in chapters 4 and 5. Although 
economics is often reputed to be a more well-established academic field, economists who are specialists in 
antitrust frequently have some kind of professional involvement in this area.  
11 I am here referring to lawyers in a broad sense, not to a specific legal profession. 
12 Determining what is the most appropriate form of conceptualizing the knowledge produced by lawyers, 
defining whether it has a scientific status or not, and what goals it should pursue are questions that mobilize an 
intense debate among legal philosophers (e.g. Ferraz Jr. 2006; Nobre 2003; Rodriguez 2012) and outside the 
legal field (e.g. Cotterrell 1998, 2006; Nelken 1993). I will address some of these issues in this chapter’s final 
section, when discussing the nature and limits of legal ideas in explaining competition policy reform and its 
outcomes. 
13 Abel’s notion of “law books” is presented in contrast to what he calls “books about law”, among which would 
be placed sociological studies about law. Rubin (2001) suggests a similar parallel: “legal scholarship” versus 
“scholarship about law”. In Chapter 2, I come back to these distinctions, as the framework I will propose for this 
dissertation stands precisely on the side of the contrasting ideas of “books about law” or “scholarship about 
law”. 
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It is possible to distinguish between two types of “law books” that are especially 
relevant for the study of competition law reform and its roles. On the one hand, there are 
studies commonly referred to as legal doctrine or legal dogmatics.14 These are efforts to 
rationalize a set of legal rules based on the internal logic of the legal system. Exemplary of 
this type of legal scholarship are textbooks and doctrinal works on competition policy, which 
constitute the specialized branch of competition law. Legal doctrine on competition law is not 
homogeneous, as there are important divergences about how should law be interpreted, about 
how to define the key concepts of competition policy, the roles and goals it should pursue, 
what constitutes a correct decision etc.15 There are, however, relevant similarities among 
these narratives. These convergences are reflected in the theoretical and methodological 
assumptions that permeate the narratives about competition law reform, its roles and 
outcomes. 
On the other hand, there are efforts to discuss legal arrangements through a mode of 
analysis that is external to legal rules. This is the case of what some scholars define as “an 
academic discipline to study the relationship between law and development and governments” 
(Trubek 2011, p.1): Law & Development scholarship (L&D). Whether L&D can be 
considered a distinguishable academic discipline or a “field of study” is far from being settled 
in the literature.16 In this chapter, however, I take L&D as a distinctive strand of scholarship 
vis-à-vis legal dogmatics, to the extent that these are studies that claim to explore the roles of 
law “as an instrument of promoting development” and/or as “an end in itself and one of the 
goals that should be pursued by development reforms” (Prado 2010, p. 19). L&D literature 
focuses on “the causal relationship between law and the promotion of development”, and its 																																																								
14 Although some legal theorists and philosophers do distinguish the concepts of legal doctrine and legal 
dogmatics (e.g. Ferraz Jr. 2006; Nobre 2003), and despite the fact that these concepts may gain different 
meanings in common and civil law traditions, I am here using them interchangeably. What is important to stress 
at this point is that in countries of the “Latin legal tradition” such as Brazil, legal dogmatics can be seen as the 
“dominant paradigm of production of scientific knowledge about the law” (Konzen 2013, p. 39; Zuleta Puceiro 
1981). 
15 Exemplary of such divergences is the discussion about the goals of competition law. For instance, while some 
authors subsume competition policy to “constitutional objectives” and advocate a role for it in promoting public 
policies (Forgioni 2005, Grau and Forgioni 1998), other legal scholars explicitly mobilize legal theories to break 
a link with the constitution and principles other than the promotion of economic efficiency (Schuartz 2009, 
Nusdeo 2002).  
16 Prado (2010), for instance, finds it difficult to visualize a “field of study” in L&D as there are many 
differences among scholars in respect to how they relate law and development, how they conceptualize 
development, and the theories and methodologies they adopt to investigate this relation. Tamanaha (2011, p. 
220) provides an even more radical view, arguing that L&D is better not seen as a field, as there is no “uniquely 
unifying basis upon which to construct” it and “no way to draw conceptual boundaries”. Even in the work of 
Trubek (2010, 2011) – a key-promoter of the idea of Law & Development – there is no consistency in the 
definition of L&D. In a single text, it is presented as an “academic discipline”, but it is also said that “the hoped-
for academic field of law and development never materialized" (Trubek 2011, p. 2). 
		 25	
“main focus is on identifying what kind of ‘good law’ leads to development” (Halliday and 
Osinsky 2006, p. 457). It differs, therefore, from traditional legal doctrine since at its core 
rests an attempt to assess the correlation between the economic and political contexts and 
legal arrangements, something peripheral in legal dogmatics.  
Despite this difference, L&D retains similarities with the hybrid roles of legal 
dogmatics as both a descriptive discourse and a foundation for policy-making. This is because 
L&D scholarship has been a combination of academic and policy-oriented movements 
characterized by the promotion of law and legal institutions, notably those of Western legal 
systems – and specifically those of the United States – as a tool for “modernizing” 
underdeveloped countries (Tamanaha 2011).  L&D may thus refer to both “a wide range of 
public and private programs by American lawyers throughout the world that attempt to impact 
legal development with regional and national foci” and to “theorists who both evaluate such 
work and propose broad frameworks for thinking about how to impact foreign legal 
development” (Kroncke 2012, p. 483).17 Not infrequently, theorists and policy-makers are the 
same, just as the dogmatic legal scholar and the practicing lawyer are often the same person. 
In this chapter, I focus on the knowledge produced by L&D scholars in respect to the 
legal reforms of the 1990s and its later developments. The selection of works taken to be 
representative of the L&D narratives was based on the “self-declaration” of some scholars as 
belonging to such a “field”. 18 They are part of a recent literature that mobilizes the notion of 
L&D to assess the legal and institutional reforms that took place in the 1990s in Brazil and 
elsewhere, and its later transformations with the emergence of a new political and economic 
context. As Trubek et al (2013, p. 306) define it, L&D research focuses on identifying and 
explaining the changing models of state and the economy by studying the “corresponding 
changes in law”. 
																																																								
17 The L&D movement has its origins in the 1960s, and was later evaluated as a failure in its policy dimension 
(Trubek and Galanter 1974). However, the agenda of connecting law and development was eventually resumed 
in the 1990s and 2000s through a series of measures of “technical assistance” promoted by scholars and policy-
makers, such as transforming legal education in countries of the South, diffusing the “rule of law”, transplanting 
legal institutions and inducing reforms in various areas, among them competition law (Kroncke 2012, p. 537). 
18 It is interesting to note, however, that many scholars that claim the label of L&D to their work can also be 
placed as representative authors of studies that “rationalize” legal rules and institutions through parameters that 
are “internal to the legal system”, as Abel (1973) puts it, or as historical references of “books about law”, such as 
socio-legal studies. An example of the former is Diogo Coutinho, co-author of an article that is analyzed in this 
section (Aguillar and Coutinho 2012) that is to a great extent similar in style to legal dogmatics, and who is one 
of the proponents of the L&D agenda in Brazil. Illustrative of the latter, in turn, is David Trubek, a scholar 
whose work has been influential in the Law & Society tradition, and who is also reputed as one of the fathers of 
the Law & Development movement since the 1960s. The disciplinary boundaries, therefore, are not static or well 
defined. 
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Several L&D studies have deployed a similar theoretical and methodological 
framework in this endeavor: the comparative analysis of legal and institutional arrangements 
across countries in historical terms. Through the “reverse engineering” of policies and 
programs that are said to be characteristic of a model of state, L&D “describ[es] the functions 
associated with them, and see[s] if law has contributed, or could contribute, to those 
functions” (Trubek et al 2013, p. 307). This framework has been applied in the study of 
various areas and institutions in emerging economies such as Brazil, China, India and Russia: 
among others, social policy (Coutinho 2012; Joshi 2012), intellectual property (Ghosh 2012), 
banking (Schapiro 2012), and competition law (Carvalho and Castro 2012; Wang 2012; 
Mattos 2007, 2009). In the study of the Brazilian case, L&D scholars have analyzed the 
changing role of law in economic development in two periods: during neoliberalism – from 
the 1990s until around 2002 – and under a so called “new developmental state”, which would 
have started to emerge with the shift of government in 2003 (Trubek 2008, Schapiro and 
Trubek 2012). 
In general, the central objectives of legal scholarship are determining how the law 
should be interpreted and practiced, how must an institution behave, or discussing if a set of 
rules is compatible with certain goals. An explanatory perspective that would conform to the 
standards of the social sciences is thus rarely the main concern of studies developed by 
lawyers. However, although mostly normatively oriented, “law books” often endorse 
propositions with descriptive intentions, even if tacitly. In other words, even if explaining 
legal reform and assessing its roles and outcomes are not among the central objectives, these 
questions are frequently embedded in the narratives produced by lawyers. The “legal ideas” 
found in these two strands of scholarship are therefore here taken as “a form of social 
knowledge in themselves”, as “means of structuring the social world” (Cotterrell 1998, p. 
172) – more specifically, the world of regulatory reform. 
Beside “law books”, economic scholarship constitutes another stream of narratives 
that emanate from agents directly involved in the practice of competition policy. The 
knowledge produced by economists is full of descriptions about how the reform of 
competition policy occurred and what are its roles and outcomes.19 What is frequently 
distinctive of economic scholarship with respect to the knowledge produced by lawyers is its 
empirical character, notably the systematic use of quantitative methods for the study of 
competition policy. Nevertheless, similarities between the studies developed by economics 																																																								
19 Similarly to the criterion adopted to review the work of lawyers, by economic scholarship I mean studies 
authored by economists. 
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and legal dogmatics can be observed in several respects. Just as a “sub-area” of legal practice 
and doctrine can be identified (competition law), a branch of economics specializing in 
competition policy has also developed, under the name of “antitrust economics”, or related to 
“industrial organization” studies.  
Although economic science allegedly has a better-established scientific status in 
comparison to legal doctrine and even to other “social sciences”, not infrequently scholarship 
constructed by economists also aims to evaluate the outcomes of competition policy in terms 
of its correctness, i.e. to produce normative statements about how should decisions be taken. 
Like legal dogmatics, this form of knowledge is far from homogeneous. There are important 
divisions among economists when it comes to defining how competition policy should be 
practiced or what constitutes a correct decision.20 However, more importantly for the purposes 
of this review and as in legal dogmatics, economic scholarship provides explanations about 
the reasons for competition law reform, and assesses its roles and outcomes in transforming 
the Brazilian state, economy and society.  
In the next two subsections, I will identify what are the underlying narratives about 
competition policy reform in Brazil that can be found in legal and economic scholarships. The 
sources I will resort to in order to depict these narratives are legal treatises, economics 
textbooks, and articles published by lawyers and economists in specialized journals and 
books.  
 
1.2.1 Necessity, evolution and modernization 
 
A first trend that can be identified in the narratives of legal and economic scholarship 
concerns the descriptions of how and why the 1990s reform of competition policy occurred. 
Almost every legal textbook, as well as many doctrinal articles specialized in competition law 
and economics start with a historical reconstruction of antitrust policy in Brazil. As in 
institutional narratives, most authors locate the origins of Brazilian competition policy in the 																																																								
20 Exemplary of the divergences within economics with respect to competition policy is the historical divide 
between the Harvard and the Chicago schools. Originating in the 1950s, the so-called Harvard, or structural 
school proposed the Structure-Conduct-Performance framework for analyzing the effects of concentrations. In 
this view, concentrated economic structures are “the principal determinant of anticompetitive behavior and poor 
economic performance” (Hovenkamp 2010, p. 2). Antitrust policies derived from this framework are “mostly 
concerned with the increase of concentration and with the presence of barriers to entry” (Gama and Ruiz 2007, p. 
235). Chicagoan antitrust economics brought economic efficiency to the forefront of competition policy, and 
developed “a more general argument that vertical ownership and contract integration should be lawful per se, 
with perhaps an exception for practices shown to facilitate horizontal collusion” (Hovenkamp 2010, p. 3). The 
Chicago school thus breaks with the structuralist paradigm, sustaining that concentration “is not bad per se, as 
long as it is seen in terms of economic efficiency” (Gama and Ruiz 2007, p. 235). 
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late 1930s, and identify several historical points of inflection that depict reform as a process 
of “evolution”.21 In comparison to the institutional official history, what is different in the 
narratives of lawyers and economists is that the antecedents for the 1990s reform, its 
motivations and later development receive a more sophisticated and contextualized treatment. 
In narrating the history of competition policy prior to the 1990s reforms, legal scholars 
and economists view this arena of regulation as a tool of interventionism, especially from 
1938 until 1962, or as being jeopardized by it, notably after the military coup of 1964. Before 
the 1990s reforms, antitrust policy is depicted as an instrument of political clashes between 
domestic aspirations and foreign corporations (Forgioni 2005), a more “ideological than 
descriptive” form of regulation (Nusdeo 2002, p. 218).22 Even with the establishment of a 
“fully functioning competition authority” by the 1962 law (Todorov and Torres Filho 2012, p. 
217), competition policy is said to have served the purposes of governmental economic policy 
of the military regime, strongly based on intervention and facilitating the concentration of 
national capital. The economists Considera and Correa (2002) identify an “ideological 
climate” historically incompatible with the development of competition policy prior to the 
1990s, as it favored negotiation among firms, state interventionism and import substitution. 
Through price control mechanisms, the government is said to have stimulated economic 
concentration and agreements among competitors, rendering unfeasible the “logics of 
competition” (Salgado 2004, p. 362). 
Similarly to institutional descriptions, legal and economic scholarship approach the 
1990s reforms as a step in a historical evolution of antitrust policy motivated by a “need” for 
the state to adjust to a new economic context. Moreover, it is depicted as an expression of 
institutional modernization, of evolutionary rupture with the preceding years of 
																																																								
21 Nusdeo, for instance, tells the story of the “evolution of antitrust legislation” in Brazil as a struggle for the 
“protection of the popular economy” in which the initial landmark of this history would be in 1938, when Decree 
869 was enacted (Nusdeo 2002, p. 218). Todorov and Torres Filho (2012) point to a “first phase” of competition 
policy in the period between the 1930s and 1962, followed by other four stages. In telling the history of 
competition policy in Latin American countries, Peña (2006) divides it into three periods, the first being between 
the 1920s and the 1980s. Nascimento (2012) narrates competition policy in Brazil as a development in four 
moments: from the 1930s to the 1960s, from the 1960s to the 1990s, from the 1990s to the first decade of the 
years 2000, and since 2011, when the new antitrust law was enacted. Similar periodizations can be found in 
Forgioni (2005), Considera (2005), Considera and Correa (2002), Aguillar and Coutinho (2012), and Oliveira 
and Konichi (2006). 
22  Forgioni mentions the existence of strong reactions to antitrust policy during that time: the US government 
would have opposed the adoption of competition policy in Brazil, classifying the 1945 act as “an act of 
economic nationalism that discouraged the arrival of foreign capital to Brazil”, and some local oppositionists 
classified it as a “Nazi-fascist” legislation that threatened the economy (2005, p. 120-122).  In the same line, 
Todorov and Torres Filho say that the 1945 law was surrounded by the political opposition to Vargas’ 
nationalistic project, and motivated fears “of the possibility that the new law could be used as an instrument 
against opposing political groups” (2012, p. 215). 
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interventionism. Several illustrations of these narratives can be identified in legal dogmatics, 
L&D literature and economic scholarship. In the book edited by Naím and Tulchin (1999), for 
instance, several articles discuss the competition policy reform as a component of the 
“modernization” of Latin American countries in the 1990s. Similarly, Gerber (2010, Ch. 7, 
Sec. D, Topic 3) claims that with the shift of economic policy induced by liberalization and 
privatizations, competition “replaced governmental control as the basis of economic policy, 
[and therefore] law to protect competition would appear to be an obvious focus of 
government efforts to move in the new direction”. In a similar line, Forgioni (2005, p. 141-
142) explains the initiatives of reform in the 1990s as “necessary [tools] to avoid the 
dysfunctions and crises that could be caused by the behavior of free economic agents in the 
market”. For Nusdeo (2002, p. 156), globalization implied the “need” for both corporations 
and national legislation to “adapt” to “new patterns”.  
In analyzing competition law reform in Latin America, Peña stresses that liberalization 
policies and structural adjustments did not prove to be “sufficient to achieve the desired 
development”, so competition policy became a necessary instrument (2006, p. 737). Brazil is 
given as an example of a country that “modernized” its existing legislation due to a “need to 
counter-attack the effects of privatizing monopolies” (Peña 2006, p. 737). Reforms would 
reflect a “consensus” among Latin American governments that competition policy was 
needed as a “safeguard of the gains brought by economic liberalization” (Peña 2006, p. 738). 
Although legal dogmatics stresses political opposition to antitrust policy as a constant 
from the 1930s until the 1960s, conflicts surrounding the 1990s reforms are exceptional in its 
narratives. Nascimento (2012), for instance, indicates the existence of some turmoil in 
Congress and with market agents when the 1994 legislation was being discussed. Martinez 
(2011) also reports that the law was intensively debated in Congress. While it enjoyed great 
support from the Executive, it was received in a “dubious form by businessmen”, even being 
accused of “installing economic terror” by some market agents (Martinez 2011, p. 41). 
L&D scholars offer an even more contextualized view, as they point to the creation of 
a competition authority and regulatory agencies as illustrations of a new legal and institutional 
framework that emerged with neoliberalism 23 . The neoliberal period is said to be 
characterized by the “universalization of a set of institutions”, a convergence around market-
centered institutional arrangements founded on the pillars of privatization and regulatory 																																																								
23 Between 1994 and 2001, several regulatory agencies were created in Brazil, in the sectors of electric power 
(ANEEL), oil & gas (ANP), telecommunication (ANATEL), health surveillance (ANVISA), health insurance 
(ANS), water (ANA), water transport (ANTAQ), and land transport (ANTT). In 2005, an agency to regulate the 
aviation sector was also created (ANAC). 
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institutions (Schapiro and Trubek 2012, Trubek 2006, Trubek forthcoming).24 Although 
neoliberal transformations were mostly articulated through the establishment of strong private 
law regimes to support transactions, instead of a large amount of public law, “some public 
regulation was necessary to support the market” (Kennedy 2006, p. 132), of which antitrust 
law is depicted as exemplary. Through reforms, Brazil is said to have adopted “the US model 
of regulatory agencies to supervise and enforce post-privatization rules and to introduce 
competition in natural monopolies” (Trubek et al 2013, p. 286). As a “stage of the wider 
process through which the roles of the state were reduced”, the “adoption of antitrust in 
Brazil” implied a shift from a key-mechanism of economic coordination of the 
developmentalist state: the instruments of price control (Aguillar and Coutinho 2013, p. 143).  
Narratives of reform as part of an evolutionary and modernizing process can also be 
found in economic scholarship25. In Salgado’s view (1997, p. 160; 1993), “the redefinition of 
an antitrust policy is simultaneously a process of modernization of the state and 
modernization of the economy”. The enactment of the 1994 law would have put Brazil in a 
condition similar to that of more developed countries (Gama 2005, p. 16; Considera 2005, p. 
21). The modernization of antitrust legislation was a landmark in “the microeconomic level of 
state intervention”, and would have “anticipated the process of state reform” undertaken by 
the Cardoso administration (Salgado 2004, p. 365). 
Another indicator of such an evolutionary perspective to explain legal reform is how it 
narrates the changes brought by the 2011 law. This latest reform would have enhanced the 
system and corrected some problems of the regulatory model inaugurated in 1994. Martinez, 
for instance, maintains that despite the “notorious advances” in competition policy since the 
1990s, experience evidenced the need for “legislative enhancements” (2011, p. 56). The 
reform that ended with the law of 2011 would have been result of this need. In legal 
dogmatics it is often mentioned that one of the most important novelties brought by the recent 
law was the institution of a prior notification process by which mergers can only be closed 
after CADE’s approval. Until then, Martinez stresses that Brazilian competition policy had a 																																																								
24 In this view, from the 1930s until the mid-1980s, the preceding years of neoliberalism, Brazil was under a 
“classic developmentalist phase”, in which the state was actively present in the economy “through state-owned 
enterprise, in industrial policy, economic planning, price control, regulatory and administrative authorities in key 
sectors, and use of tax and financial incentives” (Trubek et al 2013, p. 282). 
25 In this respect, Prado (2012, 2013) provides a dissonant account about reform in comparison to most of 
economic scholarship. In this author’s view, the reform of the 1990s was as part of a development agenda of 
neoliberal inspirations (Prado 2013, p. 6) that created a “public system that would be functional to a new market 
friendly economic order” (Prado 2012, p. 98). In the forthcoming chapters, I will sustain a similar hypothesis, 
exploring in detail some of the data Prado offers as evidence of the connection between the reform of 
competition policy and neoliberalism in Brazil.  
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particular post-closing notification system that placed the country with only Egypt and 
Pakistan among the more than 90 countries with merger control regimes (Martinez 2011). The 
change is often described in legal doctrine as the solution of a problem of the 1994 law.26 
Martinez (2011, p. 67), for instance, commemorates the fact that the “time for instituting a 
system of previous control of mergers has finally arrived in Brazil”, and Todorov and Torres 
Filho describe it as “Brazil join[ing] more traditional jurisdictions” (2012, p. 244).  
Also, if the narratives of lawyers and economists relate the inefficacy of competition 
policy of interventionism and authoritarianism, reform is linked to democratization. Martinez 
(2011, p. 35) explains the 1990s reforms within the spectrum of the 1988 constitution, which 
is said to have inaugurated a new context in which “free competition” became one of its core 
principles. Gerber proposes an even stronger link, explaining that democratization enabled the 
creation of competition law because it “provided a vehicle for consumer interests to play a 
greater role in the formation of economic policy” (Gerber 2010, Ch. 7, Sec. D, Topic 3). 
 
1.2.2 Success and effectiveness  
 
A second trend that can be observed in the knowledge produced by lawyers and 
economists concerns how it assesses the roles and outcomes of competition policy since the 
1994 reform, i.e. how it narrates what are the functions of this regulatory system in 
transforming the state, the economy and society. There is recurrent evaluation of the roles 
performed by Brazilian competition policy in terms of its success and effectiveness. In legal 
scholarship, competition policy is mostly assessed as a successful enterprise, despite some 
episodic “mistakes”. For Martinez (2011), for instance, the 1994 reform meant the shift from 
a system based on the protection of the popular economy “disguised under the name of 
‘competition’ in the period 1962-1988” into a “true promotion of competition” (2011, p. 42). 
Peña states that the reformed regulatory regime brought “economic efficiency and consumer 
protection as their main goals” (2006, p. 738). In doing so, the Brazilian system of 
competition defence was “created de facto”, “finally organized and consolidated” (Peña 2006, 
p. 740). Together with a “propitious environment”, the application of new concepts brought 
by the 1994 law, such as that of economic efficiency, meant a true “revolution of antitrust in 
Brazil” (Martinez 2011, p. 42). Schuartz (2009, p. 8) puts forward a similar understanding, 																																																								
26 For most authors of legal dogmatics, an a posteriori system of notification such as that instituted by the 1994 
law presents many problems: parties have low incentives to provide information to the antitrust authority, and 
the longer it takes to analyze, the harder it is to implement structural solutions (Martinez 2011, p. 56). 
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stating that the 1994 law initiated an “evolutionary process” with “reasonably satisfactory” 
results in comparison with the international experience and the performance of other 
regulatory agencies and the Judiciary.  
Legal scholarship often maintains that competition policy has been successful in 
Brazil, contributing to the constitution of a competitive economy and to the protection of 
consumers. There are multiple examples of such narratives. Martinez emphasizes that 
although competition law is not necessarily central in promoting a competitive economy, it 
has played an accessory role in constituting the “the current level of competition in the 
Brazilian market” (2011, p. 24). Del Chiaro and Pereira Jr., for instance, maintain that since 
1994 competition policy has achieved its objectives, as “competition policy demonstrated that 
it can minimize losses for consumers and, at the same time, be compatible with the reality of a 
developing country, in which state action to induce certain markets is essential” (2012, p. 67). 
The linkage between competition policy and consumers is a recurrent theme in legal 
dogmatics. The protection of consumers is seen “an important parameter in modern antitrust 
legislation” (Nusdeo 2002, p. 246). Although legal scholarship recognizes that there are 
different views on the relation between consumer protection and antitrust, the Brazilian model 
is seen to have privileged a view in which consumers’ interests are harmonized with the 
increase of productivity and innovation, and with an efficient allocation of resources (Nusdeo 
2002, p. 249). In this reform model of regulation, consumers are the “immediate stakeholders 
of competition rules”, and together with competitors they are the subjects protected by the 
“competition system” (Salomão Filho 2007, p. 82-87). 
L&D scholarship also identifies the law of 1994 as a landmark, as it would be an 
innovative antitrust legislation that for the first time in the country’s economic and legal 
history was actually “in effect and truly enforced” (Aguillar and Coutinho 2013, p. 143). 
Similarly to institutional and legal-dogmatic narratives, L&D states that although the 
Brazilian antitrust authority existed since 1962 and could regulate anti-competitive conduct, it 
was only in 1994 that CADE was granted the jurisdiction to control mergers and 
acquisitions27. It was thus from this moment on that a modern framework of “competition was 
fostered and enforced” (Trubek et al 2013, p. 283). To L&D authors, this move illustrates a 
shift in the role of law and the state: from “molding and boosting” an import-substitution 
economy and directly coordinating economic actors, to “strengthening competitive markets” 																																																								
27 A distinct view within legal scholarship is presented by Shieber (1966, p. 165), who analyzed the 1962 
competition act and already identified in it a provision to regulate concentrations, although according to him it 
was never implemented, once the law did not impose the mandatory submission of mergers and acquisitions to 
CADE’s rule. 
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and “stimulating private investments” through fiscal equilibrium, calculability and economic 
efficiency (Aguillar and Coutinho 2013, p. 140-142). 
Although often more empirical than lawyer’s accounts of the roles and outcomes of 
competition policy, narratives of success and efficacy also permeate economic scholarship. 
Brazilian competition policy is often seen as autonomous from political influence and as 
producing results according to international standards. Salgado, for instance, sees competition 
policy inaugurated by reform as producing “good results” (2004, p. 376). In analyzing 
decisions of merger reviews between 1994 and 2002, this author notes that 5% of operations 
suffered some kind of restriction by the Brazilian competition authority, “an intervention 
pattern that can be observed in countries with antitrust experience” such as OECD members 
(Salgado 2004, p. 367). In a study of CADE’s decisions on Administrative Proceedings 
between 1991 and 1993, i.e. under the laws enacted in 1991 (the first initiatives of reform), 
Salgado (1997, p. 151) maintains that the results of the reformed competition policy indicate 
“notable political autonomy”. Similarly, Prado asserts that once the law of 1994 was the 
“most complete, encompassing and efficient legislation of Brazilian competition defence”, 
“reforms created the legal bases for and effective action of the State in imposing limits to 
economic power” (2012 p. 112-116). 
Some criticisms of how CADE actually regulates the economy can nevertheless also 
be found in legal and economic scholarship, often in the form of what constitutes a “correct” 
or “incorrect” decision. Todorov and Torres Filho argue that although since reform CADE 
has adopted rigorous criteria in the requirements for notifying mergers, it has applied “none in 
the material review of cases”. Forgioni, for instance, sees that some decisions by the end of 
the 1990s authorized a high level of concentration in certain markets, consolidating the image 
of CADE as a “political tribunal” with low credibility (2005, p. 144). Despite this behavior, 
she also detects a “contiguous line of activity” in CADE’s decision-making, in which the 
work of the organs that compose the SBDC has “contributed to increase the diffusion of a 
competition culture in the country” (Forgioni 2005, p. 144). Similarly, Nusdeo states that 
CADE’s decisions “have not always been characterized to be correct” (2002, p. 270), and 
especially during the first 5 years under the law of 1994 it demonstrated an “effort to 
discharge itself from the attributions related to the prevention of excessive concentration of 
the market without, however, impeding the exercise of free initiative by economic agents 
directed to obtaining efficient operations” (2002 p. 258).  
Whether they are critical or apologetic of the outcomes produced by CADE, lawyers’ 
narratives about the outcomes of competition policy rarely have systematic empirical 
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foundations, and are at best anchored on what they claim to be emblematic cases. Nusdeo, for 
instance, maintains that CADE privileges the “protection of competition and consumers” 
(2002, p. 273) based on seven “important cases”, as well as on quotes from policymakers that 
are taken to be “illustrative” of how competition law is practiced. Todorov and Torres Filho 
point to CADE’s lack of rigor in a certain period by mentioning two examples of cases that 
“although leading to a significant market concentration, were approved by the authorities with 
minor restrictions” (Todorov and Torres Filho 2012, p. 236).28  
Another relatively well settled consensus in the narratives of lawyers and economists 
is that due to reform, decisions have become very technical, insulated from political influence 
(Del Chiaro 2012, p. 68; Campilongo 2012, p. 34; Martinez 2011, p. 45). Several reasons can 
be found in legal dogmatics to explain what is seen as a “successful” form of decision-making 
and its “satisfactory quality of enforcement” (Schuartz 2009, p. 9): the institutional design of 
the 1994 law, which is seen to have promoted the depoliticization of antitrust policy, and the 
“good will” of those responsible for appointing the members of the SBDC (Schuartz 2009, p. 
8), as well as the extensive use of economic science in decision-making (Nusdeo 2002, p. 
258)29. The influence of economics and economists is considered to have implied a true 
“revolution” in competition policy-making (Mattos 2003, 2008)30. 
Such a generally positive evaluation of the performance of competition policy in 
Brazil since the 1990s is stable over time, even though the political and economic context 																																																								
28 A possible exception to this pattern of unsystematic empirical claims based on selected cases that can be found 
in legal dogmatics is Martinez’s (2011) analysis of historical data about CADE’s decisions on merger reviews. 
Based on a time series of the types of decisions from 1994 to 2010, she identifies “significant advances since 
1994” in competition policy, stating that in the initial years after reform CADE would have focused on 
regulating “big concentrations” with the objective of diffusing merger control. However, her work does not 
provide much detailed information about the substantive outcomes of CADE’s decisions on the economy – a 
topic that will be central to understanding the role of competition policy reform and practice in Brazil. 
29 Schuartz (2009) provides a set of hypotheses to explain such “successful” forms of scientific rather than 
political decision-making: first, lack of political interest in competition policy, its organizational isolation and 
the lack of effectiveness in the previous period protecting the construction of this arena of public policy from an 
“intrusive and structuring control of the Judiciary”; second, since there were no “decisionary patterns rooted” in 
Brazil due to the absence of an effective competition policy prior to the 1990s, “vanguard foreign authors” 
(especially of economic science) were “transplanted” into the Brazilian competition regulation without much 
resistance; third, the presence of economists (in the role of authorities or as private consultants) facilitated the 
importation of “scientific theories” of decision-making. 
30  The idea that the extensive use of economic science in antitrust policy implied a “revolutionary” 
transformation is inspired by the work of two American economists, Kwoka and White (2008). In 1989, these 
authors published a book entitled “The antitrust revolution: the role of economics”, now in its fifth edition, in 
which they assess the growing incorporation of economic concepts and methods in competition policy in the US. 
The evaluation is mostly positive. Mattos (2003, 2008) has developed the same effort in two collections entitled 
“The antitrust revolution in Brazil”. Similarly, the “revolution” is seen as an enhancement of competition policy. 
A less optimistic vision about the use of economics in CADE’s decisions is an empirical study conducted by 
economists Gama and Ruiz (2007). Based on a sample of decisions made between 1994 and 2004, the authors 
identify a fragile, “heterogeneous and not so rigorous application of antitrust theory in decision-making” (Gama 
and Ruiz 2007, p. 256). 
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might have changed, as some scholars recognize. Peña, for instance, compares two periods of 
the history of competition policy in Latin America: the 1990s reform is seen as part of a 
period defined by the liberalizing measures of the Washington consensus, and since the 2000s 
a “post-Washington consensus” stage would have begun. In this later period, motivated by the 
“population’s great disappointment with the region’s development and wealth distribution”, 
new governments were elected, and competition policy changed in most parts of the region 
(Peña 2006, p. 732). Compared to the 1990s, it would have become “more flexible and 
politically driven” due to the “introduction of non-traditional concepts, [and the] weakening 
of the institutional framework” (Peña 2006, p. 745).31 Motivated by the “greater government 
presence in the market”, it would have provoked a “setback of competition policy in the 
region” (Peña 2006). Brazil, however, is an exception to this politicization32. To Peña, 
“competition policy was reinforced after the 2003 change of government”. In Todorov and 
Torres Filho’s view, since Lula’s election in 2003, despite the government’s inclinations to 
industrial policy and a more interventionist profile of economic policy, antitrust was not 
undermined, but was actually “strengthened” (2012, p. 228). Exemplary of this reinforcement 
is the shift of focus toward cartels, the adoption of concepts imported from the US and a 
closer interaction with that country (Peña 2006, p. 746).  
The emphasis on cartels (rather than on mergers and acquisitions) is a recurrent 
element pointed by lawyers and economists as evidence of the consolidation of Brazilian 
competition policy in time. For economist Salgado, emphasizing the attack on cartels at the 
beginning of the 2000s is a sign of considerable “advances in the construction of a 
competition culture”, following a “world trend”, especially of OECD countries (2004, p. 373). 
Instead of undermining competition policy, the change of “enforcement priorities” in this 
period would have thus “rais[ed] the profile of the antitrust law in the eyes of the business 
																																																								
31 Examples of what Peña calls “non-traditional concepts” that would have been infused in competition policy 
since the 2000s are “social and labor considerations” such as unemployment, “national interest”, and “strategic 
interest” (2006, p. 753). The “institutional weakening” would in turn encompass “budget reduction, institutional 
reforms and politically driven appointments, forsaking the technical expertise acquired in the past decade” (Peña 
2006, p. 748) 
32 In Peña’s view (2006), together with Brazil, Chile would also represent an exception of this trend of 
politicization in the “post-Washington consensus” period. Argentina, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela would in turn 
present some elements of politicization or institutional weakening identified by the author. Gerber (2010, Ch. 7, 
Sec. D, Topic 3, a) provides a slightly different view of the so called “post-Washington consensus” period, 
maintaining that the effort to develop “a market economy that is embedded in Brazilian society”, initiated with 
Lula’s election in 2003, would have “positioned competition law politically”. In his narrative, however, although 
competition policy is “serving the interests of the entire society, and controlling mergers and preventing 
competitive abuses by dominant firms, especially those from outside Brazil" (Ch. 7, Sec. D, Topic 3, a), no 
dramatic shifts can be identified. Rather, it appears as another stage in its historical development. 
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community, the general public, and other government agencies” (Todorov and Torres Filho 
2012, p. 209).  
In the narratives of law and economics, competition policy inaugurated by the 1990s 
reform has thus been a successful and effective enterprise in promoting competition, 
consolidating throughout time with no major setbacks. Similar narratives can be found in how 
international organizations evaluate the Brazilian experience, such as the “peer reviews” 
produced by OECD and the Inter-American Development Bank (OECD 2005, 2010), and in 
how lawyers and economists describe the construction, diffusion and roles of competition 
policy in different countries (e.g. Fox 2001, Kovacic 2001, Naím and Tulchin 1999). 
 
1.3 Diffusion perspectives 
 
The third source of narratives about the reform of competition law entails studies that 
can be seen as “external” to this policy domain, as they do not emanate from the institutions 
responsible for its production and reform, or from the fields directly involved in the 
professional practice of competition policy. These are what Türem (2010, p. 20) defines as 
“‘social scientific’ works on independent regulatory agencies and regulation”, “beyond the 
‘technical’ world of law and economics”. They are part of what can be seen as a body of 
research of “diffusion perspectives” on regulatory reforms.33 
Dobbin et al (2007) offer a useful summary of the defining characteristics of this 
literature, as well as of the major theories often mobilized by it. Diffusion perspectives seek to 
explain how and why a variety of “policy innovations” – “from the protection of women’s 
rights to tariff reductions to privatization” – have “spread around the globe in the last half 
century” (Dobbin et al 2007, p. 450). Institutional and legal reforms are approached within a 
framework that places it as part of a “wave of [global] diffusion” (Dobbin et al 2007, p. 50). 
Four major theories are often mobilized to explain the diffusion of institutions and 
public policies worldwide. They construct explanatory models of reform that emphasize 
different “mechanisms” of diffusion. Constructivist perspectives focus, for instance, on the 
changes in ideas as an explanation of diffusion (Dobbin et al 2007, p. 454). In this view, the 
role of expert groups in formulating and spreading policy regimes is a key element. 
Illustrative of such works are the notion of “epistemic communities” in, for example, Haas 																																																								
33 As referred to in footnote 1, my review of the streams of narratives available to understand competition policy 
reform builds on Türem’s (2010, p. 21), including what he identifies as a “diffusion approach”: “the intellectual 
home of the many works that aim to understand the spread of regulation and regulatory agencies, including 
competition laws and agencies”. This is a “new orthodoxy” that has “not only become an academic literature”, 
but also “constitute[s] a sub discipline” with its own specialized journals (Türem 2010, p. 99). 
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(1992) and Sikkink (1993), and DiMaggio and Powell’s (1987) idea of “normative 
isomorphism” – the role of experts in advocating policy norms leading to convergence around 
certain institutions and practices. The focus tends to be on how “global groups of experts” and 
networks engage in deliberating “what kinds of states should adopt what kinds of policies” 
(Dobbin et al 2007, p. 453).  
Another mechanism often present in diffusion perspectives is coercion, or “coercive 
isomorphism” (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). It explains diffusion as a result of coercion from 
powerful countries, organizations (such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, 
and the European Union) and ideas. Diffusion occurs because of “the influence of an external 
source of pressure or ideas” (Dobbin et al 2007, p. 457). Powerful actors give incentives to 
less powerful ones to adopt certain policies. Incentives may come in the form of 
conditionalities, policy leadership, and “hegemonic ideas” (Dobbin et al 2007, p. 455-456). 
 Economic competition entails another explanation for the diffusion of public policies. 
In this view, diffusion occurs because countries compete in the world economy. The main 
idea is that governments adopt certain policies to become more attractive for investment and 
more competitive in the global economy (Dobbin et al 2007, p. 457). The agents of diffusion 
are “well-informed governments vying for a fixed quantity of trade or investment” (Dobbin et 
al 2007, p. 458). A fourth recurrent emphasis of diffusion perspectives is learning, i.e. when 
policy adoption is not a mere imitation, but occurs due to actors’ “beliefs about cause and 
effect change” (Dobbin et al 2007, p. 460). Governments learn from each other, and in doing 
so, they identify policies to be adopted. The assumption is similar to the economic 
competition framework: there is a rational government evaluating possible policies, a “cost-
benefit” analysis (Dobbin et al 2007, p. 463). 
Several studies have applied such a diffusion perspective, emphasizing different 
theories or mechanisms, to explain institutional reforms in economic regulation dating from 
the 1990s. These are works mostly conducted by political scientists (Jordana and Levi-Faur 
2004a, 2004b, 2005, Jordana et al 2011, Levi-Faur 2005) and sociologists (Braithwaite 2005, 
2008), which approach legal and institutional reforms of economic regulation as phenomena 
of policy diffusion. They provide explanations about why and how occurs what they identify 
as a convergence of several countries around certain institutional and legal arrangements. The 
creation and reform of institutions for economic regulation such as competition agencies 
constitute one of the main empirical focuses of these investigations. 
Although the emphasis of this body of research is on explaining how reforms occur, 
they also end up describing its roles, even if tacitly. In this section, I review the narratives of 
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diffusion perspectives about competition policy in the two dimensions explored in the 
previous streams: how reform occurs, and what are its outcomes. 
 
1.3.1 Reform as diffusion 
 
Diffusion perspectives interested in the study of economic regulation seek to explain 
the institutional reforms of the state in the 1980s and 1990s, taken as the “changing relations 
between the economy, society and politics in late-modern societies” (Levi-Faur 2005, p. 20). 
Compared to institutional narratives and legal and economic scholarship, they can be called 
properly theoretical as regards how reform is approached, since they deploy a schematic, 
hypothesis-based research design. The “dependent variable” is the emergence (or reform) of 
regulatory agencies and competition authorities. Diffusion scholars attempt to assess the role 
of several factors that propel the proliferation of regulatory reforms (Jordana et al 2011). In 
doing so, they construct causal models, often through quantitative methodologies (Dobbin et 
al 2007, p. 450), to assess correlations between the occurrences of reforms and factors that 
might explain it. 
Competition policy reform appears in these narratives as part of a phenomenon of a 
“global regulatory explosion”, or a “regulatory revolution” intensified since the 1980s (Levi-
Faur 2005, p. 24-28). Together with regulatory agencies, competition law would have spread 
globally, exported from “Occidental state structures to the rest of the world” (Jordana and 
Levi-Faur 2005, p. 119). Evidence of such diffusion is identified in the enactment of laws 
creating or reforming regulatory agencies and competition authorities in the period. Jordana 
and Levi-Faur (2005), for instance, identify the growth of new regulatory authorities by 
analyzing the creation of these institutions across nineteen Latin American countries and 
twelve sectors of regulation, among them competition policy. While before 1979 there were 
only 43 regulatory authorities in the region, the number grew to 138 by 2002 (Jordana and 
Levi-Faur 2005, p. 103). Such spread is also detected in respect of competition law taken 
separately. Aydin (2010) and Braithwaite (2008) note that while in the 1980s not much more 
than 20 countries had enacted competition laws in the world, in 2009 there were 107. The 
growth is specially relevant until the year 2000, when the number of countries with 
competition laws rose to 80 (Aydin 2010, p. 55; Braithwaite 2008, p. 20). In regional terms, 
the growth was more intense in Europe, Asia and in the Americas. In this last region, while in 
1980 around 20% of the countries (including the US and Canada) had competition authorities 
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in place, in the 1990s the proportion more than doubled, reaching 50% of countries in the year 
2000 (Aydin 2010, p. 56).34 
Going beyond the detection of a global spread of regulatory and competition agencies, 
diffusion perspectives seek to explain it, i.e. to identify the “logic of diffusion” behind 
reforms (Jordana and Levi-Faur 2005, p. 108), with a particular interest in Latin America. 
Diffusion perspectives relate the spread of regulatory mechanisms in the region to several 
reasons. In consonance with the evolutionary narratives of the previous streams, the 
“consolidation of a new convention” would have motivated diffusion: there is seen to be a 
global consensus that this model was a more “appropriate” form of economic governance 
(Jordana and Levi-Faur 2005, p. 103), an alternative to bureaucratic forms of government 
(Jordana et al 2011, p. 1344), such as those of the developmental state. In this sense, the 
establishment of regulatory and competition agencies would constitute another stage of the 
capitalist development, in replacement of the “police economy” of the 18th century, the 19th 
century laissez-faire or liberal economy, and the 20th century provider state (Braithwaite 
2008). State crisis in the 1970s, induced by high debt and hyperinflation, is said to have given 
the impulse for Latin American governments to promote a shift toward a different type of 
state relation to the economy (Jordana and Levi-Faur 2005, p. 106). Also, similarly to legal 
and economic scholarship, democratization and measures of economic liberalization (such as 
privatization) that arose in the 1980s are seen to have paved the way for the establishment of 
new institutions of economic governance (Jordana and Levi-Faur 2005, p. 106). Moreover – 
and again similarly to legal and economic scholarship – privatization is said to create the 
“need” for regulation (Braithwaite 2005, p. 9), since “efficient markets may require not only 
strong regulatory frameworks but also efficient ones” (Levi-Faur 2005, p. 14). 
Within this context, diffusion scholars present theories to explain how the spread of 
regulatory institutions occurs. Jordana and Levi-Faur (2005), for instance, deploy a statistical 
analysis of the factors that account for the creation of regulatory institutions in Latin America, 
such as the local conditions of countries that undertake it (“economic wealth”, political 
characteristics, size, among others), and the economic sectors affected. These authors sustain 																																																								
34 The attention to the global spread of competition policy is certainly not exclusive to diffusion perspectives. 
Sassen (2008, p. 236), for instance, whose sociological work can hardly be placed within this paradigm of 
research, has emphasized that the spread of competition policy from its original context (the US) has historically 
accompanied the opening of markets in new regions – since the first half of the 20th century, as part of the post-
war reforms in Germany and Japan, within the agenda of “reinsertion” of former Soviet countries into the 
international market, and in the dismantlement of developmentalist states, especially in Latin America in the 
1980s and 1990s. Also the economist Palim (1998, p. 109) produced an empirical study based on quantitative 
analysis to explain the worldwide growth of competition laws, where he notes that “61% [of the laws] date from 
1990 or later, and 79% date from 1980 or later”.  
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that international conditionality is not decisive in diffusing regulatory and competition 
agencies, and identify that privatization is correlated to its creation, as well as that national 
and sectorial mechanisms have a role in explaining diffusion (Jordana and Levi-Faur 2005, p. 
117-118). Gilardi et al (2006, p. 142) also apply statistical analysis to argue that the 
competition for capital triggers regulatory reform, as countries want to “improve their 
credibility in domains where attracting private investment is important, that is, in economic 
regulation in general”. Dobbin et al (2007, p. 452) place the reform of competition law as an 
example of how certain countries “mimic” others when they perceive a certain policy as a 
reason of good performance. 
To explain how such consensus around competition policy travelled throughout the 
world, diffusion literature has also focused on the role of international and transnational 
actors and networks. The emphasis here is on the mechanisms of normative isomorphism as 
an explanation for how reform happens, i.e. the role of experts and professionals in promoting 
competition policy reform and inducing global convergence. International organizations such 
as the OECD, UNCTAD, the IMF, and the World Bank are said to have crucial roles in 
diffusing competition law, mainly through technical assistance to developing countries 
(Braithwaite and Drahos 2000; Braithwaite 2008, p. 19). International law firms would have 
also been key-actors in spreading competition regulation. According to Morgan (2006), for 
instance, the fast diffusion of competition law is related to the internationalization of law 
firms in the 1990s. Transnational networks of experts and competition authorities such as the 
International Competition Network and the Global Forum on Competition (Aydin 2010; 
Djelic and Kleiner 2006), as well as “epistemic communities” of trained legal officials 
(Waarden and Drahos 2011; Jordana and Levi-Faur 2007; Gilardi et al 2006), are also 
identified as potential forces mobilizing the spread of competition law and promoting 
convergence. 
If compared to legal and economic scholarship, the focus of diffusion perspectives on 
mechanisms of spread provides a schematic, theoretically driven and empirically grounded 
view of how reforms happen. The reform of competition policy in a specific context such as 
Brazil is connected to a broader social phenomenon of global dimensions. Whatever the 
mechanism emphasized by this body of research, the core statement about the reform of 
competition policy underlying diffusion perspectives is that the enactment of laws creating 
regulatory agencies and competition authorities in a variety of countries is part of a process of 
global diffusion of regulation. 
 
		 41	
1.3.2 Regulation versus neoliberalism 
 
In this body of literature, and similarly to the other streams of narratives analyzed, the 
wave of reforms in the 1990s is part of the diffusion of a model of economic governance that 
substituted previous state forms, such as the old developmentalist state existent in Latin 
America (Jordana and Levi-Faur 2005, p. 106). The result of spreads has received different 
names in diffusion perspectives. Some authors locate the impacts of policy and institutional 
diffusion on the state sphere, identifying the rise of a “regulatory state” due to the shifts which 
occurred in the 1980s and 1990s (Majone 1993). Others call attention to the broader spectrum 
of “regulatory” novelties, and advocate for a wider concept, such as the notion of “regulatory 
capitalism” (Jordana and Levi-Faur 2005; Braithwaite 2005, 2008).35 
The nuances among these concepts concern the amplitude of the phenomenon they 
intend to describe. Although sometimes referring to a narrower concept such as “state”, or to 
a broader idea of “capitalism”, diffusion perspectives have in common the emphasis on the 
adjective “regulatory”. This notion contains a narrative about what are the roles performed 
and outcomes produced by the reforms studied by this body of research as a process of global 
convergence.36 What diffusion perspectives identify as a shift promoted by reforms toward a 
“regulatory” model of governance and how they describe its characteristics are in many ways 
similar to how institutions, lawyers and economists narrate the roles and outcomes of 
competition policy institutions inaugurated in the 1990s. 
This narrative is embedded in how diffusion perspectives discuss the appropriateness 
of the adjective “regulatory” to describe the substance of the processes of spread, in contrast 
to the idea of “neoliberalism”. The diffusion of regulatory institutions is often taken as 
evidence of the inadequacy of the concept of “neoliberalism” to approach reforms of 
economic governance. Neoliberalism is defined as a set of institutions to promote 
privatization, deregulation and a diminished public sphere (Braithwaite 2008, p. 05). The 
changes implied by the reforms of the 1980s and 1990s are “commonly captured in the 
																																																								
35 Coined by Jordana and Levi-Faur and endorsed by Braithwaite (2005, 2008) this concept is presented as 
encompassing the idea of “regulatory state” (Levi-Faur 2005, p. 13). It is proposed as a “better” term because it 
entails not only regulation produced by the state, but also non-state regulation, and regulation of the state 
(Braithwaite 2008, p. 21). 
36 The authors I am here placing as representative of diffusion perspectives maintain that diffusion is “defined by 
the process of adoption rather than the similarity of outcomes”, and even that “[...] diffusion as a process should 
be separated from the outcomes that it may or may not produce” (Jordana et al 2011, 1346-1347). However, in 
this section I argue that despite their claim to solely focus on the process of diffusion (or reform), this body of 
research ends up producing a narrative about the roles and outcomes of the institutions that are spread. 
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notions of privatization and deregulation, and understood as the outcome of the rise of 
neoliberalism and the sweeping forces of economic globalization” (Levi-Faur 2005, p. 12). 
However, the spread of regulatory agencies and competition authorities through legal 
and institutional reforms and the consequent “expansion in the regulatory capacities of the 
state” are said to be indications of “significant regulatory components that go largely 
unnoticed and that are incompatible with either neoliberalism or economic globalization” 
(Levi-Faur 2005, p. 12). The diffusion of regulatory reforms would therefore pose a 
“paradoxical” situation: that neoliberalism is actually the “era of regulation” (Gilardi et al 
2006, p. 127). Rather than the “retreat of the state” or “the consolidation of a neoliberal 
hegemonic order” (Levi-Faur 2005, p. 27), the worldwide diffusion of regulatory agencies is 
therefore seen as evidence of the non-neoliberal character of the period (Gilardi et al 2006, p. 
127). In this context, the concept of neoliberalism would thus be incapable of capturing the 
series of institutional changes entailed by the diffusion of regulatory agencies in the 1980s 
and 1990s (Levi-Faur 2005, p. 13). 
In diffusion perspectives, the notion of neoliberalism would not be an “analytically 
insightful” or “useful way of describing what was happening during a passing moment” 
(Braithwaite 2008, p. 10), even constituting a “fairytale” that has never become an 
“institutional reality” (Braithwaite 2005, p. 2). Since neoliberalism promotes deregulation 
only at an “ideological level”, while at the “practical level” it produces or is accompanied by 
regulation, “the new global order may well be most aptly characterized as “regulatory 
capitalism” (Levi-Faur 2005, p. 14).  
In narrating the spread of regulatory mechanisms as evidence of the non-neoliberal 
character of the 1990s reforms, diffusion perspectives therefore affiliate with a “revisionist 
literature on the impact of neoliberal reforms”, “challenging the notion of neoliberal change 
and the consolidation of a neoliberal hegemonic order” (Levi-Faur 2005, p. 13-14). The 
debate around the best concept to characterize the institutional reforms that would have 
diffused in the 1990s is not, however, restricted to an analytical exercise. Underlying these 
discussions is also a substantive claim about the roles and outcomes of regulatory capitalism. 
Similarly to how lawyers and economists describe the role of a reformed competition policy, 
this body of research produces an apologetic portrait of regulatory devices as institutions that 
control the market and assure its proper and “efficient” functioning.  
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Although some social setbacks are recognized as being associated with the 
institutional reforms of the 1990s, 37  there is an overall optimistic view about these 
mechanisms. The diffusion of regulatory agencies and competition policy is considered to 
have promoted a qualitative change in economic governance (Jordana et al 2011, p. 1361). A 
new “division of labor between state and society” – and “in particular between state and 
business” (Levi-Faur 2005, p. 15) – would have emerged with regulatory reforms. It is one in 
which the state and the market have different functions as parts of what seems to be one and 
the same “boat”: the state has the “role” of “steering”, while business has the role of “rowing” 
(Levi-Faur 2005, p. 15). The regulatory mode of governance would “reopen the field for a 
more balanced approach to the distribution of power and resources” (Levi-Faur 2005, p. 28). 
The result would be the conformation of a “regulatory paradigm” oriented to “balance the 
effects of neoliberalism” (Braithwaite 2008, p. vii), a “tool that moderates and socializes” 
capitalism (Levi-Faur 2005, p. 14). Neoliberalism would thus not only be incorrect in 
grasping reforms, but in direct tension with the phenomena of diffusion, as it is the antithesis 
of regulation (Braithwaite 2008, p. 08), “contrary” to “regulatory capitalism” (Jordana et al 
2011, p. 1344). Especially regarding competition policy, while previous modes of economic 
governance are said to have “legitimized monopolies”, the new regulatory authorities that 
were established all over the world are committed to active promotion of competition, using 
modern regulatory techniques” (Jordana and Levi-Faur p. 1-2).  
The “technical” aspect of regulatory capitalist constitutes another substantive claim of 
diffusion perspectives about the roles of the institutions inaugurated by the wave of reforms. 
Similarly to the narratives of lawyers and economists, this body of literature describes 
regulatory mechanisms as an attempt at insulation from politics. Be it the state or capitalism 
as a whole, an idea that permeates the descriptions offered by diffusion perspectives in 
defining the characteristics of “regulatory” mechanisms of economic governance is that 
regulatory and competition agencies represent an autonomous form of governance. 
Regulatory agencies, including competition authorities, are characterized as being 
“autonomous” from politicians, as they consolidate a delegation of power to experts  (Jordana 
and Levi-Faur 2005, p. 103). Among several elements that define “regulatory capitalism” is 
“an increase in delegation (remaking the boundaries between the experts and the politicians)” 
and “the growth in the influence of experts in general and of international networks of experts 
in particular” (Levi-Faur 2005, p. 27). Despite variations across countries and sectors, 																																																								
37 In Levi-Faur’s view (2005, p. 28), “the regulatory instruments and institutions that were developed in the past 
two decades certainly marginalized the domestic and global poor”. 
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regulatory agencies would constitute an “effort” to “strengthen the autonomy of professionals 
and experts in the public policy process, to keep the regulators at arm’s length from their 
political masters, and to separate the responsibility for policy making from the responsibility 
for regulation” (Jordana et al 2011, p. 1344). A positive evaluation is attached to the technical 
and non-political character of regulation. Such autonomy of regulatory and competition 
agencies is perceived as “encouraging to the extent that regulatory institutions have some 
clear advantages over ministries, and that the mere fact of reform opens new possibilities for 
effective governance” (Jordana and Levi-Faur 2004, p. 2). 
If placed within the narratives of diffusion perspectives, the reform of competition 
policy in Brazil can be understood as an evolution with respect to previous forms of economic 
governance. The establishment of regulatory frameworks is seen as an indication of the 
existence of control of the market by the state, but now in a qualitatively different form: 
protected from politics. Within these narratives, reform is part of the diffusion of regulatory 
capitalism, and was motivated by a “need” for efficient markets opened by privatization. 
Reflecting a new division of labor between the state and the market, regulatory and 
competition agencies reformed in the 1990s would be therefore evidence of initiatives to 
counter-act neoliberalism. 
 
1.4 Assumptions and shortcomings 
 
 In the beginning of the chapter, I announced the goal of surveying the dominant 
narratives available for understanding how and why competition policy reform happened 
within the neoliberal agenda, and what are its roles and outcomes in transforming the state, 
the economy and society. In this section, I summarize the similarities that can be found 
among the three streams identified, discuss the existence of “questionable assumptions” 
underlying these accounts, and assess the corresponding shortcomings they imply for the 
study of competition policy reform. 
 
1.4.1 Process and agents of reform 
 
The smooth history that underlies the narratives put forward by institutions, legal and 
economic scholarships as well as by diffusion perspectives to explain the reform of 
competition policy is not the result of a style adopted to present these discourses in the 
previous sections. Be it in describing the particular history of competition policy in Brazil, or 
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in putting reform in a broader context of global diffusion, the attempt to narrate reform as an 
evolutionary and modernizing process constitutes the very structure of these narratives. The 
reader who accesses these sources is invited to interpret the series of laws targeting 
competition as several steps toward an immutable objective of achieving development, and 
transformations of states in adapting to a new context. Often in institutional narratives and in 
the descriptions of legal and economic scholarships, the 1990s reform in Brazil is part of a 
periodization that goes back to the 1930s. It constitutes a step of institutional modernization 
within a “legacy” that until then did not have much concrete effect. In the same sense, for 
diffusion perspectives the establishment of regulatory and competition agencies appears as 
evidence of a new model of state that is more “adequate” to the economic context. The 
historical development after reforms is depicted as the continuation of a process of 
modernization initiated in the 1990s. Even if the political context is said to have changed in 
the early 2000s, as is especially acknowledged by L&D literature and some legal scholars, 
competition policy seems to have kept the pace of evolution, with subsequent legislative 
adjustments that corrected some mistakes of the 1990s reform.  
Reform is also often narrated as a means to fill gaps and a necessary response to adjust 
to a liberalizing economy. The establishment of new institutional and legal frameworks of 
competition policy is said to have both enabled and been needed by economic liberalization. 
In institutional narratives, the 1990s reform was made “vital” due to the opening of the 
economy through privatizations and deregulation. Similarly, in the narratives of legal and 
economic scholarship, reform was a response to a “need” to control the market and safeguard 
the benefits brought by economic liberalization, to “counter-attack” possible “dysfunctions” 
of privatized markets, to “adapt” to a “new pattern” opened by globalization. Diffusion 
perspectives also associate reform with the liberalizing measures of the 1980s and 1990s, 
stating that privatization created the need for regulation, as functional markets require some 
sort of control. Reform is thus generally described as a logical and even “obvious” result of 
the new economic context, and in the case of Brazil specifically, also of the legal framework 
inaugurated by the Constitution of 1988. 
The perception of competition policy as a necessary instrument for functional markets 
is often portrayed as a widespread consensus. In legal scholarship, it is explicitly mentioned 
that reform reflected an agreement among Latin American countries about its necessity. In 
diffusion perspectives, the existence of a global consensus around a “new convention” is one 
element that would explain the spread of regulatory and competition agencies throughout the 
world. Contestation of reform is absent or at best peripheral in these narratives. In 
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institutional descriptions, struggles during the reform process are mentioned, but seem not to 
have affected the institutional design that resulted from it. Similarly, although legal and 
economic scholarship emphasize the existence of political opposition to antitrust policy as a 
constant from the 1930s until the 1960s, conflicts surrounding the 1990s reforms are 
exceptional in its narratives. Despite such sporadic references to tensions around reform, there 
is no assessment of if and how they might have impacted the competition act of 1994 and the 
very practice of competition policy. 
In such a story of evolution and necessity described by the three assessed streams, 
there is also an embedded narrative about the agents that propel reform. Reform is often 
depicted as an agentless process, or at best as driven by the “state” or groups of technical 
agents. In institutional narratives, the several “moments” of competition policy history in 
Brazil are described as a series of laws enacted in different governments. In legal and 
economic scholarship, competition policy reform reflects the adaptation of states or 
“governments” to the new forms of economic governance. In the particular case of Brazil or 
in analyzing reform in regional terms, legal scholarship talks about governments creating laws 
that establish competition authorities. Diffusion perspectives provide a more nuanced view of 
the agents of reforms, emphasizing the role of international and transnational agents and 
networks in spreading institutions such as competition authorities, although not in the 
particular case of Brazil. However, in many senses it resembles institutional narratives and 
legal and economic scholarships in taking reform as the enactment of statutes by countries 
which create regulatory and competition authorities motivated by international competition 
for capital and by “mimicking” other countries.  
 
1.4.2 Outcomes of reform 
 
Underlying the three streams of narratives assessed in the previous sections are also 
similar descriptions of the outcomes produced by a reformed competition policy. A first 
element that can be noticed is an account of the relationship between the state and the market 
installed by the establishment of a competition agency. All three streams generally portray 
reform as an attempt of the government, the main agent of reform, to control the market and, 
in doing so, to guarantee its proper functioning. In institutional narratives, reform inaugurated 
a model of state control of the economy in which CADE has the “duty” to ensure the proper 
functioning market; it is a “guardian” of a competitive economy against abuses of market 
agents. Legal and economic scholarship emphasize the role of competition policy reform as a 
		 47	
component of the modernization of the state and describe how it is associated with a new role 
of the state vis-à-vis the market: instead of directly coordinating the economy, it is an 
instrument for stimulating a competitive market. For diffusion perspectives, the consolidation 
of the “regulatory paradigm”, of which competition agencies are emblematic, entailed a new 
“division of labor” in economic governance: one in which the state controls the movements 
promoted by market agents. Depicted either as a cooperative relationship, in which the state 
and the market have different roles in a joint enterprise, or as one with opposing poles of an 
interaction through which the state tames the market, the boundaries between the two are well 
defined. The state and the market are separate entities, and competition policy is a tool of the 
state to control the market. 
In the exercise of this alleged new role through competition policy, the state is said to 
successfully control the market and promote competition. The metaphor of “David versus 
Goliath” found in institutional narratives is illustrative of a recurrent idea that although the 
Brazilian competition agency has faced difficulties due to its limited structure, it has imposed 
several “setbacks” to market agents who would have a “natural behavior” of seeking 
concentration. In conducting its preventive and repressive activities against the abuses of 
market agents, CADE is depicted as an effective instrument of the state in creating a “healthy 
economic environment”. Legal and economic scholarship’s more detailed assessment of 
decisions made by the Brazilian competition agency reaches similar conclusions. Despite 
some detected “mistakes”, a reformed competition authority is said to be generally successful 
and for the first time effective in its task of minimizing the harmful effects of market 
competition. Moreover, such positive outcomes are said to have survived and even been 
strengthened by the transformations of the economic and the political context in the early 
2000s, which is indicated by the shift of emphasis toward regulating conduct. Lawyers and 
economists often see Brazilian competition policy as an exception to the politicization of 
antitrust brought about by interventionist governments elected in the last decade in other 
countries of Latin America. Social-scientific scholarship converges in such description of the 
outcomes of competition policy reform. For diffusion perspectives, regulatory and 
competition agencies balance the effects of market liberalization by effectively promoting 
competition and dismantling the legitimization of monopolies characteristic of state models 
prior to reform. 
Such successful enterprise is said to produce impacts not only in the economy, but 
also in society as a whole. Together with the preventive and repressive roles of a reformed 
competition policy, institutional narratives identify an educational function in promoting a 
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“competition culture” to the “general public”. Moreover, by targeting anti-competitive 
conduct, the competition authority has the role of guaranteeing the welfare of consumers. 
Legal and economic scholarship deepen this understanding, often portraying consumers as the 
main “stakeholders” of competition policy. Due to reform, competition policy would have 
contributed to minimizing losses for these subjects. Although they do not refer explicitly to 
consumers, diffusion perspectives narrate the outcomes of regulatory and competition 
agencies in a similar way. Reformed institutions would have enabled the moderation and 
socialization of capitalism and a more equitable distribution of power. The outcomes of a 
reformed competition policy are thus generally portrayed as bringing universal benefits: as 
suggested by the institutional slogan, those who “win” with competition policy are 
corporations, individuals (consumers) and the country as a whole. 
Another recurrent claim underlying the three sources of narratives concerns the 
technical character of policy-making inaugurated by reform vis-à-vis political influence. 
Institutional narratives stress the independence and autonomy of the reformed Brazilian 
competition agency. The institutional design introduced by the 1990s reform, attributing to 
professionals from law and economics the duty of producing competition policy, is said to 
guarantee technical and impartial decision-making. Legal and economic scholars also sustain 
that reform would have insulated competition policy from politics. Parallel to reform, a 
technical “revolution” in Brazilian competition policy would have happened, induced by the 
extensive use of economic science in decision-making. In the same line, diffusion 
perspectives describe regulatory mechanisms such as competition agencies as emblematic of 
an autonomous form of governance. Similarly to the other narratives, the delegation of 
decision-making power to experts rather than politicians would be the main cause of such 
non-political form of policy-making. 
At a conceptual level, the narratives about the process and outcomes of reform 
underlying the three assessed streams tacitly or explicitly imply the dissolution of the puzzle 
that motivates my inquiry, as stated at the beginning of this chapter: how and why a 
mechanism to regulate the market, such as competition policy, was developed as part of the 
neoliberal agenda that sought to liberate that market? When institutions, lawyers, economists 
and social scientists narrate reform and its outcomes, they produce an analytical claim about 
how to understand the reform of competition policy that ignores neoliberalism, functionalizes 
reform within it, or opposes it to regulation. In institutional narratives, for instance, the notion 
of neoliberalism is not mentioned. Reform is depicted as a necessary instrument to control an 
opened market, and the government is said to successfully achieve its objectives. In the 
		 49	
descriptions of lawyers and economists, a similar account is produced. When an explicit 
reference is made to neoliberalism, as was the case of L&D literature, competition policy 
reform is seen as compatible with neoliberal reforms to the extent that it is seen as “needed” 
for a liberalized market to work properly. In the first two streams discussed, competition 
policy reform is therefore an unproblematic element of a set of transformations brought about 
by a context of economic liberalization. In diffusion perspectives, in turn, neoliberalism is 
directly challenged as an incorrect conceptual tool to understand the set of reforms of which 
competition policy is part. The creation and reform of competition agencies as was the case of 
Brazil would indicate that the market is being regulated, and thus evidence that the notion of 
neoliberalism is inappropriate for understanding how and why this transformation happened 
and what are the roles it performs in the state, the economy, and society. Such technical 
instruments mobilized by governments to control market agents, often depicted as successful 
in their task of assuring competition and the protection of consumers, would thus suggest that 
neoliberalism also implied forms of controlling itself, or even more radically, that they are 
anti-neoliberal. 
 
1.4.3 Reform and outcomes depoliticized  
 
 Having identified the similar descriptions proposed by different sources about 
competition policy reform and its roles (or alleged conceptual incompatibility) within 
neoliberalism, two questions arise: are these narratives problematic? If so, on what grounds 
can they be criticized? My argument is that these accounts are not convincing in offering a 
complex or critical view of reforms, as well as in suggesting the functionalization of reform 
as a counter-balance to neoliberalism, or as an evidence of the inadequacy of this notion to 
understand reform. This is because they share methodological and conceptual assumptions 
that imply a limited perspective to explain and assess the transformations of economic 
governance. 
 I find support for this idea in a literature that criticizes studies on “diffusion of law” 
(Twining 2005a, 2005b, 2006) and “globalization of law” (Halliday and Osinsky 2006), as 
well as neo-institutionalist perspectives on law38 (Suchman and Edelman 1996; Edelman and 																																																								
38 I am here referring specifically to the “theoretical tradition” of sociological new institutionalism (Suchman and 
Edelman 1996, p. 909). The “resurgence of institutionalism” is not restricted to sociology, but can be also 
identified in economics (for instance, Ronald Coase’s new economic institutionalism) and in political science 
(Heimer 2001). Although to some degree similar in several assumptions, the notion of new institutionalism may 
gain different contours in each field. A major focus of sociological new institutionalism has been to explain 
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Suchman 1997). The targets of these criticisms are to a great extent similar and at some points 
coincident with those sources whose narratives were assessed in the previous sections: 
institutions, legal doctrine and economic scholarship, and diffusion studies. Given these 
similarities, I understand that such criticisms are valid for the surveyed narratives about the 
reform of competition policy and its outcomes. 
Twining’s (2005a, 2005b, 2006) assessment of the mainstream body of research on 
“diffusion of law” is particularly helpful to identify the embedded theoretical assumptions in 
these narratives and to organize a criticism of them. Although the notion of “diffusion of law” 
proposed by Twining does not refer exactly to what I have been calling legal reform, it is 
possible to identify several overlaps among the narratives I surveyed and the kind of 
scholarship addressed by this author.39 In Twining’s work (2005a, p. 5-6), studies about 
“diffusion of law” are those interested in the interaction and influence among legal systems 
and traditions that have been conceptualized under different “labels”: reception, transplants, 
spread, expansion, transfer, exports and imports, imposition, circulation, transmigration, 
transposition, etc. It constitutes a body of research conducted within several “research 
traditions” of legal scholarship (Twining 2006, p. 204), such as legal history, comparative 
law, law reform, law and development, legal theory, sociology of law, among others.  
According to this author (Twining 2005a, p. 8-9), although no “paradigm” has 
consolidated in the literature of diffusion of law, there are several assumptions shared by 
these different perspectives. They would conform to an “ideal type” of research, a “standard” 
– or even more critically – a “naïve model” for studying the diffusion of law (Twining 2005a, 
																																																																																																																																																																													
“how regimes emerge, how coherent normative and cognitive structures develop, and how jurisdictional 
boundaries solidify” (Suchman and Edelman 1996, p. 927-928). At its core is the interest in “processes of 
institutionalization”, that is: the process by which a practice or structure is diffused, adopted by an increasing 
proportion of the organizations in a field (Heimer 2001, p. 8534). Explaining phenomena of institutional 
homogeneity thus became a central agenda of new institutional research. A neo-institutionalist approach is 
therefore particularly evident in the case of “diffusion perspectives” assessed in section 1.3. However, as I will 
argue in the following paragraphs, many of its assumptions also underlie the official narratives described in 
section 1.1, and the descriptions of legal and economic scholarships assessed in section 1.2. 
39 The notion of “diffusion of law” constructed by Twining should not be confused with “diffusion perspectives” 
discussed in the previous section. In assessing the literature on diffusion of law and identifying a “naïve model”, 
Twining is referring to “legal thought and discourses” (2005a, p. 4), notably comparative law developed in the 
20th century. In evaluating how could the “problematic assumptions” of this model be overcome, he advocates 
the need of establishing a dialogue with the social sciences. Although Twining poses this criticism to various 
forms of legal scholarship, I am here expanding it to the three streams of narratives I surveyed, including social-
scientific works of “diffusion perspectives”. I will argue that the criticism constructed by Twining may be also 
applied to these sources of study of diffusion or, as I have been using the term, reform. Although the literature 
that is being referred by this author has many similarities to the body of research interested in explaining the 
diffusion of regulatory capitalism, Twining curiously does not explicitly refers to it. In the following paragraphs, 
I nevertheless sustain that “diffusion perspectives” found in the social sciences in many ways resemble what 
Twining identifies as a standard model for studying the “diffusion of law” 
		 51	
p. 15-16).40 Twining (2005a, p. 3) identifies what are “questionable assumptions” underlying 
these approaches, and discusses what would be several “significant omissions” associated 
with them. In his critique, these assumptions are reflected in several elements that constitute 
the scholarship about the diffusion of law: how literature defines the source and destination 
of diffusion, its pathways, the agents of diffusion, the timing of diffusion, the object that 
diffuses, and the impacts produced by the diffused law. A “paradigm case” of such model in 
narrating the diffusion of law would be for example: 
 
[diffusion of law is] a bipolar relationship between two countries involving a 
direct one-way transfer of legal rules or institutions through the agency of 
governments involving formal enactment or adoption at a particular moment 
of time (a reception date) without major change. [...] it is commonly 
assumed that the standard case involves transfer from an advanced (parent) 
civil or common law system to a less developed one, in order to bring about 
technological change (‘to modernise’) by filling in gaps or replacing prior 
local law. There is also considerable vagueness about the criteria for 
‘success’ of a reception - one common assumption seems to be that if it has 
survived for a significant period ‘it works’. (italics of the author) 
Similarly to the narratives I assessed in the previous sections, these elements can be 
seen in how mainstream literature narrates the process and agents of diffusion (or reform), 
and its outcomes. Putting it in Twining’s terms, in describing the process of diffusion, the 
literature generally assumes that it is a “direct one-way transfer” from one country to another, 
that diffusion takes place among “countries”, that it occurs when there is the “formal 
enactment or adoption at a particular moment of time” (Twining 2005a, p. 3). As a movement 
from a developed context to a “less developed”, or “adolescent” legal system, diffusion 
occurs due to a “technical” process with the objective to “fill a legal vacuum or [to] replace 
prior (typically outdated or traditional) law” (Twining 2005a, p. 3). With respect to the agents 
of diffusion, the scholarship assessed by Twining is said to assume that there is an exporter 
and an importer, and that these are often governments (Twining 2005a, p. 3). What diffuses 
(the object of diffusion) is approached as a set of “legal rules and concepts” that “retains its 
identity without significant change” (Twining 2005a, p. 3). Finally, in respect to the outcomes 
of diffusion, Twining sees literature endorsing a view that evaluates the impacts of 
institutions and laws that diffuse in terms of what “works” and what “fails”. 
Twining identifies a series of shortcomings implied by these trends in narrating the 
process, agents and outcomes of reform – or, in his terms, diffusion – which converge with 																																																								
40 As Twining (2005b, p. 205) recognizes, the assumptions conform to an “ideal type”, which is rarely entirely 
endorsed in actual researches. 
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criticisms of neo-institutionalist approaches to law. With respect to the process of diffusion, 
four “questionable assumptions” identified by Twining are especially relevant. The first 
concerns the object of diffusion. The “standard model” “assumes that what is borrowed, 
imposed or imported remains the same” (Twining 2005a, p. 24). In doing so, it ignores “how 
and to what extent any particular ‘import’ retains its identity or is accepted, ignored, used, 
assimilated, adapted, rooted, resisted, rejected, interpreted, enforced selectively, and so on 
depends largely on local conditions” (Twining 2005a, p. 24). The diffusion of law is often 
immersed in “broad political struggles” that are reflected in “resistance to foreign legal ideas, 
laws, and institutions” (Twining 2005a, p. 25). Assuming that the object of diffusion is the 
same everywhere, despite a necessary process of translation mediated by political struggles, is 
thus a shortcoming of these approaches. The second assumption, related to the first, also 
concerns the relation of the imported law or institutions to pre-existing conditions. The 
“standard model’s” idea that that diffusion simply “fills a vacuum” ignores local struggles in 
the importation process. According to Twining (2005a, p. 35), imported law rarely entirely 
replaces prior local law, but interacts with it. 
The third problematic element commonly shared by the studies criticized by Twining 
regards the timing of diffusion. This scholarship often adopts a synchronic approach to 
reform, as diffusion is assumed to occur in specific “reception dates”, and moments of 
formalization and enactment of law. As a law is enacted, reform is said to have occurred. The 
problem, according to Twining, is that diffusion “often involves a long drawn out process, 
which, even if there were some critical moments, cannot be understood without reference to 
events prior and subsequent to such moments" (Twining 2005a, p. 34). 
Finally, the fourth element concerning the process of diffusion deals with the motives 
of reform. Among the several perspectives identified by Twining as forms of explaining 
reforms, two are especially recurrent in the narratives I identified in the study of competition 
policy: so called “enthusiastic” and “instrumentalist” views. An enthusiastic perspective is 
one that talks about the law that diffuses as “technological products” or “innovations” that are 
“instruments of legal and social modernisation” (Twining 2005a, p. 26). An instrumentalist 
view, in turn, defines diffusion as a process of “problem solving”, the importation of a 
solution to a local problem (Twining 2005a, p. 26). Both perspectives converge in treating the 
law that diffuses as “no more than a series of technical solutions to shared problems [...] or 
choosing one system over another because of its technical superiority” (Twining 2005a, p. 
28). The questionable character of this assumption is that it “obfuscates the underlying 
purpose [of reform] and pretends that the ends are uncontentious” (Twining 2005a, p. 28). 
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With respect to the agents of reform, the recurrent focus on “governments” as the 
propelling vectors of change is also said by Twining to be problematic. Governments are 
often not the only, “and may not be the main, agents of diffusion” (Twining 2005a, p. 34). 
Halliday and Osinsky (2006, p. 450) identify a similar problem in studies of “globalization of 
law”, which usually assume “that the agents that create global norms are themselves global or 
transnational institutions”. The globalization of law (or “diffusion”, and even “reform”) can 
however be promoted by a plurality of actors, such as governments, professionals, 
corporations, organizations, local actors, etc (Halliday and Osinsky 2006, p. 451). By erasing 
specific agents and groups from consideration, such an abstract notion of “government” as an 
agent of reform may once again obnubilate a proper understanding of the local political 
struggles involved in the diffusion of law. 
When it comes to narrating the outcomes of the diffusion of law, Twining identifies 
another set of shortcomings in mainstream scholarship. To this author, there is a “tendency in 
the diffusion literature to talk vaguely of receptions ‘working’ or ‘failing’” (Twining 2005a, 
p. 30). The assessment of the effects of reform would often lack an empirical evaluation and 
measurement of impact (Twining 2005a, p. 32). When empirically grounded, measurement of 
outcomes tends to be “technocratic, formalist, and strongly instrumentalist, paying scant 
regard to culture, context, and tradition” (Twining 2005a, p. 32). These would be studies that 
endorse an “audit culture” of reform, often conducted by perspectives of economic analysis 
and new institutionalism (Twining 2005a, p. 32). Not by chance, a similar criticism is implied 
by Suchman and Edelman’s assessment of neo-institutionalist approaches to the study of law. 
In these authors’ view, such approaches tend to endorse a formalist view of law, for which 
“laws mean what they say, and they do what they mean” (Suchman and Edelman 1996, p. 
928). An institutional perspective on models of economic governance departs from an 
assumption that takes law as “explicit, authoritative, and coercive”, obscuring its “fragmented 
and highly ambiguous” character (Suchman and Edelman 1996, p. 929). As law is taken to be 
“an objective and monolithic reality”, its outcomes are not seen as problematic, as they would 
be the translation of straightforward rules, a process of “universal compliance” (Suchman and 
Edelman 1996, p. 933). Suchman and Edelman specifically direct this criticism to studies 
about regulatory agencies and “regulatory enforcement”. These authors detect an “imagery of 
legal formalism” that leads to understanding that these agencies “act only within the scope of 
their official charter” (Suchman and Edelman 1996, p. 933). Although the spread of certain 
institutions is taken as evidence of “global convergence in particular domains of law, 
empirical research demonstrates the rampant contingency of globalization” (Halliday and 
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Osinsky 2006, p. 466). Assessing the outcomes of these diffused institutions through the sole 
indicator of their spread may thus be problematic. Such formalist accounts of outcome can be 
therefore “positively distorting, for they can suggest convergence when appearances of law on 
the books belie the reality of law in action” (Halliday and Osinsky 2006, p. 448). The lack of 
or unsystematic character of empirical research about outcomes constitutes the basis of a 
formalist view of the law (Twining 2005a, p. 35 Halliday and Osinsky 2006, p. 466; Suchman 
and Edelman 1996, p. 929). 
This set of criticisms of the assumptions underlying dominant forms of analyzing the 
process, the agents and the outcomes of legal reform can be applied to the narratives about 
competition policy reform discussed in the previous sections. In Table 1, I merge the review 
of the narratives systematized in subsections 1.4.1 and 1.4.2 with the criticisms just discussed. 
In the rows, I summarize the narrative provided by the three sources in each dimension 
(process, agents and outcomes of reform), and in the two last columns I present their 
corresponding “questionable assumptions” and shortcomings.  
The four elements identified by Twining in the “standard model” for studying the 
process of “diffusion of law” are present in how institutional narratives, legal and economic 
scholarships and diffusion perspectives tend to approach competition policy reform. All three 
streams tend to offer an “enthusiastic” and/or “instrumentalist” view of competition law 
reform. They describe the process of reform in evolutionary terms, as a necessary technical 
move toward a “better” legal and institutional model, a modernization to fill a gap, to solve 
the problems of other forms of economic governance and to adapt to a new context. Some 
narratives, such as L&D scholarships and diffusion scholars, emphasize that reform is part of 
a convergence of diffused legal reforms. Although more contextualized than institutional and 
doctrinal views, these sources also describe reforms in an evolutionary narrative, as a process 
of a generalized adaptation of less developed legal systems toward an upgraded form41.  
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
41 The emphasis on evolution and modernization found in the narratives of Law & Development scholarship may 
be connected to its roots in modernization theory (Ginsburg 2000; Galanter 1966). The “theoretical 
underpinning” of modernization theory is that “the development process entail[s] a shift away from traditional 
institutions and culture”, and normatively implies that “developing countries should adopt systems of social 
organization as well as technologies from the modern West” (Ginsburg 2000, p. 832). 
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Table 1. Narratives about reform, their assumptions and shortcomings 
  
Institutional 
narratives 
 
Legal and 
economic 
scholarships 
 
 
Diffusion 
perspectives 
 
Assumptions 
 
Shortcomings 
 
 
 
Process: 
 
Evolution; 
Necessity; 
Modernization 
 
Evolution; 
Necessity; 
Modernization; 
Convergence; 
Consensus 
 
 
Evolution; 
Necessity; 
Convergence; 
Consensus 
 
Reform is 
uncontested; 
Fills vacuum; 
Synchronic; 
Technological 
product; 
Solves problems 
 
 
 
Local conditions 
and political 
struggles 
ignored; 
Obfuscate 
purposes of 
reform and 
pretends that the 
ends are 
uncontentious; 
 
 
 
Agents: 
 
Absent; 
Governments 
 
Absent; 
Government; 
International 
actors 
 
 
Governments; 
International 
actors; 
Transnational 
actors 
 
 
Governments 
and global 
agents propel 
reform 
 
 
Abstract notion 
of government 
erases political 
struggles; 
Miss the roles of 
local actors; 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Outcomes: 
 
Control the 
market; 
Promote 
competition; 
Protect 
consumers; 
Universal 
benefits; 
Success; 
Autonomy from 
politics; 
 
 
Control the 
market; 
Promote 
competition; 
Protect 
consumers; 
Success; 
Effectiveness; 
Autonomy from 
politics; 
 
 
 
Control the 
market; 
Moderate and 
socialize 
capitalism; 
Promote 
competition; 
Autonomy from 
politics; 
 
“It works” or “it 
fails”; 
Law is objective, 
explicit and 
authoritative; 
Law does what it 
says 
 
 
 
Vague notions of 
success and 
failure; 
Impressionistic 
empirical 
analysis; 
Legal formalism; 
Functionalize 
outcomes; 
 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
Such necessary evolution is generally portrayed as a consensual process. Contestation 
of and struggles around reform are absent in diffusion perspectives, and at best peripheral in 
institutional narratives and the descriptions of lawyers and economists. When exceptionally 
mentioned, tensions seem not to have affected the reform process, i.e. how competition policy 
is actually reformed and practiced. A synchronic view of reform also permeates these 
narratives. Reform occurs when competition laws are enacted, and subsequent laws are seen 
as the continuation of the evolutionary process that began in the 1990s. Exemplary of such 
narratives is how institutions, lawyers and economists interpret the enactment of the new 
competition law in 2011. This latest reform appears as an “enhancement”, a correction of 
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“mistakes” committed in the first wave of transformations42. As suggested in the criticisms 
discussed above, such a narrative of reform as an uncontested, synchronic, and technological 
process to “fill vacuums” and “solve problems” ignores how local conditions and political 
struggles may affect reform and dispute its practice and outcomes. In doing so, these 
narratives depoliticize the process of reform.  
Another convergence among the identified narratives that resonates with the criticisms 
presented here is in respect to the agents of reform. In institutional narratives, as well as in 
legal and economic scholarship, reform is often depicted as an agentless process. When they 
do not characterize reform in such way, these narratives identify the “government” as the 
agent that transforms competition policy. This is specially the case for legal and economic 
scholarship. Reform is depicted as a process triggered by governments due to a need resulting 
from the changing economic context and with the objective of controlling the market and 
assuring its proper functioning. Diffusion approaches, in turn, present a more sociologically 
grounded view of diffusion. Together with governments and international organizations, they 
emphasize the role of individual agents in propelling reform. The focus, however, tends to be 
on international organizations and global “epistemic communities” such as transnational 
networks of professionals. 43  As in an agentless account, or in the abstract focus on 
“governments”, the local contexts and agents of reform are often absent in this view, as well 
as disputes surrounding the diffusion of a certain institution and its importation. Such 
undersocialized views of reform, informed by an abstract notion of “government” or by the 
focus on global expert agents, misses the roles of local actors and potentially erases political 
struggles. Together with the dominant narratives about the process of reform, it contributes to 
depoliticize the reform of competition policy, and complements the portrait as a necessary 
transformation that occurs spontaneously, or by the mobilization of abstract entities and 
technical agents. 
Also with respect to the outcomes of a reformed competition policy the three assessed 
sources of narratives resemble the problematic assumptions of the “standard model”. The 
impacts produced by CADE and by regulatory and competition agencies in general are mostly 																																																								
42 The evolutionary and functionalist accounts of legal doctrine and economic scholarship may be motivated by 
the fact that they are produced by those who acted as reformers, and/or are the practitioners and producers of 
competition policy. In narrating reform in such ways, they give unity and coherence to a set of institutions and 
practices (a “system”) that they built and operate. In the case of institutional narratives, the straightforward and 
depoliticizing discourse is a comprehensible and even obvious path, as CADE intends to assure its stability, 
affirm and justify its very existence as an impartial and technical institution. 
43 Such a focus on international and global actors can be related to the fact that once regulatory reform is 
approached as a global process by diffusion perspectives, “it is usually assumed that the agents that create global 
norms are themselves global or transnational institutions” (Halliday and Osinsky 2006, p. 450). 
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assessed in terms of what “works” and what “fails”, i.e. to what extent they are successful and 
effective. The reference to determine what constitutes a successful implementation is what the 
law says its objectives are – often defined in these narratives as being to promote competition 
and protect consumers. In institutional narratives and legal and economic scholarship, 
Brazilian competition policy is said to be an effective instrument of the state that technically 
produces decisions of universal benefit to its main “stakeholders” – competitors and 
consumers – despite some occasional “errors”. In a broader sense, diffusion perspectives 
identify “regulatory capitalism” as a model of economic governance that is autonomous from 
politics and produces the moderation and socialization of the economy. Similarly to the other 
narratives, diffusion scholarship tends to take the “regulatory” roles announced by institutions 
such as competition agencies as evidence of the very existence of regulation and control. 
Moreover, it implies that once regulatory and competition agencies exist, and their outcomes 
are clear-cut in their institutional functions, it is necessary to neglect the veracity or the utility 
of neoliberalism as an analytical tool. 
When based on empirical evaluations, the assessment of outcomes is often 
impressionistic. Especially in legal and economic scholarship, empirical analysis is generally 
based on an unsystematic selection of “important cases” that would illustrate the general 
behavior of CADE and therefore evidence of its roles in the economy and society.44 Eventual 
shifts in the behavior of CADE, such as what institutional narratives, lawyers and economists 
detect as the shift of emphasis from merger reviews to conduct cases since the early 2000s, 
are said to be part of a process of its enhancement and adequacy to international standards. 
Assessing how and if the political context affects outcomes is thus generally alien to these 
narratives, as competition policy is taken to be in a constant process of evolution. Based on 
such forms of evaluating outcomes, these narratives portray a reformed competition policy as 
a successful enterprise in controlling the market. By measuring outcomes with reference to 
the formal objectives of the law, or in an unsystematic empirical way, these narratives end up 
functionalizing and depoliticizing the roles of competition policy. Although competition 
policy is a form of economic governance that has direct impacts on powerful agents such as 
corporations, and determines their interaction with the state, disputes and divergent interests 																																																								
44 Several studies resort to CADE’s decisions database to assess how competition policy is practiced and extract 
conclusions about the Council’s behavior. They identify shifts in its history (for instance, the fluctuation of the 
number of Merger Reviews, changes in types of decisions over time, the shift of emphasis toward 
Administrative Procedures), and certain patterns (such as that CADE decides accordingly to the international 
standards). However, there is rarely a detailed and systematic investigation of the cases themselves, beyond 
superficial information provided by the institution. A possible exception is Salgado’s (1997) work on the 
practice of competition policy in Brazil, which nevertheless focused on a very limited period of time before the 
1994 reform and only on a specific type of decisions, the Administrative Procedures. 
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that may surround its reform and practice are often absent in these narratives. Together with 
the depoliticization of the process and agents of reform, the available narratives therefore also 
depoliticize its outcomes.  
If such assumptions sustain the naturalization of reform and the consequent rejection 
of the notion of neoliberalism to understand it promoted by these narratives – be it by tacitly 
ignoring it, functionalizing reform within it or explicitly neglecting its conceptual adequacy –, 
the puzzle posed at the beginning of this chapter remains: what is the role of competition 
policy as part of neoliberal reforms? How and why was competition policy reformed and 
what are its outcomes? Since I argued that the implications of these “questionable 
assumptions” are the depoliticization of the process, agents and outcomes of reform, an 
alternative narrative to answer these questions must be able to re-politicize competition policy 
reform and its roles. In the next chapter, I delineate a different conceptual and methodological 
framework to study neoliberal legal reforms and its impacts on the state, the economy and 
society – one that I argue is capable of overcoming the shortcomings identified in the 
available narratives. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Regulation, politics and neoliberalism:  
concepts for an alternative narrative 
 
Having identified the shortcomings underlying the descriptions proposed by 
mainstream narratives about competition policy reform, its roles and alleged incompatibility 
with neoliberalism, in this Chapter I design a theoretical framework to circumvent these 
limitations. As these narratives promote a disconnection between competition policy reform 
and neoliberalism through discourses about the process of reform, its agents and outcomes, I 
propose a set of conceptual tools that leads to the reframing of each of these dimensions. 
From this framework I derive more refined and operational research questions that, if tackled 
through empirical inquiry, enable visualizing the roots and roles of competition policy within 
the neoliberal project of transforming states, economies and societies. The framework I 
designed combines conceptual and substantive insights of the sociology of law, economic 
sociology and critical political economy into two distinct and interconnected approaches to 
revisit those dimensions identified in mainstream narratives. 
The first is an actor-centered framework that re-politicizes the process of reform and 
the very practice of competition policy through a thick theory of agency. Based on the 
perspective of a reflexive sociology, I reframe the process of reform as the constitution of a 
field of practice whose structuring and structure depend on the agents that integrate it. In the 
case of competition policy, these are notably lawyers and economists who act both as 
reformers and, since the establishment of the field, as the producers of competition law. The 
sketch of this approach, which serves as an alternative for the study of the process and the 
agents of reform, and also incorporates a dimension of practice, is the content of section 2.1. 
Besides describing the analytical structure of such approach, I also present substantive 
elements that illustrate the concrete roles performed by lawyers and economists as agents of 
neoliberal reforms. In section 2.2, I revisit studies of the sociology of law and economic 
sociology that explain how are lawyers and economists connected to the creation and 
transformation of fields of practice close to the state and the economy, especially during 
neoliberalism. These illustrations are sought to provide parameters for interpreting the data 
that was collected through the actor-centered approach designed in the first section. 
The second, and complementary approach builds on a tenet of the sociology of law to 
reframe the analysis of the outcomes of competition policy: the “law in action” perspective. In 
contrast to the often formalist and unempirical narratives found in mainstream discourses, in 
section 2.3, I describe such perspective for a systematic and empirical assessment of the roles 
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performed by the field of competition policy in the economy and society. This framework 
repositions the study of outcomes in terms of what kind of economy is facilitated by 
competition policy, and what model of society is constituted by it, thus opening way to 
understand its roles vis-à-vis the neoliberal project of transforming the economy and society. 
In section 2.4, the analytical frame of the “law in action” is complemented by a 
substantive theory about the defining traces of the neoliberal intellectual and political project 
for the economy and society, with a special focus on Latin America and Brazil. I rely on 
studies that develop a critical political economy of neoliberalism to assess its main 
characteristics as a political, economic and societal model. These are elements that inform 
what can be expected from the outcomes of competition policy if it is compatible with and 
functional to neoliberalism. 
This framework therefore interpolates the analytical structures to approach the process 
and practice of regulatory reform through its agents (section 2.1), and to study the outcomes 
of the field (section 2.3), with substantive elements that enable connecting these formal 
schemes to the political project of neoliberalism (sections 2.2 and 2.4, respectively). In each 
analytical section, I present the refined research questions that stem from the broader puzzle 
that motivates this research, and which guide the empirical inquiry presented in the 
subsequent chapters.  
 
2.1 An actor-centered approach to reform and practice 
 
In the previous chapter, I argued that mainstream narratives depoliticize the process of 
reform because local conditions and struggles are mostly ignored, and reform is often 
depicted as an uncontentious process of technological evolution. I also sustained that such 
narrative is associated with a theory of agency (most of the times tacit) that proposes an 
abstract notion of “government” as the propeller of reform, or at best highlights the roles of 
transnational or global networks of “expert” actors. In both cases, potential struggles around 
reform are erased, and as a consequence, these assumptions obfuscate the possible 
connections of competition policy reform with political positions, notably with neoliberalism. 
An alternative framework must therefore overcome these shortcomings. I here sustain 
that a useful form of transcending a functionalist view of the process of reform is precisely by 
addressing the role of concrete agents in the reform process and their connections to broader 
political disputes, i.e. beyond the treatment as a matter of impersonal or “technical” work to 
solve a problem. As Twining (2005a, p. 22) suggests, the study of reform must analyze “more 
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precise agents”, instead of an abstract notion of government. Similarly, Halliday and Osinsky 
(2006, p. 450) advocate for a need to “identify the agents that create, propagate, and receive 
global norms and organizations” in order to “explicate where global norms and templates 
originate and how they are conveyed to sites across the world where they are differentially 
integrated into local institutions and practices”. 
By focusing on concrete agents and how they condition the “diffusion” or 
“globalization” of law – or, in the terms I put it, regulatory reform –, it is possible to avoid the 
“questionable assumptions” identified by Twining in studying the process of reform. When 
reform is assessed through the agents that articulate it, its object is not taken to be immutable, 
but subject to the “broad political struggles” (Twining 2005a, p. 25). In stressing how local 
agents condition reform, the problematic idea that it “fills a vacuum” is also refuted, once the 
local conditions of where reform occurs are brought to the forefront of analysis. Such focus 
also helps to avoid “enthusiastic” and “instrumentalist” perspectives on the process of reform, 
conforming an ideological approach in which reform reflects political values and interests 
mobilized by concrete agents. In such perspective, “the most important factors in a reception 
[or reform] are the underlying values, principles and political interests that motivate it rather 
than the details of particular rules or provisions” (Twining 2005a, p. 27). Not only the process 
of reform gains new contours through a detailed study of agency, but also the practice of the 
institutional setting inaugurated by it can be assessed on different grounds.  
Although these criticisms support the potential advantages and even the need of 
analyzing the role of concrete agents in the process of reform, they offer no practical guidance 
on how to do it schematically. I therefore rely on the framework of a reflexive sociology, as 
developed by French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu and several works within this theoretical 
tradition, for the construction of a “thick” theory of agency. As I understand it, the “actor-
centered approach” proposed by Bourdieu (Dezalay and Garth 2002a, p. 9) is highly 
consistent with the criticisms posed to the assessed narratives, but with an additional 
advantage: it provides a systematic and operational framework for the study of competition 
policy reform and practice, that is capable of supplanting the shortcomings associated with 
mainstream narratives’ undersocialized view of reform. 
Bourdieu’s approach entails a heuristic model of imbricated concepts that renders the 
task of a schematic description extremely difficult. However, despite the risks of falling into 
what Bourdieu himself criticized as “professorial definitions” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 
p. 96), I understand that presenting the general guidelines that compose his framework in an 
analytical form is a necessary condition to their profitable and clear application in actual 
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research. My aim is not to provide an extensive or detailed review of these concepts, or dig 
into the broad debates with which this theory engages, something already done by Bourdieu 
himself (e.g. Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992), his collaborators (e.g. Dezalay and Madsen 
2012), commentators (e.g. Thompson 1991; Calhoun et al 1993; Swartz 1997), and that can 
be repeatedly found in dissertations working within the framework of a reflexive sociology. 
Rather, I intend to make explicit, whilst in a succinct form, the central elements that I extract 
from this “toolbox” to design an alternative approach to study the reform of competition 
policy. These concepts are “designed to put to work empirically in systematic fashion” 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 96). Therefore, after presenting them in a schematic and 
somehow “professorial” form, I will explain how I intend to articulate them in a proper 
reflexive sociological approach, and how they help shedding light into my object of empirical 
research. 
 
2.1.1 The framework of a reflexive sociology 
 
The central conceptual tools I borrow from Bourdieu’s framework are the notions of 
field, capital and habitus. Through these concepts, Bourdieu’s approach enables framing what 
I have been calling the process of competition policy reform as the constitution of an arena of 
social practices – a field –, in which understanding what are the concrete agents of this space 
is crucial. Bourdieu’s framework re-politicizes the object of study by putting in evidence the 
agents that constitute and occupy this arena, the positions they occupy vis-à-vis other agents, 
their profiles, strategies, interests, and practices. In this perspective, the task for research 
becomes to unveil the structure of a certain arena of struggle over power. 
The field is the basic unit of analysis for such framework: it is “is primary and must be 
the focus of the research operations” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 107). The idea of field 
is an analytical escape from two theoretical alternatives. On the one hand, perspectives 
according to which to study a certain object it is “enough to read the texts”, i.e. “there is 
nothing else to be known, be it in a philosophical text, in a legal code or in a poem, beside the 
letter of the text” (Bourdieu 2004, p. 19)45. On the other hand, the notion of field is an attempt 
to distinguish from approaches that assess the object of analysis solely in terms of its 
																																																								
45 Bourdieu is here referring to a “fetishism of autonomized text” that would have originated in French semiotics 
and spread to other postmodernist theoretical traditions (Bourdieu 2004, p. 17). 
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correspondence to the  “social or economic world” (Bourdieu 2004, p. 18)46, i.e. as pure 
expression of economic power, not mediated by any other forms of social interaction. The 
field, in turn, would be an “intermediate universe” between text and context, which is 
inevitably influenced by broad social and economic impulses, but also relatively autonomous 
from them, as it also has its own internal logics, and does not respond to economic and 
political impulses mechanically. The “degree of autonomy” among different social arenas 
constitutes precisely one of the “great questions that emerge regarding fields” (Bourdieu 
2004, p. 21).  
An example of such distinction is how a Bourdieusian analysis of law in terms of a 
legal field differs from both instrumentalist (notably Marxist) and “normative functionalist 
accounts” of the law (Bourdieu 1987; Dezalay and Madsen 2012, p. 439). While the first 
operates with the assumption that “law is [...] instrumentalized political ideology”, the latter 
approaches law as “modern society’s substitution of morality with a liberal ideology of rights 
as the device for social coherence” (Dezalay and Madsen 2012, p. 439)47. Instead, the study of 
law as a field underscores its nature as a social space that is relatively autonomous from the 
broader social environment, meaning that the law “functions in close relation with the 
exercise of power in other social realms and through other mechanisms”, but also has its 
“own complex, specific, and often antagonistic relation to the exercise of such power” 
(Terdiman 1987, p. 808). It is to say that although the practices that take place within the legal 
field are related, for instance, to economic and political imperatives, they are “significantly 
unlike the practices of any other social universe” because they take the specific form and 
language of the law, and are “strongly patterned by tradition, education, and the daily 
experience of legal custom and professional usage” (Terdiman 1987, p. 806-807). 
As a relatively autonomous social space, the field is conceived as a “network, or a 
configuration, of objective relations between positions” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 
97), a “place for struggle between different agents where different positions are based on the 
amount and forms of capital” (Dezalay and Madsen 2012, p. 441). In a less abstract 
definition, “the field of inquiry following a Bourdieusian research logic” entails “specific and 
specialized areas of practice” (my italics) (Dezalay and Madsen, p. 436). As recognized by 																																																								
46 On the other pole of these broad antagonist perspectives, Bourdieu situates a tradition “frequently represented 
by people affiliated with Marxism”, which tries to establish a direct connection between “text and context” 
(Bourdieu 2004, p. 18-19). Although such approach cannot be noticed in the surveyed mainstream narratives 
about competition policy reform, I take Bourdieu’s criticism as a “vaccine” for the alternative narrative I intend 
to propose. 
47 It is interesting to note that such “normative functionalist” perspective is similar to the accounts of competition 
policy reform often found in legal and economic scholarships, to the extent that they rely on “the letter of the 
text” – in this case, of the legal text – to extract conclusions about how it works and what roles it performs. 
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Bourdieu, “the concept of field can be used at different levels of aggregation” (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 1992, p. 104)48. Bringing the examples closer to the object of my research, the field 
may refer to a broad social space, such as the legal field (Bourdieu 1987), or specific areas of 
legal practice, such as human rights, international commerce arbitration, international 
criminal law (Dezalay and Madsen 2012, p. 436) – and it could be added: competition law 
and policy.  
Determining the boundaries of a field is a matter of empirical inquiry, and thus in 
analytical terms its limits can only be defined as those “within which an effect of field is 
exercised, so that what happens to any object that traverses this space cannot be explained 
solely by the intrinsic properties of the object in question” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 
100). What gives the field unity, i.e. what makes a specialized arena of practice a 
distinguishable field, is the specific form of capital (or power) that is at stake in that field. In 
the legal field, to keep the example, it is the power to determine what the law is (Bourdieu 
1987). In contrast, in an arena such as the economic field, it is economic capital that is 
disputed by the agents that interact in that arena. What defines that certain agents are part of 
the same field is thus that they dispute the stakes that are proper to that field. 
Disputes, as it has repeatedly been mentioned without any clarification, are a key form 
of interaction within fields, and also among fields. The “functioning of a field”, or its 
“principle of dynamics” is that of struggles among agents, in at least two senses: “in its 
representation and in its reality” (Bourdieu 2004, p. 29). On the one hand, struggles “in 
reality” are those for the specific stakes of the field: “struggle[s] between agents over gaining 
dominant positions in this social space, a process fueled by interest, dedication, belief, etc, in 
the issues at stake” (Dezalay and Madsen 2012, p. 441). On the other hand, the very structure 
of the field, its rules as a space for struggle are being disputed: “above all, it is a struggle 
concerning the dominant visions and division of the field itself, which conversely helps create 
not only the field’s logic and taken for granted limits but also its consecration mechanisms” 
(Dezalay and Madsen 2012, p. 441). Agents, their claims and strategies are oriented not only 
towards a dispute over a stake, but also towards establishing and generalizing its views or the 
views they represent as “legitimate” about that dispute. They are competitors for the 
monopoly over objectifying their very social practices (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 
259). Here is where Bourdieu’s framework reveals itself as one that takes interests and 
																																																								
48 Sometimes, in the case of lower levels of aggregation, Bourdieu uses the notion of “subfield”, as a more 
restrict space within a broader social field (e.g. Bourdieu 2004, p. 44). 
		 65	
conflicts as central elements of social practices, something eliminated from formalist or 
functionalist accounts.  
These disputes, however, do not occur in a vacuum, but are determined by the very 
structure of the field. This structure is given, in turn, by the positions existent in the field and 
by the agents who occupy them. Positions and capitals are precisely what give structure to a 
certain field to exercise its effects, revealing the centrality of agency for such framework. As 
it was mentioned, the field is a space of positions occupied by agents or institutions (Bourdieu 
and Wacquant 1992, p. 97; 105), it is “a social space composed of competing positions” 
(Dezalay and Madsen 2012, p. 441). Positions, in turn, are defined “in their existence and in 
the determinations they impose upon their occupants (...) by their present and potential 
situation in the structure of the distribution of species of power (or capital)” (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 1992, p. 97). The place of agency in Bourdieu’s field theory is thus central: “agents 
(...) create the space, and the space only exists (...) through agents and the objective relations 
among the agents that are placed there” (Bourdieu 2004, p. 23). As the field is an often 
conflictive space of practice, it is the “state of the relations of force between players that 
defines the structure of the field” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 99). It is to say that the 
positions agents occupy in a certain field are determined by the distribution of power among 
them, i.e. what in the jargon of a reflexive sociology is called capital. 
In Bourdieu’s framework, there are three main species of capital, each entailing its 
own subtypes: economic capital, cultural capital, and social capital (Bourdieu and Wacquant 
1992, p. 119). Economic capital “is readily converted into money and sometimes 
institutionalized in the form of property rights” (Bourdieu 1986, p. 241). Cultural capital, also 
named informational capital (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 119), exists in three forms: 
embodied (“long-lasting dispositions of the mind and body”), objectified (in the form of 
“cultural goods”, such as books, instruments, tools indicative of education and training), and 
institutionalized (such as educational qualifications which confer “entirely original properties 
on the cultural capital which it is presumed to guarantee”) (Bourdieu 1986, p. 242). Social 
capital, in turn, entails the belonging to a group not only by holding capitals similar to other 
agents, but also a set of interpersonal relations (Bourdieu 1980, p. 2). It refers to the 
possession of “durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual 
acquaintance and recognition” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 119) – i.e. “membership in a 
group”, including, for instance, the family (Bourdieu 1986, p. 246). 
This “typology” of forms of capital is not static in Bourdieu’s framework, as 
conversions that happen among the different species are a central dynamics to explain the 
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functioning of a field. For example, economic capital is converted into cultural capital when 
an advantageous economic condition of an individual is what enables her to achieve certain 
educational standards and earn titles. Also, an agent holding a high amount of legal capital 
probably profits from an advantageous position in the legal field, and can thus “reconvert” it 
into economic capital through profits earned, for example, as a lawyer in a prestigious law 
firm. 
Each field is the space of constitution of a specific form of capital derived from this 
typology (Bourdieu 2004, p. 26). For instance, in the legal field, a particular form of capital is 
crucial to determine the position occupied by its typical agents (lawyers): legal capital. Legal 
capital can be seen as a composition of different strands of cultural capital, such as the 
embodied capital given by the know-how in certain areas of the law, objectified capital given 
by the publication of influential legal treatises, and institutionalized cultural capital brought 
by a PhD earned in a recognized university. All together, these “valuable properties” held by 
an agent constitute her legal capital, i.e. what enables her to occupy certain positions within 
the legal field. The more legal capital an agent possesses, a better position she can achieve 
within the field. 
When a specific set of capitals is recognized and valued as legitimate in a certain field, 
and thus becomes a particular form of capital, it constitutes what Bourdieu called symbolic 
capital. It does not entail a fourth species of capital, but rather the form that one of the 
fundamental forms of capital is “grasped through categories of perception that recognize its 
specific logic, or [...] misrecognizes the arbitrariness of its possession an accumulation” 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 119). Symbolic capital comprises the “wealth” accumulated 
by an agent, not in the form of economic capital, but in non-material values that grant her 
access to certain positions in a determinate field. Symbolic capital appears in the form, for 
instance, of “authority, knowledge, prestige, reputation, academic degrees”, among others 
(Terdiman 1987, p. 812).  
The relationship between agents, capitals and positions is not, however, unidirectional. 
In Bourdieu’s framework, the idea that the possession of certain capitals determines the 
positions of agents in the field is only one side of the story. This structure of relations among 
different agents – i.e., the positions determined by the distribution of capital – is also what 
“commands the points of view”, what “they can and cannot do” (Bourdieu 2004, p. 23) and 
the strategies agents deploy in pursuing their interests in that field (Bourdieu and Wacquant 
1992, p. 101). In other words, the position occupied by agents in the objective structure 
composed by a network of positions captured by the concept of field orients position-taking 
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(Bourdieu 2004, p. 23). Agents therefore occupy positions in the field accordingly to the 
species of capital they possess, and their action is conditioned by their position in the field.  
At this point is where the objective dimension of Bourdieu’s theory (i.e. his 
characterization of the field as an objective structure of positions determined by forms of 
capital) also opens itself for a subjective dimension, i.e. in respect to the practices of the 
agents. In this framework, agents do not act mechanically in response to their positions in the 
field and thus accordingly to the capitals they possess and those they seek to obtain, such as 
the homo economicus of rational action theory (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 120-123). 
For Bourdieu, social action performed by the agents that occupy positions in the field cannot 
be explained solely by the forms and volumes of capital possessed or aimed by them. His 
theory also takes into account the “structures of preference that inhabit them [and that] are 
constituted in a complex temporal dialectic with the objective structures that produced them 
and which they tend to reproduce” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 123), “internalized 
schemes guiding agents’ behavior (...), a practical sense of reality” (Dezalay and Madsen 
2012, p. 442), “habitual, patterned ways of understanding, judging, and acting” (Terdiman 
1987, p. 811). This is what defines the Bourdieusian concept of habitus.  
These subjective structures are not innate or immutable, but are part of the “individual 
and collective history of agents” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 123), “throughout the 
agent’s particular and individual trajectory” (Dezalay and Madsen 2012, p. 442). As 
“different conditions of existence” (such as “different educational backgrounds, social 
statuses, professions, and regions”) that “give rise to forms of habitus characterized by 
internal resemblance within the group”, the habitus is a factor that contributes for the 
establishment of a group as such (Terdiman 1987, p. 811). Once the agents of the field may 
share such “internalized schemes”, the notion of habitus thus enables framing the social 
practices that take place within a field as both “stable and adversarial” (Dezalay and Madsen 
2012, p. 442). Despite being an arena of conflict, the field therefore also implies that actors 
share some fundamental understandings and practices about what defines the field, a common 
“sense of the game” (Bourdieu 1990). 
Having presented the central concepts of Bourdieu’s framework, it is still necessary to 
discuss how can these tools be put to work. According to the author himself, “an analysis in 
terms of fields involves three necessary and internally connected moments” (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 1992, p. 104). First, it is necessary to locate the position of the field studied “vis-à-
vis the field of power” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 104). It means understanding how 
close to arenas of power such as the state and the economy the analyzed field is situated. 
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Bourdieu mentions the literary field as the example of a field that “occupies a dominated 
position” within the field of power (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 104). A contrasting 
example would be the legal field, which has clearly a different connection to power, as it is 
directly imbricated with the economic and political fields. 
The second step identified by Bourdieu comprises “map[ping] out the objective 
structure of the relations between the positions occupied by the agents or institutions who 
compete for the legitimate form of specific authority of which this field is the site” (Bourdieu 
and Wacquant 1992, p. 105). In other words, it means unveiling the very structure of the field: 
its agents, and the positions they occupy, capitals they hold, strategies they deploy and 
struggles they fight. As the concepts themselves are imbricated in a non-linear, dialectical 
fashion, applying them leads to a sort of hermeneutic circle: “in order to construct the field, 
one must identify the forms of specific capital that operate within it, and to construct the 
forms of specific capital one must know the specific logic of the field” (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 1992, p. 108). 
According to Bourdieu, sociology shall “construct the space of objective relations 
(structure) of which the communicative exchanges we directly observe (interaction) are but 
the expression” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p.  256). Such “exchanges” come in the form 
of strategies that “agents deploy to win the symbolic struggle over the monopoly of the 
imposition of the verdict, for the recognized ability to tell the truth about the stake of the 
debate” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p.  256). In this sense, a sociological approach to 
these struggles shall not be one discourse among others disputing this monopoly. Rather, 
sociology must grasp what principles structure the field, what are the positions of the field, 
what are the actors that occupy it, how are capitals distributed among actors, what are the 
stakes of the dispute and through which strategies actors aim at achieving them.  
A sociological analysis therefore differs from “partial and interested objectivations 
promoted by the agents of the field” by objectifying the “set of points of view” and the very 
struggles for objectification of that field (Bourdieu 2004, p. 44). This is where the proposal of 
a “reflexive sociology” and the utility of the notion of field for such purposes become clear. 
The concept of field, and the framework built around it, is an analytical tool that enables 
avoiding the confusion between the discourses of the researcher with those of the agents of 
the field, and thus rupturing with “intuitive readings and spontaneous classifications that 
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always offer themselves as the point of departure for analysis” (Dezalay and Madsen 2012, p. 
437)49. 
Third, the researcher must identify the habitus of those agents that integrate the field, 
i.e. “the different systems of dispositions they have acquired by internalizing a determinate 
type of social and economic condition, and which find in a definite trajectory within the field 
under consideration a more or less favourable opportunity to become actualized” (Bourdieu 
and Wacquant 1992, p. 105). This step incorporates the subjective dimension into the 
analysis, addressing one of the elements that help to explain social action within a field. As 
Bourdieu puts it, “the field of positions is methodologically inseparable from the field of 
stances or position-takings [...], i.e. the structured system of practices and expressions of 
agents” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 105).  
 
2.1.2 Visualizing the field of competition policy and its agents 
 
In several ways, the described conceptual toolbox constitutes a helpful framework for 
the task of constructing an alternative narrative about how the process of reform of 
competition policy occurred and who were the agents that propelled it. In a more general 
level, it enables an epistemological rupture with mainstream narratives assessed in Chapter 1, 
especially those produced by institutions, lawyers and economists. The perspective of a 
reflexive sociology implies visualizing those narratives not simply as knowledge available to 
understand reform and its outcomes, but discourses produced by the very agents that are part 
of the field and that struggle to objectify it. As Bourdieu puts it, these social representations 
that are “lived and given as objective and universal [...] are in fact weapons in internal 
struggles” (Bourdieu 2004, p. 46). It is thus possible to understand why those narratives 
frequently depoliticize competition policy reform and its outcomes: once they are often 
produced by the very agents that integrate the field, narrating reform as a technical and 
																																																								
49 The “rupture” with the agents’ attempts of objectification promoted by a reflexive sociological approach does 
not imply an “epistemological superiority” of the discourse produced about the field vis-à-vis those discourses 
produced within or by the field. Rather, it serves as an epistemological distinction between these narratives. 
While the descriptions produced by the agents of the field – which are at the same time its “theoreticians” – can 
hardly be distinguished from normative assertions about how the field should work, a sociological approach to 
the field aims to go “beyond these stakes and interests” (Dezalay and Madsen 2012, p. 437). This is not to say 
such endeavor is “aseptic”, free of political values. A reflexive sociology does not subscribe to “the utopian hope 
that each individual can free himself from the ideologies that weight on his research by the sheer strength of a 
self-imposed reform of a socially conditioned understanding” (Bourdieu et al 1991, p. 74). Its purposes are rather 
achieved through a permanent “epistemological vigilance” in the research process, made feasible by the 
conceptual tools so far described. 
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evolutionary process, free of interests and interested agents, is crucial for their legitimation 
within the field and of the field as a whole. 
Bourdieu’s framework also provides a useful alternative to the shortcomings identified 
in how those narratives articulate the process and the agents of reform. A reflexive 
sociological approach to competition policy brings a thick theory of agency that re-politicizes 
reform. Within this perspective, reform becomes the creation of a field, and the focus on 
concrete agents is a crucial mean to understand this process, as well as how the inaugurated 
arena of practice works and therefore what it serves. This is because, as Dezalay and Garth 
(2002b, p. 307) maintain, “the content and the scope of rules produced to govern the state and 
the economy cannot be separated from the circumstances of their creation and production”. 
These circumstances of production, determined by the agents that structure the field, do not 
mechanically determine its functioning, but “shape the range of possibilities that are likely to 
be contemplated and implemented – or ignored” (Dezalay and Garth 2002b, p. 307). 
This framework thus circumvents agentless accounts, or narratives that rely on an 
abstract notion of government. Similarly, the limited narrative that explains reform solely on 
the basis of global and expert agents (such as diffusion perspectives) is also complexified. 
What such literature focusing on “epistemic communities” and “advocacy networks” as 
agents of reform takes as homogenous and politics-free groups, a field approach highlights as 
agents that are part of a hierarchical arena of practice plenty of internal disputes (Dezalay and 
Garth 2002a, p. 184, Picciotto 1997). Also, while “diffusion perspectives” privilege the focus 
on global actors in detriment to the role of local agents, Bourdieu’s framework – notably in its 
later developments by his collaborators (e.g. Dezalay and Garth 2002a; Dezalay and Madsen 
2012) – enables the linkage of national and international dynamics: the international depends 
on the national, and that the national is affected by the international (Dezalay and Garth 
2002a, p. 13).  
By putting the struggles among agents as a crucial dynamic to understand the field, the 
actor-centered approach of Bourdieu therefore does not incur in “enthusiastic” or 
“instrumentalist” views of reform. Rather, it places interests and conflicts at the core of the 
endeavor of understanding how reform takes place, how the instituted field works and what it 
serves. It also expands the possibilities for analyzing the field beyond the process by which it 
is created, opening way to study how it is actually practiced, i.e. who are the agents that 
integrate and reproduce this field after it was established. It thus enables a diachronic 
perspective for the study of reform. 
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The emergence and structuring of a field of practice, however, does not occur through 
a process of abiogenesis. As Dezalay and Madsen (2012, p. 441) put it, “the emergence of a 
new field almost always has its roots in other fields”. In this sense, competition policy can be 
seen as a field, or a “subfield” originated at the intersection of least four more consolidated 
and broader fields: the economic field, the political field, the legal field and the field of 
economics. Its linkages to the economic and political fields are quite evident: competition 
policy entails a model of economic governance led by state institutions with the role of 
defining norms of interaction among economic agents. CADE’s institutional status as a 
“competition authority” connected to the Ministry of Justice, the ministerial secretariats that 
compose the SBDC and the role of the President in selecting commissioners are just a few 
examples that illustrate how competition policy is connected to the dynamics of the political 
field. Similarly, corporations that struggle (or “compete”, in the economic sense particular to 
competition policy) in the economic field are the very agents subjected to the institutional 
framework responsible for producing antitrust law. 
As a relatively autonomous field of practice, however, competition policy is 
fundamentally rooted in the fields of law and economics. It comprises an arena of 
professional practice occupied by agents that are typical of those fields: lawyers50 and 
economists. The agents of the legal and economics fields are those who perform roles at the 
governmental institutions responsible for producing competition policy (i.e. as commissioners 
in CADE, and in different ministerial positions), as well as those who represent and assist 
corporations before state institutions. Moreover, law and economics constitute the very 
“language” of the exchanges and interactions that take place within this field. The struggles 
within the field of competition policy occur through legal battles and struggles over economic 
science. Lawyers and economists are therefore the ones responsible for mediating the 
interaction of this field with the political and economic fields. That most of the available 
narratives about the history of competition policy, its purposes and outcomes are produced by 
lawyers and economists is an indication of their prominent role in the field.  
So far, the translation of the reflexive sociology approach to my object has 
accomplished the task of locating the subfield of competition policy in relation to other fields 
of power. As sustained by Bourdieu, the use of this framework in research demands other two 
steps: to map the objective structure of relations between the positions occupied by the agents 																																																								
50 The concept of “lawyers” refers not only to the professionals of litigation, who practice law, such as attorneys 
or counselors. Rather, it encompasses indistinguishably those who possess a legal degree, and it is used 
interchangeably with the notion of “jurists”. 
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of the field, and identify their habitus. These are precisely the tasks that I will tackle in my 
empirical research. At this point, it is necessary to explain how I translated them into refined 
research questions. 
Following the approach of a reflexive sociology, I derive two sets of empirical 
questions to guide the research of the reform and practice of the field of competition policy in 
Brazil. First, to understand the process of constitution of the field through the agents that 
construct it, the research questions under a field approach become the following: Who are the 
agents of competition policy reform in Brazil? What are their positions, capitals, and 
habitus? How did they shape the reform process? If, as I suggested, the field of competition 
policy is a space of intersection born out of four other fields, answering these questions 
demands identifying who are the agents that acted in the process of reform, what were their 
positions in the fields of origin, what sorts of capital they possessed, and what were their 
“systems of dispositions”. As I will argue in Chapter 4, agents of the economic and political 
fields attempted to impact reform in different ways. The agents of the fields of law and 
economics (lawyers and economists) were, in turn, the “architects” of the institutional 
arrangement set up for producing competition law. The study of the constitution of the 
competition policy field in Brazil thus demands mapping the objective structure of positions 
from where it emerges, and assessing who were the agents involved in reform is a means to 
do so. 
Through these questions, it will be possible to visualize what are the struggles around 
reform and what concrete agents were hegemonic in determining the structure of the field 
created, its rules of functioning and thus the roles it may and may not perform. By knowing 
who the agents are, understanding the struggles in which they engage, and locating the 
positions from where they depart to act as reformers, the process of reform is re-politicized, 
and the connections of these agents to political stances about how the state should regulate the 
economy – the core issue in the field of competition policy – can be thus revealed. In doing 
so, the depoliticizing notion of “the government” as the agent of reform, or the excessively 
global perspectives focusing on the role of purely “technical agents”, are circumvented, and 
the process of creation of the modern field of competition policy in Brazil is explained 
through the concrete agents that produce it, the political perspectives they represent, and the 
content they infuse into the field that is created. 
Second, to understand how the field is structured after its constitution, that is, what are 
the objective relations that structure its practice, I propose the following question: Who are 
the agents of practice of competition policy in Brazil? What are their positions in the field, 
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their capitals, and habitus? As already anticipated, lawyers and economists occupy the arena 
of professional practice comprised by antitrust policy. They act in several positions of the 
field: both in state functions, as CADE’s commissioners or in ministerial secretariats that, 
together, compose the SBDC, and in law firms and economic consultancies representing and 
assisting corporations in cases decided by CADE. Therefore, lawyers and economists are the 
agents that possess the power to determine what the law is – in this case, competition law – 
and who struggle over the monopoly to define it.  
On the side of the state (the SBDC), the analysis of the capitals possessed by these 
agents and, consequently, of the positions they occupy in the field enables revealing what 
kinds of agents are recruited to produce competition policy, what entitles them to be so, and 
what is the dominant habitus that is institutionalized in the field. By mapping the objective 
structure of relations that these agents compose, it will be possible to assess what are the 
hegemonic profiles entitled of the power to produce competition law in Brazil, and to connect 
them to political positions, interests and struggles, thus re-politicizing the very production of 
competition regulation.  
The analysis of the agents of the market is a necessary complement to the picture. 
Trough the mapping of who are the agents that represent corporations before antitrust 
authorities, it is possible to assess how distant from the state – in terms of social connections, 
profiles and habitus – are the subjects that competition policy is said to control. In other 
words, the analysis of the “professional” dimension of competition policy is a means to 
overcome mainstream narratives attempt to characterize competition policy as clear-cut 
separation between the state and the market, an instrument through which the abstract entity 
of the “state” controls another impalpable category: the “market”. It is precisely based on the 
assumption that competition policy embodies a separation between the state and the market 
that these narratives ignore the possible functionalities of competition policy to the market 
logics embedded in neoliberalism, or even neglect it. 
Following the approach of a reflexive sociology, mapping the structure of relations 
among the agents that produce competition regulation – in the state and in the market – is a 
means to assess what stances can be expected from the field after it was reformed. Such 
framework depicts what Trubek et al (1994) called the “mode of production of law” – in this 
case, of competition law and policy. The mode of production is determined, among other 
factors, by the allocation of roles among the various positions in the field, the way in which 
the field (re)produces its habitus, the importance of social capital in recruitment to the field, 
and its dominant mode of legitimation (Trubek et al 1994, p. 419). 
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Through these refined research questions elaborated on the basis of a reflexive 
sociology approach, different conclusions about the roles of competition policy reform and 
practice with neoliberalism can be reached. For this purpose, analyzing the roles of lawyers 
and economists in the creation and operation of the field of competition policy emerges as a 
central task. In the next section, I provide several illustrations of how an actor-centered 
approach that focuses on the study of lawyers and economists as agents that construct power 
relations in society and propel political transformations is useful to understand the 
construction of fields of practice, its structures and connections to political projects. The 
examples presented also serve as parameters to interpret the data collected about the agents of 
competition policy reform and practice in Brazil, and thus to evaluate the possible linkages of 
this field’s structure to neoliberalism. 
 
2.2 Lawyers and economists as agents of neoliberalism 
 
Sociological approaches to the study of lawyers and economists constitute a vast 
branch of research in the sociology of law and economic sociology, respectively. The study of 
these professional groups may, however, focus on different aspects of their connections to 
society. The literature on lawyers is exemplary of such diverse forms of studying these 
agents. Some authors have approached lawyers in professional terms, underscoring the 
“power structure of the legal professions” (Cain and Harrington 1994, p. 1). These are efforts 
close to the sociology of professions that emphasize how social, economic and political 
aspects are reflected by and affect lawyers and the organization of their work (Abel 1995, 
Abel and Lewis 1988, 1989, 1995, Heinz and Laumann 1994). Topics such as the social 
conditionings of the work performed by lawyers (Larson 1977, Powell 1989) and the 
interaction with other professions in the market of professional services (Abbott 1988) have 
been privileged by this literature.  
Criticisms to this sociology of the legal professions have stressed that a strictly 
professional approach on lawyers would reflect a sort of “occupationist orientation” (Cain and 
Harrington 1994, p. 1), a “professional narcissism” (Halliday 1987) with no “macro-
sociological” agenda (Halliday 1998, p. 245) about the role of law, lawyers and legal 
expertise in society. A more comprehensive study of “lawyers in society” has been thus called 
for as necessary to explain what makes lawyers distinctive from other professions, what do 
lawyers know, and how they relate to society and the economy as a whole (Abel and Lewis 
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1995, p. 282). In line with this critique, several studies develop an effort to understand what 
Cain and Harrington (1994, p. 01) call the “constitutive role [lawyers’] work plays in shaping 
power relationships in society”. Within this strand, some authors have focused on 
understanding “the ways in which lawyers represent working-class and underprivileged 
clients”, or the “alternative forms of law work that are carried out on behalf of those typically 
excluded from the control of capital and from influence in the central state” (Cain and 
Harrington 1994, p. 01-02). Others, in turn, have privileged the study of the hegemonic roles 
played by lawyers, stressing the ways in which they contribute to the “creative institution 
building on behalf of capital” (Cain and Harrington 1994, p. 01-02). 
The kind of approach that illustrates my focus on lawyers and economists as agents of 
neoliberalism is precisely the one that underscores the constitutive roles of these agents in 
society, especially in constructing, transforming and operating hegemonic social relationships 
and institutions. In the sociology of law, these are studies that reveal the roles of lawyers as 
institutions builders and statesmen. In economic sociology, it entails a growing scholarship 
that theorizes the rise of economists into positions of power and their active roles in 
structuring new forms of economic governance. These studies do not abandon the 
understanding of the internal structuring of each professional field, but rather link 
professional dynamics to political stakes – which is precisely the task that stems from the 
translation of the reflexive sociology approach to the study of the field of competition policy. 
As I will try to show in the next subsections, a vast literature from sociology of law and 
economic sociology has identified how lawyers and economists occupying certain positions 
within their fields of origins, and thus possessing a specific set of capitals and habitus have 
been crucial for the structuring of neoliberal reforms.  
 
2.2.1 Lawyers as institutions builders and statesmen 
 
My proposal to understand the linkages between the constitution and practice of the 
field of competition policy to neoliberalism through the roles of lawyers is based on sociology 
of law’s extensive contributions about the historical importance of these agents for the 
creation, transformation and management of political and economic institutions. I depart from 
the assumption that lawyers are not only the operators of the legal system, acting in different 
functions in the judiciary or as professionals that represent clients. Rather, lawyers are also 
active agents in creating and transforming institutions and fields of practice that shape the 
state and the economy.  
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They are “institution builders” whose work entails constituting the institutional 
contours of society, the state and the economy (Halliday 1987, 1998, p. 269-270, Halliday and 
Karpik 1997). As “conceptive ideologists” of capitalism (Cain 1979, 1994), they create the 
“regulatory forms in and through which corporate capitalism develops” (McCahery and 
Picciotto 1995, p. 244). Lawyers promote an ideology that simultaneously constitutes and is 
constituted by the power relations based on economic factors (Cain and Harrington 1994). As 
already suggested in Weber’s seminal sociological approach to the law, lawyers and their 
expert knowledge create the subjects and the boundaries of market transactions; constitute the 
forms and limits of commodification; promote legal innovations that induce transformations 
in economic behavior; and provide legitimacy and an appearance of control and justice to the 
markets (Halliday 1998, p. 250-254). These roles can be observed in a variety of examples 
about the construction of regulatory systems that structure economic transactions, such as 
financial regimes (Hartmann 1995), international taxation (Picciotto 1995), insolvency and 
bankruptcy regimes (Halliday and Carruthers 1993, 2009), international arbitration (Dezalay 
and Garth 1996), and more importantly to this work: antitrust regulation (Dezalay 1992, 1995, 
Dezalay et al 1995). 
In line with the framework sketched in the previous section, I understand that the 
construction and transformation of institutions and fields by lawyers depends on who they 
are: that is, on their positions within the legal field, the sorts of capitals they possess, habitus 
they share and disputes they fight. The shape of any field is conditioned by the agents that 
structure it, and when lawyers are these agents it is no different51. Based on this assumption, 
my research deals with lawyers who reform and manage a field of economic governance 
located within the state apparatuses. The “role of lawyers in the exercise of power” has been 
observed at the national, regional and local levels in the “formal organization of collective 
decision-making” (Rueschmeyer 1973, p. 78) as early as in the nineteenth century. Since 
Tocqueville (2010 [1835]) and Weber (2004 [1919]), a vast literature has described and 
explained how and why the legal professions have historically performed such broad roles in 																																																								
51 Exemplary of the application of such framework of a reflexive sociology for the study of the role of lawyers in 
constructing and transforming of fields of practice are the studies conducted by Dezalay (1990) and Dezalay and 
Garth (2004) about how the struggles among the different “models of professional practice” entailed by law 
firms, multidisciplinary consultancies, and audit companies helped to shape business practices around the world. 
In a similar sense, the book edited by Dezalay and Sugarman (1995) presents several studies that interpret shifts 
in the corporate world as a function of the agents that construct it and their struggles, especially lawyers and the 
“professionals of numbers”, such as accountants and managers. Dezalay and Garth (1996) also provide an 
illustration through the study of the construction of the field of international arbitration, and Dezalay (1992, 
1995) provides yet another example by focusing on the battles between American and European lawyers in the 
shaping of the field of antitrust policy in Europe. 
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the state and the economy. Empirical research on the United States has corroborated 
Tocqueville’s perception that lawyers have been “overrepresented” in North American 
political institutions52. Similar accounts about the role of lawyers in state apparatuses have 
been produced in reference to other countries of the global North, such as Germany 
(Rueschmeyer 1973), the United Kingdom (Podmore 1977; Sugarman 1994), and France 
(Weber 2004 [1919]; Karpik 1999). 
The phenomenon has also been observed in the global South, notably in Asia (Dezalay 
and Garth 2010) and Latin America (Dezalay and Garth 2002a), where lawyers have 
historically dominated state structures. In countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia and Mexico, lawyers conformed the vast majority of presidents, ministers, 
government cabinets, senators, representatives and bureaucrats during most part of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. They were the very “builders of nations (…), in charge of 
creating and interpreting the rules of the game for national politics and business” (Pérez-
Perdomo 2006, p. 94). 
Brazil is no exception to the historical rule of lawyers in the state apparatuses, as 
many local studies developed by political sociology and the sociology of elites, notably 
between the end of the 1970s and the mid 1980s indicate (e.g. Venancio Filho 2004, Falcão 
1979, Simões 1983, Adorno 1988, Carvalho 2012). Jurists have been pointed as hegemonic in 
performing political roles in the country in different historical periods: during Portugal’s 
colonial control over Brazil (from the sixteenth century until 1822), in the Imperial period 
inaugurated by independence (from 1822 to 1889), and in the so called Brazilian first 
Republic (from 1889 to 1930). Lawyers were central in the process of state building that 
followed independence, as many jurists were appointed to “perform the tasks of government” 
(Carvalho 2012, p. 36; 99).  
The creation of law schools (i.e. the production of lawyers), as elsewhere in Latin 
America, was an integral part of the construction of the independent nation. Lawyers had a 
historical role of architecting liberalism in Brazil53, ideologically consolidating a national 
elite, and legitimating the control of the state apparatus by turning a de facto power into de 
iure power (Falcão 1979, p. 373). As Dezalay and Garth (2002a, p. 18) explain, lawyers have 																																																								
52 For instance, the studies of Eulau and Sprague (1964), Miller (1995) and Freidson (1986, p. 193) detect the 
prominent roles of lawyers as presidents, legislators, and officials of regulatory agencies in the first half of the 
twentieth century. Lawyers have also been prominent in positions of economic policy-making (Khademian 
1992), and as managers of corporations (Larson 1977, p. 167-170). 
53 As Falcão (1989, p. 434) maintains, although Brazilian lawyers have historically presented themselves as the 
heirs of liberalism and the rule of law, playing prominent roles in resisting to authoritarian rule in certain 
moments (for instance, against Vargas’ dictatorship in the 1940s), their actual legal practice have also “helped to 
implement most of the authoritarian legislation”. 
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historically represented a “kind of aristocratic ideal of government”, and relied on their 
“general legal training and practical wisdom” to play many roles in Brazilian politics: as 
intellectuals, politicians, business leaders, and, above all, intermediaries between public and 
private, the learned world and the world of affairs” (Dezalay and Garth 2002a, p. 18). In the 
discussed periods, legal education was less a skill that enabled an individual to pursue a legal 
career (as a judge, as a prosecutor or lawyer), than to enter state politics (Dezalay and Garth 
2002a, p. 19). Despite qualitative changes (for example, the passage from the dominance of 
magistrates to the prominence of lawyers) and a relative decay in the number of lawyers 
occupying high positions in Brazilian political institutions, this literature indicates that an elite 
trained in law was permanently present in the political arena. Such constant prominence has 
motivated narratives both in the academic and in the political fields regarding the dominance 
of “bachelorism” in the Brazilian state, i.e. the overrepresentation of bachelors, notably in 
law, in political institutions.  
This prominence would have implied the dominance of lawyers’ “forma mentis” in 
government – a rationality characterized by its “appeal to the forms” and “rhetorical 
distancing from research” (Venancio Filho 2004, p. 294). Legal expertise achieved “the 
highest standard of political knowledge” in Latin American countries during most of the 
nineteenth and the twentieth centuries because it comprises a sort of “science of the state – 
that is, a science for and of the state” (Dezalay and Madsen 2012, p. 438). The defining 
characteristic of law as symbolic capital (the typical capital provided by the legal field) is that 
it provides “a rhetoric of universality and neutrality” that operates as “a tool for ordering 
politics without necessarily doing politics” (Dezalay and Madsen 2012, p. 438). Not by 
chance, lawyers have been historically entitled to work as “public men”, guiding public 
opinion and articulating social demands and the state’s responses to it (Pérez-Perdomo 2006, 
p. 93-94). 
The historical roles of lawyers in shaping and managing the state apparatuses have 
nevertheless undergone important changes in the context of economic internationalization of 
the 1980s and 1990s. As Dezalay and Garth (2002a) suggest, the neoliberal transformations 
that occurred in the period were related to disputes of models to govern the state and the 
economy that contested the historical sovereignty of lawyers as statesmen and of law as a 
governing expertise. The paradigm of the “politicians of the law” started to be challenged in 
the new economic context that emerged in the 1980s. A battle between “an old knowledge, 
found in the courts and law faculties” and a “new knowledge coming from the North” 
(Dezalay and Garth 2002a, p. 43) was installed in parallel to and propelling the transformation 
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of the state. On one side, the generalist knowledge possessed by lawyers formed in the 
European tradition. On the other side, “technopols” – individuals entitled with an innovative 
form of cultural capital to govern the state: economic science, especially that produced in the 
U.S. (Dezalay e Garth 2002a, p. 28). In Dezalay and Garth’s view (2002a, p. 286), this was 
conflict against law schools in order to determine who had the necessary abilities to govern. 
The economic crisis that affected Latin American countries by the end of the 1970s, 
which constituted an important justification for neoliberal reforms (see section 2.4), opened 
way for jurists who historically dominated the field of state power to be discredited as 
“anachronistic”, and incapable of promoting “economic progress”  (Dezalay e Garth 2002a, p. 
35-36). This contestation, mostly promoted by economists, implied a new “hierarchy of 
knowledge”, determined, in turn, by the international market of expertise in which the U.S. 
had hegemony (Dezalay e Garth 2002a, p. 57). As a consolidated expertise in the U.S. field of 
state power, economics gained legitimacy in states that were undergoing reforms. To Latin 
American countries, this hierarchy implied what Dezalay and Garth (2002a, p. 15) 
characterized as the “retooling of state elites”: the shift of the legitimate capital to govern – 
from law to economics –, and a change in the main source of this capital – from the European 
legal tradition to the North American new economic orthodoxy. The expertise to govern the 
state was thus “dollarized” in two senses: it became more economic, and in the intellectual 
currency of the U.S. (Dezalay and Garth 2002a, p. 247). 
The ascendancy of economists to dominating positions within the field of state power 
thus represented a battle against generalist lawyers, and the attempt to consolidate a new 
professional symbolic power as the legitimate technology of government54. In political terms, 
these struggles paralleled the dismantlement of developmental states produced since the 
1930s, and the consequent consolidation of regimes suitable for the neoliberal project of 
constructing free markets. The clashes among generalist lawyers and economists constitute, in 
this sense, the “general history” of the transformation of the state in Latin America (Dezalay 
and Garth 2002a). As Dezalay and Garth (2002a, p. 17) suggest, “the people who serve 
developmental states [...] do not have the same profile as those who serve the neoliberal 
democracies”. 
																																																								
54 In the study of the transition from dictatorship to democracy in Brazil, Faria (1993) also identifies a tension 
between lawyers and economists. A polarization between law and economics as two “criteria of rationality” 
would have emerged in the early 1990s, when several anti-inflationary programs, the sanitation of public 
finances and public debt, and the stabilization of the economic system were implemented (Faria 1993, p. 21). 
This was a tension between the “imperatives of the economy” – seeking allocative efficiency – and the 
“exigencies of the law” – and its attention to the legal-rational framing of power (Faria 1993, p. 12). 
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It is not to say that lawyers ceased to be relevant for the transformation and 
management of state structures in neoliberalism. As Shivji (2006) maintains, “neoliberalism 
generates a transnational legal intelligentsia to serve and oil it”. They pave the way for the 
globalization of corporate capital in several ways: through the drafting of legislation on 
privatization, by setting up “enabling institutional frameworks in which corporate capital can 
function without let or hindrance [...], in drafting contracts to enable corporate capital to 
exploit underground minerals and overground bio-resources [...], in facilitating 
commodification of education and health; water and energy”, among others (Shivji 2006).  
Exemplary of the renewed roles of lawyers in neoliberal reforms in Latin America is 
how the “global neoliberal project”, which began being implemented in the late 1980s mostly 
through measures of economic liberalization, started to incorporate elements of institutional 
and legal reforms by the 1990s (Rodríguez-Garavito 2011, Dezalay and Garth 2002b). Such 
“institutional turn” of the Washington Consensus sought to promote “market-enhancing 
institutions” seen as necessary for neoliberal transformations of the economy, and “entailed 
an unprecedented investment in judicial and rule of law reform” (Rodríguez-Garavito 2011, p. 
159)55. As Dezalay and Garth (2002a, p. 170) maintain, “in order to consolidate the policy 
gains of the neoliberal revolution, it appeared essential to reconstruct some level of 
regulation”. Lawyers thus became key-agents to design and perform reforms that sought to 
promote economically efficient legal institutions (Dezalay and Garth 2002a, p. 164; 171; 
Gordon 2010) 56 . Globalization implied, in this sense, an increased juridification and 
judicialization of Latin American societies, and thus the demand for legal services and for the 
active roles of lawyers grew, especially in the new regulatory arenas opened by neoliberal 
policies of deregulation and privatizations (Pérez-Perdomo 2006, p. 121-129)57. 
																																																								
55 The “institutional turn” comprises the second of what can be seen as three “periods” of the state reform agenda 
propelled by the World Bank. According to Santos (2006, p. 267-268), the first phase, from the 1980s to 1990, 
would be that of “structural adjustments”: a series of market shock and trade liberalization measures. The second 
phase, from 1990 to 1999, would be the “governance period”, in which the Bank incorporated recommendations 
of institutional nature into its agenda of state reform. The third phase, from 1999 onwards, would be that of a 
“comprehensive development”, which “seeks to reconceptualize development by going beyond its 
macroeconomic and financial aspects to focus on structural, social, and human concerns” (Santos 2006, p. 268). 
56 It is important to note that, in the case of Brazil, the “comeback of lawyers” precedes the institutional turn of 
the neoliberal agenda. This is because the process of drafting the Constitution of 1988 “brought together the elite 
and the traditional language of law, favored in the setting of debates about government” (Dezalay and Garth 
2002a, p. 158). In many senses, the Constitution consolidated an active role of the government in participating in 
and regulating the economy, and provided several social protections in the form of rights. Neoliberal reforms 
started short after its promulgation, and were intensified in the mid-1990s through several constitutional reforms 
for liberalizing the economy. Neoliberalism was thus “constitutionalized” in the 1990s (Schneiderman 2008). 
57 Other examples of such prominent roles of lawyers in fields of practice transformed or created in the context 
of economic globalization are the roles of jurists as the key-agents in the NAFTA panels for dispute resolution, 
how lawyers have displaced the “diplomatic culture in favor of a more law-oriented one” in the World Trade 
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In the neoliberal restructuring of Latin American states, legal expertise was therefore 
central – but also fundamentally transformed (Pérez-Perdomo 2006, p. 123). A defining 
characteristic of this transformation is the alignment to the standards of American legal 
thinking and institutional models of regulation. What is distinctive about the form of legal 
expertise demanded by neoliberal reforms is its orientation by the orthodox economic 
institutional and cognitive models of the United States, and the lower influence of the 
historical European sources, as it was the historical case of Brazil (Dezalay and Garth 2002a, 
p. 42). As suggested by Mattei (2003, p. 383) the post-Cold War period, precisely the context 
from which neoliberal reforms emerge, can be seen as “a general process of Americanization 
in legal thinking”. The American economic and political global hegemony reaffirmed in this 
period produced impacts on the legal field in the form of “the diffusion of professional ways 
of thinking about the law and to address such major intellectual changes as results of the 
ideological apparatuses of global governance” (Mattei 2003, p. 408)58.  
Such process of Americanization can be explained by the increasing hegemony of 
American law as a better-adapted model “to neoliberal needs as compared, for instance, to 
European black-letter law” (Nader 2005, p. 210). In the case of Latin America, where such 
European tradition has been historically influential, the new regulatory arenas opened by 
neoliberalism created a need for lawyers both in the market and in the state with “knowledge 
and skills that many law schools have been unable to provide” (Pérez-Perdomo 2006, p. 121). 
For lawyers to take part in the creation and management of fields of practice opened or 
transformed by neoliberalism several transformations in the legal field occurred. The 
dollarization of state expertise in Latin American countries therefore also affected the law, 
although in a lower intensity, or with more resistances than in economics (Dezalay and Garth 
2002a, p. 56-57)59. 
																																																																																																																																																																													
Organization (Costa 2011), and their higher importance in the World Bank since the late 1990s and early 2000s 
(Pérez-Perdomo 2006, p. 132). 
58 Some of the defining traces of such Americanized legal thinking in the period of neoliberal globalization can 
be found in the work of Heydebrand (2003a, 2007). This author identifies a correspondence between the process 
of economic and political globalization and the emergence of a new type of legal rationality that would be 
functional to neoliberal globalization, as it provides a strategic combination of hard and soft procedures, and 
expand the scope of discretion in legal, political and economic decision-making and governance (Heydebrand 
2007, p. 93), as well as promotes the depolitization of government, a selective deregulation of economy, the 
deformalization of law, the deinstitutionalization of justice and the privatization of public spheres (Heydebrand 
2003a, p. 335). 
59 As Dezalay and Garth (2002a, p. 47-48) explain, the impact of the so-called “dollarization” in the legal field 
was less incisive than in economics because there is a “much longer history of legal institutions in Latin America 
and their strict embeddedness in historical structures of power. The positions of the faculties of law and the 
courts are thus the product of long histories producing patterns of behavior and hierarchies of power that are very 
difficult to change”. 
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The dollarization of law and lawyers in Latin America can be noted in the 
consolidation of the American model of “business law” in legal education, and in professional 
practice. As the skills demanded of the lawyer tuned with the pulses of an internationalized 
economy have been often absent of the European legal tradition dominant in countries such as 
Brazil, new techniques for the practice of the law and the construction of institutional and 
legal models have been imported (Engelmann 2011, p. 39). Several initiatives to reform legal 
education accordingly to these ideals took place in the region, promoted especially by private 
institutions, with the objective of training business lawyers on modern areas of economic 
regulation and judicial reform (Pérez-Perdomo 2006, p. 109, Dezalay and Garth 2002a). In 
Brazil, such roles have been exemplarily conducted by the Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV), 
both in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, which often adopt both the structure and pedagogical 
canons of American universities, have a staff mostly composed by professors who obtained 
doctoral degrees in the US, and focus on undergraduate and graduate courses on innovative 
areas of economic regulation (Engelmann 2011, p. 27-29). 
In the world of legal practice, the process of Americanization of law entails the 
diffusion of the model of the American law firm, and the consolidation of a “new class of 
lawyers” (Nader 2005, p. 202). The historically dominant model of law firms as family 
enterprises found in most of Latin American and European countries (Dezalay and Garth 
2002a, p. 49, Dezalay 1995), started to change within the context of economic 
internationalization. In Brazil, elite law firms that emulate the U.S. corporate model have 
been “a key agent and product of the Americanization of the legal landscape” (Dezalay and 
Garth 2002a, p. 198). In a small yet elite group, large business law firms composed by 
lawyers often trained in American institutions and with an internal organization similar to its 
U.S. homologues started to emerge. Even some of those that remained with a familial 
structure often became a “hybrid”, incorporating American legal expertise into its practice 
(Dezalay and Garth 2002a, p. 199). 
Corporate lawyers who work in these firms have themselves undergone a process of 
Americanization. In the case of Brazil, for instance, and in comparison to lawyers in 
traditional legal careers such as the Supreme Court’s justices (Almeida 2010), or Brazilian 
legal academics (Engelmann 2008), the capitals possessed by corporate lawyers are much 
more “dollarized”. While the former are less internationalized, and tend to concentrate 
eventual international educational experiences in the Continental European legal tradition, 
elite corporate lawyers often pursue graduate studies in the United States, are frequently 
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proficient in English and licensed to practice the law in other jurisdictions, especially the U.S. 
(Engelmann 2011, p. 25). 
As Engelmann (2011, p. 39) suggests, the pole of “business lawyers” in Brazil, its 
professional practices, and relations with the constitution of legal and judicial institutions 
aligned with the demands of the economic sphere expanded throughout the 1990s and 2000s. 
As neoliberal measures of privatizations and deregulation opened new arenas of economic 
activity and paved the way for the entrance of multinational corporations into liberalized 
markets, it also engendered new fields of practice for this legal elite of corporate lawyers to 
become mediators among corporations, and between them and the government (Seong-Hyun 
2011, Pérez-Perdomo 2006, p. 121, Dezalay and Garth 2002a, p. 50).  
The roles of corporate lawyers are thus not restricted to the market of professional 
services, as they often occupy positions in regulatory arenas, such as chambers of commerce 
and arbitration, governmental institutions responsible for producing economic regulation 
(Engelmann 2011, p. 25), and are key-vectors of the import of new technologies, such as 
court reforms and legal education (Dezalay and Garth 2002a, p. 198; 205). These two 
dimensions of the roles of corporate lawyers are frequently intertwined: acting in 
governmental and regulatory positions provides capital to corporate lawyers to work in the 
professional market, especially when they deal with business regulation while in the state 
(Pérez-Perdomo 2006, p. 119).  
Another front of Americanization that has been functional to reposition the role of 
lawyers in neoliberalism is the diffusion of a form of legal reasoning that relies on the 
application of economic methods and theory, especially microeconomics, to “examine the 
formation, structure, processes, and economic impact of law and legal institutions” (Mercuro 
e Medema 2006, p. 01): the so-called “Law and Economics” movement (L&E) 60. As it 
originated in the US in the 1950s, and later consolidated in the 1970s (MacKaay 1999), L&E 
is born out of a criticism to the alleged incapacity of traditional legal expertise in responding 
adequately to economic phenomena61. As different models of rationality, economics and the 																																																								
60 Although until the 1980s L&E had a relative “consensus about method and agenda” built around neoclassical 
economics (MacKaay 1999, p. 67), there are currently several nuances in the perspectives that mobilize 
microeconomic methods to approach legal phenomena. According to Mercuro e Medema (2006), contemporary 
L&E includes the orthodox economics developed at the University of Chicago, public choice theories, 
institutional and new institutional economics. 
61 As it is explained by one exponent of the L&E tradition – Richard Posner –, although the economic analysis of 
the law was initially restricted to antitrust law in the United States until the 1960s, it started to expand to other 
areas of American law in the 1970s (Posner 2003, p. 23), and eventually to other countries and legal traditions 
(Posner 1999). Indicators of such diffusion are the multiplication of specialized journals, the formation of 
academic associations specialized in L&E, and its institutionalization in law schools and economic faculties as 
undergraduate courses and graduate programmes in the US, Europe (Mercuro e Medema 2006, p. 03), and more 
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law would diverge in the level of analysis (empirical versus formalist), in the form of analysis 
(inductive versus deductive), and in respect to the focus on allocative versus distributive 
aspects of the economy (Mercuro e Medema 2006, p. 34-52). L&E seeks precisely to solve 
the “problem” of such epistemological divide through the reliance on the scientificity of 
economics and its attention to the promotion of efficiency62. For the legal field, the 
development of such expertise implies an innovative form of legal rationality to the study and 
the production of law and legal institutions, one that is opposed to the exegetic and formalist 
approaches notably dominant in the European legal tradition.  
L&E is not solely an academic enterprise, as it also entails “a positive program [that] 
provide[s] a set of prescriptions to deregulate through law” (Dezalay and Garth 2002a, p. 
170), which fit precisely the demands subjacent to neoliberal policies. In the U.S., for 
instance, “leading new-orthodox legal academics” connected to the L&E tradition moved into 
power positions in the judiciary and other regulatory arenas precisely during the “wave of the 
conservative revolution” in the 1980s (Dezalay and Garth 2002a, p. 170). In Brazil, such 
“ideology of business law” has promoted new regulatory models tuned with the goals of 
economic efficiency and the objective of overcoming the “problem of institutions” and the 
“inefficiency of the judicial system” characteristic of neoliberalism (Engelmann 2011, p. 29-
30). 
Through this brief overview about the roles of lawyers in society, I made explicit two 
assumptions from where I depart to incorporate these agents into the actor-centered approach 
on the reform and practice of competition policy. First, I take lawyers’ work to go beyond the 
operation of the legal system, as it also comprises roles of creating fields and transforming 
and managing several arenas of governance. Second, the shape taken by those arenas depends 
on the positions lawyers occupy in their field, the sorts of capital they posses and habitus they 
share, which are infused into the arenas where they act. Analyzing who are those agents “in 
position to exercise the symbolic power of law” (Dezalay and Madsen 2012, p. 438), their 
capitals, positions and struggles, is thus crucial to understand the very structure of the arenas 
shaped by these agents. As I argued, the forms of capital and habitus that are often related to 
the reform and creation of fields in a neoliberal line are frequently tributary to legal 
																																																																																																																																																																													
recently, in Latin America. In Brazil, since the 2000s, journals, academic networks, courses or entire graduate 
programs dedicated to the L&E approach have emerged (Engelmann 2011, p. 29). 
62 The interaction between legal and economic expertises embodied in L&E is not, however, pacific. It has been 
extensively criticized as a “one-way traffic” (Goodhart 1997), “intellectual imperialism” (Stigler 1984, Cooter 
1982, 2008), and the “colonization of law by economics” (Campbell and Picciotto 1998). 
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credentials, ideologies and institutional models acquired in and inspired by expertises 
originated in the United States.   
 
2.2.2 The rise of economists 
 
Dezalay and Garth’s claim about the association between neoliberal institutional 
reforms of the 1990s and the repositioning, both internally and externally, of the professional 
fields of law and economics converges with an extensive literature focused on the role of 
economists in politics. Although more recent than the literature on lawyers63, this scholarship 
has produced several studies that reach similar conclusions to those of a sociology of lawyers, 
i.e. that the agents of the field of economics, their positions, capitals and struggles affect the 
constitution and configuration of fields of practice close to state power – notably in neoliberal 
reforms. The increasing importance of economists and economic science in the field of state 
power has been pointed by economic sociology as a relatively recent and global phenomenon 
(Markoff and Montecinos 1993, Montecinos and Markoff 2009), observable in several 
regions, such as Latin America (Domínguez 1997, Babb 2001), Europe (Lebaron 2000, 
Fourcade 2009), Australia (Petridis 1981), and the United States (Fourcade 2009a, 2009b). 
Based on appeals to rationality and scientificity (Centeno and Silva 1998, Domínguez 
1997), economic expertise became a legitimate “technique of government”, a “tool for the 
exercise of public expertise” (Fourcade 2009b, p. 3), especially in the awake of neoliberal 
reforms.  As a “form of expertise relevant to the state administration” (Fourcade 2009b, p. 
238), economics not only explains the functioning of markets. Rather, as often addressed by 
anthropological perspectives, it performs the very realities it claims to describe, constructs 
and reconstructs the economy, models and coordinates practices and decision-making by the 
state in the economic sphere (Callon 2006, Heredia 2008). Mobilizing this form of expertise 
of government, economists offer “technical justifications” to the foundations of political and 
social orders (Montecinos 1998, p. 128). Similarly to lawyers and legal expertise, economists 
and their “economic ideas give rise to certain types of societal projects, such as the 
transformation of state structures and capacities” (Fourcade 2009b, p. 29). Based on academic 
credentials (and even more than lawyers, it can be said), economists have been increasingly 																																																								
63 This may be related to the different histories of the two fields. While the legal professions date of several 
centuries, economics as an autonomous and professional and academic discipline started to be established only 
in the 19th century (Fourcade 2006, p. 2). In Latin American countries such as Brazil, this autonomization is 
even more recent, dating of the 1940s, when economics became independent from law and engineering, and 
consolidating in the 1970s, with the creation of the first graduate programs (Loureiro 1997, p. 32-44). 
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influential in the “state building process” (Fourcade 2009b, p. 61), and the possession of 
economic expertise even became a requirement for the participation in the debates about the 
economy (Heredia 2008).  
As Fourcade (2009b, p. 237) puts it, the defining characteristics of economists’ 
knowledge since the 20th century has been “the discipline’s increasingly assertive scientific 
style and growing methodological consensus, on the one hand, and its jurisdictional 
expansion and internationalization, on the other”. Such consensus is mostly around an 
orthodoxy developed by U.S. economists, which is characterized by the importance of 
quantitative skills, profound roots in the academic world, and a “market-oriented” knowledge, 
“both cognitively and professionally” (Fourcade 2009b, p. 8-9)64. This can be seen as the 
dominant “habitus” of what has spread since the 1980s as mainstream economics, a 
“professional culture that identifies [mathematic methods] with objectivity and the pursuit of 
efficiency” (Fourcade 2009b, p. 90). The “reliance on numbers” has been a crucial component 
of American economists’ habitus, and of those influenced by this tradition as “a means to 
eschew political differences” (Fourcade 2009b, p. 127). 
As Dezalay and Garth (2002a) explain, the internationalization of this model of 
economic science, as well as the positioning of economists possessing this sort of capital is 
connected to disputes within the field of economics in the U.S. in the 1950s and 1960s. These 
were professional disputes among Keynesians and what became known as neoliberal 
economists. Aligned with the Kennedy administration and thus occupying positions in the 
establishment, Keynesians started to be contested by a group of economists that did not enjoy 
the same amount of political power, coming from less privileged social origins and investing 
in extremely mathematized theories and methods (Dezalay and Garth 2002a, p. 73-77). The 
interest of professional ascendancy by this group, combined with political disagreements and 
intellectual battles against the Keynesians made a perfect marriage with attempts to redefine 
the state mobilized by the opposing political forces. In the 1970s, the winners of this battle in 
the field of economics – neoliberal economists – mostly coming from the University of 
Chicago, hegemonized the field and started to dominate positions within the state apparatuses. 
Not by chance, the arrival of these economists to positions until then occupied by agents with 
different profiles is connected to the development of neoliberal policies.  
																																																								
64 As Fourcade (2009b, p. 64) recognizes, American economics “harbors many churches”, but has “one 
dominant religion”: “applied quantification”. To this author, “the modern history of American economics is 
fundamentally a history about ‘rival ideals of quantification’ [...] rather than rival ideals of economic analysis” 
(Fourcade 2009b, p. 83).  
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Exemplary of such connection between the increase of power of a certain type of 
economist and the shifts in state policies is precisely competition policy. An arena of practice 
historically dominated by lawyers, U.S. antitrust policy became growingly economicized 
since the 1970s, with the increased influence and presence of economists in the state 
apparatuses responsible for implementing it (Fourcade 2009b, p. 120)65. Eisner (1991) and 
Davies (2010, p. 77) observe the intensification of the economicization of antitrust in the 
1980s, culminating in the “Chicago revolution”, through which a gradual shift in the relative 
powers and presence of economists versus lawyers within the enforcement agencies occurred, 
in parallel and due to the ascendancy of the Reagan administration. Similarly to the conflict 
between lawyers and economists in the reform of Latin American states noticed by Dezalay 
and Garth (2002a), Davies (2010) evidences how the struggle of economists tackled precisely 
the dominant legal expertise. Chicago economics represented a criticism to legal rationality in 
several senses: legal rationality would have a formalist view of economic processes, a quasi-
idealist perspective on “competition” and the “market'”, distant from the empirical reality, and 
would deal with normative criteria informed by transcendental concepts of justice and fairness 
(Davies 2010, p. 80). A proper economic reasoning to competition policy would rather avoid 
the non-stable “formal-legal” categories that could not be expressed objectively, and would 
deploy rigorous empirical and mathematical analysis to achieve the sole goal that should be 
pursued by antitrust policy: economic efficiency (Davies 2010, p. 74-75).  
In political terms, the clash between legal and economic expertise, and between 
lawyers and economists with different profiles within the American antitrust field was 
translated into shifts in the very practice of competition policy. The dominance of Chicagoan 
economics and economists in the field of competition policy implied, for instance, that 
vertical mergers investigations should be abandoned as they were understood to produce no 
harm, that there should be an agnostic view on restrictive practices such as collusion, that 
monopolistic practices are not necessarily inefficient, and that the burden of proof of 
inefficiencies is of the state, not of corporations (Davies 2010, p. 76). 
The growing influence of economists in political arenas and governmental institutions 
has also been noticed outside the U.S. An elite of economists, mostly trained in the 
universities aligned with those who won the battle in the American field of economics, gained 
space in the field of state power in the 1980s and 1990s. Economists with this profile were 																																																								
65 Besides the increase of the number of economists, also the “economicization of lawyers’ training [...] both in 
law schools and in government” is also pointed by Fourcade (2009b, p. 120) as a factor contributing to the 
economicization of antitrust in the U.S. 
		 88	
particularly central to the formulation and implementation of neoliberal reforms in Latin 
America (Babb 2001, Montecinos 2009), and have increasingly exercised a monopolistic 
control over several areas of economic policy (Montecinos 1997).  
Economic and financial experts started to exercise an almost “monolithic” power in 
Latin American economic policy-making in the 1990s (Centeno and Silva 1998). As 
Schneider describes (1998, p. 78; 84), there was “near universal recourse to neoliberal 
technocrats in Latin America in the late 1980s and early 1990s”, a “correlation between 
neoliberal reform and the delegation of policy authority to technocrats”. Similarly, 
Montecinos’ (1998, p. 127) study focusing on the “relevance of actors and ideas” to 
understand neoliberal reforms maintains that “the diffusion of new ideological forms and new 
policy proposals in contemporary Latin America” is related to “the increasingly influential 
role played by economists within political and policy elites”. This would be so because since 
de mid-1970s economists offered “technical justifications to attempt the foundation of a new 
social and political order” (Montecinos 1998, p. 128) – that of neoliberalism. 
This trend has been empirically observed in several countries in the region. Chile is an 
emblematic example mentioned by Montecinos (1998) to illustrate how the prominent 
positions of economists in the field of state power evolved since Allende’s government, 
becoming hegemonic during Pinochet’s dictatorship (the so-called Chicago Boys), and later 
leaders of political parties after the authoritarian period. Ai Camp (1998) and Ibarra (2006) 
studies on the transformation of the Mexican state and economy reaches similar conclusions 
to Dezalay and Garth’s (2002a) perspective on the association between the shifts of the 
profiles of state elites and the emergence of neoliberalism. Conaghan (1998, p. 142), despite 
observing a less pronounced ascent of economists in Peru in the late 1980s, identifies the 
roles of economists as “hired guns” and “intermediaries” of political disputes. Van Dijck 
(1998, p. 98) discusses how different types of expertise were connected to different stages of 
neoliberal reforms by assessing the composition of the World Bank, a key-institution in the 
promotion of state reform. When the Bank’s policy was “program approach”, engineers 
dominated, and when it shifted to structural adjustment in the 1980s, it coincides with the rise 
of economists (Van Dijck 1998). 
In Brazil, the study of Loureiro (1997, p. 86) converges with these findings, as the 
author identifies a growing presence of economists in Ministerial positions, organs of research 
and statistics, national accounts, price and salaries control, public banks, international 
negotiations, among others. Their roles in government increased since the authoritarian 
government initiated in 1964, as a tool of legitimation of the regime, and peaked during 
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neoliberal reforms (Loureiro 1997, p. 84; Dezalay and Garth 2002a, p. 99). Similarly to the 
approach of Dezalay and Garth (2002a), Loureiro’s research enables visualizing how 
struggles within the field of economics were associated with macro political shifts in the 
Brazilian state. In the 1980s and 1990s, an old polarization of the field of economics in Brazil, 
which dated of the 1950s66, was reinvigorated: that between structuralists and monetarists. On 
the first side, economists formed at heterodox economic departments, such as that of the 
University of Campinas (UNICAMP), an institution created by disciples of the Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), which remained faithful to 
structural, historical and socio-political approaches to economic problems, and to a 
mathematically non-formalized language (Loureiro 1997, p. 70). 
On the other side, economists connected to the Fundação Getúlio Vargas of Rio de 
Janeiro (FGV-Rio) and the Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio), which are heirs 
of the orthodox monetarist schools (Loureiro 1997, p. 70). This group has historically 
invested in mathematical modeling, and has been highly internationalized, especially through 
doctorates in U.S. institutions (Loureiro 1997, p. 70; Dezalay and Garth 2002a, p. 102), and 
aligned with the mainstream produced in American universities67. Loureiro (1997 84; 87) 
shows that it was precisely this last group who achieved prominent positions in power with 
the agenda of reform of the 1980s and 1990s: that of the “economist political leader” – often 
young academics coming from São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro with graduate degrees obtained 
in the U.S. By discrediting both the developmental economics adopted by the military 
dictatorship, and the generalist lawyers in power, these economists became “key players in 
the governance of the state”, when the contextual conditions appeared (Dezalay and Garth 
2002a, p. 102). Now in the a position to apply the knowledge to a great extent imported from 
the U.S., these economists “moved to the forefront in the attack against inflation, the call for 
deregulation and privatization, and the emphasis on opening up Brazil to foreign investment” 
(Dezalay and Garth 2002a, p. 102).  
																																																								
66 As Bielchowsky (2007) puts it, in the period between 1945 and 1964, three broad strands of economic thought 
can be identified in Brazil: socialists, developmentalists (the structuralist approaches that defended an active role 
of the state in regulating the economy, especially in promoting industrialization), and neoliberals (which 
contrasted with developmentalists in supporting free markets as a priority to reach economic efficiency). During 
this period, developmentalism was the hegemonic “economic ideology” (Bielchowsky 2007, p. 33), but the 
scenario started to change during the military dictatorship and notably in the 1980s, when neoliberals became 
dominant in economic thinking in Brazil. 
67 Economists graduated at the University of São Paulo (USP), according to Loureiro (1997, p. 84), would be in 
an “intermediate point” between these structuralist and monetarist extremes. 
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Besides being economists, these groups who accented to power in these diverse 
settings had even more in common. The new political elites of “technocrats”68 often “shared 
values” and had a “similar intellectual pedigree” (Centeno and Silva 1998, p. 3). These values 
and pedigree – or this habitus, in Bourdieusian terms – were mostly acquired through 
educational experiences, especially graduate courses in U.S. institutions (Conaghan 1998, p. 
147). They were “technical experts” (Van Dijck 1998, p. 98), “men of science” (Schneider 
1998, p. 79) who differed from politicians on the basis a distinct “type of political skills they 
possess” (Ai Camp 1998, p. 201). As the “most cosmopolitan elite” in the region (Montecinos 
1998), these economists also often converged in beliefs that the market is the best suited 
mechanism of organizing the economy (Centeno 1998, p. 47), and that there are superior 
forms of knowledge than the political debate, thus some decisions must be made through 
expert rule (Centeno 1998, p. 47). Loureiro (1997, p. 117), for instance, detects the “strength 
of the belief in the opposition between democracy and efficiency” by Brazilian economists in 
the 1980s and 1990s. Such overreliance on technocratic claims was functional to make 
“democracy safe for neoliberalism”, as the important decisions regarding economic policy 
were delegated to experts (Centeno and Silva 1998, p. 12). The expert rule over economic 
debates put forward by technocratic, neoliberal economic thinking – or “economism” – 
entails, in this sense, a way to exit politics (Teivanen 2002). 
Not only their beliefs, but also their careers have shared common characteristics in the 
region. Often, economists who rose to state power in the 1990s wore many hats (Conaghan 
1998, p. 152-156), and their passage by the government enabled “establishing connections 
and developing insider knowledge”. In Brazil it was no different: similarly to lawyers, the 
economists that architected neoliberal reforms had in the passage by governmental positions a 
capital to be later explored in the market, by the opening of consultancies firms in which they 
have the “opportunity to profit from the informational and knowledge capital accumulated in 
their experience in governmental organisms” (Loureiro 1997, p. 90). The roles of economists 
in government is often “transitory”, an intermediate stage in their careers, which start in the 
university, goes to government and then to the private sector (Loureiro 1997, p. 88). 
The arrival of these agents into hegemonic positions in the field of state power, not by 
chance, coincides with the structuring of neoliberalism. They possessed a form of knowledge 																																																								
68 As Baud (1998), Silva (1998) and Ai Camp (1998) show, the phenomenon of technocracy is not inherently or 
necessarily restricted to neoliberal economists, nor to the neoliberal period, as professionals such as engineers 
and “social engineers” performed similar roles in different moments. Technocracy is connected to “neoliberal 
economic strategies”, but it entails a broader phenomenon (Ai Camp 1998). 
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(or capitals) and habitus fit to legitimate and perform neoliberal reforms, and their extensive 
appointment was a symbolic resource of governments in order to regain the confidence of 
foreign agents, notably corporations (Schneider 1998, p. 87), by signaling the respect to the 
rules of a liberalized market. As the examples illustrate, economists – and a specific profile of 
this professional group – are agents associated with the occurrence of certain reforms and the 
directions they take.  
 
*** 
As the examples illustrate, lawyers and economists are historically associated with the 
creation, management and transformation of several fields close to state power. Moreover, 
experts in law and economics holding a specific set of capitals, with a particular habitus and 
occupying certain positions within their professional fields have been active vectors of 
neoliberal reforms worldwide. Transposing the framework delineated in the previous sections 
to the attempt to assess the connections between competition policy reform and practice to 
neoliberalism, two research tasks emerge. First, to map who are the agents that construct and 
operate this field, what are their habitus, strategies and political preferences. Second, to 
compare the data collected about these agents with what the reviewed literature point to be the 
profiles of lawyers and economists that have historically performed neoliberal reforms. 
Through this comparison, it will be possible to assess how the field of competition policy is 
structured, and thus what political project it is intended to serve. It is still necessary, however, 
to delineate the conceptual tools I will mobilize to construct an alternative narrative about the 
outcomes of the field of practice constituted through reform. This is the objective of the next 
section.  
 
2.3 A “law in action” perspective on outcomes 
 
For the purposes of producing an alternative narrative to those described in Chapter 1, 
the framework of a reflexive sociology provides a useful foundation for studying the process 
and the agents of reform as intertwined dimensions, as it enables assessing the relation 
between concrete agents and the structure (and structuring) of competition policy as a field, 
thus opening way for discussing its potential connections to neoliberalism. However, the 
remaining dimension to which I intend to provide an alternative narrative, that of outcomes, 
cannot be properly tackled through this approach, once it offers no operational tools to 
analyze the products of this arena of practice, i.e. what the field produces and therefore what 
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it serves. In Picciotto’s (2011, p. 448-449) evaluation of the Bourdieusian approach proposed 
by Dezalay and Garth, this gap becomes clear: 
 
The content of political and economic changes and conflicts, which provide 
the essential motive forces for change, are exogenous to their perspective 
[...]. For them, the conflicts are between ‘factions contending for the 
definition and control of the state’, but this does not explain the nature or 
content of those struggles. 
 
Such criticism converges with what Harrington (1994) has identified as a need to 
bridge the study of the role of lawyers in politics with the attention to the content of the law. 
According to this author, while law-centered approaches that deal with doctrine and decisions 
rarely make references to agency (precisely what was identified in mainstream narratives), 
sociological perspectives that “investigate the role of lawyers and their professional power in 
politics, however, exclude the obvious – information on what lawyers do, the content of the 
law they forge” (Harrington 1994, p. 50). As I see it, this criticism can also be applied to 
those studies focusing on the role of economists in politics and economic policy, be it 
connected or not to the law. In both cases, the “emphasis on studying who and how tends to 
disregard or discount the questions of what and why” (Picciotto 2011, p. 449). The task for a 
more complete understanding of the field of competition policy can therefore only be pursued 
if an alternative narrative is complemented by an investigation of what the field and the 
agents that compose it actually produce: its outcomes. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, there are several shortcomings underlying the 
dominant narratives about the outcomes of competition policy: their tendency to endorse a 
formalist perspective of the law, and to assess the impacts of regulatory practice in functional 
and technocratic terms, i.e., as “universal compliance”, or as “what works” and “what fails”, 
often based on impressionistic or unsystematic data. It is based on these limited accounts that 
these narratives often sustain a view of the roles of competition policy that is extremely 
functional, and thus depoliticizes a field at the core of arenas of power. This form of 
addressing outcomes – both in respect to the economy and society – is the basis taken by 
mainstream narratives to affirm the roles of competition policy as a device to control 
neoliberalism, to counter-balance it, or even as evidence to neglect its very existence 
neoliberalism as social phenomenon or its utility as an analytical tool. 
The task for an alternative narrative is thus to delineate conceptual tools that enable 
conducting research on outcomes on different grounds, avoiding the pointed shortcomings. In 
the next subsections, I present a framework that builds on the idea of “law in action” to 
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overcome the limits implied by formalist accounts of outcomes. In this perspective, the 
outcomes of the field of competition policy are analyzed in terms of the facilitative, 
regulatory and constitutive roles of the law in the economy and in society (Edelman and 
Suchman 1997; Edelman and Stryker 2005). These notions will serve as a “formal” structure 
of analysis, to be later translated into concrete empirical questions concerning my research. 
Through this framework, I believe it will be possible to understand, on different grounds, 
what the field of competition policy actually produces. This is not only a necessary step 
regarding the specific dimension of outcomes, but also a means to establish parameters that 
can be dialectically confronted with data about the process of reform and its agents, 
accordingly to the framework designed in the previous section. Taken together, these three 
dimensions may illuminate what I hypothesize to be crucial connections between competition 
policy and neoliberalism, something ignored or neglected in literature. 
 
2.3.1 The facilitative-regulatory and constitutive roles of law  
 
The authors I mobilized to present a general critique to mainstream narratives give a 
hint on how an alternative framework for the study of outcomes of a regulatory arena can be 
built. When describing the shortcomings underlying how the literature on the “diffusion of 
law” (Twining 2005a, 2005b), “globalization of law” (Halliday and Osinsky 2006), and neo-
institutionalist perspectives (Suchman and Edelman 1996; Edelman and Suchman 1997) 
discuss the “impacts” of law, they point to a way of overcoming it. In fact, they converge in 
proposing a tenet of the sociology of law as a useful means to do so: the analysis of the “law 
in action”69.  
As Halliday and Osinsky (2006, p. 466) suggest, “empirical researchers need to 
maintain a studied skepticism about excessive claims made of globalization and its impact 																																																								
69 The notion of “law in action” is said to have originated with the tradition of American legal realism, notably 
sociological jurisprudence, between the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century (Treves 2004, p. 
140-145). Roscoe Pound, a representative of that tradition, in a seminal article dated of 1910, would have coined 
the idea of “law in action”, in opposition to “law in books”. The distinction was crucial for Pound’s agenda of 
“social engineering” through the law. Sociological jurisprudence was a reaction against legal formalism, and the 
concept of “law in action” would underscore the inability of the “law in books” perspective to deal with social 
problems. As Deflem (2008, p. 100) describes, Pound’s idea was that the study of law solely through legal 
doctrine and “law-internal theory” would be responsible for “a general lag of law relative to social conditions, 
the failure of legal thought to take into account advances in the social sciences, the rigidity of legislation, and 
defects in the administration of law”. Based on sociological insights about the “actual working, including the 
causes and effects, of law”, legal decisions could “be adapted to adequately respond to changing societal 
conditions” (Deflem 2008, p. 100-101). Despite being connected to an instrumentalist view of the law, Pound’s 
concept has been appropriated by law and society scholars as an analytical device to distinguish the discipline’s 
approach from legal doctrine. 
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[...] [t]he criterion of impact must be law in action, not law on the books” (my italics). 
Similarly, Suchman and Edelman (1996, p. 929) maintain that the law on the books is 
something different than the “law in action”, which “reflects a crazy-quilt of pluralistic 
normative orders and overlapping regulatory jurisdictions” and that it is in reality “malleable, 
contested, and socially constructed”. Twining (2005a, p. 33), in turn, argues that the analysis 
of impact involves a necessary “shift from legislation to enforcement”, which “represent[s] 
significant moves away from surface law to increasingly realistic concern with the law in 
action” (my italics)70. 
As Deflem (2008, p. 150) puts it, the idea of “law in action” implies conceiving the 
law not just as “formally enacted rules (“law in the books”)”, but rather to adopt “a broader 
conception of law as also involving variability in application, differentiality in enforcement, 
pluralism in authority, and ambiguity in meaning”. Instead of seeing law as monolithic and 
authoritative, and to measure its impacts as the translation of clear-cut rules, or a process of 
“universal compliance”, the “law in action” approach understands that “law is made as it is 
enforced” (Suchman and Edelman 1996, p. 933-934). The focus of research is thus 
repositioned to the “politics of enforcement”, that is, to study how the malleability and 
indeterminacy of the law is “resolved”, how and what decisions are actually made (Suchman 
and Edelman 1996, p. 934). The notion of “law in action” thus constitutes a sort of 
“epistemological attitude” for the study of legal objects, one that is suspicious of any attempt 
to characterize the products of a regulatory arena solely based on what the law and institutions 
declare to be its objectives – precisely the major problem found in mainstream narratives71. 
Although it helps detaching from the pitfalls implied by these narratives’ formalist 
assumptions in describing outcomes, the idea of “law in action” must nevertheless be 
concretized. By itself, it does not offer an operational structure to be applied in the study of 
competition policy. 
The framework that Edelman and Stryker (2005) propose for the development of a 
“sociology of law and the economy”, based on Edelman and Suchman (1997), is particularly 																																																								
70 The contrast between the “law on the books” and the “law in action” stands in parallel to the distinction 
proposed by Abel (1973), and referred in Chapter 1, section 2, of “law books” and “books about law”. It is 
precisely through a “law in action” analysis of the outcomes of competition policy that the formalist perspective 
of “law books” epitomized by legal scholarship can be avoided. 
71 It is important to note that in subscribing to the distinction between “law on the books” and “law in action”, I 
am not affiliating with perspectives that are “over-preoccupied with discrepancies between legal rules and legal 
practice”, i.e. to study the “gap” between how the law should operate and how it actually operates (Nelken 1984, 
p. 169-170). These are accounts close to Pound’s instrumentalist agenda, and lead to a dead-end, as they demand 
a normative ideal about what the law is. Rather, I understand that this distinction is useful for overcoming 
formalist perspectives about the law such as the ones reviewed in Chapter 1, and does not necessarily imply 
incurring in the “gap problem” (Nelken 1981)  
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helpful – if submitted to some adaptations – to operationalize the analysis of the “law in 
action” of competition policy. These authors design a “political-institutional framework on 
law and the economy” directed to “theorizing and empirically investigating the multiple social 
mechanisms or processes through which legal and economic action and institutions become 
part of an interconnected causal dynamic” (authors’ italics) (Edelman and Stryker 2005, p. 
527; 535). The idea of interconnectedness means that, on the one hand, “legal constructs, 
principles and institutions shape the organizational forms and identities of economic actors, 
and they shape central element of capitalist economic fields”, and on the other, that “law is 
shaped within economic fields by the very actors whose interactions the law seeks to 
constitute, facilitate, and regulate” (my italics) (Edelman and Stryker 2005, p. 535). 
 The highlighted terms – to constitute, facilitate, and regulate – are precisely the 
conceptual tools offered by these authors that can be put to operationalize a “law in action” 
approach. In the attempt to bridge the sociology of law and institutionalist perspectives of the 
sociology of organizations, these authors suggest that the “legal environment” (Edelman and 
Suchman 1997), or the “legal field” 72 (Edelman and Stryker 2005, p. 530), operates in three 
basic dimensions: as facilitative, regulatory, and constitutive environments (Edelman and 
Suchman 1997, p. 482; Edelman and Stryker 2005, p. 535). As the proponents of these 
conceptual tools suggest, these dimensions are ideal types, only analytically distinguishable, 
as in practice they “affect each other through interrelated institutional and political 
processes”73 (Edelman and Stryker 2005, p. 543). From each dimension the authors extract a 
set of research questions that, if taken together, lead to a “law in action” approach to the study 
of the legal field. 
As a facilitative tool, “the legal system is merely an arena – albeit an arena whose 
shape may dramatically affect the course of the game”, in which organizations are the players 
(Edelman and Suchman 1997, p. 483). In this dimension, the legal field “provides an 
exogenously generated, but fundamentally passive set of tools and forums” (Edelman and 
Suchman 1996, p. 482) that organizations mobilize to “resolve disputes, to structure their 
relations with other organizations, to govern their employees, to influence the behavior of 
regulatory agencies, and to gather information” (Edelman and Stryker 2005, p. 535). The 																																																								
72 Edelman and Stryker (2005, p. 531) explicitly endorse a Bourdieusian approach in suggesting that the “legal 
field” is used as the “unit of analysis” for a sociological study of law and the economy. Through this framework, 
and similarly to what I argued in the previous section, Edelman and Stryker (2005, p. 531) maintain that the 
“sociology of law and the economy can portray the social embeddedness of both law and markets”. 
73 As Edelman and Stryker (2005, p. 543) exemplify, “changes in the constitutive legal environment affect the 
legal tools available through the facilitative environment and the meaning of rules in the regulatory environment, 
and the reverse is true as well”. 
		 96	
facilitative environment is said to entail procedural rules that furnish “legal vehicles for 
organizational initiatives” (Edelman and Suchman 1997, p. 483). These are “legal procedures 
that facilitate economic activity for some actors [and] often constrain the economic activity of 
other actors” (Edelman and Stryker 2005, p. 537).  
Illustrations of what these authors call facilitative procedures are legal tools such as 
the idea “juristic of legal person” identified by Weber, which provides predictability and 
calculability for capitalist interactions, the “enabling aspects of corporation law”, such as 
limited liability and its role in “promoting shareholder investment and economic growth in the 
early history of the United States”, and the use of different mechanisms of dispute resolution, 
from litigation to “alternative techniques” such as business arbitration (Edelman and Stryker 
2005, p. 536-537). As a facilitative arena, the legal field thus enables “organizations to 
structure their relations with competitors, customers, and suppliers”, and institutionalizes 
“forms of economic exchange, association, and competition” (Edelman and Stryker 2005, p. 
535; 537). In this dimension, the core questions for sociological approach to the legal field are 
to identify “what the law facilitates and for whom” (Edelman and Stryker 2005, p. 537). 
The regulatory dimension of the legal field entails “edicts actively imposing societal 
authority on various aspects of economic life” (Edelman and Stryker 2005, p. 535). While the 
facilitative environment underscores procedural tools provided by the legal field, the 
regulatory facet highlights that law produces substantive rules that affects the economy, and 
“places law in a far more active posture” (Edelman and Suchman 1997, p. 483). As a 
regulatory environment, the law becomes a site for “overt contestation over normative rules, 
as well as for mobilizing these rules as resources” (Edelman and Stryker 2005, p. 537). The 
agents of the economic field “incorporate and respond to the normative ideals of their 
regulatory environments (Edelman and Stryker 2005, p. 537). Examples of the regulatory 
dimension provided by the authors who propose this framework are norms produced in a 
variety of arenas and institutional arrangements responsible for creating and enforcing them, 
such as antitrust, health and safety and environmental regulations, and labor and employment 
statutes (Edelman and Stryker 2005, p. 537). The focus of a research on the regulatory 
environment is thus on how “political processes and more subtle institutional processes shape 
the form and impact of regulation on the economy and infuse economic interests into the 
law”, and vice-versa (Edelman and Stryker 2005, p. 539). 
Finally, the constitutive facet of the legal field entails the roles of law in constructing 
the “basic typologies that identify the legally cognizable components of the social world and 
that explain the natures and attributes of each” (Edelman and Suchman 1997, p. 483). It is an 
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arena of “meaning-making with regard to both law and the economy” (Edelman and Stryker 
2005, p. 540). This dimension operates a “subtle and often invisible role” in providing 
“cognitive possibilities and values that influence the structure, form, and strategies of 
organizations” (Edelman and Stryker 2005, p. 540), in establishing “taken-for-granted labels, 
categories, and ‘default rules’ for organizational behavior” (Edelman and Suchman 1997, p. 
483).  
The “legal categorizations” provided by the legal field have several roles: they “define 
opportunities and limits for economic actors”, and “which economic disputes may be resolved 
within the legal system and which are outside the purview of law”, they legitimize and 
institutionalize “various organizational institutions”, and they “shape abstract economic 
thinking about the nature of markets, of capitalism and of how economy and polity are 
distinct, differentiated realms” (Edelman and Stryker 2005, p. 540). Exemplary of such 
constitutive roles of the legal field are the “many conceptual dichotomies that are central to 
the economy, such as employer/employee, public/private, procedure/substance, capital/labor” 
(Edelman and Stryker 2005, p. 540), among others. As suggested by Edelman and Stryker 
(2005, p. 542), research on the constitutive dimension of the legal field shall “explore the 
interplay between overt political contestation of meanings and more covert institutional 
diffusion of meanings”. 
 
2.3.2 Framing the outcomes of competition policy in the economy and society 
 
As I mentioned earlier, my appropriation of this framework presupposes an adaptation 
concerning the facilitative and regulatory dimensions. When talking about the different 
“environments” provided by the legal field, these authors often associate them to different 
branches of the law, e.g. litigation is seen as an illustration of the “facilitative” dimension, 
while regulation and antitrust are exemplary of the “regulatory” facet. Also, these dimensions 
seem to underscore different causal dynamics: while the facilitative environment leads to the 
study of how organizations use the law, the regulatory dimension emphasizes how the law 
impacts organizations (Edelman and Suchman, p. 1997, p. 487).  
However, several of the examples offered by Edelman and Suchman (1997) and 
Edelman and Stryker (2005) could fit both definitions of facilitative and regulatory 
environments. One of these illustrations concerns precisely antitrust law. Edelman and 
Stryker (2005, p. 536) exemplify the facilitative roles of the legal field through Sklar’s (1988) 
study about antitrust law in the U.S., stressing that it “highlights the many contradictions and 
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inconsistencies in legal doctrine [...] established both legal and intellectual grounds for the 
corporate reorganization of property, while antitrust law still worked to inhibit this very same 
economic reorganization”. The same study by Sklar (1988) is mentioned as an illustration of 
research on the regulatory dimension that underscores “that legal rules may produce 
unintended economic results” (Edelman and Stryker 2005, p. 538). In both cases, the object of 
study fits the definition of “regulatory environment”, while at the same time responds to 
questions proper of the facilitative dimension. 
What the law facilitates explains how it regulates the economy, and conversely, the 
substantive regulations produced by the legal field facilitate certain outcomes to the actors 
regulated by it. What Edelman and Stryker (2005, p. 537) identify as the central question for 
the study of the facilitative environment – “what the law facilitates and for whom?” – is a 
means to understand the processes that define the regulatory dimension: how “political 
processes and more subtle institutional processes shape the form and impact of regulation on 
the economy and infuse economic interests into the law”, and vice-versa (Edelman and 
Stryker 2005, p. 543). Hence, the questions each of these dimensions raise must be taken 
together for a fully apprehension of how the roles of the legal field in the economy. The 
facilitative and the regulatory environments are two facets of the same coin, and their 
distinction in terms of branches of law, or procedural and substantive rules doesn’t seem very 
helpful. I therefore deliberately “subvert” the typology proposed by Edelman and Suchman 
(1997) and Edelman and Stryker (2005) by merging the notions of facilitative and regulatory 
environments into a single dimension: what I will call the facilitative-regulatory role of the 
legal field.  
Transplanting the conceptual tools that compose such political-institutional framework 
to the analysis of my object of study, it is possible to construct an alternative narrative to how 
the outcomes of competition policy to the economy and society are described in the 
discourses reviewed. According to mainstream narratives, the field of competition policy, 
through the CADE’s decisions and the acting of the governmental apparatuses, promotes 
competition, prevents or corrects market failures such as monopolies and oligopolies, and 
thus produces benefits of universal interest. Once neoliberalism is mostly ignored in these 
narratives, said to be controlled through competition law, or strictly defined as the absence of 
regulation and thus said to be necessarily contrary to competition policy, the outcomes of this 
arena of regulation are abstractly and apolitically defined as “successful”, despite some 
episodic “mistakes”. 
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However, given what I sustained to be the often formalist, unempirical and 
impressionistic evaluation of outcomes, the decisions made by CADE must be analyzed in an 
empirically-grounded and systematic way, incorporating variables that re-politicize its roles in 
the economy. The framing of the facilitative-regulatory dimension is particularly useful to 
assess the roles performed by the field of competition policy in the economy in the context of 
neoliberalism. The institutions that compose the SBDC, notably CADE, as an administrative 
court, are entitled to decide about the legality of certain economic operations involving 
corporations. Several phenomena originated in the economic field enter the field of 
competition policy to be appreciated by the agents and institutions that structure it. These 
decisions are taken in processes of different kinds, such as Merger Reviews (MR) and 
Administrative Proceedings (AP). Thus, a useful way of assessing what are the outcomes of 
the field of competition policy to the economy is to evaluate the facilitative-regulatory results 
of CADE’s decision-making. In this sense, the empirical research question that guides the 
inquiry about the outcomes of competition policy becomes: What competition policy 
facilitates and for whom, and how economic interests both affect regulation and are impacted 
by it? By seeking answers for these questions, it is possible to provide an empirically 
grounded evaluation of what kind of economy is facilitated through competition policy’s 
regulation, i.e. how the economic phenomena that enter the field exit it. 
As it was reviewed in Chapter 1, competition policy’s outcomes are not restricted to 
the economic field, but also reach individuals and society. In mainstream narratives, together 
with producing a competitive and healthy economic environment, competition policy is said 
to have the role to protect those who are the true “subjects” of this regulatory arena, its 
indirect beneficiaries: consumers. The promotion of competition policy by CADE and the 
institutions of the SBDC would avoid corporations to exploit damaging prices, protecting 
consumers and thus generating outcomes to society as a whole. The social group of 
“consumers” – and not other forms of classifying society, as done by other regulatory arenas 
(for instance, “workers” or “minorities”) – is thus according to mainstream narratives the 
category that organizes the cognitive possibilities and the values that orient the functioning of 
the field and the evaluation of the outcomes of competition policy to society. As maintained 
by those sources, competition policy must take into account the impacts to consumers of the 
economic phenomena it regulates. Conversely, as identified in mainstream narratives, other 
social categories – notably that of “workers” – are often reputed as alien to the domain of 
competition policy, and when incorporated to decision-making, constitute a sign negatively 
charged of politicization. 
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Following the political-institutional framework sketched in this section, I take the 
framing of the constitutive dimension of the legal field to analyze how certain social 
categories are incorporated into the field of competition policy, and others are repelled. The 
focus here relies on how the meanings of constitutive legal categories, notably those of 
consumers and workers (and related categories such as employees, and jobs), are disputed by 
the agents of the field and bear on them. Similarly to the exercise proposed to the analysis of 
competition policy’s outcomes to the economy, also regarding society it is worth asking how 
social categories enter the field and how they exit it, i.e. how competition policy “digests” 
notions such as “consumers” and “workers” and, in doing so, constitutes the society it claims 
to protect. Hence, the empirical research question that emerges from the deployment of the 
constitutive analysis of competition policy in society is the following: How are the social 
categories of “consumers” and “workers” incorporated and/or repelled by the field of 
competition policy and what model of society is constituted by it? 
The understanding of the facilitative-regulatory and constitutive roles of the field of 
competition policy demands an empirical inquiry of the concrete functioning of this arena of 
practice in each dimension, beyond what the legal text declares to be its objectives. It also 
infuses political conflicts in the evaluation of the roles performed by the legal field, as the 
facilitative, regulatory and constitutive environments are immersed in a theory that 
understands the law as both an arena of and a set of tools for social disputes. In this way, it is 
possible to produce a narrative that doesn’t fall into technocratic or depoliticizing evaluations 
of competition policy’s outcomes, which ignores or neglects its potential connections to 
neoliberalism. 
As already anticipated, framing the outcomes of the field of competition policy in 
terms of its facilitative-regulatory and constitutive roles provides a “formal” scheme for 
studying the law in action of its roles in the economy and society. However, selecting what 
variables are worth analyzing in a certain branch of practice, and determining parameters for 
interpreting these roles depends on substantive elements pertinent to that field. In the case of 
competition policy, and given the purposes of my research, these substantial elements require 
a theory about the defining traces of neoliberalism in the economy and society, one that 
explains what should be expected from this field’s outcomes if, according to the hypothesis 
that guides this thesis, it is an integral part of neoliberalism.  
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2.4 Neoliberalism through the lens of a critical political economy 
 
To analyze if and how the outcomes of competition policy identified through the “law 
in action” perspective fit into neoliberalism, it is necessary to provide “substantive” elements 
of what I understand to be the defining characteristics of a neoliberal economy and society. 
Hence, in this section I present the assumptions from where I depart to interpret the outcomes 
of competition policy vis-à-vis neoliberalism. I rely on studies that develop a “critical 
political economy” of neoliberalism, putting forward several hypotheses about its defining 
features as a theoretical and political project to transform economies and societies. As in the 
previous section, I will give special attention to the particular conformations that 
neoliberalism takes in the global South, notably in Brazil. 
The idea of a “critical political economy” contrasts to what could be called a “classic 
political economy” (“a theoretical approach which situates the economy within a broader 
context in order to create a more wide-ranging social theory”), as well as to economics 
(especially the neo-classical strand) and “social theory which focus on cultural or ideological 
issues to the exclusion of concern with economic questions” (Browning and Kilmister 2006, 
p. 1). What makes it “critical” is the “recognition, when the economy is placed within a wider 
context, of the need for radical revision of conventional economic concepts in the light of 
their inadequacy in dealing with the questions generated by that context” (Browining and 
Kilmister 2006, p. 2). In the case of what I called a “critical political economy of 
neoliberalism”, it comprises studies that approach the concepts of neoliberal economics (and 
neoliberal political theory) as part and product of a broader social context, its political 
struggles and history.  
An illustrative example of how a political economy perspective is helpful for the 
analysis of the roles of competition policy to the economy and society is provided by Sklar’s 
(1988) classic book about the emergence and development of antitrust policy in the United 
States between the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries. In this 
study, Sklar (1988) discusses the roles of antitrust policy in what he calls the “corporate 
reconstruction” of the American economy. As this author explains, the intense economic 
depression that affected the American economy by the of the 1800s was “accompanied and 
followed by social and ideological turbulence and political realignment in the society at large 
as well as by upheavals and realignments within the immediate sphere of business activity 
itself” (Sklar 1988, p. 32).  
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This process fostered a “change in the organization of the capitalist property-
production system”, from the “small-producer, competitive capitalism”, or proprietary 
capitalism, to that of “corporate capitalism”, or “corporate liberalism” (Sklar 1988, p. 34). 
Large-scale corporations became the dominant form of economic activity, and were perceived 
as a necessary development of American capitalism, consubstantiating a “cross-class 
ideology” among several sectors of society (Sklar 1988, p. 35). The formation of large 
conglomerates and the association of corporations were seen as advantageous forms if 
compared to small businesses and a competitive system for several reasons: they provided 
“broader access to, and some centralized control over, marketing and innovation”, and offered 
“a relatively more stable earning power combined with limited liability, [and] stronger 
inducements that the insecurities of the autonomous firm, whether competing alone or 
entering ephemeral or unreliable cartels” (Sklar 1988, p. 165) 74. As Sklar (1988, p. 166) 
enunciates it, “[t]he resort to the corporate form of enterprise based upon negotiable securities 
and limited liability as a mode of property ownership became increasingly more compelling”. 
It was in this context that the “antitrust question” emerged in American politics. Sklar 
(1988, p. 2) maintains that the construction of American competition policy, initiated with the 
discussion and enactment of the Sherman Act, was “in essence about the passage of American 
capitalism from the competitive to the corporate stage of its development”. Competition 
policy was a “settlement [...] sufficiently satisfactory to the major concerns and interests 
among” groups of the capitalist class (Sklar 1988, p. 173). Although the Sherman Act 
originally reflected a struggle between farmers (small-producers) and railroad companies (the 
trusts) – precisely the poles of the transformation by then in course – and thus allegedly 
sought to control the power of big business, it never aimed at abolishing large corporations 
and the combination of capital (Sklar 1988, p. 109). Moreover, Sklar suggests that its 
enforcement went even further in supporting the consolidation of corporate capitalism, 
especially due to the role of the courts in its implementation.  
Although antitrust policy did not “cause the resort to tight combinations of capital” 
(Sklar 1998, p. 166), the author identifies several roles of the actual enforcement of 																																																								
74 As Picciotto (2011, p. 108-110) explains, corporate capitalism is defined by the dominance of the corporation 
or company as “the main form developed under capitalism for carrying on business”. If compared to the 
previous forms of capital organization, such as proprietary, family firms, the corporation presented several 
advantages that explains why it became “a key social institution”: “[i]t provides an institutional framework 
which enables business to be organized on a large scale, and to coordinate a variety of activities, even across the 
world. Institutionalized firms can coordinate and plan activities which are both more extensive and potentially 
long-term than individual or family business” (Picciotto 2011, p. 108). The consolidation of corporate capitalism 
in substitution of laissez-faire capitalism in advanced economies meant that large scale, monopolistic capital 
(Baran and Sweezy 1966), became the dominant form of economic activity. 
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competition law in that domain. Here is where Sklar’s approach reveals its utility as a model 
for the analysis of the “law in action” of competition policy. In Sklar’s (1988, p. 159) view, 
“[t]he development of the law – in its legislative and judicial phases – constituted [...] a major 
arena in the construction of, and in the conflict over, the corporate reorganization, the 
effective causes of which lay elsewhere”: in the market and in politics. The development of 
antitrust policy in that period, especially after its consolidation by 1911, “legalized corporate 
consolidations, as well as cartelization on a “higher basis” (Sklar 1988, p. 167). Competition 
policy, “while regulating corporate administration of the market to keep it within the bounds 
of reasonableness and the claims of the public interest, sanctioned and legitimized it” (Sklar 
1988, p. 168).  
Sklar thus finds that the practice of antitrust law in the United States “facilitated 
change as the American capitalism has developed, while validating the certainty and security 
of capitalist property and social relations as such” (Sklar 1988, p. 174) (my italics). Other 
authors have suggested similar findings about the actual roles performed by American 
competition policy in the economy, beyond a formalist evaluation of the law. Close to Sklar, 
Picciotto (2011, p. 109) affirms that competition policy, “although born from a populist 
impulse to restrict oligopolistic economic power, has largely become a means of legitimating 
it”. Freyer (1992, Conclusion) converges with this assessment, stating that antitrust policy 
“ironically nurtured giant corporate enterprise”. Dobbin and Dowd (2000, p. 653), in a study 
focusing on the railroad sector in the late 1800s and early 1900s, note the “remarkable role” 
played by competition policy in “constituting the modern market” by extinguishing “a form of 
industrial cooperation that was widely viewed as the way to the future” and spawning a “new 
business model”.  
What can be seen as the outcomes identified by Sklar and others in the intertwined 
process of corporate reconstruction of American capitalism and the structuring of antitrust 
policy are not restricted to what economy they facilitated. The reform of American capitalism, 
legitimized and sanctioned by antitrust, also entailed the consolidation of a societal model. In 
Sklar’s (1988, p. 436) narrative, it also “prepared the ground for the reconstruction of capital-
labor relations” (Sklar 1988, p. 436). Although the rise of corporate capitalism affirmed the 
role of a collective entity (the corporation) in place of individualized capitalists as the “basic 
unit of the economy”, it however reinforced, and even took to a new level, individualism, by 
assuring the composition of the firm through shares and contract. As Sklar affirms (1988, p. 
437), “[i]n principle and at law, rights and obligations remained fundamentally individual, not 
corporative; the basic categorical concepts remained the individual, society, and government, 
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not “the people”, or “the class”, and the state”. These can thus be seen as outcomes in a 
constitutive dimension of society. 
 
2.4.1 Defining neoliberalism 
 
This brief overview of Sklar’s work reveals that evaluating the outcomes of 
competition policy demands identifying contextual economic, societal and political elements 
in which this regulatory arena was created and within which it is practiced. The “law in 
action” is the “law in context”. The task for my work is similar: in order to discuss the 
possible connections between competition policy and the consecration of a neoliberal 
economy and society, the elements that I take to be relevant in the context in which the field 
of competition policy in Brazil was created, and in which it produces its effects must be 
explicated. As I have been sustaining, this is a context of neoliberalism.  
Although considerably different from that of the corporate reconstruction of American 
capitalism in the beginning of the twentieth century, the historical moment in which 
competition policy reform emerges is also a period of important transformations and 
adjustments in the capitalist system. In the following pages, I therefore present what I 
understand to be the defining traces of this context in both the economy and in society. These 
definitions will serve as parameters for interpreting the empirical results of my research on the 
facilitative-regulatory and constitutive roles of the field of competition policy, i.e. to compare 
if and how the outcomes I find in Brazilian competition policy relate to what I understand to 
be the defining characteristics of a neoliberal economy and society. 
I bring the notion of neoliberalism as an analytical alternative to a dominant concept 
often mobilized to characterize the economic, political and social changes that emerged in the 
last three decades of the twentieth century: that of globalization. I understand that 
neoliberalism is more precise to identify the defining traces of these phenomena, as opposed 
to the polysemous character and homogenizing effects that the idea of globalization may 
imply75. It is not to say that this latter concept does not point to some important aspects of the 
historical moment in question. It does highlight, for instance, the element of scale, which has 
been crucial in the period. However, as I understand it, the notion of neoliberalism, or at least 
																																																								
75 The notion of globalization would also be inaccurate to define the distinctive capitalist transformations of the 
late decades of the twentieth century because “globalisation, or the internationalisation of the world economy is 
an old process [...], an inner tendency of capitalism” (Duménil and Lévy 2005, p. 10). 
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the qualification of globalization as being predominantly neoliberal76, provides more accurate 
definitions of what has actually globalized, due to what reasons, and with what purposes. 
Almost every author who mobilizes the notion of neoliberalism attaches to the first 
pages of her work a libel about the difficulty of defining this concept77. Nevertheless, despite 
some nuances of scope and emphasis, it is possible to identify relatively consensual elements 
around what would be basic features of neoliberalism78. A first point of convergence is that 
neoliberalism entails, on the one hand, a theory (Saad-Filho and Johnston 2005, p. 4; Harvey 
2007, p. 64; Kotz 2002, p.1), an “ideology” (Anderson 2000, p. 13; Colás 2005, p. 70), a 
“thought collective” (Mirowski 2009, p. 428-431; Plehwe 2009, p. 4), an “intellectual face” 
(Mudge 2008), or doctrine (Clarke 2005, p. 59; Shaikh 2005, p. 50). On the other, it also 
comprises a set of more or less coherent concrete policies, “new rules of functioning of 
capitalism” (Duménil and Lévy 2005, p. 10), a “strategy of governance” (Munck 2005, p. 68), 
a “policy stance” (Kotz 2002, p. 1), “bureacratic” and “political” faces (Mudge 2008), or a 
“political project” (Campbell and Pedersen 2001, p. 1). 
As a theory, neoliberalism has its “prehistory” rooted in the 1930s and 1940s. The first 
meetings of the so-called Mont Pèlerin Society are often mentioned as a landmark of the 
development of neoliberal thinking (Harvey 2007, p. 19-20; Plewhe 2009, p. 4)79. Since 1947, 
within the post-war context, the meetings of intellectuals of different disciplines such as 
Friedrich von Hayek and Ludvig von Mises fostered the development of a “vehement 
theoretical and political reaction against the interventionist and welfare state” that spread all 
over Europe and in the United States, with the New Deal (Paulani 2005, p. 122). As an 
intellectual enterprise, this was a movement that objectified to restore the power of liberal 
																																																								
76 I here subscribe to Saad-Filho and Johnston’s (2005, p. 2) understanding that “neoliberalism is inseparable 
from imperialism and globalisation”. Without the concept of neoliberalism, globalization becomes inaccurate, or 
even a celebratory concept. 
77 See, for instance, Plehwe (2009, p. 1), who opens the introduction of a book about neoliberal thinking by 
stating that “[n]eoliberalism is anything but a succinct, clearly defined political philosophy”, or Mirowski (2009, 
p. 421) who writes in the closing chapter of the same volume that “[n]eoliberalism turns out to be anything but 
an easily and clearly defined contemporary political philosophy”. Similarly, Saad-Filho and Johnston (2005, p. 
1) point out several reasons due to which“[i]t is impossible to define neoliberalism purely theoretically”. 
78 As Mirowski (2009, p. 433) puts it, “there really is something distinctive that holds the neoliberal thought 
collective together other than mere expediency, and further, that it has enjoyed very real doctrinal purchase in 
the modern political arena”. 
79 It is important to note, as Plewhe (2009, p. 14) argues, that neoliberal “thought collective” has no single 
identifiable “birthplace”, as it “had a diverse number of places of origin”. Also, it is not a “pensée unique” 
(Plewhe 2009, p. 14) or “entirely coherent” (Harvey 2007, p. 21). The development of neoliberal theory “drew 
on different theoretical approaches (e.g., the Austrian school, the incipient Chicago School of Economics, the 
Freiburg school of ordo-liberalism, Lippmann’s “realism”), which continue(d) to coexist, but also served to 
cross-fertilize these and other approaches” (Plewhe 2009, p. 14). 
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economic thinking, for years displaced and in a “defensive position” (Paulani 2005, p. 122) 
due to the dominance of Keynesianism and the shadow of socialism (Crouch 2011, p. 5-6)80. 
The neoliberal intellectual tradition, as it developed since the 1940s until the 1980s, 
unites several theories about how the market, the state and society should work. A basic 
assumption of neoliberal thinking, which distinguishes it from classic liberalism, is that the 
conditions for its model of a “good society” “must be constructed and will not come about 
‘naturally’ in the absence of concerted political effort and organization” (Mirowski 2009, p. 
434). In neoliberal thinking, the definition of a “good society” has often been accompanied by 
the notion of freedom: for individuals, markets, corporations, contract and trade. In this sense, 
neoliberalism is a theory that enunciates the conditions in which the market and society as a 
whole could be “set free” from what would be the harmful ties of state interventionism and 
the even more dangerous chains of socialism. 
What is to be constructed, in turn, entails a specific understanding of the market and 
the state. In neoliberal thinking, “the market always surpasses the state’s ability to process 
information”, and thus a “market society must be treated as a ‘natural’ and inexorable state of 
humankind” (Mirowski 2009, p. 435). Governmental intervention, in this sense, harms the 
efficient functioning of the market and as a consequence jeopardizes liberty (Munck 2005, p. 
61). The central rationale of neoliberalism is that of an orthodox theory of free trade that 
maintains that if economic agents are free to compete, this competition will automatically 
generate benefits for all the economy (Shaikh 2005, p. 42). This assumption has two 
corollaries. First, if the market, in detriment of the state, is the best setting to “process 
information”, “capital has a natural right to flow freely” (Mirowski 2009, p. 438).  
Second, if the free movements of capital are a necessary condition for a “good 
society”, “corporations can do no wrong, or at least they are not to be blamed if they do” 
(Mirowski 2009, p. 438). If let to compete freely, corporations will generate a healthy market. 
Here is where Mirowski identifies another illustrative divergence between classic liberalism 
and neoliberalism. While the first was highly suspicious of “joint-stock companies and 
monopoly”, neoliberalism “began to argue consistently that not only was monopoly not 
																																																								
80 As Paulani (2005, p. 116-129) and Harvey (2007, p. 20) maintain, neoliberalism was majorly about a reaction 
against interventionist perspectives embodied by Keynesianism and socialism, but it also encompassed several 
“adjustments” in classical liberalism. The basis for such distinction in respect to liberalism was the adherence to 
free market principles developed by neo-classical economics since the second half of the nineteenth century 
(Harvey 2007, p. 20). 
		107	
harmful to the operation of the market, but in any event, it was an epiphenomenon attributable 
to the misguided activities of the state and interest groups” (Mirowski 2009, p. 438)81.  
This is a facet of neoliberal thinking that touches directly on competition policy. The 
shift in the liberal tradition concerning monopoly – from the classical suspicion to the 
neoliberal acceptance – was associated to the approach notably developed by scholars at the 
University of Chicago interested on the relation between law and economics, during the 
1940s and 1950s, and later incorporated into the actual practice of U.S. antitrust authorities by 
the 1980s (Davies 2010; Van Horn and Mirowski 2009).  
This perspective maintains that monopoly is not necessarily harmful to the functioning 
of the market due to several reasons. Corporations, “even behemoth corporations”, are taken 
to be “relatively benign entities that naturally gave rise to the market conditions that would 
eventually undermine them” (Van Horn 2009, p. 229). Anticompetitive results of a 
monopolistic or oligopolistic economy, such as exclusionary practices, are ephemeral, and 
eventually come to an end if market mechanisms are let to work freely (Van Horn 2009, p. 
229). Moreover, Chicagoan law and economics provides intellectual grounds for the 
understanding that monopoly is justifiable if it proves to be efficient, and that it can actually 
be a result of a more efficient corporation surpassing less efficient ones (Davies 2010, p. 75). 
The assumption underlying this view is that once corporations rationally pursue concentration 
only if “they were convinced that they could achieve efficiencies”, “mergers and 
amalgamations, leading to the emergence of giant corporations, will always lead to improved 
efficiency” (Crouch 2011, p. 56). Government intervention through antitrust can therefore 
distort the market, which in the end possesses the superior capability to correct its own 
eventual problems implied by free competition – precisely through free competition. 
In neoliberal theory, a market free of distorting governmental interventions is also a 
condition for guaranteeing the freedom of individuals. Since its origin, neoliberalism became 
a champion of individualism (Mirowski 2009, p. 428) and attempted to recast the prevalence 
of individual liberties that would have been jeopardized by the collectivist trends of welfarist 
and socialist models of government. As the “private” is taken to be superior to the “public”, 
the values of individualism and freedom of choice compose the core of neoliberal doctrine 
(MacGregor 2005 p. 143). The corollary of this assumption is that any kind of governmental 																																																								
81 Mirowski notes that this position has not, however, been constant in neoliberal thinking. Early in the first 
meetings of the Mont Pèlerin Society, neoliberalism “set out entertaining suspicions of corporate power, with the 
ordoliberals especially concerned with the promotion of a strong antitrust capacity on the part of the state” 
(Mirowski 2009, p. 439). However, due to the influence of the Chicago school of economics, these worries were 
washed up from this intellectual project, being confined to the ordoliberal strand of thinking. 
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interference on the sovereignty of the individual must be eliminated in order for both the 
market and society to work properly. The main targets of neoliberal theory, in this sense, were 
the collectivist entities embodied by “social protectionist laws”, viewed as “indirect barriers 
to trade” (MacGregor 2005, p. 143), and labor unions, which would hold an “artificial 
position of being able to manipulate wages in relative terms” (Steiner 2009, p. 195). They 
would hamper the freedom of choice of individuals, and thus distort the market’s role as “a 
device for signaling changes in supply and demand” (Steiner 2009, p. 195). 
In the neoliberal intellectual enterprise, it is thus only the market that can promote 
solutions to any problem generated within its boundaries, and secure freedom for individuals. 
If a laissez-faire market operating in these terms is a necessary condition for a “good society”, 
the state has the sole role of protecting its functioning. To do so, neoliberal thinking maintains 
that it is necessary to “redefine the shape and functions of the state”, although – it is important 
to notice – not to “destroy it”82 (Mirowski 2009, p. 436).  
It was only in the late 1970s, and notably throughout the 1980s and 1990s, that the 
neoliberal “scientific programme” found objective conditions to be actualized as a  “plan of 
political action, an immense political project” (Bourdieu 1998).  Neoliberalism ceased to be 
an entity solely in the “world of ideas”, in which it was “confined for almost three decades, 
and became an objectified reality” (Paulani 2005, p. 115). The political and economic 
objective conditions that opened room for the ascendancy of neoliberalism were the economic 
crisis of the 1970s (Paulani 2005, p. 124), which was a crisis of capital accumulation, 
unemployment, and rampant inflation (Harvey 2007, p. 12), the affront to the interests of 
giant corporations perpetrated by welfarist governments (Crouch 2011, p. 54), and the shadow 
of communism, which in the previous decades gained terrain in Europe and was a source of 
pressure for more intervention in capitalist economies (Harvey 2007, p. 15). In Latin 
America, the context of economic crisis had its particular contours. By the early 1980s, the 
model of “import-substitution industrialization” – “the emblematic economic policy in Latin 
America between 1930 and 1980” – started to collapse due to internal limitations (such as an 
																																																								
82 In conceptualizing neoliberalism as an intellectual project that calls for the reform of state structures to 
“protect [the] ideal market from what [is] perceive[d] as unwarranted political interference” (Mirowski 2009, p. 
436), not its abolishment, I oppose to how diffusion perspectives reviewed in Chapter 1 define it. While those 
accounts provide a narrow concept of neoliberalism, which would only encompass phenomena such as de-
regulation and privatization (i.e. policies oriented to reduce the presence of the state), I follow Mirowski’s advice 
(2009, p. 436): “[o]ne should not confuse marketization of government functions with shrinking the state, 
however: if anything, bureaucracies become more unwieldy under neoliberal regimes. In practice, “deregulation” 
cashes out as “re-regulation,” only under a different set of ukases”. 
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inflationary outburst) and to the international debt crisis (Saad-Filho 2005, p. 222-224)83. 
Hence, similarly to the corporate reconstruction of capitalism in the aftermath of the 1880s 
crisis discussed by Sklar (1988), neoliberalism stemmed as a solution to struggles internal to 
capitalism, to solve its crisis of accumulation (Filgueiras 1997, p. 906). 
 
2.4.2 Features of a neoliberal economy and society 
 
Although the theoretical roots of the neoliberal project are mostly located in the global 
North, and its early appearances as a set of concrete policies can also be identified in this 
region (for instance, Ronald Reagan’s government in the U.S. and Margareth Thatcher’s in 
the U.K.), neoliberalism rapidly spread worldwide84. As Saad-Filho and Johnston (2005, p. 2) 
suggest, neoliberalism is inseparable from globalization. The global promotion of neoliberal 
policies to the South became known as the “Washington Consensus” (Munck 2005, p. 65; 
Lapavitsas 2005, p. 38), due to the “convergence of three institutions based in Washington, 
D.C., the World Bank, the IMF and the US Treasury Department, around neoclassical 
economic theory and neoliberal policy prescriptions for poor countries” (Saad-Filho 2005b, p. 
113).  
It was not by chance that the implementation of neoliberal tenets as a solution to the 
crisis of capital accumulation was a global project, promoted across the South through the 
Washington Consensus. The rise of neoliberalism in the 1970s converged with a new stage of 
capitalist development: that of “globalization of capital”, which differs from the imperialist 
stage of the 1880-1913 period, and the Fordist model in place since the aftermath of World 
War II (Chesnais 1996). The solution to the crisis of capital accumulation led to a new, global 
stage of capitalist development, to which neoliberalism provided a functional intellectual and 
practical vehicle. But what are the defining traces of the global neoliberal reconstruction of 
the capitalist economy? How was the neoliberal scientific programme embodied in the 
Washington Consensus translated into concrete measures in the economy and society, 
especially in Latin America and, even more specifically, in Brazil?  I identify four major 
traces of the historical period opened by the emergence of neoliberalism as a dominant 																																																								
83 In this period, as Saad-Filho maintains (2005, p. 224), “[e]conomic growth stalled, wages plummeted and 
inflation skyrocketed in the wake of the crisis. It became easy to accept that [import-substituting 
industrialisation] had collapsed, and equally easy to argue that it should be replaced by neoliberalism. This was 
the viewpoint promoted by the US government, the IMF, the World Bank and important sections of the Latin 
American elite”. 
84 Chile was in fact an early “laboratory” of neoliberal policies, which were later “re-imported” into countries of 
the center, where they were theoretically elaborated (Dezalay and Garth 2002a). 
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political and economic model that are of special interest for the studying the roles of 
competition policy. 
 First, this is a model of global concentration and expansion of capital. As Chesnais 
argues (1996, p. 14; 91), the 1970s initiated a period of “extreme centralization and 
concentration of capital”, as the physiognomy of large groups originated in the center of 
capitalism (the U.S., Europe and Japan) substantially grew throughout the 1980s85. In a 
similar line, Harvey (2007, p. 80) notes that although neoliberal theory underscores the 
“virtues of competition”, “the reality is the increasing consolidation of oligopolistic, 
monopoly, and transnational power within a few centralized multinational corporations”. The 
degree of interpenetration between capitals of different nationalities increased in the period, 
generating highly concentrated structures in the international level. Global oligopoly 
produced in several sectors, mainly ruled by American, European and Japanese firms, created 
a limited “space of industrial rivalry” that is dominant in the world today (Chesnais 1996, p. 
36)86. Concentration was to a great extent conducted through foreign direct investment in the 
form of mergers and acquisitions87 (Chesnais 1996, p. 91), and during the 1980s it was mostly 
restricted to cross-country transactions among advanced economies (Picciotto 2011, p. 119; 
Chesnais 1996). In the 1990s, the movements of concentration expanded even further, as new 
frontiers of accumulation were opened in the periphery of the capitalist system, of which 
Latin America is emblematic. 
The expansion and concentration of capital in the 1990s is related to a second 
important trace of neoliberalism: the policies of privatization. If, according to neoliberal 
theory, the state distorts the optimal functioning of the market, its direct interference in the 																																																								
85 As Chesnais argues, concentrated forms of production and comercialization are not a distinctive feature of this 
period. They can be observed since what Sklar called the corporate reconstruction of capitalism. What is new in 
this historical moment as a global one is the “extension of highly concentrated structures of offer to most part of 
high intensity research and development industries, as well as to numerous sectors of large scale manufacturing” 
(Chesnais 1996, p. 94-95). The degree of concentration is, in turn, associated with a qualitative transformation of 
capitalist competition in this period. Competition reached an unprecedented global scale, as large corporations 
that until the late 1970s had operated “in relatively controlled oligopolistic domestic markets now face 
competition from other large corporations based abroad, both in domestic and foreign markets” (Kotz 2002, p. 
12). Concentration thus became a means of survival in this new level of international competition. 
86 Chesnais and most of the authors that I here quote are obviously writing in a period in which China had not yet 
achieved the economic prominence it nowadays enjoys. Harvey (2007), nevertheless, already points to the 
Chinese insertion in the international market in this period as reflections of this process of global expansion and 
concentration of capital. 
87 Similarly to Sklar (1988), Chesnais explains that the reasons for resorting to mergers and acquisitions as a 
means for the expansion and concentration of capital are mostly economic. Mergers and acquisitions became 
advantageous in the context of neoliberal globalization for several reasons: in sectors of high technology, M&A 
enables circumventing barriers to entry posed by the possession of a certain technology (Chesnais 1996, p. 101); 
it is also a means to reduce transaction costs of operating globally by internalizing it into a single corporation 
(Chesnais 1996, p. 102); and as an efficient strategy to conquer new markets by acquiring existing commercial 
labels, distribution networks and clients (Chesnais 1996, p. 64). 
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economy must be reduced. The role of the state shall be transformed, stepping out of direct 
participation in the economy. The privatization of state-owned enterprises, accompanied by 
the deregulation88 of certain economic sectors, and the liberalization of finance and trade89 are 
traditional neoliberal solutions to this “problem”. These measures can be observed worldwide, 
and more intensely in Latin America, where the model of import-substitution industrialization 
entailed several governmental restraints to capital flows, and an important participation of 
state-owned enterprises in the economy.  
In Brazil, for instance, the 1990s were the period when a major wave of privatizations 
took place in strategic sectors such as petrochemicals, steel, mining, fertilizers, railways, 
harbors, banking and finance, energy and telecommunications (Filgueiras 2006, p. 194)90. The 
creation of new markets through the privatization of state-owned corporations and the 
liberalization of economic sectors previously dominated by the government opened way for 
new mergers and acquisitions to occur (Picciotto 2011, p. 120), being thus potentially 
functional to the neoliberal trend of capital expansion and concentration already mentioned. 
As the study of Rocha and Kupfer (2002, p. 28) on the transformation of the structure of 
corporations in Brazil during the 1990s indicates, mergers and acquisitions following 
privatizations were associated with the expansion of multinational capital into a recently 
liberalized market. Azpiazu and Basualdo’s (2004) study about privatizations in Argentina, in 
turn, underscore how it consecrated a monopolistic control of strategic economic sectors. 
Privatization measures have thus been a “signal feature of the neoliberal project”, as its 
primary aim is to “open up new fields for capital accumulation in domains hitherto regarded 
off-limits to the calculus of profitability” (Harvey 2007, p. 160). 
A third trace of neoliberalism that is relevant for discussing the outcomes of Brazilian 
competition policy is the process of financialization, which is related to the neoliberal 
																																																								
88 I here follow Munck’s (2005, p. 63) definition of deregulation as the “removal of state regulatory systems” 
through the creation of “new forms regulation with new market-oriented rules and policies to facilitate the 
development of the ‘new’ capitalism”. Again, I thus explicitly oppose the notion proposed by diffusion 
perspectives which equates neoliberalism with the mere absence of regulation.  
89 Trade liberalization entails, for instance, the lowering of tariffs and non-tariff barriers (Deraniyagala 2005, p. 
99), such as import restrictions characteristic of the import-substituting industrialization model (Saad-Filho 
2005a, p. 225). Financial liberalization comprises measures such as “encouraging money centre and stock 
market activities in developing and newly industrialised countries” (Toporowski 2005, p. 110). Both are seen as 
key measures for market devices to work properly and consequently promote competition, technological change, 
production, growth and even reduce poverty (Deraniyagala 2005). 
90 Between 1991 and 2001, more than a hundred companies owned both by the federal government and the 
states, were privatized, and shares were sold in other companies, mobilizing amounts estimated between 92 and 
88,3 billion dollars (Anuatti-Neto et al 2005, p. 152; Filgueiras 2006, p. 194) 
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restructuring of the economy in three different, yet interconnected senses91. One dimension of 
financialization concerns the unprecedented extension of financial capital in the contemporary 
economy. As Epstein (2005, p. 3) defines it, in this respect “financialization means the 
increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial 
institutions in the operation of the domestic and international economies”. Indicators of such 
shift are the “massive expansion of financial systems in relation to the real economy, [...] an 
unprecedented growth of financial assets and leverage, [...] the emergence of highly complex 
financial instruments, and [...] the extraordinary levels of financial trading” (Picciotto 2011, p. 
261). The quantitative shift of finance is also directly connected to the processes of expansion 
and concentration of capital, as the financial sector was extremely functional, for instance, in 
funding mergers and acquisitions in the 1980s, and became a new sector of activity for 
industrial groups (Chesnais 1996, p. 239-240). In the neoliberal era, financial capital has thus 
faced “a quantitative expansion of its activities and profits” (Kotz 2008, p. 5). 
Beside a shift in extension, the process of financialization also entails a qualitative 
transformation. Financialization comprises a movement toward a relative autonomization of 
finance as a sphere of capitalist accumulation (Chesnais 1996, p. 239)92. As Chenais (1996, p. 
239) argues, “the financial sphere represents the advanced post of the movement of capital 
globalization”. Under the neoliberal paradigm, the “industry of finance” globalized as one of 
the key fields of capital accumulation and valorization (Chesnais 1996, p. 240-241). While 
during most of the twentieth century the financial sector was “closely linked with productive 
capital” (Picciotto 2011, p. 259), under neoliberal hegemony financial institutions surpassed 
its former roles as “servant of nonfinancial capital” and increasingly started to pursue “their 
own profits through financial activities” (Kotz 2008, p. 5-6). Neoliberal policies starting in 
the 1980s thus reflected the “increasing autonomy and dominance of finance capital over 
productive or commercial capital” (Heydebrand 2003b, p. 160). Exemplary of such 
autonomization are the derisory proportion of operations involving international trade in the 
foreign exchange market (Chesnais 1996, p. 244), the growth of financial assets in 
comparison to “capital tied up in the form of exchange commodities or in the form of the 																																																								
91 As several authors note, the role of financial capital in the economy is not an exclusive feature of 
neoliberalism. As early as the consolidation of corporate capitalism in the nineteenth century, financial capital 
plays a significant role in capitalist development and accumulation (Picciotto 2011, p. 258; Kotz 2008, p. 8; 
Heydebrand 2003b, p. 164-171). What is new in the neoliberal era is the extension of financialization, and as I 
will argue later, its relative autonomization as a space of capital accumulation and its dominance in the world 
economy.  
92 Even in the neoliberal era financial capital is still connected to the productive economy. According to Chesnais 
(1996, p. 246), the autonomization of the financial sphere is only relative, to the extent that the “capital that 
valorizes itself in the financial sphere was born – and still is – of the productive sphere”. 
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fixed capital of the means of production” (Heydebrand 2003b, p. 162), and the revival of 
“specialized markets” for investing in and negotiating governmental and private bonds and 
obligations, notably public debt (Chesnais 1996, p. 247; Chesnais 2005, p. 37). 
The expansion of financial capital into new domains, its increased importance in the 
flows and concentration of capital, as well as its relative autonomization as a sphere of capital 
accumulation reveal yet a third sense of financialization as a crucial element of neoliberalism, 
of political nature: the dominance of financial capital. As Duménil and Levy maintain (2005b, 
p. 1), there are several indications pointing to the “return of finance to hegemony”, i.e. to the 
“crucial position of finance, at the center of the new neoliberal setting”93. Such dominant 
position was achieved by several institutional arrangements constructed under the auspices of 
neoliberal theory. Increasingly since the 1980s, measures of financial liberalization (Picciotto 
2011, p. 263; Chesnais 1996, p. 261), deregulation (Kotz 2008, p. 8; Heydebrand 2003b, p. 
172; Chesnais 1996, p. 261), and the opening and creation of national financial markets in 
emerging economies (Chesnais 1996, p. 264-266) spread worldwide94.  
These were measures that “tended to encourage rather than control the forces leading 
to financialization and speculation” (Picciotto 2011, p. 266), setting “the financial sector free, 
and allowing the process of financialization to develop” (Kotz 2008, p. 8). Another typical 
neoliberal measure to secure the free flow of financial capital is related to one major 
theoretical tenet of neoliberalism: monetarism (Heydebrand 2003b, p. 160). The financial 
accumulation through investments in public debt, one of the key areas of financialization, as it 
was mentioned, is associated with monetary policy, i.e. the control of inflation through 
interest rates. This, in turn, is the task of central banks. Not by chance, therefore, one of the 
recurrent neoliberal policies in this area has been the promotion of central banks’ “autonomy” 
from politics (Arestis and Sawyer 2005). In peripheral countries, the creation or reform of 
“independent central banks” is mostly dated of the 1990s (Carruthers et al 2001). 
Autonomous central banks following international standards of monetary policy have 
guaranteed high interest rates, which represent a major attractive for financial operations. 																																																								
93 Examples of the dominant position of finance given by Duménil and Lévy (2005b, p. 1) are such as “[t]he rise 
of interest rates is obviously favorable to lenders; the new global distribution of production is clearly directed by 
large banks; the stock market is center stage; the managers of corporations are compelled to target their activity, 
even more strictly than before, toward the maximizing of the market value of corporations and the distribution of 
large fractions of profits as dividends” 
94 The concept of deregulation may be misleading because, as Picciotto (2011, p. 261), “finance has become 
highly regulated in many countries and internationally, but in forms favoring private or quasi-public self-
regulation”. I here rely on Chesnais’ (1996, p. 261-262) use of the term, which understands deregulation as a 
series of measures by which the state ceased to have a strict control of the financial market, for instance, on 
interest rates, price fixing of banking services and the creation of new financial products. 
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Besides the expansion and concentration of capital, privatizations and financial 
hegemony, the fourth defining trace of neoliberalism that I understand to be useful for 
studying the outcomes of competition policy are its impacts on social groups. As Harvey 
(2007, p. 75) puts it, neoliberalism “is hostile to all forms of social solidarity that put 
restraints on capital accumulation”. According to the neoliberal intellectual project, key forms 
of “social solidarity” that distort market mechanisms are social and labor rights, and the 
organization of labor in unions. Not by chance, thus, they have become central targets of 
reforms. If the market is to function freely, labor must be freed from restraints that impede its 
proper circulation as a commodity.  
The effects of neoliberalism on workers and labor unions have been extensively 
documented. Following its theoretical project, neoliberalism imposed several measures to 
weaken labor unions, and to flexibilize social protections and labor markets (Palley 2005, p. 
25; Munck 2005, p. 65; Johnston 2005, p. 137; Sinha 2005, p. 166; Bush 2007; Crow and 
Albo 2005). These trends have been observed in the case of Brazil, where the restructuring of 
capital-labor relations promoted by neoliberalism implied high rates of unemployment, 
precarization and flexibilization (Filgueiras 2006, p. 186-189; Pochman 1995, p. 245; 
Pochmann 2004; Antunes 2005), and the weakening of labor unions (Pochmann 2003, 2005, 
Saad-Filho 2010, p. 24).  
Neoliberalism entails, in this sense, “a programme of the methodical destruction of 
collectives” (Bourdieu 1998). Although the model of “neoliberal governance” silences several 
social and political categories, it also mobilizes alternative concepts. It also comprises a 
“positive” agenda in this respect, actively constructing a substitutive model of social 
organization, as several studies following a Foucauldian tradition, or the approach of a 
“cultural critical political economy” 95  have emphasized. In these views, neoliberalism 
substantially transforms the concept and composition of citizenship (Haque 2008), and 
produces a particular “neoliberal subjectivity” (McWhorther 2012, p. 71). It engineers a 
“paradigm shift in which collectivist ideas are abandoned and replaced by ideas of individual 
responsibility” (Ireland 2011, p. 10). The neoliberal rationality “tries to render the social 
domain economic [by] the increasing call for ‘personal responsibility’ and ‘self-care’” 
(Lemke 2001, p. 203). Individualism, which is a methodological and philosophical tenet of 
neoliberal theory, becomes a model of society by the extension of market principles to the 																																																								
95 Such approach reincorporates a “cultural” or “social” dimension into the approach of a critical political 
economy, thus avoiding a purely economicist perspective. As Sayer (2001, p. 688) states, a “critical cultural 
political economy” “couples its interests in the social and cultural embedding of economic processes with a 
focus on the powerful disembedding forces of economic systems and the problems they cause”. 
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social world. The constitution of an “ethos of self-governing” that promotes “individualism 
and entrepreneurialism” engenders a particular “regime of citizenship” (Ong 2006, p. 3-8) in 
which the “good neoliberal subject” is a successful enterprise-unit that maximizes utility 
(McWhorther 2012, p. 72).  
In the industrial capitalist model, production served “as a marker of identity and class 
divisions” and citizenship was equated with government (Munck 2005, p. 65). As Santos 
(2005, p. 36-37) describes, in this model the state “selected two well-defined social actors 
(capital and labor) and brought them to the negotiating table”, so the “political formation 
thereby generated was one of institutionalized conflicts rather than of stable flows.” 
Neoliberalism, however, subverts this model. A functional means to do so is through the 
conversion of such model of citizenship into categories such as that of consumer (Barnett 
2010), the “citizen-consumer” (Clarke 2004; Rose 2004; Barnett 2010, p. 286), the creation of 
“a regime of market citizenship” composed by “market” and “economic” citizens 
(Schneiderman 2008).  
The consumer is an individual economic agent capable of freely expressing and 
pursuing his or her identities, interests and choices (Munck 2005, p. 65), and “his or her 
activity is to be understood in terms of the activation of the rights of the consumer in the 
marketplace” (Rose 2004, p. 165-166). Citizenship is thus repositioned, from its original 
location within the state, to a “variety of private, corporate and quasi-public practices from 
working to shopping” (Rose 2004, p. 166). As the “citizen-consumer” is a basic social unit 
compatible with (and governable under) with the market logic, it is thus functional to the 
neoliberal intellectual and political project of substituting collectivist forms of organization, 
such as those embedded in labor unions and governmental social protections. Moreover, as 
Schneiderman (2008, Ch. 7) puts it, consumers “are understood to be a main beneficiary of 
expanded global free trade and investment”, and these alleged benefits are precisely what 
provides legitimacy to the rules of free trade. Through this social categorization, strong 
markers of social division such as capital and labor, and its well-delimited political tensions 
are eliminated, and matters of inclusion and exclusion are depoliticized, turned into problems 
of technical coordination through the logics of the market (Santos 2005, p. 37). 
This brief excursion through what I understand to be defining traces of a neoliberal 
economy and society can be summarized in how Duménil and Lévy (2005, p. 10) describe the 
political, economic and social transformations that started in the late 1970s: 
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neoliberalism refers to new rules of functioning of capitalism, which affect 
the centre, the periphery, and the relationship between the two. Its main 
characteristics include: a new discipline of labour and management to the 
benefit of lenders and shareholders; the diminished intervention of the state 
concerning development and welfare; the dramatic growth of financial 
institutions; the implementation of new relationships between the financial 
and non-financial sectors, to the benefit of the former; a new legal stand in 
favour of mergers and acquisitions; the strengthening of central banks and 
the targeting of their activity toward price stability, and the new 
determination to drain the resources of the periphery toward the centre. 
 
Also, as Saad-Filho (2005a, p. 225) underscores, these policies were implemented 
with some particularities in Latin America – notably the reference to the tasks of “inflation 
control”: 
It is a peculiarity of Latin American neoliberalism that the transition was 
frequently justified obliquely, by reference to the imperatives of inflation 
control. Neoliberal policies were, correspondingly, often disguised as 
‘technical’ anti- inflationary measures. [...] Throughout Latin America, 
financial, trade and capital account liberalisation, the wholesale privatisation 
or closure of state-owned productive and financial firms, and profound fiscal 
and labour market reforms along neoliberal lines were imposed, allegedly 
because they were essential for short-term macroeconomic stability (i.e. 
inflation control) and long-term economic growth. 
 
As I argued, it is necessary to transpose these elements as parameters to discuss the 
outcomes of competition policy in Brazil, once the reform and practice of antitrust law in this 
country is integral to the context of neoliberal reforms of the 1990s. In Brazil, the 
development of neoliberal policies is frequently associated with the governments of Collor de 
Mello (1989-1992), Itamar Franco (1992-1995) and Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-
2002). After more than twenty years since the first manifestations of neoliberal reforms, and 
in face of the ascendancy of the Workers’ Party (PT) to the presidency in 2003 and its 
maintenance in power for three mandates, a growing literature started to discuss the 
occurrence of a possible reversion of neoliberalism in Brazil96.  
Some authors have defined the period starting with Lula da Silva’s government (2003-
2010) and his successor’s, Dilma Rousseff (2010-2014), as years of “post-neoliberal 
governments” (e.g. the collection edited by Sader [2013]). Others have detected signs of the 
emergence of a “new developmental state” (Mattos 2007, Boschi 2010, Bresser-Pereira 2007, 
2010), or of a “new state activism” (Trubek et al 2013) in Brazil. In this view, a new 																																																								
96 The assessment of the reversion of neoliberal policies in Latin America is not restricted to Brazil. As Boschi 
(2010, p. 2) maintains, “in Brazil, Chile and Argentina, center-left governments started to adopt practices that 
revitalized the role of the state, indicating a return to certain developmentalist principles characteristic of the 
period that preceded market reforms, but redefined and adapted to the new times”. 
		117	
economics of development would have been adopted, encompassing measures such as the 
reanimation of industrial policy through efforts to create globally competitive national 
champions, a highly selective use of tariffs, taxes and subsidies to jump-start industries 
(Trubek 2008, p. 12), and the increasing role of state banks as key-agents in financing 
Brazilian industrial policy as well as innovation (Trubek et al 2013, p. 299-301). Other 
authors have underscored continuities of the neoliberal project in the governments elected 
since 2003, especially in macroeconomic policy (monetary, exchange and fiscal policies), as 
evidence of the absence of any deep rupture (Paulani 2008; Morais and Saad-Filho 2005, 
2011). Under this view, new developmentalist proposals such as industrial policy would have 
been only partially institutionalized, achieving a complementary character to neoliberal 
measures that remained intact (Morais e Saad-Filho 2011, p. 516; Gonçalves 2012, p. 11). 
It is not my purpose, at this point, to engage with the debate about the possible 
continuities and ruptures of neoliberalism in Brazil. However, as I rely on the elements 
offered by a “critical political economy” of neoliberalism to contextualize the neoliberal 
model of the economy and society, it is important to take into account these potential 
qualitative shifts when applying this framework into empirical research. 
 
*** 
In section 2.3, I complemented the actor-centered approach to the process and agents 
of reform through a framework that enables the empirical analysis of the outcomes of 
competition policy. I sustained that through a “law in action” perspective that focuses on the 
facilitative, regulatory and constitutive roles of a regulatory arena such as competition policy 
in the economy and society, the depoliticizing and often unempirical evaluations of outcomes 
present in mainstream narratives can be circumvented. By mobilizing these operational 
concepts, I understand it will be possible to empirically assess the connections of competition 
law reform with neoliberalism, something secondary or even neglected by the knowledge 
produced by lawyers, economists and diffusion perspectives. The assessment of the outcomes 
captured through the operational concepts of the facilitative, regulatory and constitutive roles 
of competition policy in light of neoliberalism demand, however, the establishment of 
parameters of what characterizes this economic, political and social model. 
Hence, in section 2.4, what I take to be the defining traces of a neoliberal economy 
and society were described. I relied on “critical political economy” perspectives that point to 
the concentration and expansion of capital, privatizations, the financialization of the economy 
and the mutual dismantlement and engendering of social categories as characteristic elements 
		118	
of the processes of neoliberalization that became hegemonic since the late 1980s, and notably 
in Latin America and Brazil, starting in the 1990s. These, I argued, are substantive elements 
that contextualize what can be expected of competition policy reform and practice if, as I 
sustain, it is an integral part of neoliberalism. 
Together with the actor-centered approach sketched in section 2.1, and the theories 
about the roles of lawyers and economists in neoliberalism described in section 2.2, these 
elements comprise the general framework that I deployed to construct an alternative narrative 
about the process, the agents, and the outcomes of competition policy reform and practice in 
Brazil. It is still necessary, however, to explain how I “translated” the research questions 
generated by this framework into specific empirical tasks, and the methodological strategies 
that are were adopted in the search for answers. This is the object of Chapter 3. 
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CHAPTER 3  
Methodological strategies for studying the politics of regulation 
 
 
To situate and explain the methodological strategies adopted in this research, it is 
useful to recapitulate the path so far covered, as summarized in Figure 1 below. With the 
puzzle that motivates this inquiry in mind – the linkages of competition policy reform and 
practice with neoliberalism in Brazil – in Chapter 1 I surveyed what are the narratives offered 
by institutions, lawyers, economists, and diffusion perspectives to understand this 
relationship. As I argued, based on descriptions about the process and agents of competition 
policy reform (A), as well as its outcomes to the economy and society (B), these sources 
depict competition policy as a successful form of state control over the market that 
contradicts, or even neglects the very existence of neoliberalism, and its utility as an 
analytical concept. 
Departing from a criticism to the often agentless, instrumentalist and technological 
approaches these narratives frequently mobilize to explicate reform, and to the formalist and 
celebratory evaluations of its outcomes, in Chapter 2 I sketched a framework to circumvent 
what I see as their shortcomings. This framework points to two general strategies for re-
politicizing the reform and practice of competition policy and thus evaluating its connections 
to the political and economic project of neoliberalism. First, framing the process of 
competition policy reform as the constitution of a field of practice, in which lawyers and 
economists are the concrete agents that determine the structure and thus the functioning (and 
the roles) of this field (C). Second, assessing the outcomes of competition policy as the “law 
in action” of what this field of practice facilitates, regulates and constitutes in the economy 
and society (D). From these conceptual tools, I derived four empirical research questions that 
translate the broad research problematique into an operational inquiry. Still in Chapter 2, I 
described theories that provide “substance” to this formal structure, as they enable visualizing 
lawyers and economists as agents of neoliberalism (E), as well as the defining traces of a 
neoliberal economy and society (F). These are theories that give parameters to guide the 
search for answers to the formulated questions, as they state what should be expected in the 
analysis of who are the agents of competition policy reform and practice, and what are its 
outcomes to the economy and society if it is rooted in and functional to neoliberalism. 
  
 
 
		120	
Figure 2. Research path 
 
 
 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
In general terms, thus, the construction of an alternative narrative about the linkages of 
competition policy with neoliberalism in Brazil is structured as the application of the 
theoretical framework designed in sections 2.1 and 2.3 (C and D) in an empirical study, and 
the comparison of the data obtained with the substantive theories about the agents of 
neoliberalism (section 2.2, E) and the defining characteristics of a neoliberal economy and 
society (2.4, F). Through these steps, it is possible to assess what are the roots and roles of 
competition policy reform and practice in neoliberalism. What is still to be explained are the 
letters “G” and “H” of Figure 1, that is, the methodological strategies adopted to put these 
conceptual tools to work empirically. Or, in other terms, it is necessary to describe what is to 
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be asked more concretely, according to the conceptual framework sketched, that provides 
answers to the question of how is competition policy reform and practice related to 
neoliberalism. 
As Bourdieu (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 225) suggests, “the most ‘empirical’ 
technical choices cannot be disentangled from the most ‘theoretical’ choices in the 
construction of the object”. In this chapter, I thus present how the research questions derived 
from the conceptual tools designed in the previous chapter were operationalized into a 
concrete empirical research. As I will discuss in the sections below, the data demanded by 
each set of questions is extremely diverse. I therefore mobilized different methodological 
strategies to conduct the study. In this sense, this dissertation can be seen as a “multi-method 
research” (Nielsen 2010, Bryman 2004), or “mixed methods research”, as it “combin[es] both 
quantitative and qualitative research and methods” (Creswell 2003, p. 203). 
My use of such strategy is not, however, what is often understood as a mixed-method 
approach, i.e. a means to cross-validate findings obtained through different methods, or to 
cover the weaknesses of certain methods with others (Creswell 2003, p. 213). This strategy 
normally refers to the mixing of methods for the analysis of the same research question, and 
the discussion of the potential similarities and differences among the data obtained through 
each method. As Creswell and Plano Clark (2007, p. 7) put it, the “mixing of data is a unique 
aspect” of the definition of a mixed-method approach, and enables “a better understanding of 
the problem than if either dataset had been used alone”.  
In this research, however, the resort to multiple methods is in the form of a 
combination, rather than a mixture. I combine different methods because the set of empirical 
questions translated from the broad research puzzle demands data of distinct types. The use of 
multiple methods therefore responds to the need, derived from how the research problem was 
operationalized into concrete empirical questions, to approach the different dimensions that 
compose the object of investigation. Although different, and despite the fact that they are not 
intended to provide validation or refutation among themselves, the different sets of data are 
therefore necessary because together they provide indicators to tackle the more general 
research question – that of the roots and roles of competition policy in neoliberalism. Thus, 
following Bryman (2004, p. 678), although the multi-method research may entail the 
application of two or more sources of data and methods to the investigation of a single 
research question, it also comprises the combination of distinct methodological strategies to 
“different but highly linked research questions”. Similarly, Nielsen (2010, p. 953) explains 
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that the multi-method approach also entails the use of more than one research technique or 
strategy to study several closely related phenomena. 
To present the multi-method approach applied, I organize this chapter accordingly to 
the empirical research questions formulated in Chapter 2. For each set of questions, I describe 
what kinds of data were identified as useful to answer it, and present the correspondent 
instruments designed to collect and analyze the empirical material. The questions that stem 
from the actor-centered approach were tackled through similar methodological strategies, and 
are thus grouped below. Those generated by the critical political economy of the law in 
action, in turn, are here dismembered, as they entailed different methods for data collection 
and analysis. The chapter is structured as follows: in section 3.1, I present the methodological 
strategies implied by the actor-centered approach; in section 3.2, I describe the quantitative 
study designed to investigate the facilitative-regulatory roles of competition policy in the 
economy; and in section 3.3, I discuss the set of qualitative instruments deployed to 
complement the study of outcomes to the economy, and also applied to produce indicators of 
competition policy’s constitutive roles in society. 
 
3.1 Relational biography of the agents of reform and practice 
 
From the actor-centered approach to the process of constitution of the field of 
competition policy and its practice discussed in section 2.1, I derived two sets of research 
questions which imply similar tasks for empirical research: to identify the relevant agents 
involved in it, the positions they occupy, their capitals and habitus, and how they condition 
the structuring and the structure of the field. The nature of the empirical data demanded by 
these questions is clearly qualitative: it is necessary to identify certain individuals and 
properties associated with them. As anticipated, my focus relies on lawyers and economists as 
key-agents for the creation and the operation of the field of competition policy. To depict the 
profiles of these agents, three forms of capital were taken as indicative of their positions and 
potential dispositions: cultural, social and political capital. Inspired in Bourdieu (1984, p. 
227-242), I selected several “indicators” of the elected forms of capital, and a systematic set 
of sources to collect data about them. 
Cultural capital was operationalized through five indicators of academic and 
professional trajectories. These indicators comprise the three forms of cultural capital 
identified by Bourdieu: embodied (dispositions, of which the command of foreign languages 
is exemplary), objectified (products indicative of education and training), and institutionalized 
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(such as educational qualifications and professional experiences), as summarized in the table 
below. 
 
Table 2. Indicators of cultural capital 
 
Indicators of cultural capital 
 
Definition 
 
 
Undergraduate studies 
 
 
institutions and areas of undergraduate studies 
 
Graduate studies 
 
 
institutions, countries and areas of graduate studies 
 
Academic experience 
 
 
areas of interest and practice of academic work, encompassing 
publications, teaching, supervisions, and research projects 
 
 
Professional experience 
 
 
areas of “practical” work, be it in the private and public sectors, and in 
international organizations 
 
 
Foreign languages 
 
 
command of languages other than Portuguese 
 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
Taken together, they enable visualizing the academic and professional backgrounds of 
those agents that engage in reform and are recruited to manage the state apparatuses 
responsible to produce competition law. These are both the “credentials” possessed by these 
agents to become relevant agents of the field, and potential indicators of their predispositions. 
For instance, through the analysis of objectified cultural capitals such as publications, it is 
possible to map the agents’ stances toward competition policy, i.e. which “theoretical” 
tradition they endorse in the field. 
Beside cultural assets, I also collected data about the social capitals possessed by these 
agents. These entail three forms of membership to groups or networks determined by the 
nature of the social ties established: professional, social and familiar. These forms of 
interpersonal relations illuminate the proximity among the relevant agents of the field, thus 
helping to assess if and how social ties help to determine its structure, i.e. who are the agents 
“authorized” to become part of the architecting and practice of the field. Social ties are also 
taken as indicators of the sharing of dispositions toward the state and the economy.  
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Table 3. Indicators of social capital 
 
Indicators of social capital 
 
Definition 
 
 
Professional ties 
 
 
professional interpersonal relations among agents, embodied in networks 
constructed in their professional experiences 
 
 
Social ties 
 
 
friendship interpersonal relations among agents, embodied in long-term 
relationships constructed in both academic and professional experiences, 
or even outside it 
 
 
Family ties 
 
 
familiar interpersonal relations among agents, both parental and 
matrimonial 
 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
Political capital was operationalized through one indicator: the occupancy of political 
positions, encompassing elective mandates, appointments to roles in government (in all 
spheres of governments) and in political parties. Although these elements could be placed as 
part of cultural capital, once it entails elements of trajectory, and also social capital, to the 
extent that it comprises membership to certain (political) groups, I decided to construe a 
distinct variable for political capital for two reasons. First, as a trajectory asset, political 
capital is not legitimated in the same way as academic or professional credentials, which have 
a relatively autonomous hierarchy and logics of functioning. Second, as a form of 
membership to a political group or network, the social ties built around politics are also 
connected to dynamics that are not necessarily the same as those of a professional, friendship 
and familiar basis. However, as discussed in the description of the reflexive sociology 
approach, these forms of capital are not static: conversions take place all the time, and the 
possession of one form of capital is often accompanied by others. Similarly to cultural and 
social capitals, political assets also confer a means to locate the agents in the social space 
where they act in relation to the dominant political groups, their strategies and interests. Also, 
as an element of trajectory (political positions previously occupied), it permits constructing 
the agents’ potential dispositions toward the field. 
Through these sets of capitals, and following the theoretical framework sketched in 
section 2.1, I tried to position these agents within their fields of origin and to identify their 
“structures of preference” toward the state and the market (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 
123), the “internalized schemes” that guide agents’ behavior (Dezalay and Madsen 2012, p. 
442) – i.e. the dominant habitus shared by the agents involved in reform and in the practice of 
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competition policy. Given that the core issue at stake in the establishment and practice of the 
field of competition policy is the extent of control of the state over the economy, these 
dispositions are reflected on their general perceptions of the state-market relation, and on 
specific stances concerning competition policy. Following the theoretical framework 
sketched, these schemes of perception and its corresponding position-takings are connected to 
the positions occupied by these agents, which in turn are determined by their capitals.  
It is important to notice that these indicators are not of a purely quantitative character. 
My aim is not to identify who possess more or less cultural capital, or a higher or lower 
amount of social connections. Rather, what interests me is identifying what kinds of capitals 
these agents hold, in order to position them in their fields and within the field of competition 
policy, and thus assess the very structure of this field and the hegemonic dispositions it opens 
space to. Through the mapping of who are these agents – their capitals, positions and 
structures of preferences – I contextualize what are their interests and strategies, and what 
they can and do mobilize towards what ends (Dezalay and Garth 2002a, p. 9). 
 
3.1.1 Trajectory study 
 
The research strategy adopted to capture those forms of capitals, and the positions and 
habitus they crystallize was that of a “relational biography” (Dezalay and Madsen 2012, p. 
448, Dezalay and Garth 2002a). The resort to a “biographic” method is justified by the 
character of the data demanded by the variables elected in the inquiry. It is the study of their 
trajectories that enable collecting the information about what kinds of capitals are possessed 
by the agents that construct and operate the field, and what positions they occupy. As Dezalay 
and Madsen (2012, p. 448) put it, “the biographies of the players suggest which capital and 
resources have been brought into play at the different stages of [the field’s] structuration”. 
Trajectories reveal “what moves groups into the field of state power, what they bring in terms 
of expertises and networks, how they operate, how they are oriented on terrain characterized 
by intense competition and constant change” (Dezalay and Garth 2002a, p. 10). 
The potential of such method lies beyond the explanation of isolated and “specific 
actions of individuals” (Dezalay and Madsen 2012, p. 448). This is why the method is 
qualified as “relational”. Individual trajectories are assembled into a “cumulative story that 
can be established by comparing a high number of trajectories within a particular field” 
(Dezalay and Madsen 2012, p. 448). It is the combination of several individual trajectories 
that “provide a way to examine and decode the complex fights and divisions that characterize 
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a particular field at a particular time” (Dezalay and Garth 2002a, p. 10). As the field’s 
structure is documented and inscribed in the agents’ trajectories and actual practices (Dezalay 
and Madsen 2012, p. 448), assessing what are the trajectories of these agents opens room for 
revealing the very structure of the field. 
I deployed such “relational biography” method to analyze both the agents involved in 
the process of reform of competition policy in the early 1990s, which resulted in the law 
8.884 of 1994, and those who occupied the field since reform until the year of 2011, 
comprising more than 80 agents. To identify who were the relevant agents in the process of 
reform, I combined two strategies. First, I resorted to official documents and secondary 
sources that mention lawyers and economists who were officially appointed to draft bills, and 
conduct the legislative construction of the field of competition policy. An example of that is 
an ordinance of the Ministry of Justice, dated of 1993, through which a commission of experts 
was appointed to formulate the legal project that eventually resulted in the law 8.884 of 
199497.These sources served as an entry-point to the field, and were eventually complemented 
by interviews conducted with lawyers and economists, in which I asked respondents who 
were the relevant agents in the process of reform. 
Such framework was applied in the historical reconstruction of the creation of a 
“modern” field of competition policy in Brazil, which comprised the period from 1984 to 
1994. Most of the relevant episodes included in this historical reconstruction were selected 
based on what mainstream narratives point to as the landmarks of competition policy in 
Brazil, such as the Constitution of 1998, the laws of 1991, and the competition act of 1994. I 
hence analyzed the legislative construction of these norms. However, during fieldwork I also 
identified other episodes that were referred to by the agents of the field as integral to the 
field’s history, and were thus included in the analysis 
Identifying the relevant agents of the practice of the field was much easier, as they 
comprise a finite set of individuals institutionally delimited. I selected agents appointed to the 
following positions between 1991 and 2010: all commissioners and presidents of CADE, 
Secretaries of the Ministry of Justice’s Secretariat of Economic Law (SDE), and Secretaries 
of the Ministry of Finance’s Secretariat of Economic Monitoring (SEAE). Interviews also 
enabled the identification of what the field itself reputes as key-agents of competition policy, 
who were eventually incorporated into the trajectory study. In the end, the trajectories of more 
																																																								
97 This is an ordinance of the Brazilian Ministry of Justice: Portaria do Ministério da Justiça n. 28, of January 
27th 1993. 
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than 60 agents that composed the field of competition policy in the period were reconstructed 
and analyzed.   
The trajectory study developed to gather biographical information relied on several 
sources: the Lattes Platform98, an information system maintained by the Brazilian government 
which congregates curricula of Brazilian academics; Linkedin99, a mix of information system 
and social network congregating professional curricula; Who’s Who Legal100, an international 
publication that “features over 16,000 of the World's leading private practice lawyers from 
over 100 national jurisdictions”; and personal and professional websites (such as those of law 
firms and economic consultancies). 
In the case of those agents appointed as CADE’s commissioners or presidents, the 
primary source of information was the curriculum each of them submitted in the process of 
appointment. These curricula are attached to the so-called “Messages to the Federal Senate” 
(MSF)101, through which the President sends the nomination for approval by the Federal 
Senate. I analyzed 46 curricula available in 40 MSFs presented to the Senate between 1991 
and 2010102. Another auxiliary source was a book edited by Dutra (2009), an antitrust lawyer, 
which congregates interviews with 23 former commissioners, and includes biographic 
questions.  
 
3.1.2 Qualitative elite interviews 
 
Besides the analysis of curricula based on the mentioned sources, I also conducted a 
total of 43 interviews, encompassing agents involved in the process of reform of competition 
policy, individuals appointed to CADE, SDE and SEAE, CADE’s staff, and lawyers and 
economists that work in the field as professionals representing corporations (listed in Annex 
II). The selection of interviewees obeyed two criteria. First, I tried to interview all those 
agents that were identified as relevant for the trajectory study, i.e. those involved in reform, 
and those that had occupied positions in the SBDC. The list of “relevant” agents, especially in 
the case of reformists, evolved with fieldwork, as the interviewees themselves revealed names 
that weren’t anticipated in my initial mapping. In the end, my list of invitations for interviews 																																																								
98 Available at: http://lattes.cnpq.br 
99 Available at: http://linkedin.com 
100 Available at: http://whoswholegal.com 
101 Mensagem ao Senado Federal. 
102 The MSFs dated from 2001 onwards were obtained through the search system of the Senate’s website (under 
the option “Legislative activity” at the address www.senado.gov.br). The MSFs submitted before 2001 were not 
available in digital form, and were obtained after being required to the Senate’s Archive.  
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comprised 60 agents that somehow fit into this criterion. I was able to interview 31 of 
them103. The other 29 agents that were invited but not interviewed either did not respond to 
the attempts I made to contact them104, or did respond but my research schedule didn’t match 
their availability.  
The second criterion stems from Dezalay and Garth’s (2002a, p. 10-11) suggestion 
that the study of the field must “obtain multiple points of entry in order not to be captured by 
one point of view”. In the course of research I decided to bring in voices that were not of 
those agents that participated in reform, or that ended up occupying positions in government. 
Thus, I incorporated the views of lawyers that work in the field of competition policy 
representing corporations before CADE. To select “relevant agents” of this type, I mapped 
those lawyers who are “repeated players” in CADE based on a database about CADE’s 
decisions in merger reviews (which will be discussed in the next section)105. I decided to 
adopt such delimitation based on the assumption that the more experience the agent has in the 
field, the more information he/she will be capable to provide. 
I listed 40 names that are most frequent in cases decided by CADE between 1994 and 
2010, excluding eventual agents that appeared in the database but were already comprised by 
the first criterion (i.e. were either reformists or producers of competition policy)106. I sent 
invitations for interviews for this group, and was able to interview 9 of them. Most lawyers 
did not respond to the interview invitation, and some of them replied but were not available 
for scheduling the interview at the time. The inclusion of these agents that were not directly 
involved in reform, nor occupied positions in the SBDC proved to be a valuable choice. It 
assured the multiplication of points of entry, and enabled assessing their perceptions of the 
functioning of the field. As I will discuss in Chapter 4, interviews with those agents of the 
“market” (as opposed to the agents of the “state”) enabled visualizing a shared habitus of the 
field, and the porous boundaries between the state and the market – what I will take as an 
indicator of the structure of the field and its roots in neoliberalism. 
Late in the fieldwork process, I also had the opportunity to interview staff members of 
CADE. Excluding those who fit the other criteria, I mapped 18 agents who have occupied 																																																								
103 The number of invitations is lower than the agents that compose the trajectory study for several reasons. Four 
of these 68 agents were already deceased when this research begun. I was also unable to locate any contact 
information for another 5 agents. 
104 For each of the identified agents, I made at least two attempts of contacting, by email and phone. 
105 In most cases, several lawyers of the same firm are listed in a single case. I placed them individually in my 
interviewees list. 
106 Out of the 31 agents interviewed as reformists or producers of competition policy, 15 develop professional 
activities representing corporations before CADE. Some of them figured within the top 40, but were excluded 
from my mapping of lawyers, as they were already comprised by the other criterion. 
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positions in CADE’s bureaucracy as attorney general, and as economists who assist the work 
of commissioners. While the former are appointed by the President, just as CADE’s 
commissioners and presidents, the latter are civil servants. Similarly to the other cases, most 
of the invitations were not replied. Interviews were conducted with only 2 of these agents, 
both economists and civil servants currently working in CADE. The low number of 
interviewees certainly does not allow delineating any conclusions about these “mid-level” 
agents who produce competition policy. However, these two interviews provided interesting 
indications about the habitus and the dynamics of the field, especially in the case of an 
economist who has occupied different positions in the SBDC practically since the 1994 
reform, and was thus able to provide a vast “institutional memory”. Assessing the role of the 
bureaucracy that compose the field, and who are these agents and how they affect the 
production of competition policy, would nevertheless be an invaluable contribution for a more 
complete understanding of the field, and constitutes a possible venue for expanding this 
research. 
The set of 43 interviews with this variety of agents responded to different objectives. 
First, interviewing the agents that are object of the trajectory study enabled exploring in detail 
the information about their capitals and positions identified through documental sources. 
Second, interviews with the agents who architected the field in the early 1990s served to 
gather information about the history of reform and their practical involvement in the 
construction of the 1994 law. Questions that sought to grasp how the reform process actually 
took place, what were the struggles around it, why certain institutional designs were chosen 
and why the field took a certain direction helped to illuminate the connection of these agents’ 
profiles with their positions-taking. Third, as already mentioned, bringing in other voices 
helped to understand the habitus of the field, to map what were important moments of 
development of the field after its reform in the 1990s, and to shed light into the very practice 
of those agents entitled of producing the law, as they do so in interaction with lawyers 
representing corporations. In all cases, interviews made possible the gathering of direct data 
about the construction of competition regulation, on what are the struggles of the field, and to 
locate the struggles, and these agents’ perceptions and political stances within the field. 
Interviews of this type, as Tansey (2007, p. 2) explains, do not aim to “make generalisation of 
the full population”, but most notably to “draw a sample that includes the most important 
political players that have participated in the political events being studied” – i.e. to conduct a 
“process tracing”. 
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I conducted what Weiss (1994) calls “qualitative interviews”. Besides providing 
access to trajectory information, the qualitative interview was also fit to my research purposes 
as this is a method suited to develop detailed and holistic descriptions, to integrate multiple 
perspectives, to describe a certain social process (“how events occur or what an event 
produces”), to learn how events are interpreted by social agents (Weiss 1994, p. 8-11), and 
how agents make sense of themselves and what they do (Hermanovicz 2002, p. 484). 
Interviews were semi-structured through a guide elaborated in advance, which provided “a 
listing of areas to be covered in the interview, along with, for each area, a listing of topics or 
questions that together will suggest lines of inquiry” (Weiss 1994, p. 48). 
The guide was composed by a basic axis (Annex III), which was applied to all 
interviewees, and a set of specific questions, determined accordingly to the different roles 
played by the agents interviewed (Annexes IV to VI). The basic axis explored three topics: (a) 
personal, academic and professional trajectory of the interviewee; (b) perceptions about 
CADE’s composition and decision-making; and (c) stances about the boundaries of the field 
of competition policy. Topic (a) objectified gathering data for the trajectory study, and in the 
case of those that do not integrate it, to position them in the field in order to interpret their 
responses to the other topics. In the case of those agents involved in reform or appointed to 
positions in the SBDC, trajectory questions also intended to identify what roles they assumed 
after acting as reformers or producers of competition policy, and to identify mechanisms of 
recruitment, i.e. how they ended up occupying such central roles in the reform and practice of 
competition policy. Given the centrality of biographic elements for my theoretical framework, 
and that it was also often a useful way to “break the ice” and establish a rapport with the 
interviewee, all interviews begun with a question about the respondent’s trajectory. 
Topics (b) and (c) were intended to grasp the agents’ dispositions toward the field of 
competition policy. I formulated questions that provoked the respondents to express their 
perceptions of the functioning of the field. On topic (b), I asked how they perceive the 
historical appointments to CADE (commissioners and presidents), and how they evaluate the 
decisions historically made by CADE (if there were variations in time, if they saw it as 
“correct” or not and why, among others). On topic (c), I made questions that, although not 
directly, induced respondents to express their views on how the field should work, that is, 
their normative assertions and political stances about the boundaries of the field. Questions 
were formulated to assess their views on two substantive themes that, following the 
theoretical framework elaborated in the previous sections, are connected to potential political 
cleavages and stances of the field: on how they evaluate the regulation of the financial sector 
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by CADE, and on how they evaluate the appreciation of issues related to labor in CADE’s 
decisions. On the one hand, this data enables connecting the agents’ capitals and positions 
with position-takings within the field. On the other, as I will discuss later on this section, it is 
also intended to portrait the dominant views on the roles of competition policy to the 
economy and society, which illuminate the connection between the field’s habitus and the 
political and economic tenets of neoliberalism. 
Besides the basic set of questions applied to all interviewees, I elaborated three 
specific axes for the following groups: reformers, producers (CADE’s commissioners, 
presidents and staff, and former SDE and SEAE agents), and professionals. The specific 
questions of the axis of reformers sought to explore questions about the process of reform, 
such as: what were the landmarks of the process of reform; who was involved; who, if anyone, 
opposed reform and why; and what were his/her concrete contributions to the design of a new 
competition policy (Annex IV). Through these questions, I intended to grasp factual elements 
that could be connected to the agents’ profiles and positions, and to locate possible political 
struggles around the reform process. I also elaborated questions about how and why crucial 
decisions of institutional design of the field were made. These questions explored six themes: 
the decision to establish the criterion of 400 million Reais as the threshold for submitting 
merger reviews to CADE; the definition of criteria for allowing economic concentrations 
(such as the limit of market share allowed, and the efficiency generated by the operation); the 
institutional design of CADE and the SBDC (mechanisms to guarantee “autonomy”, and 
composition); the decision to establish a post-merger notification system, instead of a pre-
merger system; the decision to include economic analysis as a method of decision-making; 
and the influence of international agents and experiences in the process of reform. 
In mainstream narratives, these are substantive elements that are said to define the 
institutional design and the boundaries of competition policy, and have been debated in terms 
of “success” and “mistakes”. As I will argue, by asking the reformers to explain how and why 
such decisions were made, and connecting these to their backgrounds, positions and stances 
toward the field, it is possible to re-politicize crucial substantive elements of the construction 
of competition policy in Brazil, and thus evaluate its connection to neoliberalism. 
In the second specific axis, that of the producers of competition policy, I sought to 
explore the agents’ views on the institutional structure of the SBDC and on the decision-
making process (Annex V). To address the first topic, I formulated the following questions: 
How was the [CADE, SDE or SEAE] structured when you got there in terms of staff and 
conditions of work?; and How was your cabinet staff composed?. These questions provided 
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an entry to the institutional history of CADE, its developments after reform and, most 
importantly, to more routine and daily conditions that, as I will argue, provide several 
indications of how competition policy is produced. The second topic was intended to explore 
what struggles happen within the field and how they take place – another potential indicator 
of positions, hierarchies and of the very structure of the field. To trigger the discussion of this 
theme, I asked former commissioners, SDEs and SEAEs what were the most important or 
controversial cases that happened when they occupied those positions. 
Finally, in the axis of professionals, I formulated questions that sought to explore how 
the professionals of the field of competition policy organize their work in law firms (Annex 
VI). This was a necessary step to understand who are the law firms that compose the field, 
and how they engage with the state apparatuses. To depict a profile of their form of 
organization, my questions explored issues such as: in what areas the law firm works; how 
many lawyers work in the firm, especially in competition policy; what are the origins and 
sectors of clients; and how do lawyers and economists interact in formulating legal strategies. 
As I will discuss in Chapter 4, these questions offered insights of the structure of the field in 
at least two senses: in how agents that occupy positions as reformists and producers are often 
close to the professional market, and in how law firms are active agents disputing and shaping 
the structure of the field of competition policy. 
Interviews were mostly conducted in two different moments of the research, and the 
very problematique of the investigation actually evolved with it. I did a first and small set of 
interviews between June and September of 2012, comprising 9 agents. The second set, 
conducted between May and July of 2013, included other 32 agents. Other two interviews 
were conducted in a late stage of research, in December 2013, as only then I was able to 
contact these interviewees. The period between these two major sets was one of intense 
reflection about the research, and of refining and, to some extent, redefinition of the research 
questions based on the first group of more exploratory interviews, in which the interview 
guide was tested and certain topics that weren’t anticipated revealed to be crucial for the 
understanding of the field. For the second set of interviews, these topics were thus 
incorporated. 
All invitations for interviews were sent by email, with a brief presentation of the 
research topic and information about my institutional affiliation, and the agencies funding the 
research. Attached to it I also sent a two-pages “Letter of presentation” (Annex VII) that 
stated, in a general form, the research topic, the purpose of the interview, and how the 
information provided would be used. I mentioned the possibility of protecting the 
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interviewee’s identity, if necessary, and/or restricting the use of any passages that the 
interviewee understood to be confidential. I also informed the respondents that, if possible, I 
wanted to record the interview, as well as that all materials obtained in the interview (digital 
recordings, notes, and transcripts) would be kept on file only by me. 
Previously to the interview, I always did a brief analysis of the interviewee trajectory, 
based on documental sources. On the one hand, this preparation turned out as useful, once I 
was able to explore trajectory elements that sometimes were not spontaneously mentioned by 
the respondent. On the other, as already discussed, it was extremely necessary to engage in an 
interview relationship that, given the nature of respondents, depended on the interviewer 
being seen as entitled of attention – a relevant interlocutor. Before starting an interview, I 
handed respondents two copies of a “Consent Form” (Annex VIII) that re-stated the 
objectives of the research, the purposes of the interview, informed what kinds of questions 
would be asked, and disclosed my personal contact information, as well as my supervisors’. 
In the bottom of the form, the respondent was asked to fill two boxes stating if it was 
necessary or not to protect his/her identity, and if any passage of the interview was deemed 
confidential or not. By the end of the interview, the respondent and I signed the form, and 
each of us kept a copy.  
Out of the 43 agents interviewed, all of them authorized recording, three of them 
asked that his/her identity should be kept anonymous, and several of them asked that some 
extracts of the interview should be kept confidential or at least not attributed to them directly. 
I will therefore not present any passage that was classified as confidential or identify those for 
anonymity was required. In order not to enable the identification of interviewees by exclusion 
and thus to jeopardize anonymity, when quoting extracts that present an evaluation of 
competition policy, an appraisal of CADE’s composition or direct criticisms to the field, I 
decided to keep them all anonymous. In quotes that report “factual” elements, such as 
historical episodes about the reform of competition policy, knowing who described them was 
important to connect the agent’s trajectory with his/her position-taking. As described by 
Walford (2011, p. 4), researching the powerful has the specificity that “the interviewees are 
chosen specifically because of who they are and the positions they hold”, and thus it is 
“difficult to offer anonymity to such people for it is not only what is said that is important but 
also who said it”. Hence, when interviewees did not explicitly require extracts to be 
confidential or anonymous, extracts were identified. 
Interviews were conducted in the cities of Brasília, Rio de Janeiro, and São Paulo, and 
two occurred through Skype and one by email. Most of these interviews were conducted at 
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law firms and economic consultancies, and a smaller part of them took place at universities, 
governmental institutions, public places or at the home of the interviewees. I also conducted 
some interviews at CADE, where I stayed for three weeks between June and July 2013 as a 
research visitor, after obtaining authorization of the institution’s president. In the end, the 43 
interviews generated a total of 3.260 minutes of recording, with an average length of 75 
minutes per interview. All interviews were transcribed for the systematization and analysis of 
the data collected. Given the extension of the transcribed materials, I used the software of 
qualitative data analysis Atlas.ti to organize the information. My use of the software, 
however, was less to generate any kind of analytical exercise, such as content analysis, but 
only to organize responses into categories connected to my empirical research questions. 
Given the character and positions occupied by the subjects researched – highly reputed 
lawyers and economists, and government officials – the interviews conducted can be seen as 
exemplary of what has been called “elite interviewing” (Aberbach and Rockman 2002, 
Odendahl and Shaw 2002, Kezar 2003, Tansey 2007, Mikecz 2012), “researching the 
powerful” (Walford 2011), or “studying up” (Nader 1972, Hunter 1995). This brand of 
interview often poses two connected challenges for research, which were experience during 
my fieldwork. One of them concerns the access to interviewees. As Nader (1972, p. 302) puts 
it, this is the “most usual obstacle” for conducting interviews with the powerful, as they are 
“out of reach on a number of different planes: they don’t want to be studied, it is dangerous to 
study the powerful, they are busy people, they are not all in one place, and so on”. Access 
may also be difficult due to the “positionality of the researcher” (Mikecz 2012, p. 484), i.e. 
the asymmetry of power between interviewer and interviewee, and the distinct and often 
conflictive ideological perspectives they hold about the object researched. As Mikecz (2012, 
p. 484-485) suggests, “the background characteristics of the researcher and the researched 
have a significant impact on the dynamics of the interview”. 
In this sense, access is more likely to be granted if the interviewer is capable of 
projecting a “positive image in order to gain [the interviewee’s] respect” (Harvey, 2011, p. 
434), and at the same time being seen as “perfectly harmless” (Waldorf 2011, p. 2). One way 
to circumvent this obstacle and to establish trust with the interviewee is for the researcher “to 
emphasize his or her academic and professional credentials and institutional affiliations” 
(Mikecz 2012, p. 485). During my fieldwork, interviewees almost always spontaneously 
demanded these “credentials”. In fact, nearly all interviews began with me being interviewed. 
The first 10 minutes of every interview frequently entailed questions about my trajectory 
(even including, in at least two cases, questions about my parents’ and grandparents’ 
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professions), and my professional goals. Very often, I was asked to justify my interest in 
competition policy, especially because although I was a law graduate, I was not a competition 
lawyer, nor wanted to become one. The question “If you’re not a practicing lawyer, why are 
you researching competition policy?” appeared several times. Interviewees also often asked 
for my own opinions about the questions I raised, and inquired what was my objective with 
the some of the questions presented. Moreover, they frequently asked what was the research 
problem of the dissertation, and the overall argument that intended to develop. 
My “credentials” often appeared to me as not exactly strong to balance the asymmetric 
relationship established in interviews: I came from a city outside the economic and political 
circle in which competition policy is produced in Brazil, the institutions in my background 
were not part of the ones normally seen as “top universities”, and my affiliation as a doctoral 
student was in a sociology of law program. Nevertheless, I believe that being a white male, 
wearing suits, and being affiliated to a foreign university contributed for opening access to 
these interviewees. If these conditions were different, it is possible that the obstacles in 
conducting interviews could be harder to transpose, as noted by other researchers107. 
In answering the preliminary questions raised by my interviewees, however, an ethical 
dilemma was frequently present – and here is where the second major challenge in my 
experience of “researching the powerful” appeared: “the degree to which the researcher 
should make clear his or her own views” (Waldorf 2011, p. 3). In preparing the “Letter of 
presentation” that I attached to the invitations sent to my interviewees, this dilemma was 
already installed: should I explicitly enunciate the objective of assessing the roots and roles of 
competition policy in neoliberalism, or not? The simple mention to neoliberalism appeared to 
me as a potential harm to the very possibility of interviewing these subjects, as I thought it 
could already express a position about the object, and thus jeopardize responses and even 
access to interviewees. The doubt was incremented by the fact that many of the mainstream 
narratives that I problematize in this dissertation were produced by those who I intended to 
interview. As Waldorf (2011, p. 3) maintains, although some authors suggest that a 
confrontational style of interview that challenges differing viewpoints is advisable in studying 
the powerful, being too explicit about the researcher’s views may not be the best option. 
Hence, in announcing the objectives of interviews, I chose to present it in a “general”, and as 
“neutral” as possible form: “investigating the roles of lawyers and economists in reforming 																																																								
107 For instance, in a study about educational policies in the UK, Neal (1995) conducted interviews with elite 
agents responsible for policy-making, and noted that a female researcher may be not taken as seriously as a male 
one by interviewees.  
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antitrust policy, and in producing competition regulation in Brazil”. This choice in no way it 
put interviewees in a harmful position, jeopardized their privacy, or hid my role as a 
researcher.  
Based on interviews and the other sources mentioned, I undertook the trajectory study 
of those agents involved in the reform of competition policy, and those recruited to be 
producers of competition law in Brazil. To link these profiles to concrete position-takings and 
to the habitus of the field, I also relied on official documents produced by the SBDC, such as 
CADE’s annual reports, and legislation enacted in the period analyzed. The detailed 
description of these agents’ profiles and their roles in shaping the field of competition policy 
is presented in Chapters 4 and 5. As the core objective of the research is to understand, 
through concrete agents, how the field was and is structured, and therefore what are its 
principles of functioning, the data collected through the trajectory study is analyzed in 
comparison to the profiles and roles of lawyers and economists in neoliberalism, as identified 
in the literature described in section 2.2. These studies provide substantive parameters about 
who are the lawyers and economists that have historically being connected to neoliberal 
reforms, the kinds of capital they hold, the positions they occupy in their fields, the strategies 
they often deploy and the stances toward the state and the economy they represent. 
 
 
3.2 A quantitative approach to the outcomes to the economy 
 
The question that reframes the analysis of the outcomes of the field of competition 
policy to the economy, as stated in section 2.3, is the following: What competition policy 
facilitates and for whom, and how economic interests both affect regulation and are impacted 
by it? As discussed earlier, the study of the outcomes of competition policy to the economy is 
framed as the “facilitative-regulatory” roles of the field of competition policy.  The objective, 
in this dimension, is to grasp what economy the field of competition policy facilitates, and for 
whom, and thus to assess how economic interests both affect and are impacted by this 
regulatory arena. What I called the “traces of a neoliberal economy” (section 2.4) are taken as 
parameters for constructing the variables that were analyzed, i.e. to distinguish what are the 
elements that can be expected from competition policy if it is compatible to the impulses of a 
neoliberal economy. I identified three elements that characterize the neoliberal economic 
model: the global concentration and expansion of capital, privatizations, and the hegemony 
of financial capital, or financialization. In general lines, my objective with the analysis of the 
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facilitative-regulatory impacts of the “law in action” of Brazilian competition policy is 
therefore to evaluate how the field responds to these characteristic impulses of neoliberalism. 
To do so, I adopted two strategies: to analyze how CADE decides, and how are the 
competences of competition policy disputed and defined. As I will explain, these topics are 
fruitful entry points to assess the facilitative-regulatory roles of competition policy in respect 
to the defining traces of the neoliberal economy. On the one hand, I take the analysis of 
CADE’s decisions as a means to evaluate how the field responds to the pressures of capital 
concentration, expansion and privatizations. On the other, as discussed in section 3.3, to 
assess how the field of competition policy deals with the hegemony of financial capital, I 
analyze the disputes surrounding CADE’s competence to regulate the financial sector. I 
sustain that, taken together, the study of these phenomena provides indicators to evaluate how 
the field of competition policy responds to the processes that, according to the critical 
political economy from where I departed, are defining traces of neoliberalism. 
 
3.2.1 The universe of decisions 
 
As stated in the last section of Chapter 1, to evaluate how the outcomes of Brazilian 
competition policy fit into the neoliberal economic tenets, it is necessary to go beyond the 
formalist accounts often found in mainstream narratives, and the frequently impressionistic 
uses of data they make in the scarce occasions when descriptions are allegedly empirical. 
These narratives about the outcomes to the economy are based on the evaluation of the 
decisions made by CADE, which crystallize the law produced in the Brazilian field of 
competition policy.  My proposal is similar in respect to the object of analysis: I assess what 
are the outcomes of the field to the economy through the study of the facilitative-regulatory 
roles of these decisions. This is because CADE’s decision-making is a privileged space to 
observe the production of effects by the field of competition policy, as decisions are the 
genuine “legal products” of this regulatory arena.  
However, to overcome the shortcomings associated with mainstream narratives in this 
dimension, it is necessary to depict in a systematic and empirical form what characterizes the 
decisions produced in the Brazilian field of competition policy. The analysis of outcomes 
with the purposes stated in this research demands a study capable of showing the historical 
trends in decision-making, and of identifying what elements are associated with the types of 
decisions made in competition policy – i.e., to determine how does CADE respond to certain 
economic agents and processes in its decisions. I believe that a useful way to achieve such 
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purposes is through a quantitative study of CADE’s decisions. Such approach enables a 
historical analysis of what decisions have been made throughout time, and avoids the 
impressionistic approach of basing the description of outcomes solely on selected decisions, 
grasping general trends in the overall regulatory practice. Moreover, it is also suitable to 
address an object that comprises a vast population, as it is the case of CADE’s decisions. The 
main hypothesis to be tested through the quantitative approach is if the facilitative-regulatory 
roles of CADE’s decisions are tuned to the impulses of neoliberalism, as sketched in Chapter 
2. In other words, the objective is to assess if the processes of capital concentration and 
expansion, especially the arrival of foreign capital through privatizations, is facilitated by 
CADE’s decisions or, conversely, if it tends to be regulated as any other case. 
In this research, the quantitative study of decisions was circumscribed to the two types 
of procedures that are most frequent in CADE and that comprise the core of its practice: 
Merger Reviews (MR) and Administrative Procedures (AP). Merger Reviews are the 
procedures through which CADE evaluates the legality of corporate concentrations that occur, 
for instance, through mergers, acquisitions, and joint-ventures108. The analysis of MR 
corresponds to what institutional narratives describe as the “preventive” roles of competition 
policy. According to the law of 1994, and as presented in Chapter 1, any operation of 
concentration that meets the notification thresholds has to be submitted to CADE’s 
evaluation. These criteria were, alternatively, that the resulting economic entity accounted for 
at least 20% of the relevant market, or that any of the participant economic agents held a total 
turnover of 400 million Reais in the previous year. Once the merger review is submitted to 
CADE, it is sent to both SEAE and SDE for these Secretariats to issue “technical opinions” 
on the merger. When back to CADE, a rapporteur is randomly assigned, issues his/her 
opinion and the case is presented to the “administrative court”, in which the other five 
commissioners and the president discuss the matter and vote. Decisions in MR can be 
unanimous or majoritarian, and with different results: to dismiss the merger without analysis 
of merit (for instance, if the thresholds weren’t met and therefore the merger was seen as not 
needed to be evaluated), to approve it in its integrity, to approve it with conditions, or to reject 
it in its totality.  
																																																								
108 In the Brazilian competition policy system, they are called Atos de Concentração (“Concentration Acts”), and 
have its legal basis and provisions stated in article 54 of the law 8.884 of 1994. With the legal reform of 2011, 
substantive changes were incorporated in the regulation of merger reviews, accordingly to the articles 53 to 65 of 
the law 12.529 of 2011. However, as the temporal circumscription of the quantitative study is between 1994 and 
2010, I will not deal with merger reviews submitted under the new law. 
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Through AP, in turn, CADE evaluates several types of “anticompetitive conducts” and 
“restrictive practices”, other than those of encompassed by merger reviews109. These include 
phenomena such as cartel formation, predatory prices, price discrimination, exclusive 
dealings, and other sorts of “abuse of economic power” and “infringements of the economic 
order”, as defined by article 21 of the law 8.884 of 1994. Here competition policy is closely 
related to criminal law, although CADE has no persecutory or jurisdictional powers on that 
matter. Nonetheless, AP decisions ruling that a violation occurred can be pursued in the 
criminal sphere by the Attorney’s Office, in the Federal and States levels. AP are thus 
emblematic of what institutional narratives name the “repressive” roles of competition policy. 
The path of an AP in the SBDC is slightly different from an MR. It starts at the SDE, 
provoked by the organ itself or motivated by the requirement of a third party (individuals, 
other corporations and state institutions, for instance)110. SDE undertakes the investigation 
about the potential anticompetitive conduct and decides if it is fit to be judged by CADE, in 
case it understands there is sufficient evidence of a violation, or to dismiss it. If the SDE 
dismisses it, the law establishes the need for a “mandatory appeal”, by which SDE “appeals” 
of its own decision to abandon the cause. Once this appeal arrives in CADE to decide whether 
or not to maintain the dismissal, whatever the decision made by SDE, it is the Council who 
decides if and how an AP will unfold. When in CADE, the procedure of an AP becomes 
similar to that of an MR: a commissioner is assigned as rapporteur, issues an opinion, and the 
other commissioners also position themselves111. Decisions in AP can also be unanimous or 
majoritarian. The results, however, are of a different kind. CADE can recognize the 
inexistence of any infringement, dismissing the AP, following or not the SDE position, or, on 
the contrary, if any violation is observed, it can impose measures to revert the conducts held 
illegal and fines to the corporations involved. In both MR and AP, CADE’s Attorney General 
also issues an opinion on the case. 
																																																								
109  Administrative proceedings are called Processos Administrativos in the Brazilian competition policy 
legislation, and were defined by the articles 30 and 53 of the law 8.884 of 1994. The provisions about the 
anticompetitive conducts regulated through AP were comprised in article 20 and 21 of the same act. Similarly to 
the regulation of merger reviews, APs underwent substantive changes with the law of 2011 (articles 66 to 83). 
Also in the case of this type of procedure I didn’t collect data after 2010. 
110 The AP could be originated from a Preliminary Investigation (Averiguações Preliminares) undertaken by the 
SDE. CADE analyzed these investigations through a distinct type of procedure, but in this research, for reasons 
of feasibility and time limitations, I decided to study only AP, as they often are a subsequent stage of a 
Preliminary Investigation. Also, AP constitute a parallel to MR in the case of conducts, while any Preliminary 
Investigation that lead to a conviction becomes an AP. 
111 Another difference is that in the AP, SEAE can issue a technical opinion on the case, while in the MR it is 
mandatory. 
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As anticipated, MR and AP constitute the majority of procedures decided by CADE. 
Although decisions comprise a finite universe, determining what is the number of MR and AP 
decided between 1994 and 2010 is not an easy task. The main source of data often used in 
other researches are CADE’s annual reports, produced since 1996, which present information 
about the number of procedures analyzed by the Council in each year, the types of decisions, 
and its forms (if unanimous or not)112. Martinez (2010, p. 39), for instance, recollects data 
based on these reports and finds that 6409 MR were decided by CADE between 1994 and 
2010. If her database is crossed with Salgado’s (2004, p. 366) study focusing on decisions 
made between 1994 and 2002, a slight difference can be noted: while Martinez identifies 
2093 decisions, Salgado observes 2082.  
Also in the case o AP divergences can be observed. Aggregating the data from 
CADE’s annual reports and Salgado’s (2004), between 1994 and 2010 CADE decided 885 
AP. However, even among CADE’s reports it is possible to observe discrepant numbers: 
while the 2010 annual report identifies 23 AP decided in 2003, that year’s annual report states 
that the number was 22. These discrepancies both in the case of MR and AP may be related to 
three problems: first, that CADE’s reports started to be issued only in 1996, so there is no 
direct data on the years of 1994 and 1995; second, that in its first versions reports were of a 
precarious quality; third and most importantly, that data collection by CADE itself was 
enhanced in the course of the years.  
Despite of the divergences, what stems from this brief description is that, given the 
vast “population” of decisions, a systematic and comprehensive analysis must rely on a 
sample. It would be simply impossible, due to the time and economic constraints of this 
dissertation, to cover the whole universe of decisions. For the purposes of thoroughly 
analyzing these decisions, discrepancies in the numbers of MR and AP are nevertheless not 
the only problem. CADE’s reports and secondary sources such as Salgado (2004) and 
Martinez (2010, 2011) only present aggregated data, not a list of all cases decided. It is not 
possible to identify, in these databases, what decisions correspond to what cases, and thus to 
scrutinize the factors involved in each process. This is a problem because sampling demands 
that this finite universe of decisions must accessible individually, so cases can be randomly 
selected, avoiding any bias. During my visit in CADE, I tried to obtain the listing of cases 
decided by the Council, but I was informed that the institution itself did not have that kind of 
																																																								
112  Annual reports can be accessed at CADE’s website, following the path “Página Inicial > Acesso à 
Informação > Auditorias > Relatório Anual”. 
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information. Thus, the only solution for overcoming this difficulty was directly reconstructing 
the universe of CADE’s decisions. 
To map the universe of CADE’s decisions, I reviewed 562 reports of trial sessions, 
available online113, which constitute a source of homogeneous information about what cases 
CADE has decided, and enables individualizing each procedure. These reports comprise 
decisions made between June 19th 1996 and December 15th 2010. There are no reports 
available for the years of 1994 and 1995, either online or in CADE. Also, 10 reports 
comprised in the period between 1996 and 2010 were unavailable for consultation, and 
couldn’t be obtained in my visit to CADE114. Each report stands for a single judgment session, 
and provides the summary of the cases decided by CADE on that day. The summary informs 
the type of procedure (MR and AP, for instance), its number, the corporations involved and 
their lawyers, the rapporteur, the type of decision and its form (unanimous or not). To 
reconstruct the universe of decisions, for each MR and AP observed in the reports I collected 
data about the date of the trial, the type and form of decision, the corporations involved, their 
lawyers, and the rapporteur.  
To complement the mapping of decisions in the period not covered by the reports, I 
resorted to Franceschini’s (2004) recollection of CADE’s jurisprudence. As the author is a 
competition lawyer, this repository is intended to be a systematic source of jurisprudence for 
practical uses, and decisions are organized according to thematic topics of special interest for 
litigation. It is not, therefore, a database presenting a complete listing of decisions. However, 
it enabled me to map decisions taken since 1994 (more precisely June 13th 1994, when the law 
8.884 came into force) until June 19th 1996 (the initial landmark covered by the trial sessions 
reports). Through Franceschini’s repository, I was able to identify other 15 MR, and 6 AP that 
were not present in judgment session reports115.  
Based on these sources, I mapped a total of 6378 MR and 852 AP decided between 
June 13th 1994 and December 15th 2010. In this 17 years period, the annual average of MR 
decided by CADE is around 375. However, as the figure below illustrates, in the initial years 																																																								
113 The reports are available at CADE’s institutional website, and can be accessed by following the path 
“Processual > Sessões > Sessões de Julgamento > Atas”. I analyzed 482 reports of “Ordinary Judgment 
Sessions” (Atas de Sessões Ordinárias), 38 reports of “Extraordinary Judgment Sessions” (Atas de Sessões 
Extraordinárias) and 42 reports of “Reserved Sessions” (Atas de Sessões Reservadas). 
114 These are the reports of 6 Extraordinary Judgment Sessions (numbers 01, 02, 03, 04, and 06 of 1996, and 17 
of 1998), and the reports of 4 Reserved Sessions (numbers 01, 06, and 08 of 1998, and 22 of 2000). 
115 For the period between 1994 and 1996, I identified 31 decisions in Franceschini’s repository. However, 10 
were not included in the mapping, for different reasons: 5 were covered by my mapping through trial sessions 
report; in 2 cases the procedure number was not recognized by CADE’s database; and in other 3 cases I could 
not retrieve from CADE’s website any document about the decision, so I was unable to confirm if and when the 
decision was made.  
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(1994-1998) the number of decisions is very low if compared to the overall average. Also, 
from the year 2000 onwards, the number of MR decided by CADE is above the average, 
reaching more than 600 cases in certain years, and almost never below 500. 
 
Figure 3. Number of Merger Reviews (MRs) decided by CADE (1994-2010) 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
 
Administrative procedures present a similar trend, despite some nuances. The average 
of procedures decided per year is around 50. However, as it can be observed in Figure X, a 
small number of AP was mapped in the initial years. Also, in the fifth year of the analyzed 
period, the number is way off the average: in 1998, CADE decided 284 cases, which 
corresponds to a third of the total of AP decisions between 1994 and 2010. 
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Figure 4. Number of Administrative Procedures (APs) decided by CADE (1994-2010) 
 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
In the reconstruction of the universe of decisions, I also looked at the types of 
decisions taken in each procedure. In classifying the types of decisions in MR, I relied on 
CADE’s typology, as described in each decision summary presented on the judgment session 
reports. I classified decisions in four types: Approved without restrictions: decisions in which 
the MR was approved in its integrity; Approved with restrictions: decisions in which the MR 
was subjected to some conditions to be approved (it included decisions classified by CADE as 
“approved with restrictions” and “approved with conditions”)116; Rejected: decisions in which 
the MR was rejected in totality; and Dismissed: decisions in which CADE did not analyze the 
merit of the MR (it included decisions classified by CADE as “archived”, “not subsumed”, 
“not admitted”, “loss of object”, “operation withdrawal”, “extinct without judgment of merit”, 
																																																								
116  In the original classification, cases here placed as “approved with restrictions” entailed, respectively: 
“Aprovado com restrições”, and “Aprovado com condições”. 
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or “lack of jurisdiction” – in practice, the effect of this type is the same as an “approval 
without restrictions”, as the operation is cleared)117. 
As the graph below illustrates, most decisions mapped in the population of MR – 5645 
or 88,5% - were of the first type: “approved without restrictions”. The second most frequent 
type of decision identified was to “dismiss” the MR, with a total of 411 procedures, or 6,4%. I 
identified another 314 decisions to “approve with restrictions”, which correspond to 4,9% of 
MR decided between 1994 and 2010. Finally, out of the universe of 6378 MR mapped, only 8 
were of the “rejected” type (0,1%), which stands for the thinnest portion of the graph below. 
 
Figure 5. Types of decision in MRs (1994-2010) 
 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
In the case of AP, decisions were classified in two broad types, as it was not possible 
to identify from the judgment summaries if, for every case, the decision was to “absolve” or 
to simply “dismiss” the charges without analysis of merit. The types of decisions thus were: 
Convicted: decisions in which the AP recognized a violation of the economic order and 
imposed penalties and/or remedies to corporations118; and Dismissed: decisions in which the 
AP did not recognize any violation of the economic order, did not impose any kind of penalty, 
																																																								
117 In the original classification, “dismissed” cases entailed the following expressions, respectively: “Arquivado”, 
“Não subsunção”, “Não conhecido”, “Perda do objeto”, “Desistência da operação”, “Extinto sem julgamento de 
mérito”, and “Incompetência do CADE”. 
118 I also classified under this category all cases in which the corporations celebrate a compromise with CADE to 
cease certain conducts, the so called Termos de Cessação de Condutas. 
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and/or dismissed the procedure without the analysis of merit for formal reasons (it included, 
for instance, decisions classified by CADE as “Archived” and “Appeal dismissed”)119; 
As the graph illustrates, 674 of the 852 AP decisions were to “dismiss”, comprising 
79,1% of the population. Conversely, 178 decisions (20,9%) imposed some sort of penalty or 
remedy, and were thus classified as “convicted”. 
 
Figure 6. Types of decision in APs (1994-2010)  
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
3.2.2 Variables, sampling and method of analysis 
 
I adopted two delimitations for analyzing CADE’s decision-making. For the study of 
MR, once there is a type of decision in which the merit of the case is not analyzed (those 
classified as “dismissed”), I decided to exclude them from the population. In practical terms, 
it meant excluding 411 cases classified as “dismissed” from the universe of 6378 decisions. 
The population of MR taken into account thus dropped to 5967 cases. I chose to exclude this 
type of cases for two reasons. 
First, although decisions to “dismiss” may reveal a dimension of CADE’s decision-
making (i.e. what it understands that falls into its jurisdiction), it comprised cases that weren’t 
analyzed for a variety of reasons: due to formal or procedural reasons, because the 																																																								
119 The cases in which CADE’s decisions were classified as “Archived” or “Appeal dismissed” entailed the 
mandatory appeals issued by SDE, in which that Secretariat concluded in its investigation that no violations were 
committed. Thus, these are types of decisions in which CADE agrees with the SDE. Cases in which CADE did 
not agree with the SDE in dropping the charges, I looked at the final decision made by the Council, which could 
be of the form of “Condemn” or “Absolve”. In the original, these classifications correspond to, respectively, 
“Determinou o arquivamento”, and “Negou provimento ao recurso”. 
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commissioners saw no potential harm to competition, because the operation was not 
concretized (“loss of object”), among others. However, from the summary of decisions it was 
impossible to know if the decision to “dismiss” was of substantive content (such as those that 
are grounded on an evaluation of the potentials to competition), due to formal reasons, or 
because the corporations withdrew the operation. Second, given the difficulty to assess the 
motives of this type of decision, it would be extremely time-consuming to select those that are 
relevant for the research purposes. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that analyzing 
thoroughly these decisions in future research may be an interesting avenue to complement the 
findings I will herein present.  
Besides ignoring the “dismissed” type in MR cases, I also excluded from the sample 
the 8 cases “rejected” by CADE. Given their minimal representation in the universe, creating 
a single category for this type of decision wouldn’t add to the analysis, as no firm conclusions 
could be extracted. Nevertheless, in Chapter 6 I analyze these 8 cases separately. Finally, 
before constructing a sample, the universe of decisions without the “dismissed” and 
“rejected” cases was reviewed in order to identify possible repetitions. In doing so, I spotted 8 
MR and 20 AP that were repeated in the universe. Hence, excluding double cases, the 
consolidated universe of decisions was of 5951 MR, and 832 AP. 
From the description of the reconstructed universe of procedures and types of 
decisions, it is possible to observe two imbalances that constitute an additional difficulty for 
sampling. On the one hand, the uneven distribution of MR and AP across time. Merger 
Reviews appear in a small number in the first years of the analyzed period if compared to the 
average, and AP are highly concentrated in the year of 1998. On the other, there is an 
imbalance in the number of decisions of each type. Especially in the case of MR, decisions to 
“approve with conditions” and to “reject” represent a minuscule proportion of the universe. 
As I will discuss in Chapter 6, this constitutes in itself valuable information of CADE’s 
decision-making practice. However, together with the important differences in the number of 
decisions made in each year, it poses a problem for sampling. If a simple random sample were 
constructed from this universe of decisions, it is very likely that it would mirror the 
majoritarian groups of the population: in the case of MR, mostly decisions from the year 2000 
onwards, and of the type of “approve without restrictions”; in the case of AP, an 
overrepresentation of decisions made in 1998. Nevertheless, as the objective of the 
quantitative analysis of decisions herein sketched is precisely to address the historical 
tendencies embedded in CADE’s decisions to facilitate or not certain economic phenomena, it 
is crucial to have decisions representative of different periods and of distinct types. 
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To circumvent this problem, I resorted to a sampling technique that guarantees a 
minimum representation of decisions from different periods of time and of different types: 
stratified random sampling. This method of sampling is suited for populations in which a 
“straight-forward random sampling may leave out a particular class of cases” (Cramer and 
Howitt 2004, p. 162). Instead of generating a random sample from the whole population, 
stratified sampling implies creating random samples from sub-groups that can be observed in 
this population. The population is divided in different strata accordingly to certain properties, 
and a sample is randomly produced for each of those disjoint groups. The great advantage of 
this technique is that it assures the inclusion of certain types of individuals that compose the 
population into the sample. Two disadvantages, on the other side, are that it increases the size 
of the final sample, and it adds complexity to the analysis, as each case will have to be 
“weighted” accordingly to its real presence in the population (I address this issue below).  
As Gorard (2004, p. 68) explains, selecting the number and the type of strata is a 
choice that must be made on theoretical grounds of relevance to the study. Therefore, in the 
case of my research, given the purpose to evaluate in a historical perspective what factors are 
related to the different types of decisions, and having observed the imbalanced distribution of 
decisions across time and types, two strata were selected: the political context of the decision 
and its type. By political context I mean the government in which the decision was enacted, 
which was operationalized in two broad groups: Itamar Franco and Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso (1994-2002), and Lula da Silva (2003-2010). Once Cardoso was Franco’s Minister 
of Finance before becoming president, I considered them as part of the same political context. 
This delimitation was an alternative to stratifying the sample by each year of analysis, which 
would significantly increase the size of the sample. By considering the “government”, I was 
able to both guarantee representativeness for the initial years that entail a small count of MR, 
and at the same time infuse a political content in the sample. 
In the case of MR, the distribution of cases in the universe of decisions according to 
these two strata was the following: 
 
Table 4. Universe of MRs according to government and type of decision 
 
Franco-FHC Lula 
Approved without restrictions 1841 3796 
Approved with restrictions 56 258 
Source: elaborated by the author 
In AP, the distribution is depicted in the table below: 
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Table 5. Universe of APs according to government and type of decision 
 
Franco-FHC Lula 
Dismissed 454 208 
Convicted 90 80 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
To calculate a representative sample for these strata, I began applying the regular 
formula for sample size (n0) determination of an infinite population (Bolfarine and Bussab 
2012): 𝑛! = 𝑧!. 𝑝!. 1 − 𝑝!𝐸!  
 
I adopted the standard parameters for the calculation of a conservative sample size, in 
order to minimize error. Hence, sampling error (E2) was determined at 5% (or 0,05), and the 
confidence level was of 95%, which implies a z of 1,96. Once the analysis is interested in 
assessing the profile of binary decisions (approved without conditions or approved with 
conditions, in the case of MR, and dismissed or convicted in the case of AP), p0, which 
indicates the parameter of variance of the population, was estimated at 0,5 – as if the 
population was equally distributed between the two types of decisions. In doing so, the risk of 
constructing a non-representative sample is diminished.  
Applying these values to the formula, the sample size (n0) estimated is of 384: 
 𝑛! = 1,96!. 0,5. 1 − 0,50,05! = 384 
 
However, once this is a formula to calculate the sample size for an infinite population 
and in the present case the universe is already known, it is possible to correct it for a finite 
population. To do so, the following formula was applied, where N stands for the finite 
population and n0 for the sample size calculated before: 
 𝑛 = 𝑁. 𝑛!𝑁 + 𝑛! 
 
For a stratified sample, the correction must be applied for each stratum as if they were 
distinct populations. Hence, the N corresponded to the total of MR or AP in each cell of 
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Tables 4 and 5. In the case of MR, the resulting sample size for each stratum was the 
following: 
 
Table 6. Sample size in MRs according to government and decision type 
 
Franco-FHC Lula 
Approved without restrictions 318 349 
Approved with restrictions 49 155 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
In AP, the sample size calculated is depicted in the table below: 
 
Table 7. Sample size in APs according to government and decision type 
 
Franco-FHC Lula 
Dismissed 208 135 
Convicted 73 66 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
The resulting sample size for MR was thus of 871 decisions, and for AP it was of 483. 
Based on the samples calculated for each stratum, cases were randomly selected from the 
universe. These were the samples taken to collect data about the profile of the cases decided 
by CADE and, based on it, to analyze what kind of economic phenomena enters CADE and 
how it exits the field, i.e. what decisions are made in what kinds of cases.  
Once the sample was stratified for grasping cases that could hardly be analyzed 
through a simple random sample, the proportion of cases in the sample is much higher than in 
the universe. For instance, while the 155 MR approved with restrictions during Lula’s 
administration correspond to 17,8% of cases in the sample, in the population this type of 
decision corresponds to only 4,33% of MR. Hence, any analysis of this data must balance the 
sample sizes according to its known presence in the universe. To do so, I calculated the 
“weights” of each stratum through a simple formula: by dividing the percentage of N (cases in 
the population) of each stratum by the percentage of n (cases in the sample) in each stratum. 
These weights were attributed to each case according to its stratum, and incorporated into the 
generation of the descriptive statistics analyzed in Chapter 6. 
As summarized on the table below, I operationalize CADE’s responses through 
decisions in three variables: the types of decision and types of restrictions in MR, and the 
types of decisions in AP. The variable of types of restrictions in MR was operationalized 
according to what the specialized literature on competition policy often refer to as the 
“remedies” imposed to a corporation in a case that is not entirely cleared. These remedies can 
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be of two types: “structural” and “behavioral”. Some remedies are said to be “structural” 
because they affect the proprietary structure of the corporations involved in the operation. 
They comprise the relocation or transfer of property rights of shares through, for instance, 
divestiture, the split of corporations, the selling of shares or intellectual property rights. Other 
remedies are called “behavioral” to the extent that they impose restrictions to the exercise of 
these rights. For instance, measures that modify the relationship with end-consumers, 
establish supply commitments, prohibit tying or bundling, impose restraints on predatory 
pricing and prevent the use of exclusive and/or long term contracts, among others. In this 
research, the variable “types of restrictions in MR” adopts this binary classification of 
remedies. Once remedies of different types can be imposed in the same operation, I classified 
the data in the following way: Structural remedies: a case that involved at least one structural 
remedy or decisions to prohibit the operation in its integrity; and Behavioral remedies: a case 
that only involved behavioral remedies. 
 
Table 8. Variable: types of decisions and restrictions in MRs and APs 
Variables Values 
Type of decision in MR “Approved without restrictions” 
“Restrictions imposed” 
Type of restriction in MR “Structural remedies” 
“Behavioral remedies” 
Type of decision in AP “Dismissed” 
“Convicted” 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
To assess what factors may be related to the types of decisions made by CADE, I 
constructed nine variables to which data was collected from each case of the samples of MR 
and AP. The definition of these variables was informed by the critical political economy of 
neoliberalism discussed in Chapter 2. The phenomena that, according to that theoretical view, 
can be expected of a neoliberal economy are: the concentration and expansion of capital, 
especially through privatizations, and the hegemony of financial capital. Although some 
variables were used for both MR and AP, each kind of procedure also entailed a specific set 
of factors. 
Through these variables, I aimed at constructing a profile of the economic agents, 
sectors and operations that “enter” the field of competition policy. The first variable was the 
sector of economic activity of the MR, in which I classified each case within 29 categories of 
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economic sectors, as defined by CADE’s official typology120. Each case received a number 
from 1 to 29, and if the sector was not comprised by these categories, I assigned the number 
99 as “Others”. Second, the type of operation, classified in five groups, as defined in the table 
below: acquisition or incorporation, merger, joint-venture, concession, or “others”. 
 
Table 9. Variable: type of operation 
 
Value 
 
 
Description 
 
Acquisition or Incorporation 
 
 
Operation in which an economic agent acquires shares of another 
economic agent. 
 
 
Merger 
 
Operation in which two or more independent economic agents form 
a new economic agent, ceasing to exist as separate entities. 
 
 
 
Joint-venture 
 
Operation in which two or more economic agents unite to create 
another economic agent or to pursue joint economic activities, 
without the extinction of the agents that originate the union or the 
acquisition of shares among them. 
 
Concession 
 
Cases that discuss the concentration implied by the concession of 
public services. 
 
Others 
 
Other types of operations (such as increase of capital, distribution 
contracts, restructuring, etc). 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
Third, the scope of the operation: national or global. I classified as “national” those 
operations that concerned solely the Brazilian market, and as “global” any type of operation 
that transcended the Brazilian economy, including it or not. Fourth, the countries of origin of 
corporations involved in the operation. In this variable, I mapped what was the nationality of 
the controlling capital of the corporations that submitted the operation to CADE. If the capital 
control was equally divided between agents of different countries, I attributed all origins. 
Fifth, based on this last variable, I classified each MR according to the path of capital 
movement. It comprised 7 mutually exclusive categories. As summarized in the table below, 
four of them take into account the order of the movement, i.e. who occupies each pole of the 
relationship. These were an operation in which a Brazilian corporation acquires or 																																																								
120 CADE’s classification of economic sectors was published on the resolution number 15 of 1998. 
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incorporates a foreign corporation; an operation in which a Brazilian corporation acquires or 
incorporates another Brazilian corporation; an operation in which a foreign corporation 
acquires or incorporates a Brazilian corporation; and an operation in which a foreign 
corporation acquires or incorporates another foreign corporation. The other three categories 
comprise movements of capital combination, in which the order was not taken as relevant. 
They entailed the combination of Brazilian and foreign capital; among Brazilian corporations; 
and among foreign corporations.  
 
Table 10. Variable: path of capital movement 
 
Value 
 
 
Description 
 
 
 
Brazilian > Brazilian 
 
Operation in which a Brazilian corporation acquires or 
incorporates another Brazilian corporation. 
 
 
Brazilian > Foreign 
 
 
Operation in which a Brazilian corporation acquires or 
incorporates foreign corporation 
 
 
Foreign > Brazilian 
 
 
Operation in which a foreign corporation acquires or 
incorporates a Brazilian corporation 
 
 
Foreign > Foreign 
 
 
Operation in which a foreign corporation acquires or 
incorporates another foreign corporation 
 
Brazilian – Brazilian 
 
 
Operation in which Brazilian capital is combined with 
Brazilian capital (e.g. mergers and joint-ventures) 
 
 
Brazilian – Foreign 
 
 
Operation in which Brazilian capital is combined with 
foreign capita (e.g. mergers and joint-ventures) 
 
 
Foreign – Foreign  
 
 
Operation in which foreign capital is combined with 
foreign capital (e.g. mergers and joint-ventures) 
 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
Sixth, the existence and type of concentration in the operation. In this variable, I 
sought to identify if the MR implied any sort of vertical or horizontal integration. Vertical 
integration occurs when a company acquires assets within the supply chain in which it is 
economically active. Horizontal integration, in turn, occurs when a company acquires assets 
in the same productive sector where it acts – often a competitor. 
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Seventh, in cases where horizontal concentration was detected, I also collected data 
about the degree of economic concentration implied by the MR. In this variable, I mapped the 
percentage of market concentration observed by the Council in cases in which horizontal 
integration was detected. As several cases comprised more than one number of market 
concentration, once they dealt with more than one “relevant market”, I adopted the highest 
market concentration implied by an operation. Thus, in a hypothetic example, if a merger 
between two corporations that produce office supplies implied a market concentration of 23% 
for paperclips, and of 39% for staples, I selected 39% to be the market concentration of that 
operation. I chose to consider the highest level of concentration as in this variable the most 
interesting information for the purposes of the research is to identify the trends of CADE in 
tolerating economic concentrations. I classified operations in five percentiles: 0-20% of 
concentration of market share, 21-40%, 41-60%, 61-80%, and 81-100%. These intervals are 
of course artificial, but their construction was based on the fact that the competition act of 
1994 defines the share of 20% as the legal limit tolerated by competition policy. I thus 
decided to incorporate equivalent intervals for this variable, in order to facilitate data 
collection and analysis. 
The definition of market shares by CADE depends on the delimitation of the relevant 
markets included in the operation. This delimitation is a crucial part of regulatory policy, and 
in many cases entailed controversies among commissioners and within the SBDC. For 
instance, depending on the definition of the relevant market as global or national, market 
shares can increase or decrease, thus altering the regulatory response. The politics that occurs 
around the definition of the relevant market and thus market shares constitutes an interesting 
object of research that can be explored in further inquiry. In this research, however, I left this 
debate aside in order to have a more operational definition. To do so, the first source of 
information was how the winning vote in CADE’s decision determined market shares. If this 
information was not available, I resorted, respectively, to the opinions enacted by SEAE and 
SDE. It it is worth mentioning that additionally to market shares it could be interesting to 
have data about the market power implied the operation in relative terms to that market, as 
measured, for instance, by the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI) or the Concentration 
Ratio (C4). However, as these calculations were not undertaken by the SBDC in all cases, I 
decided not to include it as a variable. 
Eight, connected to the degree of concentration, I also identified the variation of 
market share implied by an MR in which horizontal integration was observed: the delta 
market share of an operation. This variable entailed the percentage of market share 
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incorporated in operations, and together with the degree of concentration it helps visualizing 
the character of concentrations analyzed by CADE. To classify operations according to their 
delta market share, I dismembered the intervals constructed for the variable degree of 
concentration in more detailed strata: 0-10%, 10.1-20%, 20.1-30%, and so on until 100%. 
Ninth, the occurrence of the operation in a privatized sector. In this variable, I mapped if the 
operation was one of privatization, based on the Brazilian National Bank of Development’s 
(BNDES) list of privatized corporations in both federal and state levels between 1991 and 
2002, which comprised 129 corporations121. 
The variables constructed for the study for AP are, to a great extent, similar to those so 
far reviewed. I collected data about the sector of economic activity, the scope of the conduct, 
the countries of origin of the corporations involved, and if the conduct analyzed in the 
procedure occurred in a privatized sector. Once the object of an AP is different from that of 
an MR, I also constructed three specific variables for procedures dedicated to regulate 
conducts. First, the period in which AP was originated. I classified AP according to three 
periods: those initiated prior to the 1994 reform, once many cases analyzed after that date 
were already in CADE; those initiated between 1994 and 2003; and those initiated after 2003, 
when according to mainstream narratives the “shift” toward conducts would have happened. 
This variable sought to enable a “political” control of the regulation of conducts, and assess if 
it changed in time and how. 
Second, the type of conduct that was the object of the AP. The data gathered to fill this 
variable was how CADE’s decision defined the potential violation. I defined the type of 
conduct accordingly to the documents that initiated the procedure, often the representations 
offered to the SDE as “complaints”. Third and final, I created a variable of political nature 
specific to AP: the author of complaint. Once AP may be originated through several means – 
by SDE’s own decision, by CADE, by other governmental institutions, individuals and even 
other corporations – it is worth analyzing who mobilizes the regulatory arena of competition 
policy in this dimension. Moreover, this variable enables discussing if, depending on who 
activates the system, the responses differ. I created four values for this variable: the SBDC 																																																								
121 The BNDES’ sources used for the construction of this catalogue were: the list of corporations owned by the 
national government totally or partially privatized between 1991 and 2002 (available at: 
http://www.bndes.gov.br/SiteBNDES/bndes/bndes_pt/Institucional/BNDES_Transparente/Privatizacao/pnd.html
); the list of corporations owned by state governments privatized between 1996 and 2002 (available at: 
http://www.bndes.gov.br/SiteBNDES/bndes/bndes_pt/Institucional/BNDES_Transparente/Privatizacao/estaduais
.html); and the list of privatized corporations of the telecom sector owned by the federal government between 
1991 and 2002 (available at: 
http://www.bndes.gov.br/SiteBNDES/bndes/bndes_pt/Institucional/BNDES_Transparente/Privatizacao/telecomu
nicacoes.html). 
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(when the AP originated at SDE, SEAE or CADE); governmental organs (such as the 
Attorney’s Office, in both federal and state levels, and the National Congress); individuals 
and NGOs (when it started with a complaint from civil society); and corporate agents (when 
the AP originated from a complaint of another corporation), subdivided into national and 
foreign corporations. 
Through this set of variables summarized in the table below, what I called the defining 
traces of a neoliberal economy in section 2.4 can be confronted with the actual practice of 
competition policy in CADE’s decisions, as depicted by the samples of MRs and APs. On a 
descriptive level, it is possible to assess what kind of economy is facilitated and, conversely, 
restricted by competition policy. 
 
Table 11. Summary of variables for the quantitative study of decisions 
Merger Reviews (MRs) Administrative Procedures (APs) 
Types of decision Types of decision 
Types of restriction Sector of economic activity 
Sector of economic activity Scope of the conduct 
Type of operation	 Countries of origin 
Scope of the operation	 Privatized sector 
Countries of origin	 Period initiated 
Path of capital movement	 Type of conduct 
Type of concentration Author of complaint 
Degree of economic concentration	 Government 
Delta market share – 
Privatized sector	 – 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
These variables enable analyzing if there are correlations among the economic 
phenomena that demand CADE’s regulation and the responses they get from it. In other 
words, it is possible to “test” if and how decisions are affected by the selected economic and 
political variables. The trend of capital concentration can be “tested” through the variables of 
degree of economic concentration and type of operation, in order to see if there is a trend in 
what CADE has historically understood as a concentration that deserves some sort of 
restriction. Also, the movement of expansion of capital into a recently liberalized economy, 
especially through privatizations, can be assessed by the variables of sector of economic 
activity, scope of operation, path of capital movement, privatized sector and state-owned 
capital. Together, these variables construct a portrait of the patterns of operations that 
mobilize CADE in certain periods, and if these patterns resemble what the critical political 
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economy of neoliberalism predicts: the arrival of foreign capital, notably in privatized sectors, 
through mergers and acquisitions.  
Also concerning AP these variables can be used to assess if decisions made by CADE 
are functional to the pulses of a neoliberal economy. The trend of capital expansion can be 
discussed through the mapping of how CADE decided conduct cases involving foreign 
corporations (informed by the variables countries of origin, and scope of operation), and 
privatized sectors (through the variable privatized). It also enables assessing if political 
factors such as the author of complaint involve distinct economic agents or imply different 
decision outcomes. 
To present and analyze the data gathered through these variables, I rely solely on 
descriptive statistics, i.e. frequencies of each variable and correlations among them. A more 
complete study about decisions should be able to dissect this data through statistical methods 
of inferential analysis, constructing models that are capable of testing how these variables 
affect the types of decision simultaneously – something I was not able to do due to time 
constrictions and my own methodological limitations. Nevertheless, the descriptive statistics 
generated in the course of the analysis enable a comprehensive view of the profile of 
economic phenomena regulated by competition policy in Brazil, and how it regulates it. As 
this kind of information is not available in other sources, this research can be seen as an 
exploratory endeavor. Even if not based on inferential statistics, as I will argue in Chapter 6, 
several conclusions can be drawn from the data collected about CADE’s practice in producing 
competition policy. 
Data used to fulfill the variables created was collected through CADE’s institutional 
website. After constructing a stratified random sample, and with these variables in hand, I 
consulted each of the selected MR and AP in CADE’s “Process Research” database. Most of 
the information was not available in the summaries of judgment, so in all cases I had to 
consult the integral versions of votes issued by commissioners, and even the full procedure. 
An often useful source of data about the operation profile in the case of MR was the initial 
presentation of the merger review by the lawyers of the involved corporations. As they have 
to submit a form with systematic and descriptive information about the operation, this was a 
useful resource for most cases. It is important to notice that this analysis has only been 
possible because CADE’s database of processes is almost completely digitalized. 
3.3 A qualitative inquiry into the outcomes to the economy and society 
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Besides the quantitative study of decisions made by CADE, the proposed analysis of 
the outcomes produced by the field of competition policy also followed a qualitative path. In 
respect to the facilitative-regulatory roles of competition policy to the economy, I 
complemented the analysis of decisions with a study about jurisdictional disputes involving 
the competence of CADE in regulating economic agents – most notably the financial sector. 
This was a necessary methodological strategy to assess how the field deals with one 
dimension predicted by the critical political economy of neoliberalism that could not be 
grasped through a quantitative study of decisions: that of financialization. The study of the 
outcomes to society was undertaken through a similar qualitative approach. Following the 
framework of the constitutive roles of law discussed in section 2.3, I sought to identify how 
two legal categories – those of “consumers” and “workers” – are incorporated into the field of 
competition policy. 
In both cases, the approach is said to be qualitative due to the nature of the data 
collected and the method of analysis. In this sense, the research “does not depend on 
statistical quantification, but attempts to capture and categorize social phenomena and their 
meanings” (Webley 2010, p. 928). With these objectives in mind, the qualitative study of the 
outcomes to the economy and society deployed similar strategies. On the one hand, I aimed at 
grasping the agents’ perceptions and normative stances toward both the jurisdictional disputes 
involving the financial sector, and the legal categories of “consumers” and “workers” in 
competition policy. These were collected through the interview method discussed in section 
3.1. On the other, I sought to identify the extent to and the forms through which these 
perceptions have been institutionalized in the field’s actual practice. I thus relied on a content 
analysis of selected decisions, and documental analysis of several institutional initiatives 
undertaken by CADE concerning jurisdictional disputes and the legal categories mentioned. 
In the next subsections, I detail the methods deployed to study jurisdictional disputes and its 
connections to financialization and the constitutive roles of competition policy in respect to 
the legal categories of “workers” and “consumers”, respectively. 
 
3.3.1 Jurisdictional disputes 
 
As it may have been noticed, one of the defining traces of a neoliberal economy, as 
theorized through the critical political economy of neoliberalism sketched in section 2.4 – the 
hegemony of financial capital –, was not discussed in the framing of the quantitative study of 
decisions (section 3.2). The reason for that is simple: financial capital is largely absent of 
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CADE’s decision-making. Understanding the reasons for this absence constitutes precisely 
the objective of the empirical research I undertook to assess what are the facilitative-
regulatory roles of the field of competition policy in respect to the financial sector, and thus to 
investigate its possible connections to the neoliberal tenets. 
The presence of the financial sector in the field of competition policy constitutes a 
subject of intense disputes among the agents of the field. The irrelevance of this sector in 
terms of number of decisions (as I will discuss in Chapter 6, around 1% of the sample of MR 
involved this sector) is connected to several battles to establish the boundaries of the field of 
competition policy, i.e. to define which economic phenomena are to be understood as part of 
its jurisdiction, and which are not. The disputes that occur around the appropriateness of the 
regulation of the financial sector can be roughly grouped in two poles of positions: on the one 
side, agents who affirm the competence of the SBDC to regulate concentrations in this area of 
economic activity, on the other, those who defend that CADE has at best an accessory role, 
and that the Brazilian Central Bank (BACEN) should be entitled to regulate the sector.  
The absence of the financial sector from the field of competition policy is thus actively 
disputed and constructed by agents that compose the field, and are external to it. I understand 
that the jurisdictional disputes around the competences to regulate the financial sector provide 
an indicator of how the field of competition policy deals with neoliberalism’s characteristic 
financial hegemony. My focus was on assessing on what grounds the jurisdiction of the field 
of competition policy is established in respect to both the Brazilian Central Bank and the 
Judiciary, through what means and with what results.  
The methodological strategies applied to undertake such study comprised two steps. 
First, I mapped the different stances toward the jurisdiction of competition policy in respect to 
the financial sector through qualitative interviews with the agents of the field. As discussed in 
section 3.1, the basic axis of the interview guide contained questions about how lawyers and 
economists understand the boundaries of the field. One of the themes explored in this 
dimension were precisely how agents evaluate the regulation of the financial sector by CADE. 
Through open questions that demanded the interviewees’ evaluation of this subject, I 
provoked them to express their preferences and normative stances about what should be under 
the jurisdiction of competition policy and why. These stances were also gathered from 
publications authored by lawyers and economists that disputed the issue, and connected to a 
historical reconstruction of the controversy, and its consequences in terms of institutional and 
legal arrangements. 
		159	
Second, to go beyond the agents’ stances depicted from interviews, I also gathered 
data that illustrate how these disputes are institutionalized in the practice of competition 
policy, notably by those responsible for producing competition law. In the case of the tension 
between CADE and BACEN, I construct indicators of such institutionalization through the 
analysis of decisions in MR and AP that involved the financial sector. I assessed cases that 
compose the sample used for the quantitative study. The objective, in this dimension, was to 
identify if and on what terms the struggle between CADE and BACEN appears in decision-
making, i.e. how CADE has historically responded through its decisions to the financial 
sector. 
Through the mapping of the agents’ stances, and the indicators of how this dispute was 
institutionalized, I sustain it is possible to analyze if and how the field of competition policy 
facilitates the hegemony of financial capital. Together with the quantitative study of 
decisions, the qualitative study of jurisdictional disputes therefore completes the dimension of 
the proposed alternative narrative about the outcomes of competition policy to the economy. 
What is still missing is the definition of the methodological strategies adopted to study the 
outcomes of competition policy to society. 
 
3.3.2 Conceptual dichotomies 
 
Besides the economic dimension of the outcomes of competition policy, the proposed 
approach to the “law in action” of the field also highlighted its impacts on a societal level. 
These were framed as the constitutive roles performed by the field of competition policy, i.e. 
a dimension of “meaning-making” in which the law establishes the cognitive possibilities and 
values that compose the structure of the field. As it was discussed in section 2.3, such 
constitutive roles can be observed in several “conceptual dichotomies” embedded in legal and 
economic categories. By framing the constitutive dimension of competition policy in society 
in such terms, I aim at problematizing what mainstream narratives describe as the uncontested 
roles of the field in “protecting consumers”. 
Transposing this framework for the study of the field of competition policy and its 
outcomes to society, I sustained that by assessing how the categories of “consumers” and 
“workers” are mobilized within this regulatory arena, it is possible to investigate its 
connections to the pulses of neoliberalism. Thus, the question formulated to guide the inquiry 
in this dimension was the following: How are the social categories of “consumers” and 
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“workers” incorporated and/or repelled by the field of competition policy and what model of 
society is constituted by it? 
In section 2.4, I described how the “traces of a neoliberal society” touch directly on 
these two societal categories. In general lines, the objective pursued in this dimension of 
analysis was to assess if and how the field of competition policy responds to these 
characteristic phenomena of neoliberalism, i.e. to what extent the ways in which it mobilizes 
the categories of “consumers” and “workers” replicate what was theorized as the defining 
elements of the neoliberal project in a societal dimension. To do so, I adopted methodological 
strategies that were similar to those mobilize in the study of the outcomes of competition 
policy vis-à-vis financial hegemony. 
First, I tried to assess what are the hegemonic structures of preference of the field of 
competition policy in respect to the categories of “consumers” and “workers” through 
qualitative interviews, as presented in section 3.1. The basic axis of the interview guide 
contained a question that sought to induce respondents to present their normative views on 
who are the subjects to be protected by this regulatory arena. I asked all interviewees if they 
have ever dealt with a case in CADE in which labor issues were raised, and how they evaluate 
the appreciation of such topics in competition policy. The openness of the question was 
deliberate. I did not want to posit the tension between the categories of “consumers” and 
“workers” beforehand, once what interested me was precisely to see if and how they relate 
these concepts as an actual dichotomy. It is interesting to notice that, even if not directly 
demanding an elaboration of the category of “consumers”, in almost all cases respondents 
ended up discussing the tensions between this legal category and that of “workers”. 
Interviews therefore provided an entry to what Edelman and Stryker (2005, p. 542) define as 
one of the elements that shall be explored in the study of the constitutive roles of law: the 
“overt political contestation of meanings”. 
However, as these authors suggest, to fully grasp the constitutive dimension of law, 
the contestation of meanings shall be discussed as part of an interplay with “more covert 
institutional diffusion of meanings” (Edelman and Stryker 2005, p. 542). Hence, the second 
methodological strategy in the study of the outcomes to society explored how the legal 
categories of “consumers” and “workers” are actually institutionalized in the regulatory 
production of the field of competition policy. To do so, I sought to determine both the extent 
of the presence of labor-related issues, and the way in which they appear in regulatory 
practice. 
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I circumscribed the analysis to three sets of procedures. First, MR in which a 
Performance Agreement was celebrated. The Performance Agreements, or “TCD” in the 
original acronym122, are the legal means through which corporations that present an MR to 
CADE acquiesce to certain conditions in order for the operation to be approved. As discussed 
in section 3.2, these conditions may entail structural and behavioral measures to be adopted 
by these corporations during a certain period of time – among them, conditions related to 
employment. I complemented the analysis by identifying the MR covered in the sample used 
for the quantitative study that entailed labor-related conditions, in which TCD were not 
necessarily celebrated. Finally, I also reviewed all “Agreements to Preserve Reversibility of 
Transaction”, or APRO, enacted by CADE between 1994 and 2012. The APRO is a 
“precautionary order” celebrated between CADE and the corporations involved in an 
operation in which the Council detects a high potential of anticompetitive effects. Through 
the APRO, corporations agree to preserve the corporate structures existent prior to the 
concentration, until the analysis of the MR is concluded by the authority. Among the 
conditions established in an APRO, employment clauses may be included. 
In each of these sources, I sought to identify if and in what circumstances the 
categories of “workers”, “labor”, or “employment” appear, i.e. how does CADE incorporate 
or repel these categories as cognitive possibilities of the decision-making process. Based on 
this mapping, I compared to how the category of “consumers” is mobilized in decision-
making, as depicted by mainstream narratives reviewed in Chapter 1. Through these 
strategies, it will be possible to assess how the categories of “consumers” and “workers” are 
both mobilized in the normative stances of the agents of the field of competition policy, and 
institutionalized in the regulatory practice of CADE. Rather than automatically accepting the 
reading that mainstream narratives make of what the law announces as its objectives in 
society – to “protect consumers” –, such qualitative study of the constitutive dimension of 
competition policy problematizes the very establishment of the subjects that are to be guarded 
by the field. Moreover, it enables assessing if the ways in which these categories appear or are 
absent of this regulatory arena resemble the neoliberal trends of disrupting collective entities 
connected to labor, and of performing the constitution of a consumer citizenship. 
 
 
 
 																																																								
122 It stands for Termo de Compromisso de Desempenho. 
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3.4 Empirical hypotheses of the study 
 
In this chapter, I described the methodological strategies deployed to put to work the 
theoretical framework sketched in Chapter 2. Through the designed multi-method empirical 
approach, I sustained that it will be possible to assess the roots and roles of competition policy 
reform and practice in Brazil vis-à-vis neoliberalism. Based on the combination of the 
theoretical framework and the methods designed in this chapter, I can now enunciate, in brief 
terms, what are the hypotheses discussed in the forthcoming chapters. 
From the actor-centered approach designed in sections 2.1 and 2.2 to offer an 
alternative narrative about the process of reform and the agents of the field, later translated 
into the relational biography described in section 3.1, the hypothesis that stems is the 
following: Competition policy reform and practice in Brazil is rooted in the neoliberal project 
to the extent that the agents who have architected and historically occupied the field have 
professional and political trajectories which are mostly aligned with neoliberal ideology of 
market sovereignty, and infuse and replicate a habitus that is functional to the tenets of the 
neoliberal political project, such as market freedom, economic expansion and concentration, 
privatization and the related ideal of efficiency. 
In the dimension of outcomes, a set of three hypotheses can be formulated if one 
departs from the framework of the facilitative-regulatory and constitutive roles of the legal 
field, combined with the substantive theoretical elements of the critical political economy of 
neoliberalism. First, in respect to the quantitative study of CADE’s decisions, the hypothesis 
that guided empirical research was that: The outcomes of competition policy to the economy 
are to facilitate the impulses of neoliberalism, by enabling and legitimizing the expansion and 
concentration of capital in Brazil, especially through privatizations. 
Second, still in the level of the facilitative-regulatory roles of competition policy to the 
economy, a complementary hypothesis derived from the study of jurisdictional disputes is 
that: By limiting its jurisdiction over the financial sector, and affirming the entitlement of the 
Central Bank to regulate the concentration of financial capital, the field of competition policy 
facilitates and legitimates the neoliberal trace of financial hegemony. 
Finally, from the framing of competition policy’s impacts in society as the constitutive 
roles performed by the field in respect to the legal categories of “consumers” and “workers”, 
the key hypothesis assessed is that: In selectively incorporating “workers” and 
“employment”– key-components of the capital-labor relation regulated by the field – as 
subjects to be protected by competition policy, and in parallel affirming “consumers” as the 
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sole beneficiaries of regulation, the cognitive boundaries and values institutionalized in the 
field of competition policy contribute to the constitution of the model of “consumer 
citizenship” vaunted by neoliberalism. 
In the forthcoming chapters, these hypotheses are discussed in light of the data 
collected through the methodological strategies here designed. In Chapter 4, I present the data 
obtained through the relational biographic method to reconstruct the historical process of 
construction of a modern field of competition policy in Brazil, and evaluate the enunciated 
hypothesis about the agents of reform. In Chapter 5, I describe the results obtained through 
the actor-centered approach deployed to map the structure of the field after reform. In Chapter 
6, the hypotheses about the outcomes of competition policy to the economy and society are 
analyzed through the methods sketched in sections 3.2 and 3.3. Together, these hypotheses, 
backed up by their corresponding empirical material, are taken as potential indicators of the 
roots and roles of competition policy reform and practice in neoliberalism, which constitutes 
the thesis’ central argument. 
Although the linkage between competition policy and neoliberalism has been ignored 
or actively deconstructed by what I called mainstream narratives, my research is not alone in 
investigating this connection. In departing from the conceptual framework sketched in 
Chapter 2, and in applying the methodological strategies presented for the study of the 
construction and practice of competition policy in Brazil, this dissertation engages with a 
heterodox, although growing literature that has stressed the “politics of regulation” that takes 
place around competition policy. Hence, in presenting and discussing the results of the 
empirical study that forms the backbone of this work, I will compare my findings to what 
others have argued to be the roots and roles of competition policy in neoliberalism in other 
contexts, such as the US (Eisner 1991, Davies 2010), Europe (Hermann 2007, Wigger 2008, 
Buch-Hansen and Wigger 2011), and Turkey (Türem 2010). I also seek to extend the 
knowledge about this connection in the case of Brazil, marginally addressed by the works of 
Bello (2005) and Onto (2009). 
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CHAPTER 4 
The creation of competition policy as a “modern” regulatory arena 
 
“Everyone sticks their nose in, the law has no owner”. This was how a prominent 
Brazilian competition lawyer explained, in an interview, how several initiatives to reform 
competition policy in Brazil since the early 1990s happened. Also talking about the reformist 
initiatives of the period, another lawyer claimed: “We, lawyers, are not legislators” – to 
which he nevertheless added – “we never miss an opportunity to point out how things could 
be enhanced”. 
The idea that “the law has no owner” calls attention to the multiple channels of 
influence operating in the historical episodes of reform. Reforming the Brazilian competition 
policy system was indeed a complex process in which several agents – professionals such 
lawyers and economists, representatives in Congress and corporations – tried to impact. It is 
quite convincing in this sense that no “paternity test” is possible or even useful to understand 
the process of legal reform. However, in conducting fieldwork it became quite clear that a 
small group of professionals was decisive in mobilizing the reformist agenda, and in making 
crucial choices of institutional and policy design. Following the proposed framework to 
understand the roots and roles of competition policy reform in neoliberalism through the 
study of the agents that propelled it, in this chapter I map who were those agents that “stuck 
their noses” into reform, and who didn’t “miss an opportunity to point out how things could 
be enhanced”. In other words, I present and discuss who were the architects of reform, what 
were their channels of influence, the struggles they took part in, and the contents they infused 
into the transformation of a regulatory arena. 
The focus of the chapter is thus to assess who were the agents involved in reform – 
their professional, academic and political profiles – and how they influenced the shape of the 
institutions designed to produce competition policy in Brazil. In doing so, I believe it will be 
possible to visualize the connections of competition policy reform to several economic and 
political impulses that are characteristic of the neoliberal reforms that were being undertaken 
in Brazil by that time.  
In contrast to how mainstream narratives explain the process of reform, and as 
anticipated by the conceptual framework sketched in Chapter 2, these connections were not 
straightforward or undisputed. Several struggles around the format of a reformed competition 
policy were identified. In the 1990s, there were cleavages between the group of professionals 
more directly involved in the drafting of the competition acts, the government, and 
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corporations. Even within this group or within the government itself several divergences 
about the design of Brazilian competition policy occurred. As I will argue in this chapter, 
these struggles are illustrative of the linkages of reform with the broader transformations 
fostered by neoliberalism. 
Moreover, reform did not occur in a linear, synchronic way. There were at least three 
attempts to transform competition policy in Brazil, with different agendas and degrees of 
success. As it will be discussed in the next chapter, reform also did not cease with the 
enactment of the law. Several topics of divergence were not resolved by the institutional 
design consolidated in 1994, and were only advanced in the years that followed the reformist 
initiatives of the early 1990s. 
To depict the numerous struggles around reform, and the several reformist initiatives 
in time, I present the reconstruction of reform in a chronological fashion. I start by discussing 
the reformist initiatives started already in the late 1980s and early 1990s to transform the 
Brazilian competition policy established in 1962. Interviews revealed that there were two 
important attempts of reform in this period: in 1988 and in 1990/1991. However, before 
presenting the specific reformist initiatives of those years, I take a step back, and start the 
reconstruction of this period by analyzing the debates surrounding competition policy in the 
Constituent Assembly that resulted in the Brazilian Constitution of 1988 – a landmark of the 
transition from the dictatorial period.  
The study of this period enabled assessing the almost automatic connection that 
mainstream narratives make between the reform of competition policy of 1994 and the 
“democratization” of Brazilian institutions embedded in the Constitution of 1988. As 
reviewed in Chapter 1, these narratives often associate the redefinition of the state’s roles in 
the economy to the period of transition from the dictatorial period, allegedly market by a 
strong interventionist state, to a democratic stage, supposedly accompanied by a liberalized, 
market economy. As economic liberalization was a heated topic in the Constituent Assembly, 
many dilemmas that would permeate the “modern” field of competition policy in Brazil were 
already raised in the drafting of the Constitution, although they were only resolved by the 
specific reformist initiatives in the subsequent years. The struggles within the Constituent 
Assembly contained, in this sense, the embryos of several disputes that where later tackled by 
the architects of reform in 1988, 1990 and finally in 1993/1994, with the enactment of the law 
8.884. This is precisely what I describe in section 4.1.  
The second period, discussed in section 4.2, comprises the mentioned initiatives to 
reform the 1962 competition act that took place between 1984 and1991. As I will present 
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below, they were not successful in advancing what is often reputed as a modern system of 
competition policy, which was only established in 1994. One of these initiatives, probably 
precisely because it was not successful (i.e. it was not converted into a new law), is normally 
not mentioned in mainstream narratives as part of the history of competition policy in Brazil, 
but, as I will argue, provides important elements to understand how reform occurred and how 
it took the paths that led to the 1994 legislation. The third period of reform is analyzed in 
section 4.3, and is circumscribed to the production of the 1994 antitrust act. As the law 8.884 
of 1994 is said to have consolidated an innovative and modern system of competition policy 
in Brazil, I analyze how the reform process that resulted in this legal framework occurred. In 
section 4.4, I present a set of conclusions about the neoliberal roots of competition policy 
reform in Brazil based on the identification of its architects, and of the historical process of 
the field’s creation.  
This chapter therefore intends to contrast what mainstream narratives often depict as 
an evolutionary phenomenon of technological modernization induced by the government. The 
core hypothesis that I aim at maintaining with the data provided in the pages that follow is 
that the reform of competition policy in Brazil was a contentious process which, in its 
decisive stages, was propelled by a small group of professionals close to the market and/or 
ideologically aligned with the neoliberal imperatives of economic liberalization. Instead of a 
“necessary” or “consensual” process, reform comprised positions that were defeated, and 
others that ended up victorious. Reform was constructed through political compromises that 
are central to understand the institutional design taken by the Brazilian competition policy, 
and which provide evidences of its linkages to the broader neoliberal reforms. Also, the 
“government” – an abstract entity frequently presented as the main agent of reform – was 
often not only far from mobilizing the transformation of the field of competition policy, but 
even acted as an opponent of the reformist agenda pushed by a group of experts. 
  
4.1 Embryos of reform: the Constituent Assembly of 1987-1988 
 
 In mainstream narratives, the reform of competition policy in Brazil in the early 1990s 
is often explained as part of the context of democratization and economic liberalization that 
followed the decay of an authoritarian political system and economically interventionist 
model of state. The Constitution of 1988, still in place, is pointed to as the symbol of such 
transition. Between articles 170 and 181, it establishes the “General Principles of Economic 
Activity”. On article 170, it states the principles that shall guide the economic order, among 
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which can be found “free competition” and “consumer protection”. In article 173, which 
defines the possibility of direct state participation in economic activities, the fourth paragraph 
contains a norm concerning the so called “abuse of economic power”: “The law shall repress 
the abuse of economic power that aims at the domination of markets, the elimination of 
competition and the arbitrary increase of profits”. As mainstream narratives often explain, 
the competition act of 1994 would be precisely the translation of such command into an 
operational legal and institutional framework. 
 Although the Constitution and the subsequent legislation that consolidated the 
reformist impulses of the 1990s are smoothly tied together in these sources, such relationship 
is not straightforward. The constitutional norm to which the modern Brazilian competition 
policy is linked was subject of several disputes in the Constituent Assembly that produced the 
1988 Constitution, until it took the final form inscribed in the constitutional text. As I will 
argue in this section, these disputes contained the embryos of broader tensions between 
distinct positions regarding the state and the economy, many of which would be revived in the 
specific reform efforts of the early 1990s, and in the development of Brazilian competition 
policy after its transformation. The debates around the Constitution, nevertheless, were silent 
on various other topics that would eventually be tackled by the reforms that would begin a 
few years later. 
 The National Constituent Assembly (ANC) was convened in November 1985, under 
the presidency of José Sarney, as a symbol of the political opening after more than 20 years of 
military dictatorship. One year later, in November 1986, 536 representatives were elected, and 
together with 23 Senators that were already members of the Congress, they comprised the 559 
constituent representatives of the ANC. The majority of representatives of the Assembly were 
part of a “conservative block”, while the “progressive” or “center-left” block constituted a 
minority (Pilatti 2008)123. 																																																								
123 I rely on Pilatti’s (2008) analysis of the ANC’s composition to define the positions occupied by the agents 
that participated in the elaboration of the new Constitution. As this author explains, parties such as the Partido 
Comunista do Brasil (PC do B), Partido Democrático Trabalhista (PDT), and the Partido dos Trabalhadores 
(PT) could be defined as “left-wing” parties in the ideological spectrum of the ANC, while the Partido 
Democrático Social (PDS), Partido da Frente Liberal (PFL), and the Partido Liberal (PL) could be placed as 
“right-wing” parties. This classification is based both on “the common sense and on the self-perception of the 
[agents] and their adversaries, that they were so [left or right-wing] in that moment and in that context” (Pilatti 
2008, p. 4). The picture is completed with the party with most seats in the ANC: the Partido do Movimento 
Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB), which encompassed a wide ideological spectrum, from conservative to 
progressive representatives, with some representatives being “moderate”. Mainwaring and Liñan (1998) 
converge with this classification almost completely. Parties classified as left-wing, together with a group of 
center-left politicians of the PMDB, called themselves the “progressive” group, while those of center-right 
formed what Pilatti (2008, p. 13) defined as the “conservative block”, which later was self-entitled the “Centrão” 
(large center). 
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4.1.1 The progressive hegemony: repressing oligopolies and monopolies 
 
 Installed on February 1st 1987, the ANC finished its work on October 5th 1988. The 
production of the new Constitution took place through five main stages, as described 
below124. At the “preliminary” stage, which lasted until April 1987, the representatives 
discussed and voted the internal regulations of the ANC: the procedures and design of the 
deliberative spheres. Also during this period, the elected representatives, civil society 
organizations, and citizens in general could make suggestions to the constitutional text. At 
this stage, only two explicit references to CADE and competition policy can be identified on 
the ANC historical database. One was the proposal signed by a citizen who, among 
suggestions that included changes concerning mining activities and penalties for drunk 
drivers, presented a general claim for the “end of corruption and the strengthening of CADE 
through income tax”125. 
The other proposal was submitted by the constituent representative Brandão Monteiro, 
the leader of the Democratic Labor Party (PDT) at the ANC, elected by the state of Rio de 
Janeiro. Monteiro was an active representative at the ANC. Monteiro was a lawyer, graduated 
from the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ) in 1964, and was involved with 
political movements since high school. While in law school, he presided the local students’ 
union, and between 1962 and 1963 he was the vice-president of UNE, the Brazilian National 
Students Union. In 1964, Monteiro’s political rights were revoked by the military dictatorship 
shortly after it was installed, on April of that year. Detained several times and tortured by the 
military regime, with the end of bipartisanism and the beginning of the political opening, 
Monteiro helped to create the PDT. 
On May 1987, he submitted a set of 40 suggestions to the ANC, which dealt with a 
variety of topics. Monteiro, for instance, proposed the mandatory participation of workers in 
the administration of state-owned corporations (Suggestion number 4.537), replicated the 
guarantee of state monopoly over oil and gas, as was the case since the 1940s (Suggestion 
number 4.531), and the prohibition of mass media oligopolies  (Suggestion number 4.528)126. 
																																																								
124 The complete description of these stages can be found at the National Congress’ website. At this source, 
seven stages are identified – two in addition to the five I mentioned: the “Redaction Commission” and the 
“Promulgation” stage – but are herein ignored, as they did not comprise moments of legislative elaboration.  
125  Between March 1986 and July 1987, almost 73 thousand suggestions were made by civil society 
organizations and individual citizens. In my research at the National Congress’ database of suggestions made by 
citizens, I found only one that explicitly mentioned CADE.   
126 All proposals made by the elected representatives to the ANC at the preliminary stage are available at the 
National Congress’ special website about the Constituent Assembly, in the section “Suggestions by Constituent 
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His proposal on competition policy is therefore part of a set of measures that aimed at the 
construction of an economically interventionist model of state. 
Monteiro’s suggestions concerning competition policy came under the number 4.530, 
in which he claimed for the inclusion, in the Constitution, of an article establishing that: 
 
The Administrative Tribunal for Economic Defense, composed by 5 
members of notorious legal or economic knowledge and immaculate 
reputation, chosen by the National Congress for a 5-years mandate, is 
entitled of repressing the abuses of economic power and of promoting the set 
of constitutional principles of the economic order, under the terms of the 
supplementary law. 
This proposal still had a more juridical facet, if compared to the 1994 version of 
CADE, which was attuned with the model of a regulatory agency. On an additional paragraph 
proposed by Monteiro, the legal vein of his project becomes clear: the members are called 
“Ministers”, like the members of the higher courts, and they are explicitly equated to the 
Ministers of the Superior Court of Justice in their responsibilities and rights. 
 Like all suggestions made at the preliminary stage, Monteiro’s proposal followed its 
path to the second phase of the ANC: the thematic sub-commissions127. Between April and 
May 1987, the representatives debated the more than 12 thousand proposals made by their 
peers, and almost 73 thousand suggestions received from the population at 24 thematic “sub-
commissions” that were entitled to produce a preliminary version of the Constitution on 
different topics. Each sub-commission was composed by a President and two vice-presidents, 
who had the role to preside the discussion and the voting sessions, and to organize the work 
of the commission. Another important character in each commission was the rapporteur, who 
was in charge of presenting an initial draft of the articles concerning the sub-commission’s 
theme, and of systematizing the results of the amends and discussions into a final draft.  
As Pilatti maintains (2008, p. 14), although the composition of the ANC and, as a 
corollary, of each sub-commission and commission, was vastly dominated by a “conservative 
block”, there were institutional nuances of the Assembly that guaranteed possibilities for the 
progressive minority to influence the constitutional process. The decentralization of the work 
into sub-commissions and commissions, as well as the figure of the rapporteur were 																																																																																																																																																																													
Representatives” (Sugestões  dos Constituintes). Monteiro’s proposals were consolidated between the numbers 
4.500 and 4.539, including them. 
127 All texts (amends, drafts, and legislative debates) quoted in this section are available at the House of 
Representative’s special website about the ANC: <http://www2.camara.leg.br/atividade-
legislativa/legislacao/Constituicoes_Brasileiras/constituicao-cidada/o-processo-constituinte>. Last accessed on 
November 12th 2013. To locate a document here referred, it is necessary to select the stage of debates to which it 
belongs. As in this chapter’s exposition, the website is in chronological order. 
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exemplary of these peculiarities (Pilatti 2008, p. 14). On the one hand, decentralization 
opened more opportunities for members of the minoritarian group to impact the decision-
making process. On the other, a political agreement between the different forces of the ANC 
established that the conservative block would hold all presidencies of sub-commissions and 
commissions, while those of the progressive group would be entitled to the positions of 
rapporteur – who were provided with a great “power of agenda” (Pilatti 2008, p. 14).  
 The topics related to competition policy were discussed by Sub-commission VI-A: 
“Sub-commission of General Principles, State Intervention, Property Regime of the Subsoil 
and Economic Activity”. The composition of this sub-commission replicated the general 
correlation of forces in the ANC: the “conservative block” held most positions, and the 
progressive group a minority (Pilatti 2008, p. 106). In accordance to the political agreement of 
division of positions, the president and rapporteur of sub-commission VI-A were, 
respectively, part of the conservative and progressive groups. 
The president was Delfim Netto, an economist who served as Minister of the 
Economy during the military dictatorship (more precisely, from 1967 to 1974), and later as 
Minister of Planning, from 1979 to 1985, in the transitional period. Netto is placed in the 
ideological spectrum of the ANC as a “moderate” by Pilatti (2008, p. 106), although he was a 
member of the PDS, the political heir of the ARENA – the regime’s official political party 
during the years of bipartisanism in Brazil, from 1966 to 1979. The “czar” of Brazilian 
economic policy-making for more than 10 years (Macedo 2001, p. 375), he was historically 
aligned with the monetarist economic tradition (Loureiro 1997, p. 92), a line of thinking that 
in the 1940s and 1950s was in direct conflict with the structuralist approach best represented 
by Celso Furtado and the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC).  
The rapporteur of sub-commission VI-A was Virgildásio de Senna, an engineer from 
Northeast Brazil, and member of the “progressive” fraction of the PMDB. In 1963, he was 
elected mayor of Salvador, the capital city of the state of Bahia by the PTB, the labor party 
created by Vargas in the 1940s. The different trajectories of both the president and the 
rapporteur in sub-commission VI-A evidence what Pilatti (2008) maintains to be, 
respectively, the defining positions of the conservative and progressive groups. 
The works of sub-commission VI-A started with the presentation of the rapporteur’s 
initial draft. In this document, Senna included the notions of “consumer protection” and “free 
initiative” (still not free competition) among the principles that should guide the economic 
order. Also, as part of an article dedicated to define the extension of state intervention in the 
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economy, the draft established that (article 6A10, First Paragraph of the draft): “The law will 
repress the formation of private monopolies, oligopolies, cartels and any other form of abuse 
of economic power” (my italics). The rapporteur justified the text of a norm targeting 
competition by saying that “the suppression of imperfect market forms, as other modalities of 
abuse of economic power” was to be foreseen because “a free market does not always lead to 
an optimal allocation and distribution of production factors”128.  
 If compared to the version that would eventually become the current text of the 
Constitution, the first draft of what is referred to as the foundational norm of Brazilian 
competition policy was considerably different. The repression to monopolies, oligopolies and 
cartels are explicitly mentioned in that first draft. As the description of the subsequent stages 
of the ANC that follows evidences, such a version of the constitutional norm was hegemonic 
until the very end of the Assembly’s work, and most frequently mobilized by members of the 
progressive group, although at times endorsed by some representatives of the conservative 
block. Another important detail was highlighted in the transcript: according to the 
rapporteur’s first draft, only private monopolies were to be repressed. The reason for that is 
understandable: one of the major issues being discussed in the ANC was the maintenance of 
state monopoly over certain economic sectors (or even its extension to new areas), such as oil 
and gas, which were established since the 1940s. This was one of the major areas of conflict 
between the conservative and the progressive groups. In Senna’s draft, the restriction of 
repression to the private form of monopolies was a matter of consistency with the guarantee 
of state intervention in the economy that he and other representatives would repeatedly try to 
insert in the Constitution. 
Submitted to the other members of sub-commission VI-A, several proposals to change 
the rapporteur’s draft were presented in the form of  “amendments”. Seven representatives of 
the conservative block, and other two of the progressive block presented a total of eleven 
amendments that were related to the rapporteur’s proposal on competition policy129. Most of 
the amendments proposed by representatives of the conservative block implied substantive 
changes on the text submitted by Senna. For instance, Antonio Carlos Franco, an economist, 
and member of the conservative fraction of the PMDB (Pilatti 2008, p. 61), proposed the 
transformation of article’s 6A10 first paragraph to: “The law shall supress any form of abuse 
of economic power” (Amendment number 6A0156-9). Virgílio Távora, of the PDS, a military 																																																								
128 Excerpts from the rapporteur’s initial draft, available in the Report of Sub-commission VI-A rapporteur 
(Volume 165 of the ANC documents). 
129A total of 377 amends were presented to the rapporteur’s draft, including the 11 concerning the article on 
competition policy. 
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engineer long involved with the former regime’s party ARENA and other political 
organizations of the right, proposed that article 6A10 adopted the same text of the 
Constitution of 1967: “The law will repress the abuse of economic power, characterized by 
the domination of markets, the elimination of competition, and the arbitrary increase of 
profits” (Amendment number 6A0196-8). His proposal aimed to “imprint in the Constitution 
the liberal regime of the rule of law to be effectively implemented in Brazil”. 
Antonio Ueno, an economist and lawyer of the PFL, proposed a similar change 
(Amendment number 6A0262-0), justifying that “the country has witnessed a gigantic growth 
of the state in the economy. Today there is an excess of regulation, from general issues to 
particular questions of low importance”. And he added: “State-owned corporations that hold 
monopoly, de jure or de facto, shall also be subjected to the sanctions of the law when they 
practice abusive acts by taking advantage of their monopolistic condition”. The amendment of 
Afif Domingos, a manager from the PL of São Paulo, preserved some aspects of Senna’s 
original draft, but implied an important shift, covering state-owned corporations (Amendment 
number 6A0286-7). The amendment of Jalles Fontoura, an engineer affiliated to the PFL and 
a former member of the regime’s party – the ARENA – merged the texts of Senna’s proposal 
with that of the 1967 Constitution (Amendment number 6A0226-3). The motivation of such 
amendment was, according to its author, the fact that “the repression of the abuse of economic 
power is the norm in the whole civilized world, and cannot be ignored in Brazil”130. 
Finally, The only two congressmen of the so-called progressive block to present 
amendments were both of the PDT of Rio de Janeiro, and each submitted two proposals. Luiz 
Alfredo Salomão, an engineer, proposed amends that aimed to include the expression “the 
repression of the abuse of economic power” among the principles of the economic order, and 
did not alter the rapporteur’s draft of article 6A10 (Amends number 6A0008-2 and 6A0016-
3). Similarly, Brandão Monteiro – the same author of the mentioned suggestion at the 
preliminary stage – submitted two amendments (Amends number 6A0339-1 and 6A0340-5). 
One was similar to Salomão’s, as it suggested the inclusion of the 1967 Constitution text 
among the principles of the economic order, and kept the rapporteur’s initial proposal. The 
second amendment proposed by Monteiro replicated his initial suggestion, now at the level of 
the sub-commission, recommending the inclusion of an article creating the Administrative 
Tribunal of Economic Defense, “similar to the American Federal Trade 																																																								
130 Two other amendments of the conservative block implied provisions concerning competition policy of a 
much more general character in comparison to Senna’s proposition: Amendment number 6A0253-1, by  Rubem 
Medina, of the PFL, and Amendment number 6A0325-1, of Luiz Roberto Ponte, a member of the conservative 
fraction of the PMDB (Pilatti 2008, p. 61). 
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Commission”.Monteiro’s proposal was, in this sense, consistent with Senna’s initial draft, and 
meant an instrumental provision to put to work the norm on the repression of private 
monopolies, oligopolies and cartels originally present on the rapporteur’s draft. 
The rapporteur recommended the rejection of all mentioned amendments, on distinct 
grounds131. The rejection of the proposals of Távora (PDS), Fontoura (PFL) and Domingos 
(PL) were based on formal arguments, such as  “regimental reasons”, or due to “legislative 
technique”. Similarly, the rapporteur understood that the purpose of Ponte’s (PMDB) 
suggestion was already included in the original draft. Senna also rejected the amendments of 
the two progressive representatives that included the repression of the abuse of economic 
power as a principle of the economic order on similar grounds. For him, the two proposals of 
Salomão and one of Monteiro’s suggestions were already encompassed by the original draft. 
Three amendments of the conservative block received a more substantive opposition 
by the rapporteur. For instance, in analyzing Medina’s (PFL) amendment,  Senna argued that 
“[i]t is important to make explicit that the law will repress private monopolies, oligopolies 
and cartels, because these could otherwise be interpreted as not being forms of abuse of 
economic power”. In respect to the amendment proposed by Monteiro, the rapporteur justified 
the rejection by stating that the Constitution would not be the adequate mean to “define the 
competences and the composition of sectorial organs of the administration”. 
 The rapporteur’s opinion on each of the amendments was submitted to the plenary of 
the sub-commission to be voted. As Pilatti (2008, p. 108-112) shows, in the voting session of 
May 24th 1987, the conservative group was able to reverse many of the central issues of the 
rapporteur’s draft, which were initially blocked by Senna through the rejection of 
amendments. In a “massacre” against the rapporteur’s draft (Pilatti 2008, p. 112), 
amendments that were rejected by Senna and which aimed at attacking the draft on questions 
such as the definition of a national corporation, the preferential treatment of the national 
capital, and the creation of state monopolies on certain areas were eventually approved. 
Similarly, out of the 13 amendments that were approved by Sena – all proposed by 
representatives of the progressive block – 12 were rejected in the voting session (Pilatti 2008, 
p. 113).  
In the case of the amendments concerning competition policy, however, there were no 
conflicts with Senna’s decisions. The rapporteur’s rejection of all 11 proposals was endorsed 																																																								
131 Out of the 377 amendments submitted, only 13 were approved by the rapporteur. Senna’s opinions on the 
amendmentss submitted are available, in alphabetical order accordingly to the proponent, in the Report of 
Commission VI’s rapporteur (Volume 167 of the ANC documents). 
		174	
by the plenary, and thus the original text of the draft was approved. This is an indication that, 
at least at this point of the ANC, although there were divergent conceptions around the norm 
on competition policy, the issue was still not at the center of the struggles between the 
different political forces. Rather, questions such as the distinction between national and 
foreign capital, as well as the affirmation of state monopoly over certain areas were the major 
arenas of clashes. 
 Renumbered as article 7, first paragraph, of the sub-commission’s VI-A final draft132, 
the article on competition policy entered a new stage: the debate on the Commission of the 
Economic Order (Commission VI). Together with the drafts of sub-commissions VI-B (Urban 
Question and Transports) and VI-C (Agrarian Policy and Agrarian Reform), the draft was to 
be discussed by a larger forum, composed by 65 representatives. In Pilatti’s (2008, p. 123-
124) classification, Commission VI was also dominated by members of the conservative 
block. Similarly to the sub-commissions’ composition, a member of the conservative group 
was entitled to the Presidency of Commission VI (José Lins, of the PFL), and what Pilatti 
(2008) defined as a “progressive” was appointed rapporteur (senator Severo Gomes, of the 
PMDB). 
 The work of Commission VI started on May 27th 1987, with the presentation of 
amendments to the drafts that came from the sub-commissions. In the case of the article 
concerning competition policy, three amendments were proposed, all by members of the 
conservative block133. Ueno (PFL) presented the same amendment he had submitted at sub-
commission VI-A (Amendment number 00231). Domingos (PL) also revived the amendment 
he had presented at the previous stage, but in a slightly different way. Instead of explicitly 
naming private and public monopolies as forms of abuse of economic power, he proposed a 
text that adopted a general rule, which could encompass both forms of his previous 
amendment (Amendment number 00699). The last amendment was presented by Cunha 
Bueno, an economist of the PDS, who merged the text of different dispositions into one 
paragraph, adopting a version that was similar to Ueno’s proposal and to the 1967 
Constitution (Amendment number 00644). 
 Rapporteur Gomes declared to have approved the amendments of Ueno and Bueno, 
and to have approved integrally the proposal of Domingos. On June 1987, he submitted to the 
Commission a first substitutive project, consolidating the drafts coming from the three sub-																																																								
132 “Anteprojeto da Subcomissão VI-A” (Volume 171 of the ANC documents). 
133 The text of all amendments are available in Volume 160 of the ANC documents (Emendas Oferecidas à VI 
Comissão  da Ordem Econômica). 
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commissions134. However, article 6, paragraph 4, of this document stated a version that was 
similar to Senna’s draft. An important difference to the draft elaborated by the sub-
commission’s rapporteur was that the explicit mention to private monopolies was absent of 
Commission’s rapporteur version. This fact generated a debate with Senna, who was also a 
member of Commission VI. Senna directly criticized the Commission’s rapporteur, stating 
that the suppression of the word private conflicted with other dispositions of the Constitution, 
which guaranteed state monopoly over certain areas135. Gomes replied, explaining that the 
(legal) monopoly would be created by the law, and since it could happen that a state 
corporation becomes monopolistic, if this monopoly was not created by law, “evidently it 
should be treated as any other monopoly”.  
Another representative who called attention to the contradiction – but for different 
reasons – was Roberto Campos, senator of the conservative PDS, and a renowned economist 
in Brazil who occupied several prominent positions since the late 1950s and throughout the 
military regime. He served as president of Brazil’s Development Bank, BNDES (1958-1959), 
Ambassador of Brazil in the US (1961-1964), and Minister of Planning (1964-1967). With 
graduate training in economics at the University of Columbia, Campos was part of a line of 
thinking that became known as “orthodox monetarist” or “entreguistas” (Loureiro 1997, p. 
43)136. Campos presented a harsh criticism of Gomes’ draft, classifying it as a report that  
 
aggravates state intervention, and transforms the state in a controller and 
planner, while the world evidences that the state tends to decrease its 
interventionist pressures, not only in capitalist regimes, but also in socialist 
regimes, due to its obvious demonstration of incompetence. 
  
 Campos attacked what would be the incongruence of the article on competition policy 
as exemplary of such interventionist role of the state. For him, according to the rapporteur’s 
draft, “in one article the state can create monopolies, and in the other, the law will repress 
monopolies”. 
In the same voting session, Vladimir Palmeira, an economist and lawyer of the 
Worker’s Party (PT), pointed to another contradiction in Gomes’ draft proposal concerning 
competition policy. Palmeira, however, explicit distanced himself from Campos’ arguments. 																																																								
134 Available at Commission VI first Substitutive draft (Volume 161 of the ANC documents). 
135 The debate between Gomes and Senna occurred on June 8th 1987, and is available in the session transcripts 
published on the ANC Diary, published on July 9th, 1987, between pages 140 and 141. 
136 This group of economists was called entreguistas by their nationalist and/or structuralist counterparts because 
their views on economic policy, such as tolerance and openness to foreign capital and investment, would imply 
the “surrendering” of Brazil’s economic sovereignty.  
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To that representative of the progressive block, the rapporteur’s draft contained a “permanent 
contradiction”: that “[modern capitalism’s] declarations [of free initiative] and the formation 
of oligopolies and monopolies are characteristic of the modern economy”. For him, while 
“everyone comes here and ask for free initiative, capitalism itself generates monopolies and 
oligopolies”. Thus, to suggest the end of oligopolies in Brazil would imply the “extinction of 
the capitalist regime”, something that the project did not intend to do, as it established “free 
initiative” as a key principle of the economic order. For him, these would be “empty words”, 
a purely “formal question” sustained by “electoral interests” 137. 
While in sub-commission VI-A divergences around competition policy were restricted 
to the amendments, at this point they were translated in direct tensions among the 
representatives. What can be roughly grouped as two sets of positions that would be 
transversally present during the development of the ANC can already be perceived at this 
point: on one side, the conservative group pushing for a text that revived the 1967 
Constitution’s norm, and did not mention oligopolies, monopolies, and cartels; on the other, 
proposals mostly coming from the progressive block, which recommended the explicit 
mentioning of those economic phenomena. 
On June 12th 1987, the rapporteur presented a second draft138. According to Pilatti 
(2008, p. 126), the second version incorporated central issues proposed by the progressive 
block, such as the limitation of control of national corporations by Brazilian nationals, but 
maintained the general content of the first draft. In respect to competition policy, a shift can 
nevertheless be noticed, one that is consistent with the criticisms of the conservative group. 
Gomes’ new draft erased the article that repressed oligopolies, monopolies and cartels, and 
consolidated the conservatives’ proposal in the text139. 
Gomes’ second draft generated many reactions (Pilatti 2008, 127-129. The 
conservative block presented three ample amendments that, together, redefined practically the 
whole draft in consonance to their expectations. As they held the majority of the seats on 
Commission VI, the amendments were easily approved. One amendment that encompassed 
the disposition on competition policy was proposed by Senator Irapuan Costa Junior, an 
engineer of the conservative fraction of the PMDB140. Despite proposing substantive changes 
in the rapporteur’s draft, such as a more “elastic definition of national corporation” and the 																																																								
137 Both Campos’ and Palmeira’s declarations are available in the session transcripts quoted on footnote number 
27, between pages 156 and 169. 
138 “Comissão VI – Substitutivo (Nova Redação)” (Volume 163 of the ANC documents). 
139 Article 1, item V, of the rapporteur’s second draft. 
140  Amendment number 6S0471-0, available in the document “Emendas Oferecidos ao Substitutivo – VI 
Comissão da Ordem Econômica” (Volume 162 of the ANC documents). 
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“denationalization of the exploration of hydraulic energy and of mineral reservoirs in 
indigenous lands” (Pilatti 2008, p. 132), Costa Junior’s amendment surprisingly resuscitated 
Gomes’ original text in respect to competition policy – even going beyond it. The amendment 
defined that “The law shall repress monopolies, oligopolies, cartels, and any other form of 
abuse of economic power, admitted the exceptions made in this Constitution”141.  
The highlighted text is where the major difference from Gomes’ first draft can be 
noticed. While the commission’s rapporteur erased the distinction between private and public 
monopolies in the first draft, Costa Junior’s amendment replicated the text, but explicitly 
prevented state monopolies from the control implied by that article. Moreover, while Gomes’ 
second draft incorporated the text that the conservative block was trying to consolidate since 
the debates in sub-commission VI-A (i.e., not talking about monopolies and oligopolies 
explicitly), Costa Junior’s amendment reincorporated the original text. Approved by 37 votes 
against 7 (and 1 abstention), Costa Junior’s amendment became the final draft of Commission 
VI.  
 
4.1.2 The conservative comeback: a general and encompassing legal text 
 
The draft then entered the third stage of the ANC: the Commission of Systematization. 
This Commission had the role to prepare the final text that was to be voted by the ANC 
plenary. This stage encompassed a period in which the ANC “lived a long phase of agony”, as 
“all expectations convulsed, all schedules were delayed, and all conflicts intensified” (Pilatti 
2008, p. 147). Composed of 93 of the 559 representatives, it begun its works on June 26th 
1987, when the rapporteur delivered the first draft of the Constitution to be discussed. 
Following Pilatti’s description (2008, p. 168), the political forces in the Commission of 
Systematization were more balanced at this stage especially because all rapporteurs of sub-
commissions and commissions were automatically incorporated. However, the conservative 
block needed only 1 extra vote to attain the majority in any voting poll.  
The Commission’s president was a representative from the conservative block: senator 
Afonso Arinos, of the PFL, a lawyer, law professor, and member of a prominent Brazilian 
family. The rapporteur, in turn, was a representative of the progressive group: Bernardo 
Cabral, of the PMDB, also a lawyer, and a representative at the National Congress who had 
his political rights revoked by the military regime in 1967. After the ANC, in 1990, Cabral 																																																								
141 Article 6, paragraph 1 of Amendment number 6S0471-0. 
		178	
was appointed Minister of Justice by President Collor de Mello, when the attempts to reform 
competition policy in Brazil started to intensify, as I will describe in the next sections. 
On the first draft that Cabral presented to the Commission of Systematization (article 
310, paragraph 1), the text that came from Commission VI on competition policy was 
integrally replicated 142 . Five amendments were offered to this document, three by 
representatives of the conservative block, and other two by the progressive group143. Ueno, of 
the PFL, replicated the same amendment he had presented at the previous stages, excluding 
any mentions to monopolies, oligopolies and cartels (Amendment number 63), and Eraldo 
Trindade, of the same party, replicated the rapporteur’s proposal, but excluded “oligopolies” 
from the article’s text (Amendment number 240). A third amendment of the conservative 
block, proposed by Nilson Gibson, and economist and lawyer of the PMDB, added a 
disposition that characterized as crimes usury, the arbitrary increase of profits and the 
elimination of competition (Amendment number 1953). 
On the side of the progressive block, Abigail Feitosa, a doctor of the PMDB, proposed 
a slightly different version from that coming from the Commission of Systematization 
(Amendment number 2121). Instead of saying that the abuses of economic power should be 
repressed, respecting “the exceptions made in this Constitution”, she changed to “the 
exceptions made for state-owned corporations”. Apparently minor, this shift, however, could 
imply that even state-owned corporations that achieved monopoly but were not granted so by 
the Constitution would be exempt of competition policy control – something feared by many 
representatives of the conservative block, as evidenced in various amendments proposed in 
the previous stages. Also, Mauricio Correa, of the PDT – a lawyer who eventually became 
Minister of Justice in Itamar Franco’s government (1992-1994), when the 1994 competition 
act was gestated, and was later appointed by the same president as a justice at Brazil’s 
Supreme Court – proposed a version that was virtually equal to the draft coming from 
Commission VI, and implied only minor textual changes (Amendment number 4239). 
Having analyzed the amendments, the rapporteur proposed a second draft144. The text 
on competition policy, then article 304, paragraph 1, was the same of the first draft, and thus 
equal to that coming from Commission VI. A new round of amendments begun, open to 
																																																								
142 “Anteprojeto de Constituição” (Volume 219 of the ANC documents). 
143 These were the “Emendas de Mérito e Adequação ao Anteprojeto de Constituição” (Volumes 221 and 222 of 
the ANC documents). 
144 “Projeto de Constituição” (Volume 223 of the ANC documents).  
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proposals from both representatives and society as a whole145. I identified a single proposal 
that was external to the ANC in respect to competition policy. The amendment was authored 
by the Industrial Federation of São Paulo (FIESP), the Center of the Industries of São Paulo 
(CIESP), and the Commercial Federation of São Paulo – some of the most powerful 
associations of industrialists and business owners of the country146. Subscribed by more than 
30 thousand citizens, the amendment proposed a text that was in consonance with most of the 
conservative block’s proposals concerning competition policy, i.e. in consonance with the text 
of the 1967 Constitution. 
Another 20 suggestions were made by representatives at this stage. Out of these, 9 
were proposed by representatives of the conservative block. They replicated most of the 
clashes that occurred in the previous commissions, in which the conservative group mostly 
converged around the submission of state-owned corporations to the control of competition 
policy, the reduction of the scope of state intervention in the economy, and/or the elimination 
of explicit mentions to monopolies, oligopolies and cartels.  
Trindade (PFL), for instance, submitted two amendments containing the same 
proposal he had presented at the beginning of the Commission’s works, which excluded 
“oligopolies” from the norm147. In that representative’s views, such suppression would be 
necessary because “the modern economy is typically oligopolized”, and it is not “the origin of 
the abuses of economic power are not the existence of oligopolies per se”. Oligopolies, in his 
justification, are “an expression of economic power”, and “the Brazilian legislation is not 
contrary to economic power, but only to the abuses of economic power”. For rapporteur 
Cabral, such amendment was to be rejected because “if the modern economy is oligopolized, 
it is only in the existence of these oligopolies that it is possible to find the origins of the 
abuses of economic power”148. Another example was the amendment proposed by Ricardo 
Izar, a lawyer of the PFL, whose text was practically the same as the one repeatedly presented 
by Ueno. His amendment also stated that “both private and state-owned corporations are 
submitted to this rule”149. 
The most dissonant proposal within the conservative group was made by Sotero 
Cunha, a businessman of the PDC, which not only preserved the draft’s text, but expanded it, 																																																								
145 These were the “Emendas de Plenário e Populares” (Plenary and Popular Amends), available at the House of 
Representatives’ special website on the ANC (Volumes 227 to 231 of the ANC documents). 
146 Amendment number PE00035-1 (Volume 231 of the ANC documents). 
147 Amendments number 1P00217-6 and 1P12498-1 (Volume 227 of the ANC documents). 
148 The rapporteur’s opinions on the presented amendments are available in the document titled “Parecer sobre 
as emendas oferecidas em Plenário ao Projeto de Constituição” (Volume 234 of the ANC documents). 
149 Amendment number 1P12969-9. 
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proposing the inclusion of “financial conglomerates”, together with monopolies, oligopolies 
and cartels, as forms of abuse of economic power (Amendment number 1P06669-7). The 
position of a conservative in proposing such inclusion was surprising, given the tendency of 
other agents of the same group to converge around less specific norms. However, the 
rapporteur’s decision on the amendment was also not converging with the progressive block’s 
attempts to define the text. Cabral, a member of the progressive fraction of the PMDB, 
rejected the proposal, stating that “the nature of a financial conglomerate is highly diverse 
from that of a cartel, or of an oligopoly”. For him, there are “critical moments of economic 
and financial conjuncture of a country in which it is necessary to stimulate mergers, 
incorporations and other forms of gigantic corporations”. The “size of corporations” was not 
to be subject of “prejudice” in the Constitution, as “one of the healthy postulates of capitalism 
is the scale economy, which enables decreasing costs, and at the end benefitting consumers”. 
The amendments coming from the so-called progressive block were also more incisive 
at this point of deliberations150. Four of them proposed a more strict and explicit version of 
the text attacking monopolies, oligopolies and cartels: in the amends of Percival Muniz (a 
cattle breeder of the PMDB), Olivio Dutra (a labor union leader of PT), Maurício Correa 
(PDT), and Haroldo Saboia (a journalist and public official affiliated to the PMDB), these 
forms of economic concentration were to be “banned”151. In the view of these representatives, 
practices such as monopolies, oligopolies, and cartels must be “explicitly prohibited in the 
Constitutional text”152, in contrast to what the draft defined as a “repression”. In all cases, the 
exceptions for state monopoly were made in the amendments.  
The rapporteur responded in different ways to this group of proposals. In the case of 
Correa’s amendment, Cabral rejected the suggestion, stating that monopolies were not to be 
prohibited a priori for three reasons: because there were monopolies granted by the 
Constitution; the concession of public services often imply monopolies; and because these are 
activities which are “natural monopolies”. The response to the amendments of Muniz and 
Saboia  were different: in Cabral’s view, the intention of prohibiting certain practices was 
already embedded in the draft’s original text. 
Other amendments by the progressive group infused more encompassing elements 
into the text defended by their peers. Geraldo Bulhões, a lawyer of the PMDB, proposed an 																																																								
150 Besides the amendments described below, Abigail Feitosa, a progressive of the PMDB, presented the 
amendment number 1P02003-4, which was practically equal to the draft’s text, diverging only in the final 
section, where it proposed to “repress [...] any kind of economic exploration, except from state-owned 
corporations”. 
151 Amendments number 1P001798-0, 1P02583-4, 1P03992-4, and 1PO4615-7, respectively. 
152 Excerpt form the justification of Maurício Correa’s amendment. 
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amendment that was very similar to the one presented by the conservative Sotero Cunha, 
which included “financial conglomerates” among the forms of abuse of economic power to be 
repressed by the state (Amendment number 1P17869-0). Haroldo Saboia and Vilson Souza, a 
progressive and a moderate lawyer of the PMDB, respectively, proposed amendments that 
included provisions that were similar to those of a structural control over corporations 
exercised in cases of merger reviews – but in a much more incisive form153. In their 
proposals, when an abuse of economic power was detected, the state could perform 
“takeovers” of corporations, and determine the split of conglomerates. They were both 
rejected by the rapporteur, stating that these would be inappropriate specifications for the 
Constitution, and that some of its content was actually against the principles that “characterize 
a free and fluid economy”. 
On August 26th 1987, the rapporteur Cabral presented a third draft, systematizing the 
proposals presented in reference to the Constitution Project154. To some extent, this draft was 
identical to the previous versions, but it nevertheless encompassed the proposals coming from 
both forces of the ANC. On article 229, first paragraph, the text determining the repression of 
monopolies, oligopolies and cartels – “admitted the exceptions made in the Constitution” – 
was maintained.  Additionally, on article 228, third paragraph, Cabral included the text that 
the conservative block was trying to implement, which stated that “the law shall repress any 
form of abuse of economic power that aims at dominating national markets, eliminating 
competition and arbitrarily increasing profits”. As Pilatti explains (2008, p. 163), the draft 
presented by Cabral at this stage of the ANC generated intense reactions of the conservative 
group, as it still consecrated many of the core proposals made by the progressive group, such 
as a strict definition of and several privileges for the national corporation, which basically 
illegalized ownership by foreigners; the amplification of labor rights; and the limitation of the 
roles of the military. 
A new round of amendments was opened. In comparison to the previous stage, a 
smaller number of proposals targeting the articles on the abuses of economic power was made 
to the latest draft155. Out of the 17 proposals presented, 8 were made by members of the 
conservative block, replicating the trends observed in the previous stages. For instance, Ueno, 
of the PFL, once again presented an amendment to eliminate the explicit mention to 
oligopolies, monopolies and cartels, incorporating the text of the 1967 Constitution 																																																								
153 Amends number 1P17767-7 and 1P13731-4, respectively. 
154“Substitutivo 1 do Relator” (Rapporteur’s First Substitutive) (Volume 235 of the ANC documents). 
155 “Emenda (ES) ao Substitutivo 1” (Volumes 236 to 239 of the ANC documents). 
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(Amendment number 23430). Domingos (PL) presented the same amendment he had 
proposed at sub-commission VI-A, which was consistent with the draft’s text, but did not 
distinguish between private and public monopolies (Amendment number 34442).  
On the side of the so-called progressive block, the position consolidated was once 
again present. Most of the amendments kept the explicit reference to the repression of 
oligopolies, monopolies and cartels. Six of the 9 amendments presented implied the 
repression on oligopolies, monopolies and cartels. However, two of them merged this text 
with what article 228 of the then most recent draft stated, thus consolidating a version that 
combined what was being frequently proposed by the conservative block with what most of 
the progressive representatives were suggesting. These were the amendments of Severo 
Gomes (PMDB), the rapporteur of Commission VI, which had oscillated between the two 
texts in the drafts of the previous stage, and of senator and sociologist Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso, also of the PMDB, who later became Minister of Finance in Itamar Franco’s 
government and was one of the designers of the Plano Real, one of the stabilization measures 
of the early 1990s156. In 1994, Cardoso was elected President of Brazil. Their amendments 
proposed the following text:  
 
The law shall repress the formation of monopolies, oligopolies, cartels and 
any other form of abuse of economic power that aims at dominating the 
national markets, eliminating competition, or arbitrarily increasing profits, 
admitted the exceptions provided in this Constitution. 
 
The rapporteur then publicized his opinions on the presented amendments, stating that 
he partially approved 8 of the proposals. These were all amendments that combined the texts 
of articles 228 and 229 into a single norm, i.e. merging the provisions inspired by the 1967 
Constitution (normally sustained by the conservative block) with the explicit repression of 
oligopolies, monopolies and cartels (frequently mobilized by the progressive group). On 
September 18th 1987, Cabral presented his second substitutive project157. In this version’s 
article 194, third paragraph, the project stated a text that was identical to the amendments 
presented by Gomes and Cardoso, with one important difference: there was no explicit 
reference to the “exceptions” to state monopoly. 
The only attempt to change the text consolidated by the second substitutive in respect 
to the article on the abuse of economic power was made by Monteiro, of the PDT. Through 
																																																								
156 Amends number 33672 and 35041, respectively. 
157 “Substitutivo 2 do Relator” (Volume 242 of the ANC documents). 
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the motion number 0581158, Monteiro suggested the incorporation of the text that was 
repeatedly presented by him at the ANC, since its first stage: that an Administrative Tribunal 
was to be created to “repress the abuses of economic power” and “concretize the 
constitutional principles of the economic order”. On the session of November 6th 1987, this 
proposal was once again debated159. Cesar Maia, an economist of the same PDT, made an 
initial defense of the project. Maia called for the support of other representatives to 
Monteiro’s amendment by stating that: 
 
In the last years, CADE – the administrative tribunal that had the 
responsibility to execute [the] attributions [to repress the abuses of economic 
power and the action of monopolies and oligopolies] – was practically 
extinct. Today, it is still, subordinated to the Ministry of Justice, swollen and 
without any functions to which it is entitled by law.   
 
This was the first time, since the initial references of the very same Monteiro at the 
early stages of the ANC, that CADE was mentioned on a substantive debate. Maia added that 
such proposal would be a solution to CADE’s ineffective situation, since  
 
[...] the Legislative power, through this administrative tribunal, and 
superseding the complicity that may occur with the Executive power, will be 
able to effectively perform the task to repress and monitor [the abuses of 
economic power]. 
 
José Jorge, an engineer of the conservative PFL, rebutted the defense of Monteiro’s 
proposal by Maia. In his view, the Judiciary would be “enough to effectively put in practice 
what is provided by the Constitution”. And he added: “We have a new, ample judicial 
structure, in a certain way modernized due to the new Constitution”.  The proposal to create a 
new organ in the administration, “augmenting the structure of government”, would be 
unnecessary, as the Judiciary and the Executive, through CADE, could accomplish the 
objectives stated by the new Constitution. Virgílio Távora, of the conservative PDS, adopted 
a different position. He supported Monteiro’s proposition, affirming the “absolute need” of 
such amendment, as “CADE was extinct, and didn’t work”. In a similar line, Francisco 
Dornelles, of the conservative PFL, manifested that “the creation of such tribunal is an 
aggression to the Judiciary”, as “[t]here is no sense in creating an administrative tribunal to 
perform the typical activities of the Judiciary”. Right after Dornelles’ speech, the voting on 																																																								
158 This was a motion that required that the amendment number ES-32032-7 was to be discussed by the whole 
Commission of Systematization, once it was rejected by the rapporteur. 
159 The transcripts of this debate are available at the Session Report of the 32nd Extraordinary Meeting of the 
Commission of Systematization, published at the Supplement C, pages 143-144, of the ANC’s Diary. 
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Monteiro’s proposal begun. By 45 votes against, 43 in favor, and one abstention, the 
amendment was rejected.  
Following Pilatti’s (2008) classification, out of the 43 votes in favor of Monteiro’s 
amendment, 36 came from representatives of the progressive block, 3 of moderate 
congressmen of the PMDB, and other 4 of conservative parties. These votes included the only 
8 representatives of the Commission of Systematization that were affiliated to what Pillati 
(2008) defined as left-wing parties. On the side of those who rejected the amendment, the 
predominance was reversed:  36 of the 45 congressmen were of the conservative block, other 
5 were moderate representatives of the PMDB, and only 4 were classified by Pilatti (2008) as 
being progressive (all of the PMDB). Therefore, at this point, those who supported a text 
without explicit references to monopolies, oligopolies, and cartels were mostly contrary to the 
proposal of reforming CADE. 
The norm on the abuses of economic power then advanced to the next and final stage 
of deliberation of the ANC: the Plenary. At this point, the project of constitution produced by 
the Commission of Systematization (“Projeto A da Comissão de Sistematização”)160 was to be 
discussed by the whole Assembly. What is deemed as competition policy’s foundational text 
was then inscribed on the fourth paragraph of article 202 of the project. 
In January 1988, another round of amendments was opened. In respect to the article 
on competition policy, three proposals can be identified161. One was a collective amendment 
presented by the so-called “Centrão”, the union of conservative representatives at the ANC, 
subscribed by 292 representatives. As Pilatti (2008, p. 233) maintains, in general lines, the 
amendments proposed by the “Centrão” preserved the text of Project A, only including minor 
alterations and selective suppressions. In doing so, the conservative block incorporated 
important aspects of the agenda initially mobilized by the progressive group, submitting it to a 
“treatment that was compatible with the conservative interests” (Pilatti 2008, p. 233). The 
proposal regarding the abuse of economic power is illustrative of this trend. Through the 
amendment 2P01043-1, which encompassed the whole chapter on the economic order, the 
provision on competition policy suffered only a slight change in comparison to the final 
project submitted by the Commission of Systematization: the mention to the “arbitrary 
increase of profits” was eliminated162. 
																																																								
160 Volume 251 of the ANC documents. 
161 “Emendas (2P) de Plenário e do Centrão” (Volumes 254 and 255 of the ANC documents). 
162 The text of the amendment is at page 804 of Volume 255 of the ANC documents. 
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More than two thousand individual amendments were also presented at this stage, but 
only two affected Project A’s article 202, fourth paragraph. Monteiro, of the PDT, once again 
presented an amendment to include the creation of an Administrative Tribunal in the 
Constitution (Amendment number 2P01275-2). It was the fourth time since the preliminary 
stage of the ANC. Maluly Neto, also a lawyer, but member of the conservative PFL, proposed 
an amendment which implied the most substantive changes on the project that came from the 
Commission of Systematization (Amendment number 2P01336-8). In consonance with the 
trends of the conservative block during the previous stages, his amendment did not mention 
oligopolies, monopolies and cartels, replicating a redaction that was similar to the 1967 
Constitution’s. Similarly to Monteiro’s, it also included “the creation of an agency to repress 
the abuses of economic power and to protect consumers”. The individual amendments of 
Monteiro and Neto were rejected by Cabral, who was still the rapporteur in charge of 
systematizing proposals. In both cases, the motivation was that the creation of a specialized 
tribunal would be “onerous” and “reduce the efficiency of services”, and imply an 
unnecessary “increase of the Judiciary’s structure, which is fully capable of achieving the 
objective of the amendment”. 
On April 27th 1988, together with other dispositions about the economic order, article 
202 was to be voted on. At this point, the conservative representatives grouped around the 
“Centrão” were negotiating with the progressive forces of the ANC, as they faced important 
defeats in other matters, despite being the majority (Pilatti 2008, p. 237). In the discussion of 
article 202 it was no different. A merger of amendments that affected that norm was 
presented, signed by representatives of both the progressive and conservative blocks163. The 
proposal implied a new text for the fourth paragraph of article 202, revitalizing the version 
that was frequently proposed by the conservative group since the works of sub-commission 
VI-A: “The law shall repress the abuse of economic power that aims at dominating the 
markets, eliminating competition, and arbitrarily increasing profits”. Oligopolies, 
monopolies, and cartels were absent of the amendment, as well as the explicit reference to the 
exceptions to state monopoly. 
The proposal was approved almost unanimously by the representatives that attended 
the session: 464 votes in favor, 6 against, and 5 abstentions. Those who opposed the 
amendment were all of the conservative group. Since the merged amendment encompassed 																																																								
163 As Pilatti (2008, p. 314) maintains, the merger of amendments was the “adequate vector” found by the 
conflicting forces of the ANC to enable the elaboration of the Constitution to follow “as a rule, the path of 
consensus, which isn’t built unless the majority concedes something”. 
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the whole text of Project A’s article 202164, and there were no individual manifestations on its 
merit, it is not possible to conclude that the opposition to this proposal was connected to the 
article on the abuse of economic power, especially because the content of paragraph four was 
precisely what representatives of the conservative group were trying to implement since the 
first deliberations of the ANC. 
The text that resulted from this amendment is precisely what became consolidated in 
the final version of the Constitution. The rapporteur eventually presented a second draft to the 
plenary – “Projeto de Constituição B” –, which restated the approved proposal on the fourth 
paragraph of article 179. A single a minor amendment was presented to the text165. The last 
two drafts – “Projeto de Constituição C” and “Projeto de Constituição D”166 – replicated the 
text that resulted from the collective amendment, which was submitted to a minor 
grammatical correction. On September 22nd 1988, the final voting session took place, and the 
latest draft of the Constitution was endorsed by 474 of the 495 representatives who voted. 
Even those who manifested their opposition to the final text – notably the PT’s leader at the 
ANC, Luís Inácio Lula da Silva – declared that they would subscribe to the text (Pilatti 2008, 
p. 307).  
Thus, on October 5th 1988, the Constitution was promulgated. In its article 173, 
paragraph 4, the text on the abuse of economic power that many representatives of the 
conservative block were pushing forward since the initial stages, and which was only 
eventually incorporated through the merger of amends by both forces of the ANC, came into 
existence: “The law shall repress the abuse of economic power that aims at the domination of 
markets, the elimination of competition and the arbitrary increase of profits”. It thus left to a 
specific law – i.e. the competition act of 1962, or another law to be created – the task of 
operationalizing the constitutional norm. 
 
*** 
Departing from the legislative process that resulted in the Constitution of 1988, some 
observations about the actual production of what is said to be the foundational norm of 
Brazilian competition policy can be sketched. First, although the description above – centered 																																																								
164 Other important and polemic issues were included in the amendment, such as the limits of the direct 
exploration of economic activities by the state (article 202, caput), and the definition of corporate liability 
(article 202, paragraph 5). 
165 Amendment number 2T01840-1 (par of the “Emendas (2T) ao Projeto B” – Volume 301 of the ANC 
documents). This amendment was proposed by Genésio Bernardino, of the PMDB, and suggested the 
elimination of the details that defined the abuse of economic power, implying a more succinct text. 
166 Volumes 314 and 316 of the ANC documents, respectively. 
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on the debates around competition policy – may lead to the wrongful impression that this 
topic was one of the major arenas of disputes at the ANC, its character was secondary in 
respect to other topics 167 . The number of amendments presented to the norms about 
competition policy in comparison to other articles that structured the economic order is an 
indicator of that. For instance, while only 20 amendments in the Commission of 
Systematization targeted norms on competition policy, there were 153 proposals to change 
articles that dealt with the definition of and the establishment of privileges to the national 
corporation168,  and  143 in reference to the norms that defined property rights over land, and 
the conditions of expropriation169. If not entirely secondary, competition policy was most 
intensely disputed when it touched some of these heated issues, as in the struggles to exempt 
or not state owned monopolies from the control of the so-called “abuses of economic power”. 
Second the agenda of competition policy in the ANC, although secondary, contained 
several crucial aspects in respect to policy-making and institutional design, even if at an 
embryonic stage. Some embryos were planted, and eventually sprouted in the development of 
reform in the 1990s and 2000s. One example was the refraction to submit “financial 
conglomerates” to competition regulation, often articulated as undesirable due to the “need” 
of concentration in this sector in certain historical moments – something I explore in Chapter 
6. Another example was the debate around economic concentration. More than one time, the 
rejection of the text that explicitly mentioned monopolies, oligopolies, and cartels was based 
on the idea that the “modern economy” was inheritably (or even desirably, in the case of 
“scale economies”) oligopolistic, and thus the repression – or, more radically, the “banning” 
of such form – would be erroneous. These are possible indicators of the embryonic roots of 
the constitutional norm on competition policy in a neoliberal economic thinking that was 
starting to develop in Brazil. 
 Other embryos, however, were aborted at the ANC. The most interesting example of 
such was the attempt to create a reformed antitrust authority. In the process of elaborating a 
new constitution, the initiatives to reform what was recognized as an “inexistent” CADE, or 
to create a new institution with its roles looked like the crusade of a solitary Don Quijote, 																																																								
167 As Pilatti (2008, p. 4-5) shows, among the most heated topics, which generated a polarization between the 
conservative and progressive groups at the ANC, were “the distinction between national and foreign capital, land 
property, the exploration of oil and other minerals, the potentials of hydroelectric energy, and telecommunication 
services”. 
168  These amendments included article 226 of the rapporteur’s First Substitutive to the Commission of 
Systematization, and its three additional paragraphs. 
169 Articles 245 and 246 (including its three paragraphs) of the rapporteur’s First Substitutive to the Commission 
of Systematization. 
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fighting windmills. The “ingenious gentleman” at the ANC was representative Brandão 
Monteiro, of the PDT, who presented five amendments creating an Administrative Tribunal to 
enforce the norm on the repression of abuses of economic power. The proposal, whose 
institutional design pended to a legal rather economic profile, was often interpreted as 
unnecessary, and the Judiciary was viewed as the proper arena of regulation. 
It seems that the agenda of implementing modern regulatory agencies was still not 
available as an institutional alternative at the time of the ANC, and would only become a 
concrete policy alternative later on. Moreover, those who supported the version of the 
constitutional norm that is said to be the foundational rule of a modern competition policy 
often rejected the proposal to reform of CADE. As I will argue in the next sections, it would 
be only later, and through the hands of a small group of professionals with different profiles, 
that such agenda of institutional reform would converge with the ideals that were embedded 
in the text that came out victorious from the process of creating a new constitution. 
Third, the process of elaborating a new Constitution was far from consensual, even in 
a secondary arena of debates as competition policy. The creation of an article to repress the 
abuses of economic power was permeated by several clashes, which, as in other domains 
(economic or not), tended to parallel the distinct political forces present in the Assembly. On 
the one hand, the progressive block often supported a text that explicitly mentioned 
monopolies, oligopolies and cartels as forms of abuse of economic power that were to be 
repressed, and which exempted state monopolies from such control. On the other, 
conservatives (and industrial associations) frequently proposed a version that neglected the 
ban to oligopolies and monopolies, or the establishment of their repression as a constitutional 
principle, and which tried to submit state-owned corporations to the same rule, or at least 
didn’t exempt them explicitly. The victorious position was that proposed by members of the 
conservative block since the beginning of the ANC. In turn, those defeated were mostly part 
of the progressive block, which was trying to push forward an agenda of an economically 
interventionist state170. 
Another important aspect that can be observed in the description of the legislative 
process is that on both sides of the dispute, the debate around competition policy was 
dominated by representatives who were lawyers and economists of a traditional profile. On 																																																								
170 In some cases, representatives of the conservative group supported proposals of the progressive group in 
respect to competition policy, including versions of the text that mentioned monopolies, oligopolies, and cartels. 
A possible explanation for that relies on an element that is hardly captured by the dichotomy 
progressive/conservative: economic nationalism. As Pilatti (2008, p. 284) identifies in the voting on other 
articles, the dissidence of members of the conservative block was often facilitated when “interests of statist-
nationalist character were at stake”. 
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different sides of the ideological spectrum, lawyers had what could be seen as the profile of a 
“politician of the law” (Dezalay and Garth 2002a). Economists who most directly shaped the 
norm on competition policy were still not those often identified with neoliberalism, as 
described in Chapter 2. With the exception of Roberto Campos, and Delfim Netto, both 
economists and lawyers had their source of legitimacy more connected to a long involvement 
in politics, than to their academic or technocratic profiles.  
This may be another reason for the still incipient agenda of reform that took place at 
the ANC. A substantive and specific initiative to transform the institutional design of 
competition policy would only appear some time later, through the hands of professionals and 
experts on competition policy. Most of them, as I will describe in the next sections, had a 
trajectory that was connected to the academy and/or professional practice, and were aligned 
with the institutional and economic orthodoxy that was spreading since the late 1980s. 
The centrality of these agents that were still absent in the ANC becomes even clearer 
if the position taken by some agents who were representatives at the Assembly and later 
became political exponents of the Brazilian government in the early 1990s is compared to the 
actual development of reform under their rule. Maurício Correa, of the PDT, who presented 
an amendment that I classified as a “radical” version of the progressive proposal – banning 
the formation of oligopolies, monopolies, and cartels – was also appointed Minister of Justice 
in Itamar Franco’s government. Fernando Henrique Cardoso, the author of an amendment that 
merged together the texts of the progressive and conservative blocks, was Franco’s Minister 
of Finance, and was later elected President.  
It was during the period in which both Correa and Cardoso occupied important 
positions in the national government that the 1994 law started to be gestated. The 
development of reform under the 1994 law nevertheless conflicted with important aspects of 
their proposals at the ANC – especially the explicit repression or banning of oligopolies. 
Thus, if they can be deemed as the best representation of the “government” during which the 
1994 reform took place, and their positions in respect of competition policy were those 
expressed in the ANC, the driving sources of reform probably resided outside of the 
“government”.  
As I will argue in the next section, it wasn’t the “big names” of government who 
advanced the reformist agenda in the 1990s, but rather agents at an intermediate level of the 
state administration and professionals who were experts in competition. They were the ones 
in contact with the institutional, legal, and economic technologies necessary to implement a 
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“modern” competition policy – something that apparently was still not available at the time of 
the ANC. 
 
4.2 Specific antecedents of reform in the 1980s 
 
 As discussed, competition policy occupied only a limited space within the broad 
spectrum of topics dealt by the ANC, and even within the secondary level of importance it 
received, questions of institutional design were not advanced at that time, and some were even 
aborted. However, specific initiatives to revert what seemed to be the consensus that CADE 
was inoperable under the 1962 legislation started already a few years before the draft of a new 
Constitution, continued in parallel to it, and intensified after its promulgation. These attempts 
are often absent in mainstream narratives, and when present, they are deemed as unsuccessful 
or limited in promoting the construction of a modern competition policy in Brazil. In this 
section, my goal is to describe the specific antecedents of what would eventually become the 
steps resulting in the successful reform of 1994, and identify possible answers for why they 
are not seen as representative of a new phase of competition policy in Brazil, and as a 
corollary, what makes the later movement of 1994 an emblem of a “modern” regulatory 
system. In doing so, it will be possible to shed light on the novelties brought by the 1994 
reform, and, as I will maintain, on its roots in neoliberalism. 
I deployed the same strategy of reconstructing the reformist impulses around 
competition policy through the agents that were involved in these attempts to transform 
competition policy in Brazil. Three moments in which changes related to competition policy 
can be identified prior to the 1994 reform. One is frequently mentioned in mainstream 
narratives as the first initiative of a period of liberalization and deregulation, which would be 
eventually consolidated by the 1994 competition act: the 1991 legislation creating the 
National Secretariat of Economic Law (law number 8.158 of 1991). However, during 
fieldwork I was able to identify two other moments in which a reformist agenda was in place, 
and which were not anticipated by the available knowledge on competition policy. One 
occured between 1984 and 1986, in which a series of presidential decrees was enacted to 
transform the institutional design of CADE. Another moment was in 1988, in parallel to the 
ANC, when the project for brand new legislation was written.  
These initiatives occurred at an infra-constitutional level, around laws, decrees and 
ordinances, and were oriented to change the specific legislation on antitrust, its procedures 
and the institutional design of CADE. By no means, however, can they be automatically 
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linked as stages of an immutable trajectory. As I will try to show, each moment involved its 
own idiosyncrasies, to a great extent determined by the political context in which they 
occurred, and by the agents who struggled around the field of state power. Nevertheless, one 
important element that was transversally present in all those years, and which also 
encompassed the reform that resulted in the 1994 law, was the inflationary crisis in Brazil. As 
the graph below indicates, between 1979 and 1994, inflation rates were extremely elevated in 
the country.  
 
Figure 7. Annual inflation rates (%/year) – 1970-1999 (IGP-DI index) 
 
Source: author’s elaboration based on IPEA Data (FGV/Conj. Econ. - IGP) 
 
Oscillations and eventual decreases in the period were associated with the 
implementation of different economic plans of stabilization, in 1986 (Plano Cruzado), 1989 
(Plano Verão), 1990 (Plano Collor 1), and 1991 (Plano Collor 2). These plans were evidently 
of limited efficacy, as inflation rose in the months that followed each of them (Fontes et al 
1998, p. 78), at least until 1994, when the Plano Real was established. The struggle against 
inflation was determinant in all these episodes, and impacted them in different ways. 
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4.2.1 A “governmental” policy between 1984 and 1986 
 
The first initiatives to transform the institutional design of CADE in Brazil after the 
1962 legislation can be observed in the mid-1980s. In October 1984, President João 
Figueiredo, the last military figure to govern Brazil, and his Minister of Justice, the lawyer 
Ibrahim Abi-Ackel, signed a decree that “altered the composition of the Administrative 
Council for Economic Protection”171. In this norm, CADE was linked to the 1962 legislation, 
and was said to be tasked with “investigating and repressing the abuses of economic power 
and its implications to the popular economy and to consumer rights”. Although already 
talking about consumer rights, the decree replicated what mainstream narratives often see as 
an emblem of the interventionist past of antitrust in Brazil: the protection of the “popular 
economy”. 
The decree fundamentally altered CADE’s composition. While the 1962 law 
established the participation of a president and four other members with “notable legal or 
economic knowledge”, all appointed by the President, Figueiredo’s ruling increased the 
number to seven, and detailed the criteria for appointments: all commissioners had to be 
public officials and “representatives” of Ministries (quite oddly from an orthodox approach, 
including organs such as the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Health) and of the 
Presidency. CADE was thus clearly supposed to be a governmental organ. I was not able to 
reconstruct through interviews or documental sources the production of this decree, and thus 
to identify who was actually mobilizing the changes in CADE’s composition and why. 
However, the timid reform undertaken at this point seems to encompass what mainstream 
narratives refer to as an organ of governmental intervention. Despite this change, CADE was 
to a large extent still not operating in 1984, and the composition of seven members imposed 
by the decree was never actually implemented. 
Between 1985 and 1986, under the Presidency of José Sarney, another spasm of timid 
change can be identified. On May 13th 1985, a presidential decree determined the transfer of 
CADE from Rio de Janeiro to Brasília172. In 1986, two other decrees were issued. In January, 
together with his Minister of Justice, Fernando Lyra, Sarney issued a decree that established 
the “Regulations of law 4.137/62”173. This decree resulted from the work of a commission 
																																																								
171 Decreto number 90.283, of October 8th 1984. 
172 Decree number 91.293, of May 31st 1985. 
173 Decree number 92.323, of January 23rd 1986. 
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assembled by Lyra’s Secretary-General of the Ministry of Justice, José Paulo Cavalcanti 
Filho.  
As revealed in an interview with Mauro Grinberg – a lawyer who participated in that 
commission to produce the decree and was appointed a commissioner to CADE in 1986 – 
Cavalcanti Filho’s father-in-law, Armando Monteiro Filho, was a close friend of Tancredo 
Neves, with whom Sarney had been elected vice-president in 1985. An engineer from Recife, 
Monteiro Filho served as Minister of Agriculture in the government of João Goulart between 
1961 and 1962, appointed by the then prime-minister Tancredo Neves. Curiously, he was also 
the son-in-law of Agamenon Magalhães, the author of a legal project of 1948, which would 
eventually became the 1962 competition act. 
 
Table 12. Trajectory: Cavalcanti Filho 
 
José Paulo Cavalcanti Filho 
A lawyer graduated from the Federal University of Pernambuco’s law school (UFPE), in Recife, and 
member of the Academy of Arts and Letters of the state of Pernambuco, Cavalcanti Filho was appointed 
president of CADE in 1985, and was later a member of the Council of Social Communication (an advisory 
organ of the National Congress), a consultant for UNESCO and the World Bank, and is currently a member of 
the National Truth Commission, created by the federal government to investigate the crimes perpetrated 
during the military dictatorship in Brazil. 
 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
Cavalcanti Filho was of central importance to the initiative of producing a decree on 
competition policy. Far from being a governmental priority, it was rather the initiative of a 
lawyer who occupied an intermediate political position in the federal administration. As 
Grinberg’s interview suggests, 
 
It [the proposal for a decree on CADE] started from the initiative of José 
Paulo, who believed in it. It started from a practically isolated initiative of 
José Paulo, which was obviously confirmed by the Minister. But I don’t 
believe the Minister had participated actively in it. He just gave support to 
José Paulo. 
 
Cavalcanti Filho invited six other members to join the commission that would produce 
the decree. One of them was precisely Grinberg, a lawyer and close friend of Cavalcanti 
Filho’s father. The other members were the lawyers Miécio Oscar Uchoa Cavalcanti Filho, 
Renato Rodrigues Tucunduva Júnior, Antônio Evaristo de Moraes Filho, and Fábio Konder 
Comparato. The only non-lawyer to participate in the commission was Clóvis de Vasconcelos 
Cavalcanti. 
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Table 13. Trajectories: Grinberg, Uchoa Cavalcanti Filho, Tucunduva Júnior,  
Moraes Filho, Comparato, Vasconcelos Cavalcanti 
 
Mauro Grinberg 
Grinberg was a law graduate from the University of São Paulo (USP), but began his career as a 
lawyer and law professor in Recife, Pernambuco, in the area of business law. He was a lawyer (public official) 
of the National Treasury Attorney’s Office (Procuradoria da Fazenda Nacional), and in the early 1980s 
moved to Brasília to work in the area that handed external lending made by the federal government. 
 
Miécio Oscar Uchoa Cavalcanti Filho  
Graduated in law from UFPE in Recife, and by the time of his appointment a recent Public 
Prosecutor of the Republic. He previously served as a legal assistant of several subsidiaries of the Grupo 
Gerdau, the biggest Brazilian corporation in the steel sector, in Northeast Brazil. Between 1986 and 1987, he 
worked with Secretary José Paulo Cavalcanti Filho in two other commissions that drafted legal projects on the 
expropriation of urban settlements, and access to information. 
 
Renato Rodrigues Tucunduva Júnior 
A law graduate from the USP, who also held a bachelor’s degree in business management from the 
Fundação Getúlio Vargas of São Paulo, and a master’s degree from the University of California, at Berkeley, 
where he presented a thesis on the protection of consumers in Brazil. By the time he was invited onto the 
commission, Tucunduva Júnior was a lawyer at a firm founded by his father, and worked in the area of 
consumer law. In 1986, he also joined the National Council for Consumer Protection, an organ of the by then 
existent Ministry of Deburocratization. 
 
Antônio Evaristo de Moraes Filho 
Graduated in law from the State University of Rio de Janeiro (UERJ), Moraes Filho specialized in 
criminal law, and defended several well-known people politically prosecuted during the military dictatorship. 
Like his father, who was also a prominent criminal lawyer and founder of the Socialist Labor Party (Partido 
Operário Socialista) in 1910, Moraes Filho was directly involved in politics. He contributed to the creation of 
the Brazilian Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Brasileiro, PSB). 
 
Fábio Konder Comparato 
Comparato graduated in law at the USP, and held a PhD in law at the University of Paris 1 – 
Sorbonne. A full time law professor, specialized in business and economic law, he has published extensively 
on the fields of human rights and legal philosophy. He was an activist lawyer during the military dictatorship, 
being directly involved with human rights organizations. The interest in business law, mostly academic and 
critical, is explained by Comparato as a means that “enabled me to enter into the arcane features of capitalism, 
to un-mount the whole capitalist structure that frames social life”174. In his late works on human rights, he has 
also produced specific criticisms of the effects of economic globalization in Brazil (e.g. Comparato 1999, p. 
174). 
 
Clóvis de Vasconcelos Cavalcanti 
An economist from UFPE, Vasconcelos Cavalcanti held a specialized degree in economic theory 
from the FGV-RJ, and a master’s in economics from Yale University. As he describes his own trajectory in a 
personal website, “he decided not to pursue a PhD at Yale because he considered that the best doctorate would 
be experiencing the reality in Brazil, and because he disagreed with the content of the economic theory taught 
in the U.S.”175. He worked as a professor of economics, and later became a permanent researcher at the 
Joaquim Nabuco Foundation, a public research organism since 1979 part of the Ministry of Education and 
Culture. A member of the International Celso Furtado Center for Development Policies, a think-thank named 
after one of the exponents of Latin American structuralism, and of the Board of Directors of CLACSO (the 
Latin American Council on Social Sciences, renown as an association of academics who are strong critics of 
neoliberal policies in the region), Vasconcelos Cavalcanti maintained in an interview that he has “always been 
a heterodox”, who “liked mathematical models, but hated its alienation of reality”, and opposed the “empire 
of the market in the functioning of the economy”. 
 
Source: elaborated by the author 																																																								
174 Interview conceded to Revista Caros Amigos, number 163, October 2010.  
175  Section “Biography”, available at Vasconcelo Cavalcanti’s personal website: 
<http://cloviscavalcanti.blogspot.com.br/p/biografia.html>. Last accessed on October 17th 2013. 
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As the trajectories illustrate, the group formed by José Paulo Cavalcanti Filho was 
almost entirely composed by lawyers of a similar profile, who tended to combine political 
involvement against the dictatorial regime, and expertise in traditional areas of the law. The 
group was also mostly composed of professionals who followed careers as academics or 
public officials. In their trajectories, two lawyers – Comparato and Moraes Filho – were also 
long involved with left-wing groups before being recruited to the commission. 
Three of the lawyers were in some way connected with the law school of Recife, in 
Northeast Brazil, the historical heir of the first law school built in the country, together with 
USP’s law school. This common relation to UFPE is a possible indicator of the social ties 
existent in the group. In the case of Grinberg and Cavalcanti Filho, they were explicitly 
mentioned in an interview, but it is very likely that Miécio Cavalcanti was also part of a close 
circle of acquaintances of Cavalcanti Filho. Although three of the agents coming from 
Pernambuco held the same surname – Cavalcanti – I was not able to identify if they were 
related or not, especially because it is a relatively common family name.176 Another common 
origin for an important part of the commission was the USP: three lawyers were graduates at 
that law school in São Paulo. 
The group was not specialized in competition policy, although two of its members 
were previously involved with business law.177 Their traditional profiles, and the hegemony 
of lawyers in the commission are reflected in the shape of the decree they elaborated. 
Similarly to the text of the 1967 Constitution, and that which would eventually be approved 
by the ANC, it defined the abuses of economic power as the domination of markets, the 
elimination of competition, and the arbitrary increase of profits. The decree also detailed the 
application of the 1962 law in respect to sanctions, fines, judicial procedures, the participation 
of the Attorney General’s Office, deadlines, and the administrative procedures that should be 
analyzed by CADE. The commission did not aim to infuse many novelties into the regulatory 
system in place by that time, but rather to operationalize the 1962 law. As Grinberg 
explained: 
 [José Paulo Cavalcanti Filho] was a supporter of the idea that a good law is 
an old law, one that has undergone interpretation through jurisprudence, that 
has been read, studied and examined. So instead of creating a commission to 
produce a new law, [José Paulo] said ‘Let’s do a decree’ – which is an act of 																																																								
176 The economist Vasconcelos Cavalcanti mentioned in his interview that the other “Cavalcanti” were “distant 
relatives”, and the he didn’t know any of them in person before being invited to compose the commission. 
177 As Grinberg recalled in an interview (Dutra 2009, p. 18), “the meetings [of the commission] were very rich 
because, as nobody had experience in the subject, we did brainstorming. We put ideas on the table and debated 
them” (my italics). 
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the Executive power – ‘Making adaptations so the existent law can produce 
effects’.  
 
The changes brought by the decree were therefore of a legal character, thought to 
work within the framework of the 1962 law, and its concerns were restricted to repressing 
anticompetitive conducts – i.e. there were still no ideas about the regulation of economic 
concentrations. The language of economics was thus mostly absent from the commission’s 
work. As Grinberg explained when asked about the presence of an economist in the 
commission: 
 
At that time, antitrust law was still not seen with the economic concerns it 
mobilizes today. There was no economic analysis in Brazil, and CADE’s 
decisions at that time had no economic analysis, as it would eventually 
include. I would say that decisions were much more crude. [...] It was a 
process of learning. We were learning to work with economic concepts 
inside the law. 
 
Still far from what would characterize the reform toward a modern system of 
competition policy in Brazil, the only economist present on the 1986 commission was more 
attuned to structuralist economics, macroeconomic issues and the tradition of Celso Furtado, 
than with what would eventually become hegemonic as the economic theory of neoliberalism. 
Moreover, as Vasconcelos Cavalcanti stated in an interview, measures of economic 
deregulation and privatization were not in the horizon of the commission’s work, as 
“neoliberalism was not prestigious by then”. 
Despite the differences of the composition of this commission from those that would 
eventually be formed in the subsequent years, and the content they would try to infuse into the 
reform of competition policy, the construction of the 1986 decree is narrated as part of the 
same reformist struggles that would permeate the late 1980s and early 1990s: to manage 
inflation through mechanisms other than direct price control, and to make CADE an effective 
instrument for such purposes. In Grinberg’s explanation of the commission’s initiative, 
provided in an interview, this narrative is evidenced: 
 
In this commission we created the bases for the new functioning of CADE, 
which effectively started in the upcoming year, in the Ministry of Paulo 
Brossard [...] We were swimming against the tide [...] because in the whole 
world [price control mechanisms] were excrescences. Price control should 
be made through healthy competition, not through the imposition of 
governmental authority. 
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The second reformist initiative that I identified in 1986 was related to another decree, 
enacted under the number 93.083 of August 7th. Still under the presidency of Sarney, but now 
through the hands of a new Minister of Justice – Paulo Brossard de Souza Pinto –, the decree 
targeted CADE’s composition. Brossard was a law graduate from the Federal University of 
Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS), specialist in civil and constitutional law, law professor, and had 
a long involvement in regional and national politics. 
The decree signed by Sarney and Brossard maintained the general line of the previous 
texts, which gave CADE the power to “repress the abuses of economic power and its 
implications to the popular economy”. It nevertheless substantially transformed the 
mechanisms of appointment. Instead of stipulating the precise origin and functions of the 
commissioners to be appointed, as was the case in the decree produced in 1984, Brossard’s 
decree defined the composition of one president and four commissioners, all indicated by the 
Minister of Justice, and appointed by the President of the Republic. No other criteria beyond 
the possession of “notable legal or economic knowledge”, an “immaculate reputation”, and 
being older than 30 years were imposed. 
The decree also ended the composition of CADE determined by the 1984 norm, and 
thus Brossard and Sarney were entitled to reassemble the Council. Although by then José 
Paulo Cavalcanti Filho had left the Ministry, the new composition constructed by Brossard 
incorporated Grinberg, who was appointed commissioner in 1986. The appointment to 
CADE’s president was Werter Rotunno Faria, a friend and companion in political activities at 
UFRGS of Brossard’s. Faria was a law professor and a retired judge, having specialized in 
business law. Prior to his recruitment to CADE, he had occupied several directive positions in 
financial institutions, and acted as a legal assistant to different business associations, such as 
the Federation of Rural Associations of Rio Grande do Sul (Farsul), and the Federation of 
Commercial Associations of Rio Grande do Sul (Federasul).178 
The other lawyers added by Brossard were George Marcodes Coelho de Souza, a 
former lawyer of the Brazilian Central Bank, and Ana Maria Ferraz Augusto, a specialist in 
economic law at the Federal University of Minas Gerais (UFMG), who later became a judge 
and was replaced by Maria Isabel Vianna de Oliveira Vaz, also a lawyer and specialist in 
economic law from UFMG.179  The only non-lawyer in CADE was Geová Magalhães 																																																								
178 Information retrieved from the preface authored by his wife, Guiomar T. Estrella Faria, published in a book 
organized in tribute to Faria, who died in 2005 (Accioly 2008). 
179 The appointment of Maria Isabel de Oliveira Vaz to replace Ana Maria Ferraz Augusto is an illustrative 
episode of the social ties working in the field of competition policy. In 1989, Augusto withdrew from CADE, as 
she was approved to be a judge in Minas Gerais. Together with Werter Faria, she consulted the by then Minister 
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Sobreira, an economist from Ceará, Northeast Brazil. A graduate in Literature, Sobreira 
possessed master’s degrees in economics and economic law, and served in the Secretariat of 
Economic Planning of the Presidency of the Republic. 
Similarly to the commission that elaborated the regulations of the 1962 law between 
1985 and 1986, the agents involved in the drafting of the decree altering CADE’s 
composition, and those who joined the first Council under this norm, were mostly lawyers 
with a profile that combined political involvement and expertise in traditional areas of the 
law. The only economist was also academically and professionally connected to a 
developmentalist approach to economics. Social ties were equally important in the formation 
of the group of commissioners that would stay in CADE until 1990, especially in the case of 
Brossard and Faria, who were close friends and came from the same academic circle, and in 
the case of two lawyers from UFMG. 
During the period this decree was in effect, CADE met once a month in Brasília, and 
decided the cases based on the 1962 law. As Grinberg reports in an interview, commissioners 
didn’t have their own offices, and CADE had no permanent structure, library and files 
(interview with Dutra 2009, p. 22). According to this former commissioner, during the 1980s 
CADE was still embryonic, and its decisions had no “economic sophistication”. Its limited 
effects on regulating the economy were attributed to the government, as CADE still faced 
strong opposition from other governmental spheres, especially from the Ministry of Finance, 
who according to Grinberg “was truly horrified by CADE”, and centralized economic 
decisions. 
The content of the initiatives to transform the functioning of CADE started to change 
in only in 1988, when new agents mobilizing the reformist agenda entered the scene. The 
political context was also about to shift by the end of the 1980s, and as a consequence, the 
agenda of constituting a modern competition policy system gained new contours. 
 
4.2.2 The “modern” yet unsuccessful initiative of 1988 
 
In 1988, still under the government of Sarney, and in parallel with the final stages of 
the ANC, another commission of professionals was formed to propose changes in the 																																																																																																																																																																													
of Justice, Oscar Dias Corrêa, a law professor from UFMG, about her replacement. At that time, Corrêa’s 
personal advisor in the Ministry was Orlando de Oliveira Vaz Filho, a lawyer graduated from the UFMG, who 
was married to Maria Isabel de Oliveira Vaz. Both Corrêa and  Vaz were former member of the Democratic 
National Union (UDN), a right-wing party that opposed Vargas’ regime during the 1940s and 1950s. As Maria 
Isabel recounts in a memoir about her studies at UFMG (Vaz 2012, p. 55-56), Augusto suggested to the Minister 
that he invite her replacement “at home”. He then invited Vaz to become a commissioner in CADE. 
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Brazilian competition law. Through an “Order of CADE’s President”, in August 1988 Werter 
Faria appointed four lawyers to “elaborate, within thirty days, a legal project related to the 
repression of the abuse of economic power, in light of the project of Constitution”180. By that 
time, the ANC was debating the constitutional text at the Plenary stage, and the norm that 
would become the constitutional text was already dominant. The lawyers appointed by Faria 
for the task of operationalizing what was about to be approved by the ANC were Alberto 
Venancio Filho, Carlos Francisco Magalhães, José Inácio Gonzaga Franceschini, and 
Washington Peluzo Albino de Souza. 
 
Table 14. Trajectories: Venancio Filho, Magalhães, Franceschini, and Souza 
 
Alberto Venancio Filho 
Venancio Filho graduated in law from the “National School of Law” of the “University of Brazil”, 
later named Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ), in 1956. A lawyer since 1957, he worked for the 
Canadian multinational Rio Light, and was also actively involved in academic publications and policy-making 
in the areas of legal education and economic law. He participated in several governmental and international 
commissions related to education, and was one of the idealizers and later executive-director of the Center for 
Study and Research in Legal Education (CEPED), initially launched by the public university of the State of 
Guanabara in 1966, and later incorporated into two private institutions, the Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV-
Rio) and the Catholic University of Rio (PUC-Rio), until it ceased its activities in 1973181. As Dezalay and 
Garth (2002a, p. 106-108) explain, the CEPED was an initiative to reform legal education in Brazil under the 
auspices of the “law and development” movement, with the support of the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID) and the Ford Foundation. 
As a lawyer, he worked in what by that time was a large law firm founded by José Luiz Bulhões 
Pedreira, a prominent Brazilian lawyer who was long involved in politics, as a legal advisor to different 
governmental Ministries in the 1950s and 1960s, and as the director of the legal department of BNDES 
(appointed by the economist Roberto Campos). Pedreira participated in the drafting of a number of laws 
concerning the Brazilian economy, such as the law creating the National Bank of Housing (BNH), the laws 
creating the Brazilian Central Bank, and the Comissão de Valores Mobiliários (CVM – inspired in the 
American Securities and Exchange Commission), and is deemed as “the author” of the Brazilian Public 
Corporations Act (Lei das Sociedades Anônimas), together with Alfredo Lamy Filho, who worked as a 
professor in CEPED. Together with Bulhões Pedreira, Venancio Filho joined a “Technical Committee” to 
advise president Jânio Quadros (1961) in the “design of a strategic model of country” (Gatto et al 2009, p. 
60)182. As Venancio Filho reported in an interview, the invitation to compose the commission to draft a new 
antitrust legislation was officially made by CADE’s president, Faria, but the initial indication originated from 
Carlos Francisco Magalhães, with whom he had previously worked in cases presented before CADE. 
 
 
Carlos Francisco Magalhães 
A prominent competition lawyer in Brazil, Magalhães graduated from the Presbyterian University 
Mackenzie, in São Paulo, Magalhães spent his whole career working in law firms. By 1988, he was already 
considered a specialist in competition law. As an intern at a big law firm in São Paulo in the 1960s, he 
followed two of the first three cases decided by CADE under the 1962 law, as the corporations involved were 
clients of the firm, and he was in touch with several foreign publications on antitrust, which were brought to 
him by lawyers who worked in the firm. In 1976 he opened his own law firm, which since then works in the 																																																								
180 The ordinance (Portaria) was published under the number 02, on August 10th 1988. Available at the Diário 
Oficial da União of August 12th 1988, p. 4909. 
181 CEPED was close to a graduate program in economics held by the FGV-Rio and coordinated by Mario 
Henrique Simonsen, an exponent of the monetarist, and right-wing tradition of Brazilian economics (Loureiro 
1997, p. 50), who eventually taught on the courses promoted by the Center. 
182 The book edited by Gatto et al (2009) is a sort of biographic narrative about Bulhões Pedreira, and received 
an emblematic title: “José Luiz Bulhões Pedreira: the invention of the Brazilian modern state”. 
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field of competition. As a lawyer, he was early in touch with the experiences of other countries in antitrust 
policy. In the interview, for instance, Magalhães recalled a visit to the European antitrust authority in the late 
1970s to discuss a case of two clients who were exporting their products from Brazil through shared logistics, 
and who feared the intervention of the European authorities. He discussed the case with the head of the EU 
Directorate-General for Competition, who eventually became a friend. 
Between the late 1970s and the early 1980s, Magalhães was invited by Senator André Franco 
Montoro, who was involved in a Congressional Investigation Committee about cartels, to draft a proposal to 
reform the 1962 law183. According to Magalhães, the draft he presented to Franco Montoro already contained 
measures to “revitalize article 74 of the law 4.137/162”, imposing a system of merger review. As I will 
describe, this aspect would be recast by him in the 1988 commission.	Prior to his work in the commission, 
Magalhães had also contributed to the draft of yet another law: the so-called “Ferrari Act”, legislation to 
regulate the automobile sector in Brazil. In that opportunity, he was a lawyer representing the association of 
automobile industries. Magalhães was also a founding member and president of the Brazilian Institute of 
Studies in Competition, Consumption, and International Trade (IBRAC). As Ubiratan Mattos, a lawyer and 
another founding member, explained in an interview, IBRAC was created by practising lawyers, after the 
Consumer Code of 1991 was enacted, to be an “interlocutor from the other side”, i.e. representing 
corporations. Since the beginning it included corporate lawyers, law firms, and corporations as members, and 
later incorporated former appointees of the SBDC (such as CADE’s commissioners), including economists. 
 
José Inácio Gonzaga Franceschini 
Also a prominent competition lawyer, Franceschini graduated from USP in 1972, and worked in law 
firms from 1973.  Since the beginning of his career, as revealed in my interview with him, Franceschini was 
involved with competition law, representing corporations before CADE. Franceschini also eventually became 
a member of IBRAC, and until today he occupies a directive position at the organization. In his career, he has 
also been involved in several professional associations, such as the International Bar Association’s (IBA) 
Antitrust Committee, the Foro ProCompetencia, and is an honorary member of the Latin American Club on 
Competition.  
 
Washington Peluzo Albino de Souza 
The fourth member, Washington Peluso Albino de Souza, a law professor of the UFMG since 1949, 
is a specialist in economic law, and reputed as one of the founding fathers of the discipline in Brazil (e.g. 
Clark 2012).  A critic of neoliberalism in Brazil, Souza created at UFMG a center of production of scholars 
and lawyers specialized in economic law. Three of them were connected to CADE, at different points of 
history, as, appointed commissioners to CADE. Souza, however, never took part in the commission, as before 
the beginning of its work he was appointed Dean of the Federal University of Minas Gerais. 
 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
The political and economic context in which the commission drafted the proposal was 
still a mixture of an interventionist state with timid initiatives to liberalize the economy. As 
Magalhães reported in an interview, the government seemed to expect a law fit that context, 
i.e. which could enable direct control over the economy, especially to regulate prices, but with 
some modern traces to solve the inefficacy of the 1962 law. Instead of directly responding to 
that expectation, however, the commission would have pushed for more radical changes. As 
Magalhães reported: 
 
																																																								
183 In the interview, Magalhães couldn’t precise the exact date that this episode took place, but mentioned that it 
was probably in the late 1970s. I was not able to locate in the archive of the Federal Senate when the referred 
Congressional Investigation Committee took place, but it was likely between the late 1970s and the early 1980s 
because Franco Montouro was a senator between 1971 and 1983. 
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The [1962] law was not being enforced because we were in an 
interventionist economy. And they [the government] needed the law. We 
were a kind of Don Quijote, the three of us. We said: ‘Let’s take the 
opportunity that we were appointed, and let’s make it a market economy’. 
Through this law, instead of regulating what was in place, we moved 
forward. 
 
And so they did, or at least tried. The commission divided the tasks of drafting a legal 
project into different parts: Venancio Filho was in charge of writing the institutional design 
for competition policy, Magalhães was responsible for drafting the definitions of the 
objectives, infractions, penalties, and what would be the system of merger reviews, and 
Franceschini focused on detailing the procedural aspects of the new legislation. As Magalhães 
reported, the division of work mirrored each one’s interests and expertise: 
 
[Venancio Filho] thought that no major changes in the law 4.137 [of 1962] 
were needed. It was just enhancements, because it could get worse. 
Franceschini was very focused on process. He was right, because there was 
no law for administrative procedures. I had a more European position. I 
liked the European legislation, which I thought was more modern than the 
American, more suitable for us. And our legislation, the law 4.137 [of 
1962] was too rooted in the American experience. I wanted to go a little 
further, to insert this preventive part, for justifications. I wanted to insert a 
clear “rule of reason” in everything.  
 
The commission, presided by Venancio Filho, started its activities on August 25th 
1988, with an “informal audience” in which the three appointed lawyers, CADE’s president 
and an economist who worked in the Ministry of Justice were present184. The commission had 
six other meetings in the cities of Brazília, São Paulo, and Rio de Janeiro, between September 
14th and November 4th 1988.  
Each of the members produced an initial draft of the parts they were responsible for, 
and then presented to the other members, who discussed the whole text. The work dynamics 
of the commission was quite informal. Meetings occurred in CADE, and at the law firms of 
its members. According to Mario Nogueira, a lawyer at one of the largest Brazilian law firms, 
specialist in mergers and acquisitions and competition law, and currently a Director of 
																																																								
184 This economist was Francisca Belkiss Carneiro Guidi, who was Secretary of Planning of the Ministry of 
Justice, to which she was appointed on March 1986 by Minister Brossard (DOU of April 1st 1986, p. 1518). In 
the interviews with the members of commission, her name was not mentioned, so it was not possible to confirm 
if she was still in that position at that time. However, as the “informal audience” was internal to CADE, it is 
likely that she was still working at the Ministry of Justice. Belkiss Guidi held a PhD degree in economics from 
the University of Paris 1 – Panthéon Sorbonne, obtained in 1974, on “infrastructure investments in 
underdeveloped countries”. 
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IBRAC, much of the accessory tasks to the commission’s work were done at Franceschini’s 
law firm, in which Nogueira was an intern in 1988:  
 
Because of the three [members of the commission], ours was the largest 
firm, the commission’s secretariat was in our law firm. So they did all those 
things, prepared the texts, Franceschini collected it, and his secretary typed it 
down. At that time, it was typing, with an electric typewriter [...]. And I took 
[these typed drafts] and corrected them, to see if the typing was accurate. 
 
On December 1st 1988, with the work concluded, the Minister of Justice, Brossard, 
enacted an ordinance that published the content of the draft, a description of the commission’s 
works, and a detailed justification of the proposal presented by its members185. The draft 
contained many novelties in relation to the 1962 law, and to the early 1980s attempts to 
operationalize or transform it. The draft contained 116 articles, and explicitly aimed to 
“totally replace the law 4.137 of September 10th 1962”. 
In the explanatory memoranda prepared by each of the commission’s members, and 
which opened the ministerial ordinance, these novelties are mentioned. The opening 
explanatory memorandum was authored by Magalhães, and detailed the choices of the 
commission in respect to what it defined as the law’s objectives. Magalhães started the 
memorandum by recalling that despite of the “vital importance” of competition policy to the 
country,  
 
[...] it is one of the most ignored and unknown pieces of legislation, not only 
for the businessmen it regulates, but even for professionals, lawyers and 
economists who should find in the law suitable instrument to solve the deep 
problems of competition in our country. 
 
In his memorandum, Magalhães recognized that the draft was inspired by the 
international experience – “of other more modern legislation, especially Japan’s” –, as it 
proposed a synthesis of its content right in the first articles. International influence was also 
reported on more substantive aspects of the draft. Magalhães explained article 21 of the draft, 
which defined the “anticompetitive conduct” to be repressed as the introduction of a norm that 
 
[...] contemplates a classic concept originated in the North American 
legislation, which is specially directed against the so called cartels and illicit 
unions of corporations to achieve the distribution of the market and profits 
among themselves.  
 																																																								
185 Ordinance 704,  DOU December 2nd 1988, pp. 23436 and 23452. 
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These were, however, “concepts and forms perfectly consecrated in the legislation and 
doctrines of other countries, including our own current law [of 1962]”. Articles 22 and 35, in 
turn, conceptualized what the commission saw as novelties: the “abuse of dominant market 
position”, influenced by the “modern European legislations”, and the control of “mergers, 
acquisitions, and associations”. According to the draft’s article 22, the existence of “dominant 
position” was to be identified by the antitrust authority – but “without prejudicing the analysis 
of each case” – in two situations. First, if a single corporation or group of corporations was 
the “sole supplier, intermediary, acquirer, or funder of a product or service or of its 
corresponding technology” in a given “regional or national relevant market”186. Second, if a 
single corporation controlled more than 40%, or a group of corporations controlled more than 
60% “of the national or regional relevant market of a product or service or of its 
corresponding technology”187. On article 32, the draft detailed how CADE should analyze the 
cases related to the “abuse of dominant market position”. Similarly, article 35 introduced a 
mandatory system of merger reviews in Brazil. It established that acts of economic 
concentration such as mergers and acquisitions that implied “the control of more than 20% of 
a relevant market of products or services by the entities resulting of the grouping or 
concentration” should be submitted “within 30 days after taking place” (my italics) for 
CADE’s approval. As can be noticed, the text already adopted a post-merger version, which 
was later endorsed by the 1994 law, and extensively criticized in the subsequent years. 
Magalhães’ memorandum highlighted the novelty of a merger review system, underlying the 
convergence of Brazil with international standards: 
 
By emphasizing the preventive roles [of CADE], the draft followed the 
unanimous example of the modern antitrust legislations, and brought to the 
control and supervision of CADE the acts that [...] in theory may constitute 
abuses. But if motivated by conjunctural or temporary reasons, or even by 
certain particularities, such as benefitting not only the involved parties, but 
the general collectivity, [these acts] must be tolerated, even in special 
situations of deep recession, or of joint efforts to increase exports. 
 
As the quote reveals, the economic concentrations defined in article 35 were to be 
“tolerated” in certain situations. The same logic was embedded in article 22, concerning the 
“abuse of dominant position”. In Magalhães’ view, the European tradition that would have 
inspired this norm provided 
 																																																								
186 Article 22, paragraph 1 of the draft. 
187 Article 22, paragraph 2 of the draft. 
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[...] a concept usually accepted in those countries and in the modern 
economy of not considering monopoly and other positions of market 
domination as illicit per se, but on the contrary, accepting them as an 
economic reality, and repressing, nevertheless, its abusive manifestation. 
 
The exceptions that authorized CADE both to not classify “monopoly and other 
positions of market domination” as illicit, and to approve certain mergers were described in 
the draft’s article 33. They entailed, for instance, concentrations that “increase production, 
enhance distribution of goods or the supply of services, or promote efficiency and the 
development of technological or economic progress” (my italics)188. As an exception to the 
illegality of economic concentration, the concept of “efficiency” appeared for the first time in 
the history of Brazilian legislation on antitrust. 
Another exception comprised cases in which “benefits resulting from the act or 
adjustment be evenly distributed among the parties, on one side, and consumers or the final 
users on the other, even if indirectly”189. Other exceptions entailed concentrations that 
“promote the increase of exports”190, or “when the restriction [of competition] contained by 
those acts is necessary for impelling reasons of the global economy and of common good”191. 
As Magalhães revealed in an interview, he introduced this idea from the Japanese 
antitrust legislation, after reading about the formation of “official cartels” to “save the 
Japanese industry”. The motive for the import of this notion to Brazil was the perception, 
according to Magalhães, “that we were still in a developing economy, that we would need 
protection for national industry, preponderantly national interests”. 
Specifically in relation to the merger review system (article 35), two other possibilities 
were established for a concentration to be approved beyond the legal levels of 
concentration192. First, that if didn’t imply “ the cessation of activities or the elimination of 
lines of production of any firm, and if it occurs, there must exist a corresponding increase in 
productivity or efficiency”. Second, that the concentration did not “result in harms to the 
public interest, to consumers, or to the final users”.  
Another aspect highlighted by the commission in its opening memorandum was the 
inclusion of an explicit submission of state-owned corporations to the mentioned forms of 
control, both in cases of “abuse of dominant position”, and merger reviews. As Magalhães 
stated in the draft, this was a deliberate provision to face “statist gigantism”: 																																																								
188 Article 33, item “a” of the draft. 
189 Article 33, item “b” of the draft. 
190 Article 33, paragraph 1 of the draft. 
191 Article 33, paragraph 2 of the draft. 
192 Article 35, paragraph 3, items “a” and “b” of the draft. 
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The commission sought to find the most encompassing concept [of 
corporation] as possible, leaving aside the formal legal consideration to 
reach all economic agents that can be touched by the restriction of 
competition, or that can be the active subjects of the violations mentioned in 
the law. Therefore, the law also encompasses state organisms that exercise 
economic activity, be it permanently, temporarily, or occasionally, since 
[CADE’s] experience has evidenced that due to statist gigantism, state-
owned corporations and even parts of the public administration have 
perpetrated unjustified restrictions to free competition. 
 
Magalhães went further on the explanation, connecting the draft to what by that time 
was a recently enacted Constitution: 
 
The commission understood, in this aspect, that from the moment that the 
state is involved in the economic activity, it is also part of the game of free 
competition, and is obliged to assume the costs of following the natural or 
legal laws of the market, without any sinecures or privileges, as established 
by the principle consecrated on article 173 of the Constitution, and its 
paragraphs 1 and 2. 
 
In presenting the specific justification of equating private and state-owned 
corporations in merger reviews, Magalhães characterized the measure as “an innovation that 
seemed extremely timely for the commission”. In his view: 
 
The innovation departs from the observation and the experience of the last 
two decades, in which generalized state dirigisme over the economy stood 
out, through the interference of the state in various of the most significant 
segments of the market, and the creation regulations that very often conflict 
with the objective of fully respecting freedom of commerce that an antitrust 
law seeks to guarantee. 
 
Another of the “major innovations brought by the draft”, as stated by Venancio Filho, 
concerned the institutional design of CADE, substantially reformed in the proposal. 
Responsible for structuring this part of the draft, Venancio Filho explained in his 
memorandum that the goal was to “strengthen and increase the organ’s administrative 
autonomy”. Article 5 of the draft not only increased the number of commissioners, but also 
sought to “ preserve the indispensible technical character of the organ”, as detailed by 
Venancio Filho:  
 
From these concerns emerged the formula of creating a list of six names 
among law graduates and economists that would be chosen by the organ 
itself, and later submitted to the analysis of a reputed judge, member of the 
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Conselho Superior da Magistratura193, in the case of the former, and to the 
Conselho Federal de Economia194, in the case of the latter, and reduced to a 
list of three names, of which one was to be chosen by the President of the 
Republic. 
 
 
Venancio Filho’s proposal implied a formal control of the professional groups of 
lawyers and economists over appointments. The composition was also fixated, tending to 
privilege the legal side: 4 lawyers and 2 economists. The appointment of CADE’s president 
was slightly different from the other commissioners: the Minister of Justice was supposed to 
recommend a name to the President of the Republic, who would then submit it for the 
approval of the Federal Senate. In all cases, those appointed to CADE were supposed to be at 
least 30 years old, and to posses a “notable legal or economic knowledge”. Moreover, 
according to the draft, commissioners would have mandates, and could be only removed 
under special circumstances determined by the law. 
In the publication of the draft containing these novelties, a deadline of 45 days for 
suggestions to be submitted to CADE was also fixated. Identifying what happened to the draft 
after this moment was hard. In my interviews, the unfolding of the draft was a bit obscure. 
Magalhães, for instance, only mentioned that the draft inspired different legal proposals in the 
National Congress, but it never went further, at least until the construction of the 1994 law. 
Nevertheless, the first episode that I was able to identify after the publication of the draft is 
dated of June 1989. Between June 28th and 30th, CADE organized in Brasília the III National 
Seminar on Abuse of Economic Power to debate the draft. According to Souto (1992, p. 307), 
“all segments connected to the subject” were present, such as the National Confederation of 
Industries, the National Confederation of Commerce, the Council for Consumer Protection, 
the Brazilian Bar Association (OAB), the Regional Councils of Economists, Managers and 
Accountants, law professors and competition lawyers. Even “technical experts and 
authorities” from Japan were “especially invited to give speeches” (Souto 1992, p. 308). 
The next link in the path that the draft would have travelled is suggested by Souto 
(1992, p. 308), who was a participant in the conference held by CADE. According to him, a 
special commission was designated in the conference to critically assess the draft. The 
suggestions made by this commission were published in a journal edited by CADE by that 
																																																								
193 The Superior Council of the Judiciary is a disciplinary organ formed by judges that operates at the state level 
in Brazil, and is also responsible for appointing the names of candidates to the higher state courts. 
194 The Federal Council of Economics is a national professional association that supervises and regulates the 
exercise of professional economists. 
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time195, and parts of it were eventually incorporated in a bill presented to the National 
Congress by representative Hélio Rosas (of the PMDB of São Paulo) under the number 
3845/1989, on October 17th 1989. Rosas’ bill specified in a similar way what would be 
important novelties created by the 1988 commission, but there was no detailed system of 
merger review, and the institutional design of CADE and the appointment dynamics was 
considerably different. Rosas’ bill was dropped on February 2nd 1991, due to regimental 
reasons, as it stood more than one year without any movement in the National Congress. 
Based on the information provided by Magalhães, that the draft was presented as bills 
“by several representatives and senators”, I conducted a search in the National Congress’ 
legislative database to locate other proposals196. Only one was dated of 1989, but it stipulated 
the repression of abuse of economic power in 3 generic articles, without any similarities to the 
1988 draft197. Other 5 bills were identified in 1990, of which only one was directly linked to 
the draft198. This was a bill proposed by representative Plínio Arruda Sampaio, of the left-
wing Worker’s Party (PT), submitted to Congress on June 28th 1990199. Sampaio’s proposal 
was to a great extent identical to the 1988 draft, and made explicit reference to both the 
commission who elaborated the draft, and to the Seminar conducted by CADE in June 1989.  
Although much more succinct in the procedural norms than the draft, and different in 
the design of CADE’s composition200, and despite some minor textual changes, the bill 
converged in establishing the definitions of abuse of dominant position, and a system to 
control concentrations. An important distinction in respect to the draft, however, is that 
Sampaio’s proposal did not replicate any of the exceptionalities created in the 1988 document 
to authorize potentially harmful concentrations. The concept of efficiency was not once 
mentioned in the bill. As the other two bills presented after the publication of the 1988 draft, 
Sampaio’s proposal was dropped on February 2nd 1991, with the end of the legislative term. 
Two contextual factors of the late 1980s can possibly explain the lack of immediate 
success of the 1988 draft in being converted into a law. First, the political agitation of the 
country. By 1989, a new constitution had been enacted, and in November of that year the first 																																																								
195 According to Souto (1992, p. 308), the suggestions were published on the Revista de Direito Econômico do 
CADE (CADE’s Journal of Economic Law), n. 6, of 1989. 
196 I performed a search for the subject in the period 1988-1990 with the following key-words: “competition”, 
“antitrust”, “CADE”, and “Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica”. 
197 This was the bill number 4198/1989, presented by representative Luiz Soyer, of the PMDB on November 11th 
1989. The bill was dropped on February 2nd 1991, for the same reason as Rosas’. 
198 The other 4 bills not detailed at this point were connected to the period that started with Collor’s inauguration 
as President, in 1990, as I will discuss in the next section. 
199 Bill number 5538/1990. 
200 Sampaio proposed that CADE’s president and all 6 commissioners be appointed by the President of the 
Republic, based on the Minister of Justice’s suggestion. 
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direct presidential elections since 1960 were to be held. Candidates representing 22 different 
parties participated, mobilizing the entire political spectrum, and draining the attention of the 
Congress, and the government itself201. Second, an economy deteriorating in an inflationary 
crisis. Since 1986, inflation increased at large steps, jumping from 1.037% in 1988 to 1.782% 
in 1989. In such context, the explanation provided by the architects of reform, that the 
government in this period was still induced to resort to price control mechanisms – something 
incompatible with a modern competition legislation – is quite compelling. Exemplary of this 
trend was the economic stabilization plan enacted by Sarney on January 16th 1989 (Plano 
Verão), which determined the freezing of prices and salaries. In other words, the government 
was either not interested in, or incapable of (or both) advancing the reformist agenda by that 
time202. It was thus only due to the political changes brought by the new decade that another 
set of confusing episodes related to competition policy reform would take place. 
 
4.3 Toward a “modern” field in the 1990s 
 
In the year of 1990, Fernando Collor de Mello started his government, after defeating 
the Worker’s Party leader, Lula da Silva, in the 1989 elections. Collor’s administration was an 
agitated period, both politically and economically. Elected for a four-year mandate, Collor’s 
inauguration took place in March 1990, but he was precociously impeached on September 
1992, after a long period of troubled relations with the National Congress, and a political 
scandal of corruption. During this brief period, the economic problems that occupied the 
governmental agenda in the previous years, notably inflation, were still unsolved. Although 
inflation decreased more than 300% after Sarney’s last plan of stabilization, rates were still 
very high, as it reached 1.476% by the end of 1990. Collor’s administration, as its 
predecessors, was thus struggling to control the inflationary crisis.  
Two plans of stabilization were enacted during his government. On March 16th 1990, 
one day after the presidential inauguration, Collor Plan I was enacted, which among other 
measures included the freezing of financial assets, prices and wages. By the second semester 
of 1990, inflation rose again, and on January 31st 1991, the Collor Plan II was presented, 																																																								
201 Souto (1992, p. 308), for instance, identifies the “disorganization” of the works of the National Congress due 
to the electoral period in 1989. 
202 On May 10th 1989, Sarney’s Minister of Finance in 1987, Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira gave a speech at the 
National Congress that is illustrative of the compelling force that the inflationary crisis exercised in government: 
“Although during some time in 1988 the discourse of ‘a new price-freezing, never again’ prevailed, a consensus 
started to form around the idea that a new price-freezing would be inevitable if hyperinflation was to be avoided” 
(Bresser-Pereira 1989, p. 132). 
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which “basically consisted of a new freezing of prices and the creation of new financial 
instruments to replace the ‘overnight’” (Suzigan and Villela 1997, p. 82). The second plan 
had a short-term impact on inflation, and by the end of 1991 the accumulated of the year was 
slightly above 480%. 
Although the measures deployed by Collor somehow replicated the attempts of Sarney 
to control inflation, his administration’s economic policy was nevertheless considerably 
different in other aspects. With his election, “the governmental policy was very much 
influenced by the so-called ‘Washington Consensus’ of the early 1990. There was 
advancement in the objectives of deregulation, privatization and opening up of the economy” 
(Suzigan and Villela 1997, p. 82). These policies were combined, for instance, with several 
initiatives of industrial policy conducted by government, including the formation of sectorial 
chambers through which the government negotiated policies for certain sectors (Suzigan and 
Varella 1997, p. 83-102). As Nassif (2007, p. 154-155) maintains, although in the first months 
of Collor’s government a group of “radically liberal” economists from PUC-Rio hegemonized 
economic policy-making, they were gradually substituted by a group of more moderate 
economists. These where mostly technicians connected to the BNDES, and proponents of the 
theory of “competitive integration”, which combined initiatives of industrial policy with the 
promotion of economic opening as tools to promote a competitive integration in the global 
economy. 
It was in this context that the agenda of antitrust reform was again mobilized, and 
would eventually lead to the consolidation of a “modern” field of competition policy in 
Brazil. The first initiatives, still of a dubious character, took place between 1990 and 1991, 
under Collor’s government. In 1993, when Collor was already out of office due to an 
impeachment process, the final movement that resulted in the 1994 law occurred.  
 
4.3.1 The dubious agenda of 1990-1991 
 
The agenda of competition policy reform between 1990 and 1991 mirrored the 
political and economic context in which it was developed: it entailed dubious movements 
between the past and the future, between initiatives of governmental coordination, and an 
orthodox economic policy. Following the impulses of 1988, however, the terrain was already 
being paved for the decisive movement of 1993.  
In 1991, after the first year of Collor’s government, he authored a publication entitled 
“Brazil: a project of national reconstruction”, which stood for a sort of governmental 
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program of that administration203. In the book’s chapter V – “Citizenship and fundamental 
rights” – item 7 was specially dedicated to “Competition and Consumer Protection” (Collor 
de Mello 2008). In this document, “the reformulation of the economic protection system” was 
said to be part of the “modernizing project conducted by the Collor administration”, with the 
objective of “concretizing the constitutional norms” (Collor de Mello 2008, p. 118-119). After 
describing the existence of “competition protection legislations” in the “advanced market 
societies governed by democratic principles”, Collor listed several legislative initiatives of his 
government that would illustrate the “modernizing project” in this area: the law 8.137 of 
1990, which defined crimes against the economic order; the law 9.078 of 1990, the Consumer 
Code; and the law 8.158 of 1991, a “legislation of competition protection”, which is often 
present in mainstream narratives as a landmark of the historical development of competition 
policy in Brazil. As former commissioner Mauro Grinberg maintained in an interview, 
Collor’s agenda was directed to transforming the past, and starting over (interview conceded 
to Dutra 2009, p. 22): 
 
In the beginning of Collor’s government a revolution happened within all 
Ministries, with the objective of erasing the old, and starting the new. That’s 
when the law 8.158/1991 came, because the law 4.137/1962, they said, 
wasn’t useful, it was old. 
 
The first acts undertaken by Collor in respect to competition policy were, 
nevertheless, prior to these laws. On March 15th 1990, the decree number 99.180 was enacted, 
setting the tone that the administration would imprint in antitrust matters in the next months. 
The decree established “the reorganization” of Ministerial organs, and those connected to the 
Presidency. It created the National Secretariat of Economic Law (SNDE), an organ of the 
Ministry of Justice, and submitted CADE to its structure. CADE’s role was defined as to 
“assist the Minister [of Justice] in the formulation and conduction of the national policy of 
economic protection, as well as to promote and defend the rights and interests of consumers”. 
When a new decree was enacted on May 10th 1990, this definition was eliminated, but CADE 
nevertheless remained a hierarchically inferior organ to a Ministerial secretariat, directly 
subjected to the President of the Republic. 																																																								
203 Interestingly, in the program of government presented by Collor’s adversary, Lula, in 1989, there is not a 
single reference to the word “competition” (PT 1989). Nevertheless, and in accordance with what the 
progressive group, of which Lula was a member, proposed at the ANC, the program mentioned the intention of 
controlling the acts of “large corporations of foreign capital”, as well as “Brazilian capital oligopolies” (PT 
1989, p. 10). The program went further, and attacked “the country’s legal system and the roles of the Judiciary”, 
which would “permanently preserve the privileges of lucrative capital, monopolies, oligopolies and large land 
owners” (PT 1989, p. 1). 
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Following these decrees, a set of “Provisional Measures” (Medidas Provisórias - MP) 
was enacted by the President, which would eventually result in the law 8.158 of 1991. These 
measures had the force of a law and were authorized by reasons of “relevance and urgency”, 
but did not demand the approval of the Legislature to be enforced. After 60 days (extendable 
for another equal period), they had to be submitted to the National Congress, where they 
could be converted into a law. That is what happened with the 4 MPs submitted by Collor 
between August and December 1990: on January 8th 1991, they were converted by the 
National Congress into  Law 8.158204. 
The formulation of these measures, as well as the decree, counted with the 
participation of  the Ministry of Justice’s Executive Secretary, Tércio Sampaio Ferraz Junior. 
 
Table 15. Trajectory: Ferraz Junior 
 
Tércio Sampaio Ferraz Junior 
Graduated in law and philosophy from USP in the early 1960s, Ferraz Junior possessed two doctoral 
degrees, one in philosophy, obtained in Germany, and the other in law, obtained at USP. After the completion 
of his PhD abroad, he was a full-time law professor for more than 10 years, and became one of the exponents 
of Brazilian legal philosophy. In the early 1980s, he started combining his academic activities with 
professional involvement. Ferraz Junior began his career as a lawyer relatively late, first as the head of 
FIESP’s legal department, and later as an executive director of the Siemens in Brazil. In 1990, he was 
appointed Executive Secretary by the Minister of Justice Bernardo Cabral, the former rapporteur of the ANC’s 
Commission of Systematization. Still in the Collor administration, he was later appointed the Attorney-
General of the National Treasury. After leaving the government, in 1996 he joined Magalhães law firm as a 
partner. In 1991, Ferraz Junior also supported the creation of IBRAC. 
 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
As the former Executive Secretary reported in the interview, his contact with 
competition policy occurred while he was in government. The first episode was right after the 
1989 elections, when a new institutional design for implementing competition policy was 
discussed: 
I worked on the administrative reform. And it was in the administrative 
reform that the idea to create the so-called National Secretariat of Economic 
Law appeared. At first, it was supposed to be a secretariat connected to the 
Presidency of the Republic, not to the Ministry of Justice. But it was later 
assimilated by the Ministry of Justice when the proposals were implemented. 
[...] The Ministry of Justice had CADE. CADE existed since 1962, with all 
its operational problems. There was no secretariat, CADE did it all, and did 
it poorly. [...] For reasons of economic policy and public attention, especially 
the corporate public, we agreed on creating a Secretariat of Economic Law 
in the Ministry of Justice, and a Secretariat of Economic Policy (SPE), 																																																								
204 These were the MP numbers 204 of August 2nd; 218 of September 3rd; 246 of October 13th; and 276 of 
December 5th 1990. 
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which would later become the Secretariat of Economic Monitoring, in the 
Ministry of Finance. 
 
The administrative reform mentioned by Ferraz Junior was crystalized in the decree 
99.244, which created the SNDE and the SPE. When the government started, and already as 
Executive-Secretary, Ferraz Junior was called once again to make changes in the Brazilian 
competition law – the novelty, at this point, was that the invitation came from the Ministry of 
the Economy, and not from the Ministry of Justice, as in the previous initiatives:  
 
[...] it was when I received the task from the by then Ministry of the 
Economy to elaborate a change in the law, to make it more effective. It 
happened in 1990. [...] At first, what triggered the reform of the 1962 law 
was, on the one hand, its inefficiency, because it didn’t really work. That 
was known. On the other, the quick decision of the government, in the 
Minister of the Economy, to end state intervention on prices. The demand 
came from there. We needed capitalist mechanisms to avoid prices getting 
out of control.  
 
To perform the task, Ferraz Junior assembled a small commission, consisting of him 
and two other members of the government: a legal advisor of the Ministry of Justice205, and 
the National Secretary of Economic Law, José Del Chiaro – who was also a law graduate 
from USP, Ferraz Junior’s former student, a founder of IBRAC, and who had also previously 
worked as lawyer in FIESP. Del Chiaro described what were the objectives of this 
commission: 
 
[We] had two goals: one was the Consumer Code, and it was achieved, we 
approved it during my term. The other... We wanted to make a revolution, to 
cease to be a “tepid” organ, and become an instrument of the market 
economy within the norms of the 1988 Constitution. [...] We sought to 
spread the consciousness that there was a change of attitude in the economy, 
leaving an economy controlled by the state, and entering a market economy. 
It was the goal of opening up. 
 
Ferraz Junior portrayed similar objectives that the commission sought to attain: “the 
MP had a very immediate objective: liberalizing prices, the end of intervention. We had to 
create a structure that was capable of handling it”. According to Ferraz Junior, the choice for 
the MP as the legal device to promote the reform was due to the hurry of the government in 
liberalizing the economy. As he stated, “The message was that: we are opening every price 
and we need this [law] working”.   																																																								
205 In transcribing Ferraz Junior’s interview, due to a small rupture on the record, I was not able to capture the 
full name of the legal advisor. 
		213	
As he also revealed, since “there were not many specialists [on competition law] by 
that time”, during the works of the commission he was in contact with the three lawyers who 
worked on the 1988 draft: Venancio Filho, Franceschini and Magalhães. The influence of 
these agents on the 1990/1991 reforms was mixed. On the one hand, the commission led by 
Ferraz Junior did not want to replicate a “procedural” project, such as that of 1988. On the 
other, as I will detail below, Magalhães’ ideas about the law, already expressed in 1988, 
would eventually gain space with the 1990 commission.  
The first two MPs presented by Collor, and jointly signed by the Ministers of Justice 
and of the Economy were practically identical, and detailed a vast set of competences of the 
SNDE. The opening article of MP 204, was emblematic of what was still a worry with prices 
(and thus inflation), and of a corresponding punitive attitude of the government: 
 
[The SNDE shall] investigate and correct the anomalies in the behaviour of 
sectors, corporations, commerce, as well as of its administrations and 
controllers, that are capable of directly or indirectly disturbing the 
mechanisms of price formation and the availability of goods and services in 
the market, and of interfering with the constitutional principles of the 
economic order. 
 
Although MP 218 of September lowered the tone, establishing SNDE’s duties to 
“investigate and correct” acts that could “harm the economic order and the principles of free 
initiative and free competition”, the text was virtually identical to the first measure. In both 
cases, the focus was on repressing conduct that could affect prices. In line with the decree of 
May 1990, CADE had an accessory role, being responsible for analyzing cases when the 
recommendations of the SNDE to the investigated corporations weren’t followed. The MPs 
also detailed CADE’s institutional design, establishing that the SNDE would provide 
“administrative and human resources support”, and that it was to be composed of a President 
and 4 commissioners directly appointed by the President after the Minister of Justice’s 
suggestions, and dismissible at any time. The ideal of autonomy from the administration’s 
control embedded in the 1988 draft and reflected, for instance, in the norm that guaranteed 
mandates for commissioners, was thus absent from these MPs. 
The MPs 246 and 276, enacted on October and December of 1990, respectively, 
brought considerable novelties in respect to the preceding measures. It was at this point that 
the commission led by Ferraz Junior was decisively influenced by the draft of 1988, 
especially in respect to the notions proposed by Magalhães two years before. The MP 
replicated, with minor textual changes, the full content of the 1988 draft on the definition of 
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abuse of dominant position (article 21 of the draft), on the institution of a mandatory and post-
merger review system (article 35), and established the same exceptions that enabled the 
antitrust authority to “tolerate” certain phenomena of economic concentration (article 33), 
including the notion of efficiency. Magalhães’ proposal also changed CADE’s composition, 
assuring mandates for commissioners, as in the 1988 draft. The most important difference in 
respect to that document was that in the MP the SNDE, and not CADE, was the enforcement 
authority. 
Although the last MP enacted by Collor, the 276 of December 5th 1990, surprisingly 
eliminated some of the changes introduced by Magalhães’ contribution, such as the 
exceptions of article 33, when it was transformed in the law 8.158/91, the text of the MP 246 
was resuscitated. On January 8th 1991, a new law was approved by the National Congress, 
that reformed the merger review system of the 1962 law, modernizing it accordingly to the 
draft of 1988, and at the same time attributing the power to enforce these norms to SNDE, and 
focusing on violations and on criminal remedies in cases concerning prices. 
When published, the dubious character of this legislation, extensively criticized by 
mainstream narratives, generated worries among both national and foreign businessmen. As 
Ferraz Junior recalled, 
 
I remember that I, as Executive-Secretary, together with the Secretary of 
Economic Law, and CADE’s president, we made several conferences at 
FIESP, at the National Congress, at the American Chamber of Commerce. 
We started going to the businessmen to explain the law to them. [...] There 
were worries due to the enlargement of the administrative-penal categories 
and the new competences that were being given. [...] There was a reaction 
against it. Businessmen had no idea about it, about what it was, what was its 
role. There was no consciousness.  
 
If on the side of corporations the reforms promoted between 1990 and 1991 generated 
fears, among professionals it was generally a cause of dissatisfaction, as some of my 
interviewees revealed. For one competition lawyer I interviewed, for instance, “The law was 
very bad. It was bad because it was made to combat high prices. It was a law that created the 
SNDE, but didn’t do right on changing the merger review system”. Another interviewee 
maintained that “As a Provisional Measure, it came out very badly! [...] It had not immediate 
enforceability, and there were no procedures described how to enforce it”. 
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In February 1991, another and final commission was formed to construct the detailed 
regulations of the law recently approved206. It was a joint-commission between the Ministries 
of Justice and the Economy, that put together two people who would be decisive in the next 
episode of the reformist agenda: Neide Teresinha Malard, a lawyer who at the time was an 
advisor at the Ministry of Justice, and Lucia Helena Salgado, an economist who was an 
advisor to Antonio Kandir, the Secretary of Economic Policy of the Minister of the Economy. 
In this commission, Malard and Salgado became friends. As Malard reported on an interview, 
that group of people in charge of regulating the law of 1991 felt it was a limited instrument:  
 
Soon, very soon we realized that that law had been actually created with the 
objective of emptying CADE. The decisions were political decisions, and 
they were taken by the Secretariat of Economic Law, which was a true 
notary office. 
 
The feeling that the dubious agenda of the 1990/1991 period did not advance the 
reform of competition policy was shared by many lawyers and economists, both in private 
practice and in government207. Nevertheless, some of the changes that would eventually be 
consolidated by the 1994 law were already gaining space in the legislation, and most 
importantly in the minds of several of these professionals, who by that time were already 
establishing connections among themselves. It was a matter of a new political and economic 
context for opening the window for a decisive reform. 
 
4.3.2 Finally reformed: the construction of the competition act of 1994 
 
On October 1991, Collor made the first appointments to CADE under the law 8.158. 
With a new composition formed by three lawyers (including the President), and two 
economists, CADE started its works in February 1992. Within CADE, its President and 
another commissioner, both lawyers, would have a prominent role in the advancement of the 
reformist agenda in 1993: Ruy Coutinho do Nascimento, and Neide Teresinha Malard, 
respectively. Together with other lawyers and economists who were involved in the previous 
																																																								
206 The regulations were published by the Presidential Decreto 34, of February 14th 1991, involving no major 
novelties. 
207 Even among those who opposed Collor’s administration, Law 8.158 provoked reactions. The bill presented at 
the National Congress by representative Plínio Arruda Sampaio in 1990 (PL 5538/1990), and which 
incorporated, although selectively, the content of the 1988 draft, accused the creation of the SNDE through the 
set of MPs enacted by Collor of having the “objective of emptying CADE”, and proposed the extinction of that 
Secretariat. Similarly, another bill by a representative of the PT, João Paulo, number 4878 of April 1990, also 
criticized the “emptying of CADE”. 
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attempts to transform the Brazilian antitrust system, they would shape what is reputed as a 
modern competition policy, as consolidated by the law 8.884 of 1994. 
 
Table 16. Trajectories: Coutinho and Malard 
 
Ruy Coutinho do Nascimento 
Coutinho was a lawyer graduated from the University of Brasília (UnB) in 1969. He was specialized 
in economics and capital markets by the FGV of Rio de Janeiro, and after already been established as a 
professional, he completed a master’s in finances at UFMG. His professional career was mostly developed in 
investment banks. Coutinho was an intern at the investment bank Denasa, where he worked with former 
president Juscelino Kubitschek. After working in another investment bank, Coutinho joined the BNDES, 
where he stayed for 28 years, before being appointed the director of one of the councils of the Ministry of 
Industry and Commerce. As friend and a former colleague in Denasa, Coutinho participated in Collor’s 
campaign in 1989, and joined a team of advisors that constructed his governmental program in the months 
prior to his inauguration. Coutinho was part of a “Working Group on Federal Banks”, which was responsible 
for studying the privatization of public banks, both at the state and federal levels. In 1991, while in BNDES, 
as he reported in an interview, he “helped to pilot some privatizations such as Usiminas, and the CSN 
[Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional]. 
 
Neide Teresinha Malard 
Malard graduated in law at UFMG in 1971, and in 1973 she went to Europe, where she obtained a 
specialization in international business law at the University of Stockholm. In 1989, after a period working as 
a legal advisor to Brossard, the Minister of Justice of Sarney, Malard went to the London School of 
Economics to pursue a master’s degree, and attended several courses on competition law, motivated by the 
contact she had with the subject when the Ministry determined the transfer of CADE from Rio de Janeiro to 
Brasília. Malard developed her career in the public administration, as a public servant, and occupied several 
positions as a lawyer in organs of economic policy, and as a legal advisor during the ANC. During the Collor 
administration, she was the Attorney-General of the National Company of Supply, responsible for agricultural 
policies, and was later invited to join the advisory team of the Ministry of Justice’s Secretary General, who 
was dealing with several projects related to the administrative reform. As revealed in an interview, she was 
invited to join CADE by the Minister of Justice. Malard later completed a PhD in economic law, retired from 
the public administration in 1998, and since then is a competition lawyer and a law professor in Brasília. 
 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
As revealed in an interview, Coutinho’s invitation to join CADE came directly from 
the President, in 1991, after the enactment of the law 8.158 who according to him affirmed 
the “need to resuscitate CADE” given the iminent “closing the organs of price regulation” and 
the start of “an aggressive process of privatization”. As Coutinho reported, Collor wanted to 
substitute price control, something he had resorted to during the first two years of 
administration in the attempt to control inflation, by competition protection: 
 
His expression: ‘I want to substitute price control by competition 
protection’. I think the sentence is self-explanatory, although he mobilized 
mechanisms of price control in [stabilization plans] Collor I and Collor II. 
We are talking about 1991, Collor I and II had already passed, and none of 
them had worked. His vision was really not that one. He had a vision that 
was clearly of deregulation, of opening, of privatization, of insertion of 
Brazil, of globalizing Brazil. 
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 In both extracts from Coutinho’s interview, Collor’s view on competition policy after 
the enactment of the law of 1991 is depicted as being connected to privatization and 
deregulation, and as part of the solution for the inefficacy of the stabilization plans he had 
authored. 
The task of reactivating CADE however, was perceived as blocked by the recent 
transformations in competition law. The dissatisfaction with the changes implied by the 
Collor administration in antitrust policy was being born among the very commissioners 
appointed to CADE by the end of 1991. Coutinho, for instance, reported this shared feeling in 
an interview given to Dutra (2009, p. 29-30): 
 
By the end of 1992, there was a consensus among commissioners that, given 
the new configuration of our economy, the moment to think about the 
revision of many aspects of the 1962 law, which was still valid, had arrived. 
[...] with Collor’s government, the opening of markets had begun, and 
destatization gained impulse. Besides, CIP was extinct, and later SUNAB. In 
this context, competition protection was crucial, but the law in place 
revealed itself outdated. That’s what we realized in CADE. We then thought 
about promoting its transformation. 
 
As Malard revealed, even in its physical structure CADE was practically nullified in 
the administration. When the new commissioners went to the Ministry of Justice to check 
CADE’s installations, they found out that they were gone. “They thought CADE was a 
council of consultation. The reform was so poorly carried out that they didn’t realize it was a 
quasi-judicial organ”, said Malard. 
The existence of a consensus within CADE around the impression that the law had to 
be reformed was also expressed by her: 
 
We realized that CADE couldn’t depend on the SNDE. We depended on the 
SNDE for everything, including budget. So since the beginning we noticed 
that despite the fact that the law 8.158 was better than the law 4.137 [of 
1962], it was more modern, incorporating principles that were already 
consolidating in Europe, the institutional aspect of this law was extremely 
weak. 
 
It was thus in the course of the activities performed by the competition authorities that 
once again the reformist agenda found an opportunity to emerge. CADE’s commissioners 
started a movement to articulate a new set of changes in competition policy. By that time, 
Collor had already been impeached, and Itamar Franco, until then vice-president, was the new 
President. The Minister of Justice was the lawyer Maurício Correa, of the PDT, who at the 
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ANC authored an amendment that I classified as part of the “radical” version of the 
progressive group, banning oligopolies and monopolies, and assuring an exemption to state-
owned corporations. His position, at this point of history, was about to change. 
The idea to reform the still recent law 8.158 was taken to Minister Correa, who 
forwarded the message to President Franco. Franco himself was sympathetic to the very idea 
of strengthening CADE. More than one interviewee attributed at least part of the President’s 
sensitivity to the idea of revising antitrust policy to more prosaic, personal reasons. In 1991, 
while he was still vice-president, Franco was the author of several representations to CADE, 
in which he denounced abusive prices charged by the pharmaceutical industry. By that time, 
Franco’s mother was facing health problems that demanded a variety of high cost 
medications. 
On January 27th 1993, Ordinance number 28 of the Minister of Justice, determined the 
constitution of a commission to, “within 20 days”, “study and propose the enhancement and 
consolidation of the legislation on competition protection and abuse of economic power”208. 
Correa’s ordinance was opened by a sort of diagnosis about competition policy, in which he 
pointed to the “insufficiency of the legislation to repress [the abuses of economic power], and 
to the “citizenship’s claim of more effective instruments to repress the abuses of economic 
power”. Besides Coutinho (who also presided the commission), and Malard, the other 
members appointed to join the group assembled by Correa were: Antônio Gomes, by then 
Secretary of Economic Law; Ferraz Junior, who participated in the commission of 1990 and 
was at this point indicated by the Ministry of Finance209; Alexandre de Paula Dupeyrat 
Martins, a legal advisor at the Federal Senate, and according to Coutinho an advisor of 
President Franco; José Geraldo Brito Filomeno, a prosecutor of the state of São Paulo; Maria 
Aparecida Santos Pereira, who in the ordinance is defined as an “economist”, and according 
to Coutinho was also a direct advisor of President Franco; and Magalhães, who was appointed 
as the president of IBRAC210. 
Although the official composition comprised 8 members, mostly lawyers, interviews 
revealed that a larger group of people participated in the drafting of what would become the 
1994 Law, including economists, who had an unprecedented influence in the history of the 
reformist attempts. The other three members of CADE’s plenary – the lawyer Carlos Eduardo 																																																								
208 The ordinance was published on the DOU of January 28th 1993, page 514. 
209 As Ferraz Junior stated in an interview, he didn’t have an active participation in the commission of 1993 as he 
ended his term at the Ministry of Finance, but nevertheless participated in the debates of the bill in Congress, in 
1994. 
210 In interviews, I was also able to identify references to the “informal participation” of other corporate lawyers, 
in discussing the proposal of a new law with the commission, but especially in Congress.  
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Carvalho, and the economists Marcelo Monteiro Soares, and José Matias Pereira, both 
graduates  of the UnB in the early 1970s, and public servants –, as well as CADE’s Attorney-
General, Paulo Gustavo Gonet Branco, also took part in the commission.  
Another group of participants was connected to the Ministry of Finance, and orbited 
the Ministry’s SPE, at that time occupied by Winston Fritsch. According to the interviews, 
there were two economists around Fritsch who worked in the commission to reform 
competition policy: Lucia Helena Salgado, and Eliane Lustosa Thômpson-Flores. 
 
Table 17. Trajectories: Fritsch, Salgado, and Thômpson-Flores 
 
Winston Fritsch  
Fritsch graduated as an engineer from the UFRJ, possessed a degree in economics by the University 
of Cambridge, and had been a professor of economics at PUC-Rio. He joined a team of economists that, 
together with Fernando Henrique Cardoso, designed the stabilization plan enacted in 1994, the Plano Real. As 
defined by Nassif (2007, p. 154), Fritsch was “radically liberal”, opposed any involvement of the government 
in industrial policy, and developed a series of deregulatory measures while in the administration. 
 
Lucia Helena Salgado 
A graduate in economics from the UFRJ, Salgado held a master’s in political science by the IUPERJ, 
also in Rio. A public official since 1984, she worked in federal departments related to economic policy, such 
as SUNAB and CIP. In 1990, she joined the SPE, as an advisor to the Secretary, Antonio Kandir. It was 
during that period that she worked on the regulations of the 1991 competition law, together with Malard and 
others. In 1992, she was transferred to the Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA), a governmental 
think-tank, which by that time was subordinated to the SPE. As a researcher at IPEA, Salgado started studying 
competition policy, and published one of the first documents discussing contemporary theories about the 
topic, and issues of institutional design (Salgado 1992). In this study, Salgado analyzed the international 
experience of antitrust policy, especially the US and Europe, and highlighted aspects of institutional design 
and regulatory practice, such as the common trend among “industrialized countries” of determining the 
illegality of “excessive market concentrations” only in cases in which “no gain to society is proven” (Salgado 
1992, p. 15). In that period, Salgado also authored a paper in which she criticized the creation of sectorial 
chambers by the Collor administration (Salgado 1993), as incompatible with a market economy. In 1993, she 
also helped the Secretary of Economic Law to create investigation offices in São Paulo, and worked in 
elaborating deregulation policies at the BNDES. Right after her master’s, Salgado began a doctorate in 
economics at UFRJ, which would be later complemented with a period as a visiting student at the University 
of California, at Berkeley (UCB), between 1994 and 1996. After a period abroad, she was appointed a 
commissioner to CADE in 1996. 
 
Eliane Lustosa Thômpson-Flores  
A Graduate in economics from the PUC-Rio (where Fritsch was a professor of economics), she also 
held a master’s in economics from the same institution. Between 1993 and 1995, Thômpson-Flores was the 
General-Coordinator of Industrial Matters of the SPE, at the Ministry of Finance. 
 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
Although the members defined in the ordinance were officially appointed by the 
Minister of Justice, the commission’s composition was to a great extent articulated by 
CADE’s commissioners, especially its President. The composition avoided a purely 
governmental commission, so both professionals who were active in private practice, and in 
state institutions were invited. 
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The draft elaborated by this commission was submitted to the National Congress on 
April 24th 1993, through the Communication number 213/1993 of the Presidency of the 
Republic, and was converted into Bill number 3712/1993. The draft initially submitted was 
mostly focused on the repression of anticompetitive conduct, and on assuring CADE’s 
institutional autonomy vis-à-vis the SNDE (which was to be transformed into the SDE) and 
the Ministry of Justice, becoming a proper regulatory agency. The only change in respect to 
merger reviews was the addition of a procedural norm to article 74 of the law of 1962. In 
other words, the draft didn’t revoke the 1962 competition act, leaving to the law of 1991 the 
regulation of economic concentrations. 
The bill went through the National Congress during the whole year of 1993, and was 
approved only on June 1994, under the number 8.884, in a version considerably different 
from that submitted by the Minister of Justice as the result of the commission’s work. In 
addition to that proposal, the version passed by the Congress incorporated a whole new 
system of merger review, introduced changes in CADE’s institutional design (for instance, 
increasing the number of commissioners to 6, while the draft proposed 4), and explicitly 
revoked the law of 1962. This version, eventually approved by the Legislature, was a 
substitute bill elaborated by representative Fábio Feldmann, and signed by João Carlos 
Aleluia, and Nelson Marquezelli, who were the rapporteurs of the Executive’s draft at 
different congressional commissions. 
In discussing the process of reform that resulted in the law of 1994 with several of my 
interviewees, they reported that many of those agents who were officially appointed to the 
commission of 1993, or who informally worked with that group, continued shaping the bill 
when it entered Congress, i.e. after the commission’s draft was officially submitted to 
Congress. Coutinho, for instance, was revealed to have visited the National Congress to 
discuss the bill numerous times precisely between April 1993 and June 1994. Some of the 
interviewees also mentioned to have worked closely with representative Fábio Feldmann in 
the drafting of the substitute which would be approved211. According to one interview, the 
draft elaborated by the 1988 commission was eventually presented to Feldmann when the 
1993 draft was in Congress, in order to supply him with references to the elaboration of the 
law.  As Feldmann reported in the presentation of his substitute version, in July 1993 he, as 
the rapporteur of bill at the Commission of Consumer Protection, Environment and 
Minorities, started to study the Executive’s project. In this document, he mentions the 																																																								
211 Feldmann was a lawyer from São Paulo, specialized on environmental issues, and a former intern at 
Franceschini’s law firm. 
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“support of the Legislative Advisors of the House of Representatives”, and to have gathered 
the “opinion of lawyers and economists experienced in the matter”, as well as to have 
conducted “several meetings with representatives of the Ministries of Justice and Finance”. 
At the end of his report, Feldmann also acknowledges the collaboration of several 
people in the creation of the bill, including lawyers and organizations involved with consumer 
rights, and personalities already mentioned in the course of this reconstruction: Franceschini, 
Ferraz Junior, Grinberg, Fritsch, and Thômpson-Flores. This digression into the transit of the 
agenda of reform from the 1993 commission into Congress was a necessary step because the 
information provided by my interviewees about how this process occurred never 
distinguished between the work of the commission and that the continued after the draft’s 
presentation to the Legislative. That is, the process of reform that resulted in the 1994 law 
started with the formation of the 1993 commission, but evolved in Congress, counting on the 
participation of some of those who were officially appointed to draft an initial bill. The 
description of the reform process that follows below thus encompasses the whole transit of 
the reformist impulse, from the commission’s work to the legislative debates. 
The development of the 1993/1994 reform was marked by divergences and, at some 
times, tensions, among the members of the 1993 commission, between the commission and 
the government, in Congress, and with groups outside the state. Within the commission, these 
tensions often paralleled a professional divide between lawyers and economists. 
Representative of such divergences were the discussions about the institutional design of 
CADE, and the extension of competition policy’s control over state-owned corporations. As 
reported in some interviews, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Finance struggled to 
determine who should be responsible for competition regulation.  
Coutinho explained the arguments of those who mobilized the idea of submitting 
competition policy to the Ministry of Finance: 
 
Economic protection. ‘The name is right’, as the group [supporting the 
Ministry of Finance] said. [...] They thought that the Ministry already had 
instruments, already had the experts who could exercise [this control] more 
naturally than the Ministry of Justice. 
 
Malard also reported the controversy, suggesting the struggle of expertise and the 
references to international models that underlying it: 
 
The Ministry of Finance had great power, and they want at all costs to root 
CADE within its structure. Because in Europe, in some countries, the organ 
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of competition protection was connected to the Ministry of the Economy. I 
remember writing a note [...] to explain the reasons why CADE should 
remain with the Ministry of Justice. I showed the connection between 
consumer relations and competition relations. I showed the importance of 
the due process for convicting corporations, that the issues were more legal 
than economic, so much that in the US the process was judicialized. [...] 
They maintained that the control of mergers was more an economic issue 
than anything. And we showed that it was important to be a state organ, that 
it had independence from the Minister. And the Ministry of Justice had this 
profile to host a collegiate body that worked more with law than with 
economic theory. 
 
The law of 1994 consolidated a compromise, transforming CADE into a regulatory 
agency connected to the Ministry of Justice (although “autonomous”, as mandates were 
assured to its commissioners), and giving accessory roles to SDE and SEAE (still SPE by that 
point) – these, in turn, hierarchically subject to the Ministries of Justice and Finance, 
respectively. As Malard revealed in an interview, however, the decision to create SEAE and 
define its competences in the SBDC was not part of the commission’s intentions, and 
occurred while the draft was already in Congress, directly expressed by the Ministry of 
Finance. 
Although lawyers and economists seem to clash in the definition of the Ministry to 
which CADE would be submitted, there seemed to be no doubts about the necessity of 
guaranteeing the presence of economists in the institutional design of the agency. As in the 
previous projects, “notable legal or economic knowledge” was defined as a condition for 
appointment. As Coutinho explained in an interview, opening way for economists, or 
“technicians”, was perceived as a need of the time: 
 
Lawyers and economists, we thought it very salutary, especially in a time of 
economic fears. We were in the worst scenario. We were coming out of the 
President’s impeachment. We were living a brutally high inflation, so we 
had to have a robust body of economists, not only as commissioners, but 
also as technicians in CADE. It was a matter of survival. If we were to 
constitute a council purely formed by lawyers, it would be complicated, 
mostly because we were creating merger reviews. So the economic aspects, 
econometric aspects, they had to be taken care of with attention.  
 
Another point of divergence among those professionals who were gestating the reform 
of competition policy was reported by Salgado in her interview. This tension revived a debate 
of the ANC in which the two groups – progressive and conservative – often conflicted in 
defining the text to regulate competition: the extension of competition policy to state-owned 
corporations. As Salgado put it: 
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One tiny word made all the difference. It [the initial proposal] was like that: 
‘State-owned corporations are not subjected to this law’. And I said: ‘State-
owned corporations are subjected to this law’. I said: ‘It is not possible! 
Petrobras, Vale... They are half of the GDP!’.  
 
The result of the debate was article 15 of the 1994 law, which explicitly applied the 
law to state-owned and private corporations, “even those that exercise an activity under the 
regime of legal monopoly”212. To Salgado, what motivated the position maintained an 
exception to state-owned corporations was a “cultural trace” of part of the elites, which 
understood in an erroneous way the boundaries between the state and the market: 
 
This was a cultural trace, of thinking that one thing is the state, and the other 
thing is the market. Part of the elite still thought – but not today – of 
Petrobras as an arm of the state, not as an arm of the market. So it took a 
while, a few years longer. This is still very present.  
 
 As in the ANC, the victorious position was that extending the normative reach of 
competition policy to state-owned corporations. 
 Apart from these tensions, the collective work of those professionals involved in the 
draft of a new competition policy is said to have converged in several other topics. One of 
them was on the design of the merger review system, already included in the laws of 1962 
and 1991, but which lacked an enforcement mechanism. The study of foreign experiences was 
especially relevant for defining the contours of this instrument. As Salgado reported, the 
initial idea of defining a threshold for submitting merger reviews of 40% of market share for a 
merger review to be mandatory was inspired by the international experience: 
 
The idea of the 40%, we brought from the best international practices. We 
had doubts about, for instance, how to define the relevant market. Some 
people helped. For instance, a very important person, a commissioner at DG-
IV [the European Commission’s competition authority]. The idea was to put 
at 40%, not 30%, or 20%. But 40%. Where did it come from? From the 
European jurisprudence. I remember talking on the phone with him [the 
commissioner at DG-4]. So we put 40%, a little based on this conversation, 
on this security he gave us, telling that it was a good benchmarking. 
 
However, and despite the fact that none of the interviewees reported a divergence in 
this aspect, the proposal of 40% wasn’t reflected in the initial draft that the commission 																																																								
212 Interestingly, in the draft initially submitted to Congress in 1993, the so-called “legal monopolies” of state-
owned corporations were exempt from competition control (article 12, sole paragraph of the bill 3712/93). 
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submitted to the Minister of Justice. As the commission’s proposal endorsed the articles of the 
law 8.158 of 1991 in respect to merger review, the threshold of the project was of 20%. Since 
the version eventually approved as the law of 1994 defined a threshold of 30%, it is likely that 
those professionals working close with Feldman, especially those orbiting the Ministry of 
Finance, such as Salgado, managed to increase the criterion. Nevertheless, on November 16th 
2000, after more than 6 years under the law of 1994, through the Provisional Measure number 
1.950-70, President Cardoso changed it to 20%, the number that prevailed. 
The idea mentioned by Salgado, inspired in the European practice, reveals yet another 
dimension of the commission’s work: the resort to the experience of foreign systems and 
agents. Although no direct pressure from foreign agents on the commission’s work was 
reported213, the members of the commission themselves were in touch with international 
experiences and imported some of its instruments. Coutinho went to the US in 1993, during 
the commission’s work, and visited the FTC, the DOJ, and several law firms. Malard had 
academic experience in the UK in competition law, and Salgado had previously studied both 
the American and European legislations. The contacts, as Salgado’s previous example reveals, 
were mostly informal, with people working at the FTC and at the European Commission’s 
antitrust authority.  
Exemplary of the instruments imported was the “Term of Commitment to 
Performance” (Termo de Compromisso de Desempenho – TCD), a negotiated device 
institutionalized on article 58 of the law of 1994, and, as Salgado described in the interview, 
inspired by the European experience. This mechanism enables the antitrust authority to 
impose certain conditions for an operation to be approved. The objective, in Salgado’s view, 
is to deal with potentially harmful concentrations without jeopardizing the operation’s 
objective of “generating profit and more efficiency”: 
 
It was based on the idea that some operations may produce a negative effect 
on competition, due to the degree of concentration, but through some sort of 
intervention, be it behavioral, through a commitment, be it structural, such as 
selling part of the corporation, this operation can be suited to the legal 
design, and can thus proceed. That is, that the central objective is that the 																																																								
213 On the contrary, as Malard’s interview revealed, foreign agents didn’t intervene at all in the reform of 
competition law, while on other legal reforms, such as intellectual property law, they were extremely involved: 
“They made no pressure on us. Do you know why I tell you that? Because at that time I was also coordinating 
the working group on intellectual property, and there was pressure all over the new patents law. From the 
Americans, above all. They just didn’t leave the country. Everyday you had to talk to an American lawyer. But 
not in competition law. On the contrary, they weren’t really interested”. Coutinho also reported that there was no 
“explicit” pressure, but only suggestions that “Brazil was economically robust enough to have a competition 
law” in his visits to the US.  
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operation can proceed with its objective of generating profit, more 
efficiency, and the economy can remain with its level of competition not 
harmed by the operation. (my italics) 
 
The importation of this European instrument also brought another novelty into the 
1994 law, which was absent from the previous legislation: the notion of “employment” in 
competition policy. As Salgado explained, this was the result of the “tropicalization” of the 
European conception of “sharing the benefits” of competition policy: 
 
We brought from the European tradition, the idea of sharing benefits. 
Sharing benefits is typically European. Sharing benefits with consumers. In 
Europe there is a great worry with small businesses, but we didn’t put that in 
the law. The translation, almost a “tropicalization”, was the worry with 
social issues. And how did we put that? A concern with employment.  
 
Salgado revealed that the inclusion of this issue in the law, “probably brought by a 
lawyer” and not by the economists at the commission, did not generate tensions, although 
employment issues “was not antitrust”. The preoccupation with employment, according to 
her, was part of “our tradition of a welfare state”: 
 
This is unorthodox in terms of antitrust, but translates something about 
social preoccupations. The sharing of benefits is antitrust. But nobody 
questioned: ‘This can’t be in the law’. Because that was part of our tradition 
of a welfare state. There must be a net of social protection. And it wouldn’t 
be us who would eliminate that from the law, although it was not antitrust. 
Why not put it as a commitment? So if you want to fire people, it’s OK. But 
before firing, reinsert them [in the labor market]. It’s no bother. Reinsert, re-
train. You want to profit, you can profit, but share a bit with your employees, 
who have benefited you before. It was a bit the idea of retribution. 
 
The inclusion of employment in the law of 1994 occurred through the first paragraph 
of the article that created the TCD, establishing that in the definition of a commitment, “the 
exposition of the sector to international competition and the alterations in the level of 
employment will be taken into account”. 
Another instrument that according to Salgado was brought from the international 
experience, in turn inspired by the US antitrust authorities, was a mechanism analogous to the 
Consent Decree, consolidated on article 53 of the law of 1994. As in the US, the Brazilian 
version, called Termo de Cessação de Conduta aimed at establishing a consensual instrument 
through which the antitrust authority and the investigated corporations agree on the conditions 
established to cease what was identified as harmful, anticompetitive practices. 
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Also within the arena of conducts, another importation was the concept of “dominant 
position”, already present in the early draft of 1988. As Salgado recalled, the choice was 
deliberate, and implied consciously turning down the US version of “monopoly power”, and 
adopting the European notion of “dominant position”: 
 
It [dominant position] is much more like us. Monopoly power only says that 
it is an abuse to elevate prices above the competitive price. But dominant 
position is much richer, because it talks about the capacity of imposing 
conditions to any agent of the market – on the distributor, on the supplier, 
etc. It enables observing closely the richness of actions a corporation may 
perform. 
 
The European concept was thought to be more suitable for the Brazilian reality than 
the American version. Nevertheless, article 25 of the commission’s draft, also incorporated 
what could be seen as the American version of “dominant position”, as it defined as an 
illegality the “abusive increase of prices”. This idea was later incorporated by article 21, 
XXIV of the law of 1994. 
The international experience also served as a negative example. When questioned if 
the commission ever thought about defining the details of the economic analysis of merger 
cases in the law, Salgado said that they “sought not to commit the same mistake as Mexico”, 
who detailed parameters, “stifling the law” in respect of the advancements of economic 
theory: 
 
Mexico put in the law everything that should be actually regulated... These 
things change – how to analyze, what tests, the technique. These things must 
be very flexible, because the theory advances. It shouldn’t be in the law. 
This must be object of, at most, regulation, as it is in the US, or through 
guidelines, directives. Orientations for the market to know how it is being 
analyzed. [...] Defining intervals for concentration, the HHI [Herfindahl–
Hirschman Index, used to assess the degree of concentration in a certain 
market], etc, these are things that shouldn’t be appropriate to define in the 
law. 
 
Together with the discussions and disputes among those directly involved in 
producing the draft for a reformed competition policy, movements related to reform were also 
happening outside the commission, and they helped shape the regulatory system inaugurated 
in 1994. One of them was propelled by central figures of the administration, which could 
better embody the idea of “government”: the President of the Republic and the Minister of 
Justice. In several meetings with the commission, as reported by some interviewees, Franco 
tried to insert price control mechanisms in the competition act that was being discussed. His 
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view, according to an interviewee, was “old fashioned for these things”, as he was still a 
supporter of price control mechanisms. As Coutinho maintained in an interview with Dutra 
(2009, p. 31), both the President and his Minister of Justice had an “extremely ideological 
view”, and “exercised a great pressure to include in the law these mechanisms”.  
These “ideological views” cannot be separated from the worsening inflationary crisis 
that occurred at the time: by the end of 1992, when Franco substituted Collor, inflation 
reached 1.157%, and by the end of 1993, the year that the commission was working, reached 
a historical peak: 2.708%. As Magalhães maintained, the major expectation of Franco with 
the reform of the law was to create mechanisms to control the crisis, but those appointed took 
the opportunity to contradict these objectives and make “a good law”. 
Malard, nevertheless, pointed to a relative success of Franco’s insistence on inserting 
price control mechanisms into the new law, although it has never been actually enforced:  
 
He thought it was important that this mechanism was kept by the new law, 
although we tried to convince him of the contrary. We told him that there 
were other mechanism that could be used to repress this kind of conduct. But 
he conditioned sending the draft to Congress to the inclusion of a norm that 
could assure that CADE would take the measures in cases of excessive 
prices. So that’s how article 21, last item, came to existence. Ironically, 
CADE has never enforced that article. 
 
Pressures also came from outside the state. Besides lawyers, economists, and 
academics, several other individuals and groups participated actively in the discussion of the 
draft, such as consumer protection NGOs, the Foundation of Protection and Consumer’s 
Protection (PROCON), consumer associations, FIESP, CNI, among others. The Brazilian 
industrial associations were generally suspicious of reform, and at times opposed it directly. 
Coutinho visited FIESP several times in order to convince its members about competition 
law’s importance as a modernizing step to substitute mechanisms of price control that many 
corporations actually enjoyed. According to one interviewee, FIESP’s president understood 
the idea of an antitrust authority as a “police control”, an “interference in the economy, right 
when it was opening itself with privatizations”. Similarly, as another interviewee maintained, 
“no one [in the market] wanted a project with those characteristics”. Salgado, for instance, 
explained that the inclusion, in the draft, of a norm that established punishments for 
corporations convicted for infractions to the economic order independently of guilt 
(consolidated on article 20 of the law of 1994) was “absolutely unpalatable for businessmen”. 
The model of price control and sectorial arrangement of prices, such as the CIP, that the 
		228	
reform sought to substitute was not opposed by many groups of the Brazilian capitalist class, 
but, on the contrary, approved by them.  
As some interviews revealed, the pressures coming from the market – be it explicit or 
veiled – managed to affect in a decisive form the design and practice of a reformed 
competition policy. This influence is reflected in what several interviews defined as 
“mistake”, or a “jabuticaba”214: the post-merger review system, existent only in Brazil (and 
Egypt and Pakistan, as Martinez [2011] explains). Like the draft of 1988, and the law of 1991, 
the commission of 1993 and the consequent law of 1994 kept a text that imposed a mandatory 
notification of mergers, but authorized their notification after the operation was undertaken. 
Interviews showed, however, that this design was neither a mere accident, nor a natural 
phenomenon. Rather, it was about politics. As an interviewee reported, the commission chose 
not to institute a pre-merger review system due to two reasons: 
 
On the one hand, due to the relative lack of consciousness of the business 
class about the law. On the other, due to the perception that we didn’t have 
qualified people to do the job. They were not specialized, they were still 
under formation, and they were just a few. So the commission consciously 
decided not to include this, also because of the fear of paralyzing the 
country. Because if it was to be taken strictly, there was the risk of 
paralyzing the country. 
 
This “risk of paralyzing” the country was also what another interviewee emphasized in 
explaining the commission’s decision of preserving a post-merger system. Such a risk was 
feared by the government, due to the economic context of the time and the pressures of 
market agents: 
 
The pre-merger review system was at first discarded. We realized two 
things: it was not supposed to have pre-merger control, nor investigations. 
[...] Where was everybody? Preparing the Uruguay Round!215 The country 
was about to open itself to foreign investments that were coming here. So 
maybe the government didn’t want to lose political control over the 
competition protection organs. [...] And also because of the pressure of 
businessmen, especially in merger reviews. Brazil has always been very 
concentrationist.  																																																								
214 The “jabuticaba” is a fruit of the Myrtaceae family native of Southeastern Brazil. Supposedly an exclusive 
species of the country (although it also grows in other South American countries), the jabuticaba provides a 
widely used metaphor that highlights, in a pejorative tone, the particularities of Brazil: “If it only exists in Brazil, 
but it is not jabuticaba, be suspicious!”. 
215 As Picciotto (2011, p. 78) explains, “liberalization reached its apogee with the successful conclusion of the 
decade-long Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, resulting in the establishment in 1995 of the WTO”. The final 
round of negotiations was held in December 1993, and the Final Act of the Uruguay Round was signed in April 
1994 – precisely in the period of gestation of a new competition act in Brazil. 
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For another interviewee, however, it was never intended to constitute a post-merger 
system. Rather, they tried to concede an extended deadline for corporations to collect 
information after presenting the operation to CADE. The idea that Brazil institutionalized a 
post-merger system, according to her, was due to the work of lawyers representing market 
agents in subverting the law’s interpretation: 
 
We thought it was a pre-merger system, but it wasn’t clear in the text. The 
market decided to understand that it was not pre-merger and imposed this 
understanding. The text was fragile. Lawyers, together with corporations, 
gave the legal discourse to what the market wanted to understand. 
 
In any case – be it due to the lack of “consciousness” of businessmen, to the pressures 
of the government, to the imminence of foreign investments, to the direct opposition of 
corporations, or to a fragile text of which lawyers took advantage – article 54, paragraph 4 of 
the law 8.884 of 1994 was consolidated as a post-merger review system. 
In Congress, the reformist agenda found natural support of the government’s 
parliamentary basis, and faced criticisms from those who opposed the administration. The 
project entered Congress in 1993, but it was only in 1994, included as part of the 
governmental measures to establish the stabilization plan called Plano Real, that it started to 
move. Twenty individual amendments were presented, 16 of which were of the government’s 
support group, that didn’t touch on substantive aspects of the draft.  
Another four amendments were from representatives of the PT and of PSTU, a radical 
left-wing party. The proposal signed by PSTU’s representative, for instance, suggested that 
CADE’s composition was to include representatives of consumer protection organs, business 
associations and labor unions. Another proposal was signed by Vladimir Palmeira, of the PT 
– the same who in the ANC was a member of Commission VI, and criticized the lack of 
explicit repression of oligopolies. He recast most of the 1988 draft, and determined the 
extinction of SDE, the institution of a system of merger review with a threshold of 20% 
without any explicit exception to allow concentration, and exempted state-owned corporations 
entitled to legal monopoly from competition control. In the voting session of June 7th 1994, 
the PT’s leader in the House of Representatives expressed his criticism of Feldmann’s 
substitute project, stating that although it represented “an advance in respect to the existing 
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legislation”, it was “insufficient”, because it didn’t “conceptualize in a clear way what are 
oligopolies and cartels”216. 
Despite the divergences and criticisms, Feldmann’s project was approved with the 
support of all parties. In respect to the aspects highlighted in the reconstruction above, the law 
8.884 of 1994 gave CADE the status of a regulatory agency, connected to the Ministry of 
Justice, but with an independent budget and legal duties, and formed of 6 commissioners and 
one president, lawyers or economists, with mandates guaranteed by law. It also explicitly 
submitted state-owned corporations that held legal monopoly to competition control, and 
imported several instruments and concepts from the international experience, notably from 
Europe and the US. The law instituted a post-merger review system with a threshold of 30% 
of market share, and several possibilities of allowing concentrations above this level, 
including the notion of efficiency217. Through the hands of a small group of lawyers and 
economists, the “modern” field of competition policy, tuned with the international standards, 
was thus being inaugurated in Brazil. 
 
4.4 Neoliberal roots of reform 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, mainstream narratives tend to portray the process of legal 
reform as an evolutionary dynamic of modernization, a phenomenon of technological 
advancement and convergence, motivated by the necessities of adequacy to a new context, to 
solve problems generated by existing regulatory systems, or to fill eventual normative 
vacuums. Underlying these descriptions is a frequent idea that reform is an almost obvious, 
and spontaneous social process, propelled by the “government”. In more socialized 
perspectives, a nuanced view is presented: international organizations, and transnational or 
global actors are presented as the possessors of the know-how of the new technology to be 
implanted, and therefore as its mobilizers. In departing from these assumptions, the dominant 
perspectives that describe legal reforms of economic regulation construct a narrative that 
downplays the impact of local conditions, actors and struggles on reform, obfuscating the 																																																								
216 Speech transcribed on page 8991 of the National Congress’ Diary (Diário do Congresso Nacional), House of 
Representatives, June 8th 1994, Section I – Report of the session of June 7th 1994.  
217 The possibility of allowing concentrations for reasons of the “national economy”, infused in the 1988 draft, 
was also incorporated in the 1994 law, as some acts could be declared legitimate “when necessary for reasons of 
the national economy and of the common good” (article 54, paragraph 2 of the law 8.884). As maintained in an 
interview, the appropriation of this idea in 1994 was nevertheless slightly different: “They added: ‘as long as it 
doesn’t affect consumers’. They put in something that didn’t exist, something that complicated the issue. This 
article has never been applied [after the 1994 law]. Never has CADE had the courage to talk about it, because it 
didn’t want to create a precedent”.  
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contending purposes underlying reform, and claiming that its ends are consensual. Reform is 
thus depoliticized.  
The reconstruction of the agenda of competition policy reform in Brazil presented in 
this section, centered on the concrete agents who designed and disputed the institutional and 
legal contours of the regulatory system to be transformed, opens room for a different 
understanding of the process of reform, means, and goals. By connecting the institutional and 
legal choices fixated in the series of laws, regulations and drafts with the agents who 
articulated them, their trajectories, positions, and preferences, it is now possible to visualize 
the roots of the attempt to institute a modern regulatory framework of competition in 
neoliberalism. 
Based on the description of reform constructed above, three main conclusions can be 
drawn. First, that the constitution of a modern field of competition policy in Brazil gained 
form most notably through the hands of corporate lawyers, and economists close to the 
economic mainstream in antitrust, and to the intellectual and policy nucleus of neoliberal 
reforms in other areas. Second, and differently from what mainstream narratives propose, far 
from a consensual process propelled by the government, there were several clashes around 
reform: among those professionals who directly designed the field, between them and market 
agents, and also with the “government”. Third, as struggles happened, some positions were 
defeated, and others were victorious. As I will argue, the rules and institutions designed for 
the field that resulted from these struggles were informed by the neoliberal tenets of 
transforming the state and the economy. 
 
4.4.1 The architects: corporate lawyers and mainstream economists 
 
In 1988, with the creation of a commission exclusively formed by lawyers to produce 
the draft of a new antitrust law, a trend that would permeate the subsequent episodes of 
competition policy reform was being inaugurated: the decisive role of agents close to the 
market – professionally and/or intellectually – as the prime architects of a system to regulate 
it. In 1988, all three members of the commission were corporate lawyers. Differently from the 
changes promoted in the mid-1980s, when minor shifts in competition policy were articulated 
by lawyers mostly coming from careers in the public sector, and or from academia, the 
commission formed by Venancio Filho, Magalhães, and Franceschini was joined by two 
lawyers experienced in antitrust, and another with a history of involvement with the 
importation of new legal instruments, theories and methods from the US. 
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In this group, Magalhães, a permanent presence in advancing the reformist agenda 
from 1988 until 1994, had a central role in defining the concepts that marked the difference 
between the field that was to be created, and the historically “ineffective” model of antitrust 
policy in Brazil, most notably the norms that regulated economic concentrations. This 
innovation consisted in the institution of a post-merger review system that included the notion 
of efficiency for the first time in Brazilian antitrust history, and submitted state-owned 
corporations to its control. These novelties translated into a specific regulatory device 
concerns already present at the ANC, between 1987 and 1988. There were basically two 
concerns that the conservative group often expressed when opposed the text frequently 
proposed by the progressive group in the production of the Constitution: the explicit reference 
to monopolies and oligopolies as forms of concentration to be restricted, or even more 
radically, banned; and the creation of exceptions for state monopolies from competition 
policy. Magalhães’ work solved these issues in favor of those who were victorious in the 
ANC, by not illegalizing economic concentrations, and not exempting state-owned 
corporations from competition control. These were principles tuned with the neoliberal 
economic tenets, and combined with policies of privatization and deregulation, could shape 
the Brazilian economy accordingly. The law of 1994 largely incorporated those definitions. 
Although no economists were directly involved in the construction of the proposal 
elaborated by the 1988 commission, what by that time was already the mainstream of 
economics was being infused in the reform of competition policy in Brazil – and through the 
hands of lawyers. The argument expressed in Magalhães’ memorandum in the 1988 draft to 
justify the toleration of economic concentration in certain situations, which attributed to the 
European legislation the inspiration of the merger review system, is inseparable from what by 
that time was already a hegemonic position in the “modern antitrust legislations”. 
The “unanimity” of foreign experiences referred by Magalhães was not the institution 
of merger reviews (already established, although in an embryonic form, in the 1962 law), but 
most importantly the conditional approach to the repression of economic concentrations, in 
which economic efficiency plays a great role. By 1988, when the commission was working on 
the draft, this understanding had already been consolidated in the sources from which 
Magalhães claimed to have taken the inspiration to produce the draft. In the U.S., two 
administrative guidelines of 1982 and 1984 issued by the DOJ crystallized the shift away 
from a long tradition of American antitrust, as embodied by the guidelines of 1968 (Eisner 
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1991, p. 195), which was starting to fall apart since the 1970s218. This was the period of 
Ronald Reagan’s government, whose election in 1980 “was the catalyst for the most dramatic 
changes in the FTC and DOJ antitrust division” (Davies 2010, p. 77). Under Reagan’s 
administration, US antitrust policy was re-established “upon the principles of Chicago 
industrial organization economics” (Davies 2010, p. 77). 
The guidelines of 1982 “suggested a reorientation toward mergers, stressing their 
important and positive role in the economy” (Eisner 1991, p. 196), and were “the most 
prominent indication that antitrust had become dedicated exclusively to efficiency 
maximisation (Davies 2010, p. 77). As Eisner (1991, p. 196-197) explains, while the DOJ’s 
1968 guidelines were seen as an “antimerger policy”, in the new understanding that sprouted 
in the 1980s, mergers “were presented as efficiency promoting, clearly in agreement with the 
tenets of the Chicago school of industrial organization”219. Like the draft of 1988, the DOJ’s 
guidelines of 1982 enumerated the conditions (or “Defenses”) in which a merger could be 
approved, among which was the notion of efficiency220. The 1984 guidelines went even 
further along this line, and “explicitly stated that efficiencies would be considered in the 
assessment of mergers that exceeded established thresholds” of economic concentration 
(Eisner 1991, p. 198). 
Europe, to which Magalhães attributed the source of his inspiration, was by that time 
starting to align with the trend originated in the US. As Buch-Hansen and  Wigger (2011, p. 
81) maintain, since the mid-1980s European competition policy, notably that developed by 
the European Commission’s Directorate General for Competition, “was subordinated to the 
sole purpose of establishing rigorous competition, thereby becoming a major regulatory 																																																								
218 As Robert D. Willig, who was deputy assistant attorney general for economics of the DOJ Antitrust Division 
between 1989 and 1991, wrote in a somewhat praising tone about the novelties introduced by the 1982 and 1984 
guidelines, they constituted “dramatic departures from the previous guidelines published in 1968”, which “relied 
almost exclusively on measures of concentration and provided little precise guidance on how to define the 
relevant market, the universe over which concentration would be measured” (Willig 1991, p. 282). 
219 The new trend was explicit in the guidelines’ first item, which was in several points similar to Magalhães’ 
memorandum: “Although they sometimes harm competition, mergers generally play an important role in a free 
enterprise economy. They can penalize ineffective management and facilitate the efficient flow of investment 
capital and the redeployment of existing productive assets. While challenging competitively harmful mergers, 
the Department seeks to avoid unnecessary interference with that larger universe of mergers that are either 
competitively beneficial or neutral. In attempting to mediate between these dual concerns, however, the 
Guidelines reflect the congressional intent that merger enforcement should interdict competitive problems in 
their incipiency” (my italics). 
220  According to the “efficiency defense” established on the DOJ’s 1982 guidelines (item V), “In the 
overwhelming majority of cases, the Guidelines will allow firms to achieve available efficiencies through 
mergers without interference from the Department. Except in extraordinary cases, the Department will not 
consider a claim of specific efficiencies as a mitigating factor for a merger that would otherwise be challenged. 
Plausible efficiencies are far easier to allege than to prove. Moreover, even if the existence of efficiencies were 
clear, their magnitudes would be extremely difficult to determine” (my italics). 
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instrument to warrant a genuinely free-market economy”. The combination of social policy 
goals with competition policy – often seen as typical of European antitrust – was gradually 
disappearing from the European Commission’s practice, and a new set of directives was 
targeting various forms of state aid and industrial policy in member-states (Buch-Hansen and 
Wigger 2011). At least since 1985, the Commission also “started to tackle state-monopolies 
by means of so-called privatization directives [...] a hitherto virtually unused provision” 
(Buch-Hansen and Wigger 2011, p. 80). 
Already in 1988, thus, and through the work of a commission formed exclusively by 
lawyers, the economic mainstream was being incorporated into the reform of Brazilian 
competition policy. Lawyers were infusing modern economic theories into the law, even 
without economists. This finding speaks directly to the literature discussed in Chapter 2, 
sections 2.2 and 2.3. Dezalay and Garth (2002a) claim that the institutional reforms of the 
1990s in Brazil were paralleled by the ascendancy of economists into the field of state power, 
in detriment of the historical roles performed by lawyers as statesmen and institution builders, 
and law as an expertise of government. In this view, lawyers would have a comeback only 
later in the implementation of neoliberal reforms.  
In the case of competition policy, however, the phenomenon described indicates that 
already in the late 1980s lawyers were key agents in the introduction of reforms aligned with 
the neoliberal standards. Moreover, they were a particular kind of lawyer: corporate lawyers 
who were expert in the subject, and possessed connections and experience with foreign agents 
and practices, especially in the US and Europe. This observation also enables reassessing a 
specific evaluation about competition policy in Brazil, often present in mainstream narratives, 
but also in sociological studies such as Onto’s (2009). According to this author, it would be  
 
only with the inclusion of economists in the antitrust organ (two years after 
the new law was approved) that the Brazilian competition policy started to 
adopt new procedures and organizational practices more similar to those 
adopted by the FTC. Antitrust policy became a space of calculability, in 
which decisions started to be taken according to economic criteria of 
efficiency  (Onto 2009, p. 35-36). 
 
As I will discuss in the next chapter, it was indeed only after the enactment of the 
1994 law that an explicit and articulated set of procedures and practices highly reliant on 
economic science was implemented in CADE. However, the institutional roots of this system 
were already inspired by the US practice in the late 1980s, and would be consolidated in 
1994. The legal possibility for incorporating what Onto called “procedures and organizational 
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practices” was thus to a great extent opened by the novelty that emerged in 1988 and was later 
replicated in other projects.  
In the subsequent attempts to transform competition policy – in 1991 and 1993 – 
corporate lawyers were also present, including Magalhães. The novelty after 1988 was that 
economists started to actively participate in reform. Although the construction of the law 
8.158 of 1991 was again articulated by corporate lawyers – two who had worked at FIESP 
and Magalhães –, the elaboration of the 1991 law’s regulations already involved the 
participation of an economist who would be active in the 1994 reform: Lucia Helena Salgado. 
It was only between 1993 and 1994, nevertheless, that economists achieved more possibilities 
to influence reform, and in different opportunities disputed it with lawyers. 
Economists involved in the production of the 1994 law orbited the Secretariat of 
Economic Policy, then run by an exponent of the orthodox economic department of PUC-Rio, 
Winston Fritsch. According to the interviews conducted, they were not officially part of the 
commission appointed to elaborate the draft, but contributed to it in different respects, such as 
the definition of the market share threshold for merger reviews (demanding a number higher 
than that approved in Congress), the economic delimitation of the profit criterion for 
mandatory mergers submissions, and even in writing the explanatory memorandum of the 
substitutive project presented by Feldmann in Congress. These economists not only endorsed 
the heritage brought from the 1988 draft in respect to the approach to concentrations, but 
expanded it, contributing to the importation of regulatory instruments, such as the TCD. 
They also seem to have contributed to the preservation of some intentions already 
present in 1988, but that were at risk of being lost in the 1993 commission. This was the case 
of the debate about submitting state-owned corporations to competition policy control, as 
depicted in the clash between Salgado and Coutinho. As Salgado described, her dispute with 
Coutinho was about overcoming a “cultural trace” still present in the elites, one that confused 
the “market” with the “state”. State-owned corporations, in her view, were to be equally 
submitted to competition control, as they were genuine, and purely market agents. Thus, the 
influence of economists in the 1994 reform doesn’t seem as “secondary” as suggested, for 
instance, by Onto (2009, p. 68). Again, they helped prepare the terrain for what would 
eventually be an even more decisive influence of economics. More importantly, these were 
already a specific kind of economists, radically different from those who, although 
marginally, were already involved with the field. Instead of being heterodox economists close 
to developmental economics and policies, the economists that arrived in 1993 were connected 
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to the nucleus of neoliberal reforms, in the Ministry of Finance, and part of what was already 
a consolidated mainstream, orthodox approach. 
The decisive architects of reform were thus agents close to what mainstream narratives 
say they “regulated” or “controlled”: the market. They were their representatives (corporate 
lawyers), or believers in its superiority vis-à-vis the state and politics (mainstream 
economists). The role of these architects in shaping the institutional contours of a modern 
competition policy became clearer in the reconstruction presented through the mapping of the 
struggles that took place among them, and through the contrasting of their position-takings 
with other agents who tried to impact reform. Reform was a process marked by struggles and 
political compromises that, as I argue, constitute another indicator of the roots of reform in 
neoliberalism. 
 
4.4.2 The process: struggles and political compromises 
 
Although the architects of reform were a relatively cohesive group – many were 
acquaintances, worked together before or after reform, and had academic connections –, 
divergences were present in the process of transforming competition policy in Brazil. At this 
point, the “clashes of expertise” that Dezalay and Garth (2002a) talk about help understanding 
the nature and political consequences of these disputes.  
Exemplary of these tensions captured in interviews was the battle between the 
Ministries of Justice and Finance around CADE. While until the late 1980s the Ministry of 
the Economy (later Ministry of Finance) was said to be an opponent of the idea of 
strengthening CADE, the change of government and the arrival of a new generation of 
economists in the field of state power underlay a shift in the Ministry’s relation with the 
subject. The Ministry of Finance not only became interested in competition policy, but 
attempted to absorb it within its hierarchical structure. Lawyers and the Ministry of Justice, 
on the other hand, reacted, affirming its necessary control over the organ. This dispute was 
expressed through appeals to expertise: lawyers highlighted the unavoidable legal aspects of 
competition regulation, while economists stressed the undeniable economic content of its 
object. What seems to underlie the position defended by economists was a fear that decisions 
would be inappropriate in economic terms, as CADE, historically an organ of legal features, 
wouldn’t have the technical capabilities to produce decisions qualified according to the 
standards of economics – i.e. according to the new economic model they were implementing 
in other areas (liberalization and privatization). 
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A political compromise was eventually constructed to resolve the dispute – 
establishing CADE as an autonomous regulatory agency, and conceding each Ministry a 
Secretariat to be involved in policy-making (SDE and SEAE). Even if it meant a defeat of the 
economists, it also implied the assurance that there would be a space of influence for them in 
the decision-making process, besides the direct appointment of economists to CADE. As I 
will discuss in the next chapter, this institutional design was fundamental to advance the 
reform of competition policy through the economicization of antitrust. 
In the creation of a new space of practice and regulation, tensions occurred not only 
within and among the fields of law and economics, but also with the political and economic 
fields, as discussed in the framework sketched in section 2.1.2. Exemplary of a conflict with 
the political field was the tension between the professionals constructing reform and the 
agents that were the best representation of what mainstream narratives define as “the 
government”. In all the described attempts of reform, Presidents and Ministers, of different 
political parties, were often pointed to as sources of opposition to the agenda that was being 
pushed forward by those appointed to do so.  
There were numerous references to the attempts of “the government” to “subvert” 
what would be a modern system of competition policy through the inclusion of price control 
mechanisms. In some interviews, the government was said to not “understand” what 
competition policy was about, so those agents articulating the transformations took the 
opportunity to advance a new institutional design and consolidated certain legal mechanisms 
beyond, or even against the interests expressed by Presidents and Ministers. The often 
oppositional stand taken by government evidences that the group of corporate lawyers and 
neoliberal economists who shaped reform worked as a sort of vanguard, and thus had an even 
more central role in actually adjusting the Brazilian competition regulation to the international 
standards. 
A third example of conflict concerned the economic field, and was identified in the 
unsympathetic responses of market agents to the attempt to reform competition policy. 
Notably in respect to the control of concentrations, market agents were suspicious of the 
proposed system, and often thought of it as a measure that contrasted with the impulses of 
privatization, liberalization, and deregulation that were being promoted at the same time. The 
architects of reform worked extensively in talking to these agents and tranquilizing them. As 
reported by several interviewees, the institutional design embedded in the 1994 law, but 
already present in the 1988 draft, reflected the market’s expectations. Be it due to a deliberate 
choice or the result of lawyers exploiting a faulty legal text, the post-merger review system – 
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the mentioned “jabuticaba” – performed a sort of “social function” in respect to the market, 
by sending a signal that the reform that was being undertaken did not aim at jeopardizing the 
natural dynamics of the market. 
Reform was thus far from consensual within the group propelling it, and between it, 
the higher ranks of government, and corporations. Evolutionary narratives, which depict 
reform as a consensual process toward a commonly shared objective are therefore misplaced. 
The Brazilian experience of competition policy reform was marked by clashes and political 
compromises to accommodate different and at times conflicting interests – often tending to 
pro-market positions. Moreover, it was clear from the struggles around reform that the 
importation of a modern technology of competition regulation was highly affected by the 
local context – be it due to the clashes of expertise between lawyers and economists, or to the 
dominant views of both “the government” and “the market”. As Twining (2005a, p. 24) 
suggested, “local conditions” affected the way a legal import is assimilated, adapted and 
rooted in a specific context. 
 
4.4.3 Prospects for neoliberalism institutionalized 
 
The way it was articulated between the late 1980s and early 1990s, competition policy 
was an integral part of neoliberal policies of liberalization, deregulation and privatization that 
gained ground as an appropriate response to a decade long inflationary crisis. There is nothing 
unique in Brazil about that. As Saad-Filho (2005a, p. 225) maintains, it is a characteristic 
trace of neoliberal policies in Latin America to be “often disguised as ‘technical’ anti-
inflationary measures”. The analysis of what competition policy reform institutionalized in 
Brazil enables, however, understanding on what grounds and with what purposes such linkage 
between neoliberal policies and inflation control is actually constructed. 
Disguised or not, competition policy reform in Brazil was indeed articulated as the 
component of a series of anti-inflationary measures (not by chance, it was presented as one of 
the legal measures of the Plano Real), as at its core is the regulation of price formation. The 
way it was institutionalized through the hands of a vanguard of corporate lawyers and 
mainstream economists, and often against the will of the government, implied the constitution 
of mechanism for expanding and guaranteeing the market as the proper arena of price 
formation. The Brazilian state would have been historically interfering in this dynamic, be it 
through direct economic activity (state-owned corporations), or through mechanisms of price 
control, especially since the 1980s. With the creation of a modern field of competition policy, 
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and the parallel destruction of the interventionist institutions such as the CIP and SUNAB, the 
state’s primary role in the definition of prices was taken away, and deposited into the market. 
This movement fits the neoliberal project of reforming the state and the economy. As 
discussed in section Chapter 2, section 2.4, at the center of neoliberal theory is the idea that 
the market, in place of the state, is the best setting to “process information” (Mirowski 2009a, 
p. 438) – and prices, in mainstream economic theory, are about information. 
This is not to say that price formation was absolutely free under a modern competition 
policy. The 1994 law instituted several measures that explicitly mentioned prices – some of 
them even reputed by the architects of reform as being wrongfully inserted into the law due to 
the government’s pressure. Nevertheless, the space for the market to determine prices was 
enhanced through reform, especially due to the institutional and legal imports that gave 
content to that regulatory arena: a system open to economic concentrations, that submitted 
state-owned corporations to its control, and respectful of economic efficiency as a central 
criterion of analysis. Price was now to be mediated by the market through competition – and 
not by previous forms such as price control and what interviewees and mainstream narratives 
called “arenas of negotiation” between the government and the market221. But a market that 
could, if justified for reasons of efficiency, be concentrated. Through a reformed competition 
policy, the impelling claim that the economic reality of the time is one of concentration, 
already ventilated in the ANC to oppose the explicit ban of oligopolies and monopolies, and 
endorsed in the specific reformist initiatives of the 1980s and 1990s, was thus matched to the 
allocation of price formation to the market. Two tenets of neoliberal theory were therefore 
consecrated through reform. 
However, as both the theoretical framework from which I departed highlights, and the 
experience of those involved with competition policy since 1994 would reveal, the formal 
institution of a new regulatory system with the described traces was no guarantee of how it 
would be practised. The law contained prospects for the neoliberal orthodoxy to develop, but 
no assurances. A “politics of enforcement” was opened by this regulatory arena, and created a 
new set of challenges to be resolved. These new tasks evolved around determining who was 
entitled to produce competition policy in Brazil, and guiding the actual content and the 
priorities of the decision-making practice. These were matters beyond the text of the law. 
Reform was thus to be advanced in the practice of the recently created field.	
																																																								
221 As I will try to show in the next chapter, competition policy did not eliminate “arenas of negotiation” between 
the state and the market, but rather opened a new one, founded on a technocratic discourse and practice. 
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CHAPTER 5 
The mode of production of competition regulation 
 
As it was discussed in Chapter 2, to assess the hypothesis that the field of competition 
policy is rooted in and functional for neoliberalism, it is not enough to evidence its original 
connections to the agents that impacted reform, their positions and struggles. Although the 
modern contours of Brazilian competition policy started to be molded already in 1988, both at 
the ANC, and in the elaboration of a first comprehensive draft to transform antitrust, 
institutionalizing the prospects for neoliberalism to develop, there was no guarantee that the 
actual practice of the field would mirror the reformist intentions. The law of 1994 set the 
stage for the production of competition policy, opening way for a “politics of enforcement” to 
take place (Suchman and Edelman 1996). It is thus also necessary to understand how the field 
is structured after its constitution, that is, what are the objective relations that structure its 
practice.  
To analyze the practice of the field of competition policy, I proposed a research 
question that is similar to that tackled through the data presented in the previous section: Who 
are the agents of practice of competition policy in Brazil? What are their positions in the 
field, their capitals, and habitus? By mapping the structure of relations among these agents, I 
believe it is possible to assess and explain what stances are institutionalized in the field after it 
was reformed, and thus to identify its linkages to the tenets of neoliberalism. 
In this chapter, I seek to illustrate how the field was structured after its creation – i.e. 
the agents that hold the monopoly to determine the law, their positions and habitus – 
replicates the central trend identified in the reform of competition policy: the dominant 
presence of corporate lawyers and mainstream economists professionally and ideologically 
aligned with the neoliberal project. As I will discuss below, the recruitment of agents with 
these profiles was crucial in two senses. First, for guaranteeing that the means and contents of 
enforcement were compatible with the inspirations that guided the construction of the field. 
Second, for the advancement of reform into domains that weren’t tackled in the episodes that 
led to the creation of the field.  
The sections that follow go into the details of the profiles and trajectories of those who 
possess the “notable legal or economic knowledge” to produce competition policy in Brazil: 
the commissioners and presidents appointed to CADE between the beginning of competition 
policy as a modern regulatory agency, in 1994, and 2012. I also applied such trajectory study 
to agents that occupied the SDE and SEAE and were seen by the field as important for its 
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development. Based on the methodological strategies described on Chapter 3, I identified 
what sorts of capital legitimize certain actors to achieve the position of regulator, to what 
stances on competition policy they are connected, and in what senses they helped to preserve 
and advance a neoliberal shape to the field of competition policy. 
In section 5.1, I present a general overview of CADE’s historical composition in the 
entire period in which competition policy was produced through the reformed law of 1994. In 
this section I also describe how the agents involved in the field perceive this composition. The 
narratives that emanate from those involved in the field’s practice – both from agents that 
occupied positions in CADE, SDE or SEAE, and professionals who had never served any of 
these governmental organs – often erase or naturalize the dynamics behind the definition of 
who is entitled to produce competition law in Brazil. They provide definitions on what 
constitutes a “technical council”, and, in opposition, of who are seen as the “outliers” that 
achieved positions in CADE, and what is viewed as a “political” or “interventionist” Council. 
These are normative stances on how should competition policy be produced, and thus 
constitute useful parameters to understand what kind of expertise and competences became 
hegemonically valued and legitimate in CADE. In other words, it provides a reference to 
evaluate if the neoliberal tenets have been institutionalized as the appropriate (or “technical”) 
profile to produce competition policy. 
Once CADE’s different compositions (Figure 12) cannot be fixated in terms of years, 
to facilitate the analysis I divided the exposition of CADE’s compositions in three broad 
periods, relatively circumscribed by CADE’s presidencies. In section 5.2, I present the 
compositions from 1994 to 2000, a period marked by a serious institutional crisis of the field 
of competition policy and its solution. In section 5.3, the period from 2000 to 2008 is 
analyzed, one that, despite some changes in the balance between lawyers and economists in 
CADE, and in the political context, was one of relative stability and consolidation. Finally, in 
section 5.3, I assess the composition of the period from 2008 onwards, which was often 
reputed in interviews as that of “politicization” and growing “interventionism”. In the final 
section (5.4), I go back to the hypothesis that guided the inquiry into the agents that produce 
competition policy in Brazil, and discuss whether and how neoliberalism has been also 
institutionalized in the field’s dynamics. 
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5.1 General overview and views of the producers of competition policy 
 
The reform consolidated by the 1994 antitrust act inaugurated an institutional design 
in which CADE gained the contours of an administrative tribunal responsible for deciding the 
legality of corporate conducts and economic concentrations that fit the criteria established by 
reformers. This tribunal is formed by one president and six commissioners. Lawyers and 
economists are entitled of decision-making, once to become a commissioner the law 
established, besides an “immaculate reputation” and being over 30 years-old, the need to 
possess “notable legal or economic knowledge”. Formally, the President is in charge of 
appointing a commissioner, and the Federal Senate evaluates the nomination. If approved, the 
commissioner serves a two-years term, and may be reappointed for another term of equal 
duration. 
In the first part of this section, I provide a general overview of CADE’s composition 
between 1994 and 2012222, which will serve as a reference for the detailed analysis presented 
in the forthcoming sections. In the second part, I describe what are the views of the very 
agents that integrate the field of competition policy about the “notables of law and 
economics” recruited to produce antitrust law in Brazil. 
 
5.1.1 Notables of law and economics 
 
Since the reform of the field, in 1994, until 2012, 46 individuals were appointed to 
CADE, comprising 6 presidents and 41 commissioners (1 of them occupied a seat as both 
commissioner and president). I classified these agents as “lawyers” and “economists” 
according to their academic trajectory (undergraduate and graduate studies). In cases in which 
the undergraduate and graduate studies were developed in distinct areas (for instance, 
undergraduate degree in law, and a PhD in economics), I also took into consideration the 
professional activities of the individual to determine where to classify her. These cases, a 
minority in the universe of the “notables”, will be identified in the next sections, and the 
classification adopted in these special cases will be made explicit. 
																																																								
222 I am here considering commissioners and presidents that produced competition law under the reformed law of 
1994. Thus, the agents selected comprise those appointed in 1993, but who stayed in office until 1996, and those 
appointed in 2012 before the new competition act of 2011 (law number 12.529) came into force, in May 2012, 
revoking the 1994 antitrust act. 
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Among the 41 commissioners, 24 where law graduates, and were thus classified as 
“lawyers”. Other 17 agents came from different origins, such as economics, management, 
public administration and engineering, but were classified as economists, as it was their 
knowledge of economics (frequently reflected in their cultural capital, such as a PhD in 
economics) that legitimized their appointment to CADE. Among the 6 agents that occupied 
the chair of president, 4 were lawyers, and 2 were economists. 
Under the 1994 law, commissioners and presidents were appointed under four 
different administrations: Franco (1992-1994) appointed one president and 6 
commissioners223; Cardoso (1995-2002) appointed 19 commissioners, and 2 presidents; Lula 
(2003-2010) appointed 14 commissioners, and 2 presidents; and Rousseff (2010-2012) 
appointed 4 commissioners, and one president. The total sum of the appointments made by all 
presidents that were in office between 1994 and 2012 equals 49. This is because, as I will 
discuss in the next sections, 2 commissioners were appointed for their first mandate by one 
president, and for the second mandate by a different one.  
The figure below summarizes CADE’s composition in the period of analysis. There 
are seven lines in the table, which stand for CADE’s president (the first line) and 6 
commissioners (second to seventh lines). The boxes painted in black refer to the mandate of a 
lawyer, and those in orange, to the term of an economist. The spaces in gray comprise 
intervals in which a certain position wasn’t being occupied. The width of each box 
corresponds to the duration of the mandate, based on the dates of the first participation of a 
commissioner or president in CADE, and her last session. To identify the composition of 
CADE in a certain moment of time, it is necessary to pick the year and verify which “boxes” 
are touched by that straight line. For instance, right in the year 2001, the President was João 
Grandino Rodas, and the commissioners were Mércio Felsky, Celso Campilongo, Thompson 
Almeida Andrade, Afonso Arinos, João Bosco Fonseca, and Hebe Teixeira Romano. Between 
the years 2001 and 2002, to give another example, for a relatively long period of time 2 posts 
in CADE were vacant. 
  Although all mandates tended to begin together in the initial years (notably in 1994 
and 1996), after a while they started be intermittent. This is due to different reasons, such as 
the case of commissioners who didn’t have their mandates renovated, or those whose 
appointment was delayed in Senate. It is therefore not possible to talk about the council as 
fixated in terms of years, presidencies, or governments. For instance, under Gesner Oliveira’s 																																																								
223 Five of the seven appointments made by Franco were previously nominated by Collor in 1991, under the law 
8.158. 
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presidency, the council in 1998 was fairly different from that of 2000: 5 commissioners had 
been changed, and lawyers doubled their number.
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Figure 8. CADE’s composition under the law of 1994 (1994-2012) 
 
Source: elaborated by the author 
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Nevertheless, some trends can be observed in the historical composition of CADE. 
For instance, the prevalence of lawyers vis-à-vis economists in certain historical periods (e.g. 
from 1994 to 1996, and from 2000 to the middle of 2004), and the dominance of economists 
in other moments (e.g. from 1996 to 1999, and from 2006 to 2008). Despite periods of 
notorious imbalance between the two professional groups, as a rule, since reform – and that 
was an important novelty in respect to the previous compositions of CADE – the council was 
never entirely composed solely by lawyers. Economists were always present, at least in the 
number of 2, and were also appointed as presidents of the Brazilian competition agency in 
two opportunities, governing the institution for a total of 8 years. This finding diverges with 
Onto’s study (2009) about the economicization of antitrust policy in Brazil. In this author’s 
view, this process would have begun with the appointment of economists to CADE, which in 
turn would have taken place only from 1996 onwards (Onto 2009, p. 86).  
However, as depicted in the figure above, I identified two economists who were 
members of CADE since 1993. As described in section 4.1, even before the reform of 
antitrust, in the council assembled by the Minister of Justice Paulo Brossard, in 1986, an 
economist was already present as a commissioner. The numeric shift pointed by Onto is 
certainly worth understanding, as at a certain historical moment economists surpassed lawyers 
in an arena traditionally dominated by legal expertise. However, as I will discuss in this 
chapter, given that economists were already present in the history of competition policy in 
Brazil, more important than a quantitative increase, was a qualitative change in the profile of 
economists. The economists that outnumbered lawyers in CADE in the mid-1990s came from 
considerably different trajectories if compared to their predecessors, and brought with them 
distinct and innovative forms of capital to determine how should antitrust policy be practiced 
in Brazil. It is precisely the novel quality of these economists, as I will try to show, that helps 
understanding how and why CADE’s composition pended to the side of mainstream 
economics and, thus, to neoliberalism. 
Both the dominance of a certain professional group – notably that of economists from 
1996 onwards –, and the attempt to institutionalize a minimum representativeness for lawyers 
and economists were not fortuitous. They resulted from disputes over the field of competition 
policy to assure its practice in a certain way, and through certain means. A “politics of 
composition” takes place in the history of the reformed field of competition policy in Brazil, 
and it constitutes a valuable entry point to assess its possible linkages to neoliberalism. 
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5.1.2 “Technical”, “outlier”, “political” and “interventionist” 
 
“Thank God we live in a time in which the question of ‘Are the commissioners today 
better than before?’ is not as relevant as in the past”. This is how a lawyer responded a 
question that requested his/her evaluation of CADE’s compositions throughout history. The 
answer reveals two important elements that were replicated in many other interviews: first, 
that CADE’s composition has been “good” for some time, and second, that it was not the case 
in a certain moment of history. 
This evaluation is frequently shared in the field of antitrust. Moreover, a “good” 
Council is said to be a “technical” one, and this is seen as a constant in CADE, despite some 
few exceptions As a former commissioner maintained: “The anecdote tells that appointments 
have assumed an increasingly technical character, and less political, also because a critical 
mass of people working in this area started to be formed”. 
A similar evaluation was offered by another former member of the SBDC: “Although 
I can identify different inclinations, different profiles, there is a certain technical worry. There 
has been a worry to compose CADE with people familiar with the area”. In the evaluation of 
yet another interviewee, the technical character does not imply, however, homogeneity:  
 
Everyone in CADE has a CV that enables her to be there. Obviously, there is 
an influence, merely ideological. It is not an influence to decide something 
in the interest of who appointed them. But there are clear trends in how to 
face the economy. 
 
In the view of different competition lawyers who have never served in governmental 
positions, CADE’s historical composition has been extremely technical, “recognized by the 
market”, even representing an exception within the state apparatuses, as the extracts below 
illustrate: 
 
I would say CADE is an exception within public administration, because it 
has always have respected by the primacy of the technical pattern vis-à-vis a 
purely political appointment. Although it has happened, it is not the rule. 
The rule has been technical appointments, and this is very important for the 
formation of the organ’s culture. 
 
In the responses provided in interviews, there are clues about what makes CADE such 
a “technical” agency. One is the opposition, or at least a hierarchy in respect to “political 
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influences”. As one interviewee maintained: “It’s been a place relatively isolated from 
political appointments”. In the view of another one,  
 
The council has become more reliable, more predictable, increasingly 
independent, with less purely political appointments. All political 
appointments must at least have a minimum of technical appearance, 
otherwise they don’t succeed. 
  
The technical character of the council is seen as a barrier to political interference, as 
yet another extract reveals:  
 
The merit of having technical people is that they don’t have political 
compromises, and thus react badly to any attempt of interference. [...] The 
government itself, and the Legislative, started to see CADE as an organ that 
if you pressure too much, if you call to try and influence a decision, to ask 
for a favor, you don’t succeed.  
 
The profile of those who compose the council was often appointed as one of the 
reasons that would explain CADE’s impermeability to political influences. An element that 
characterizes this profile and thus legitimizes a commissioner or president as a technical 
appointment are her academic credentials: 
 
The profile of a commissioner is essentially a university professor, 
especially today. They’re almost all professors of law or economics. There 
are rare exceptions. It’s a profile of public universities professors, with the 
exception of the major private universities, such as PUC, and FGV.  
 
There’s people with a solid academic background. Almost all of them went 
abroad to study, and most of them have a PhD, some even a post-doctorate. 
From the technical point of view, CADE is well equipped. 
 
Professional expertise is also pointed to as an indicator of technicality, as these 
extracts illustrate: 
 
Who are CADE’s commissioners? They are academics, people with 
expertise in the area. They are eventually people that worked in the sector. 
There is not many political interventions, such as putting someone that has 
no idea about competition defense, or that has no expertise. There is a worry 
with the academic expertise of commissioners. Today, they are normally 
PhDs in law or economics. A PhD in Political Science is not appointed to 
CADE, for example. 
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The “technical” character of CADE’s composition was also often established in 
comparison to other regulatory agencies in Brazil, which would be much more politicized 
than competition policy, as illustrated below the extract below: 
 
Contrary to other organs, such as the regulatory agencies, CADE is not very 
much the object of political interest. Because of that, it is kept more 
protected from appointments that are not technical. CADE is usually 
integrated by people that really know the subject. 
 
An explanation to the shielding of CADE from politics often offered by the 
interviewees is related to a perceived minor importance in terms of economic impacts, in 
comparison, for instance, to other regulatory agencies, and its precarious institutional and 
budgetary situation. As an interviewee maintained, “Because CADE has a really modest 
budget, maybe it hasn’t attracted the attention of political parties to make appointments”. 
That would also explain what some interviewees perceive as an increasingly growing 
presence of young professionals among the appointments. As the salary to be a commissioner 
has been historically low, if compared to positions in private practice, CADE tends to attract 
young lawyers and economists: 
 
CADE has become increasingly technical and young. They are still 
technical, but younger as the time passes. This is because the opportunity 
costs in Brazil raised. You’re not able to attract people to become a 
commissioner.  
 
As a lawyer maintained, this institutional debility would be actually an “advantage” 
for competition policy: “If salaries were good, maybe there would be more [non-technical 
appointments]”.	
Despite the changes that happened in the political scenario in Brazil since the reform 
of competition policy – most notably, the passage from FHC to Lula, members of the two 
major contestants in national politics –, the evaluation that depicts CADE as an exceptional 
technical arena is one of continuity. Several interviewees converge in this perception, some 
even expressing surprise: “There were much less [changes] than I thought we would have. In 
a certain way, there was a continuity of technical officers that were there before the 
government, especially in SDE and SEAE”. 
 Competition policy was compared, in this sense, to other governmental areas in which 
no ruptures would have happened, such as macroeconomic policy: 
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The government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso strengthened the Ministry of 
Finance, keeping [Pedro] Malan for 8 years. There was this stabilization in 
economic policy, there was coherence for 8 years in economic policy, with 
the same team, with the same leadership. There was the same process in the 
Ministry of Justice during Lula’s government. We had only two Ministers, 
Márcio Thomaz Bastos, and Tarso Genro. It was the same agenda, an agenda 
of protecting and valuing institutions. 
  
 In the view of several interviewees, CADE’s regulatory practice would be thus 
historically independent from the government:  
 
Just as in the example of macroeconomic policy, competition policy in 
Brazil is consistent, independent of the government. This is one of the 
reasons that explain the good institutional performance of Brazil, this 
consistency in some fundamental policies. Macroeconomic policy even 
more. [...] There was the shift to Lula, but this was kept intact, even 
deepened. [...] And with competition policy is the same thing. 
 
Besides the nearly consensual evaluation of the technical character of CADE’s 
appointments, interviews also revealed another frequent shared perception about the 
composition of that council: that there are “outliers” in the general rule of technical agents. 
What defines an “outlier”, in these narratives, is the absence of expertise in the subject, and a 
lack of proper understanding of “what is CADE” or competition policy, as an extract from the 
interview with a former commissioner illustrates: 
 
There will always be a dissonant voice, a voice that doesn’t understand what 
is CADE, or that goes there for a specific reason, that contrasts with the 
objective of competition policy defense. It will always happen, and it 
happens in any tribunal, at any time, anywhere in the world. 
 
In a similar sense, the idea of a proper “language” of antitrust was raised by yet 
another former commissioner: 
 
There were exceptions [to the technical rule], no doubt. People that 
parachuted there, that had no contact with the subject. [...] It was a little 
embarrassing sometimes. It’s a grammar, a language that he/she doesn’t 
speak and the others are speaking. This is a problem. 
 
An example mentioned by several interviewees to illustrate the behavior of an 
“outlier” in CADE was a commissioner that conducted public hearings in certain cities to 
discuss cases with the local population. According to several interviewees, the potential 
“damages” and “distortions” caused by “outliers” have nevertheless been “corrected” by the 
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collegiate structure of CADE. As a lawyer referred, “once it is a council, I think this kind of 
‘distortion’ is minimized by the capacity of the others”. As another interviewee highlighted, 
“There were commissioners that had no idea about what CADE or antitrust in Brazil. But as 
any bureaucracy – and CADE is a bureaucracy –, it seems that it walks by itself, and doesn’t 
produce much damage to society”. 
Although CADE’s composition throughout time is said to be primarily technical, and 
“outliers” are seen as small minority with no real interference in the decision-making process, 
another convergence that emerged from some interviews pointed to a recent shift in the 
Council’s profile. These are perceptions maintaining that CADE has become more 
“politicized” and “interventionist” than before, and less independent from the “government”. 
Such shift is often identified with the arrival of certain agents in CADE, especially since 
2010. 
An extract from an interview with a former commissioner illustrates this idea: 
 
In the past, once CADE was not well known, people were there for technical 
reasons. I even wonder if nobody actually wanted it! So Coutinho’s group 
was very technical, and Gesner [Oliveira] also brought technical people with 
him. But things evolved, and today it is much more politicized. 
 
Another former commissioner qualified this “politicization”, suggesting that there is 
an alignment of the Council with what “the government thinks” and a consequent loss of 
“autonomy”, especially in respect to the support to certain industrial sectors (i.e. the 
formation of “national champions”):  
 
CADE exercises too little its autonomy. I think it takes too much into 
consideration what seems to be the interest of the country, which is actually 
what the government thinks it’s important to the country. For example, 
certain corporations are important to the country, if they are national 
champions, if they are corporations that will represent shares and profits, if 
they are corporations that have national participation, if they are in 
significant sectors. 
 
Although not talking in terms of “politicization”, other former commissioners 
highlight the emergence of a new decision-making style in the same period in which there 
would be such alignment with the governmental thinking. For a former commissioner, for 
instance, this shift would entail a more “interventionist”, “anti-capital” approach to antitrust, 
and that would be a perception shared by market agents: “From the ideological point of view, 
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I think there is a generalized perception in the market today, that CADE has become more 
interventionist. A mentality a little more anti-capital than before”. 
In the view of yet another former member of the SBDC, the novelty is in the 
(problematic) kind of intervention promoted by CADE since a recent past: 
 
Commissioners asking for a commitment to performance with technological 
development to approve a merger. Commissioners asking for commitments 
to investment to approve a merger. If you can’t relate structural control of 
the market to performance in terms of prices, quantity, and quality, how 
come can you relate with variables like those? 
 
As described above, there are three major trends embedded in how the field of 
competition policy interprets the historical composition of CADE: first, that the council has 
had a predominantly “technical” character throughout the years; second, that there have been 
some “outliers” recruited to CADE, who nevertheless haven’t impacted decision-making 
significantly; third, that there is a recent move toward a more “political” and “interventionist” 
profile. More than mere opinions that emanate from these agents, these evaluations contain 
clues about the hierarchies and structures that operate in the field of competition policy in 
Brazil. The divide between a “technical” and a “political” council, as well as the contrast 
between “experts” and “outliers” provide parameters to investigate who is seen as legitimate 
to produce competition policy and why, and who is not. In other words, this is a means of 
identifying if the neoliberal tenets have been institutionalized as the appropriate (or 
“technical”) profile to produce competition policy. What is still to be done, thus, is identifying 
what sorts of agents fit each category. 
 
 
5.2 Back to the future: the implementation of a “technical” agency 
 
The first composition of CADE to produce competition policy under the reformed law 
of 1994, in the transition between the government of Franco and his successor and former 
Minister of Finance, Cardoso, was mostly inherited from the Collor administration. Five 
commissioners appointed in 1991, under the law 8.158, were confirmed by Franco in March 
1994 for another term, and were thus entitled of initiating the history of a modern field of 
competition policy in Brazil until April 1996. They were three lawyers – Ruy Coutinho do 
Nascimento, Neide Teresinha Malard, and Carlos Eduardo Vieira de Carvalho – and two 
economists – José Matias Pereira and Marcelo Monteiro Soares. In January 1995, following 
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the approval of the 1994 law, which determined a council with 6 commissioners and one 
president, other two lawyers were recruited to CADE: Edgard Lincoln de Proença Rosa and 
Edison Rodrigues Chaves. 
As the table below illustrates, the group in charge of CADE in the early moments of 
the reformed field was quite homogeneous: they were all public servants, in an advanced 
stage of their careers (the age average was 50 years old), with master’s degrees as their 
highest graduate title and no extensive dedication to academic work. They were also not 
specialists in the subject, with the exception of Malard, who held a master’s degree in 
competition law at the London School of Economics. Working in the federal state apparatuses 
in Brasília for a long time, their academic formation was also mostly developed in the Federal 
Capital: three of them graduated at UnB, and other two that came from UFRJ obtained their 
master’s at the University of Brasília. 
 
Table 18. Trajectories: Coutinho, Malard, Carvalho, Pereira, Soares, Rosa, and Chaves 
 
Ruy Coutinho do Nascimento, 51 and Neide Teresinha Malard, 47 
As described in the previous section, Coutinho and Malard were directly involved in the design of 
the 1994 law (trajectories on Table 16). They were both lawyers that came from careers in the state, and with 
a long involvement in political positions in an intermediate level of the administration.  
 
Carlos Eduardo Vieira de Carvalho, 54 
Carvalho graduated in law at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ) in 1962, and in 1991 
completed a master’s in administrative law at the University of Brasília (UnB). Also a public servant, by the 
time of his first appointment to CADE in 1991, Carvalho had recently retired as an attorney of the National 
Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq), an agency of the federal government 
responsible for funding educational and research institutions and projects. A former student of the CEPED 
initiative in 1969, Carvalho was also a law professor of administrative law at the UnB, and a member of the 
Commission on Constitutional Law of the Brazilian Bar Association (OAB) in Brasília.  
 
José Matias Pereira, 42 
Pereira graduated in law and economics (at UnB, in 1974), and was registered in both professional 
orders, but is here classified as an economist because his professional career has developed mostly in the field 
of economics: he was a public official at IPEA close to retirement, and in the 1980s he was a professor of 
economics in different universities in Northern Brazil, teaching courses such as “rural economics”, “rural 
development”, and “economic formation of Brazil”. Besides serving in several political positions in the local 
administration of municipalities in the North of Brazil, had also worked at the SNDE in 1990. 
 
Marcelo Monteiro Soares, 45 
Soares was an economist also graduated at the UnB (1972), and a public official subordinated to the 
Ministry of Industry and Commerce since the 1970s. While in the Ministry, he worked in different organs, 
such as the Secretariat of Planning, in and coordinating projects at the Council of Commercial Development. 
In 1990, he also served as the chief of staff of SNDE – precisely during the same period that Pereira was 
working in that Secretariat. As reported by Malard in the interview, the appointment of both Soares and 
Pereira to CADE in the first place was an initiative of Franco’s Minister of Justice, Alexandre Dupeyrat, who 
was “their personal friend”. 
 
Edgard Lincoln de Proença Rosa 
Rosa, 52, graduated in law at the UFRJ in 1967, and had a long career as a public servant. Between 
1973 and 1991, he was a legal advisor of the Federal Senate, approved through public competition, and in 
1993, by the time of his appointment to CADE, he had been approved to work as a lawyer in the National 
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Treasure’s Attorney’s Office (PGFN). Between the 1970s and 1980s, Rosa also worked as a law professor in 
different universities in Brasília, teaching courses such as tax law, legal philosophy, sociology of law, and 
legal epistemology. Rosa held a master’s degree in tax law, obtained in 1985 at UnB. 
 
Edison Rodrigues Chaves, 64 
As his Council colleagues, Chaves also came from the public service. A lawyer graduated at the 
Faculdade de Direito Brás Cubas, in the state of São Paulo, he was a legal advisor of the House of 
Representatives in the late 1980s, and was later approved an Attorney of the Brazilian National Security 
Institute. In 1994, Chaves was requested to work as a legal advisor to the Ministry of Justice, when he was 
appointed to CADE. He obtained a master’s degree in “right to information” at USP, and thought courses on 
law and media, law and journalism, and related subjects in two faculties of arts in São Paulo. 
 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
The enforcement of competition policy by CADE’s first composition was very strict. 
In the 9 Merger Reviews decided between 1994 and March 1996 (the period in which this 
composition worked) that I was able to identify224, none was approved without restrictions by 
the plenary leaded by Coutinho225. In 7 MR conditions were imposed for approval, and other 
2 were entirely rejected. The conditions formulated by CADE at that time were mostly related 
to the increase of productive capacity, the quality of products and services, price reduction, 
and to the prohibition of certain conducts by the resulting concentrated corporate entity (Bello 
2005, p. 141). 
 The number of cases approved with conditions corresponded to 77,77% of the 
decisions taken by CADE in that period – way above the average that would be consolidated 
for the whole practice of CADE under the 1994 law (between 1994 and 2012): 5,26% of 
decisions approved with restrictions. The 2 MR rejected in the period, in turn, correspond to 
one fourth of the all operations that were not approved by CADE in its history as a reformed 
competition agency226. In other words, in less than two years, 2 of the 8 rejections to ever be 
enacted by CADE happened. In symbolic terms, it was also impacting: the very first case 
decided by CADE under the 1994 law was rejected227. 
Also in Administrative Proceedings the practice of CADE’s first composition 
indicated an incisive decision-making. Out of the 7 AP decided between August 1994 and 																																																								
224 See Chapter 3, section 3.2.2 about the selection of cases. 
225 Salgado (2004, p. 367) describes a slightly different decision-making pattern, affirming that while in 1994 
60% of MR were approved with restrictions, and 40% were rejected, in 1995 CADE approved 56,52% of MR 
without restrictions, 21,74% with restrictions, and no operation was rejected. Gheventer (2005, p. 149) also 
present data that evidence what he calls “an interventionist phase”. According to his research, between June 
1994 and May 1996, CADE would have decided 23 MR, and none would have been approved without 
restrictions. Although the numbers differ, probably due to the database considered by each author, it still 
converges with the idea that the Council was extremely interventionist in its two initial years of work under the 
1994 law. 
226 These were the MR number 06/1994 (Brasilit/Eternit), and 01/1994 (Rockwell/Albarus). 
227 This was the case Brasilit/Eternit, decided on November 21st 1994. 
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March 1996 that I was able to identify, 3 received some sort of sanction. As in MR, the 
proportion is much higher than that consolidated in the historical practice of competition 
policy in Brazil. While from 1994 to 2012 the average of AP in which a conviction was made 
was of 20,89%, in the brief period of Coutinho’s presidency, CADE convicted 42,85% of 
corporations subjected to an Administrative Procedure 228 . It looked like the fears of 
interventionism expressed by some market agents such as FIESP during the 1993 reform were 
being confirmed: the reinvigorated Brazilian competition policy was restricting economic 
concentrations, and imposing sanctions right when the country entered a new and more 
intense phase of liberalization and privatizations229.  
According to Bello (2005, p. 129-161) the first MR decisions enacted by CADE in 
1994 did not generate much public debate, despite of its restrictive trend. However, 
divergences between CADE and the Ministry of Finance, notably the SPE (which in 1995 
would become SEAE), were already happening. As Malard reported in an interview to Dutra 
(2009, p. 46), the Ministry of Finance “didn’t like” their decision in the case Rhodia/Sinasa 
(MR 12/1994), “because they enacted a technical opinion that was favorable to the 
operation”. 
In March 1995, nevertheless, the Council decided a case that would go beyond 
disagreements among the organs of the SBDC, and produce an institutional crisis. This was 
an MR in the steel sector through which the German corporation Korf Gmbh, that in Brazil 
owned the Companhia Siderúrgica Pains, was acquired by a Uruguayan company called 
Siderúrgica Laísa SA, owned by the Brazilian conglomerate Grupo Gerdau. In what became 
known as the “Gerdau-Pains” case, CADE observed that the operation would result in a 
concentration of 46,2% of the long ordinary steel market in Brazil (Bello 2005, p. 137), and 
decided for the approval of the operation, but conditioned it to the cancellation of the 
acquisition of the Pains company by the Gerdau group. In practice, it meant a veto to the 
concentration.  
																																																								
228 As in MR cases, my data differs from Salgado (2004, p. 372-373) in respect to AP, but the general trend is 
also observed by her. According to that author, in 1994 40% of AP were convicted, and in 1995 33% received 
some sort of sanction. The numbers, therefore, are still well above the historical average, specially in 1994. 
229 Between 1990 and 1994, 33 state-owned companies were privatized, including the whole steel sector. In 
1995, with the election of Cardoso, a new stage of privatizations begun: together with the privatization of other 
19 corporations, the BNDES supported the destatization of corporations owned by the federate states, and the 
concession of public services (telecommunications, electricity, and transportation) was initiated. Also in 1995, 
two constitutional amendments affecting the economic activity were approved: amendment number 6 eliminated 
the distinction between national and foreign corporations established by the Constitution of 1988, and 
amendment number 9 enabled concessions for oil and gas extraction and refinement, which until then was 
monopoly of the state. 
				 256	
The case, whose rapporteur was the economist Pereira, was extremely controversial 
within CADE. The final score was 4 votes for the imposition of the mentioned restriction, and 
3 for the approval without structural restrictions. The majority was composed by Pereira, 
Soares, Chaves, and Carvalho. Those defeated in the voting poll were Malard, Rosa, and 
Coutinho. Curiously, all those with economic training voted for the imposition of structural 
restrictions, including Carvalho, who I classified as a lawyer, but also possessed a degree in 
economics. Not only within CADE there was disagreement. While the SDE converged with 
the Council’s majoritarian position, the Ministry of Finance, through the SPE, enacted a 
technical opinion in the case, which was very much in line with the position of those defeated 
in the poll: it approved the operation with conditions other than any structural remedies. At 
that time, the SPE hosted several economists who were involved in the 1993 reform, such as 
Eliane Lustosa Thômpson-Flores, who signed the technical opinion enacted in the “Gerdau-
Pains” case. 
In face of the restriction, the corporations involved in the operation initiated a legal 
battle that would have significant outcomes to the field of competition policy. In May 1995, 
Gerdau’s first attempt was to present new arguments to CADE, asking for a new judgment, 
but the rejection was maintained in October 1995 (Bello 2005, p. 139). In November 1995, 
Gerdau made an appeal to the Minister of Justice, by then Nelson Jobim, a lawyer from Rio 
Grande do Sul, who would later become a justice at the Brazilian Supreme Court (STF). 
Jobim accepted the appeal and determined the suspension of the effects of CADE’s decision. 
The Minister defended the need of alignment between CADE and the government’s policy, 
maintaining that it “didn’t have full autonomy for decision-making” (Bello 2005, p. 144). He 
also sustained that Merger Reviews were legally dubious, as no conviction could be made 
based on the “presumption of harms” that could be caused by a concentration, which in turn 
would be necessary in a context of international competition (Bello 2005, p. 145). Jobim’s 
decision was the catalyst of an institutional earthquake.  
Several reactions sprouted in the media, both in favor of and against the Minister’s 
decision. Journalists debated the correctness of CADE’s intervention, and of the Ministry’s 
attempt to revert it (Bello 2005, p. 151-154). Economists diverged among themselves. 
Maílson da Nóbrega, former Minister of Finance during Sarney’s administration, criticized 
CADE for its “prejudice against private initiative”, and Mário Henrique Simonsen, an 
economist identified with monetarism and orthodox economics, wrote an article titled “CADE 
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disturbs”230, in which he maintained that the Brazilian antitrust law “forgets that globalization 
demands concentration, at least in the national level”, and claimed for the “urgency of 
revising the law 8.884” – less than two years after its enactment. Similarly, Roberto Campos, 
another exponent of Brazilian economics, made harsh criticisms to CADE’s decisions in an 
article titled “The dangerous acronyms”231. Other economists such as Jorge Fagundes, who 
would later become one of the most frequently hired economic consultants by law firms in 
competition policy, and Mário Possas, a self-entitled Keynesian, publicly supported CADE’s 
decision (Bello 2005, p. 155-156).  
Among lawyers, the reaction tended to converge around the defense of CADE’s 
behavior. As Bello describes (2005, p. 156-157), attorneys such as Carlos Francisco 
Magalhães, Onofre Sampaio, and José Del Chiaro criticized Jobim’s decision to overrule the 
antitrust authority. Both Magalhães and Del Chiaro were active agents in designing the 
reform of competition law in Brazil in the previous years, and as Sampaio, would be frequent 
lawyers representing corporations before the SBDC. In their view, the Minister’s revision of 
CADE’s decision would jeopardize its autonomy as a modern regulatory agency, and 
contradict an explicit norm of the 1994 law, which determined that CADE’s decisions could 
not be reviewed by the Executive232. 
Nevertheless, the controversy was ignited by yet another lawyer who was actively 
involved in competition policy reform: Tércio Sampaio Ferraz Junior, the same that as the 
Executive-Secretary of the Ministry of Justice designed the series of Provisional Measures 
that resulted in the law of 1991, and who was a member of the 1993 commission formed to 
create a new competition law. Acting as the lawyer of Gerdau, he argued that once the rule 
determining the impossibility of revision by the Executive was confined to the title that 
specified the rules for Administrative Procedures, it didn’t apply to Merger Reviews. 
Another expression of opposition to CADE’s restrictive decision coming from lawyers 
was made by the “Center of Legal Studies” of the Federation of Commerce of the State of São 
Paulo, who criticized CADE for “repressing – instead of supporting – mergers that enable the 
competitiveness and survival of corporations” (Bello 2005, p. 159). Within the political field, 
Jobim’s decision to revert CADE’s ruling was also attacked. Miguel Rossetto, a 																																																								
230 The article “O CADE atrapalha” was published on February 2nd 1996, in the edition number 604 of the 
Revista Exame. Available at: <http://exame.abril.com.br/revista-exame/edicoes/0604/noticias/o-cade-atrapalha-
m0047502>. Last accessed on June 14th 2013. 
231 The article “As siglas perigosas” was published in the newspaper Folha de São Paulo on March 17th 1996. 
Available at: < http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/1996/3/17/brasil/3.html >. Last accessed on June 14th 2013. 
232 Article 50 of the law 8.884 of 1994. 
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representative of the Worker’s Party at the National Congress, elected by the state of Rio 
Grande do Sul – the same as Jobim’s –, accused the Minister of acting in favor of Gerdau 
because the company was the major funder of the electoral campaign of Antonio Britto, of the 
PMDB, who was running for governor of that state, and was supported by Jobim (Bello 2005, 
p. 146). 
The controversy also generated turmoil within the SBDC. In CADE, while Coutinho 
was on vacation, the substitute president, Chaves, who had voted for the restriction, asked the 
Republic’s General Attorney’s Office to execute the decision. Coutinho came back, and 
expressed his disagreement with what would be a “personal act” of Chaves while in the 
position of president (Bello 2005, p. 146). Another source of tension came from the Ministry 
of Finance. An economist that worked at the SPE in analyzing MR publicly proposed that the 
emphasis on concentration should be abandoned by CADE, and the focus redirected to 
repressing conducts, as that would be the modern international trend (Bello 2005, p. 149). 
This economist was Ruy Afonso de Santacruz Lima, who in 1998 would be appointed 
commissioner in CADE. 
Motivated by the dissatisfaction with CADE’s behavior, movements to change what 
was a recently reformed competition legislation were taking place. As publicized by the 
newspaper Folha de São Paulo on February 27th 1996, motivated by a request of FIESP, 
Jobim was about to “propose the suspension of CADE’s deadlines until changes in the 
antitrust law are made”233. To promote such “changes”, a Provisional Measure was being 
designed by an interministerial group, giving to the SDE the role of analyzing an MR and 
deciding whether CADE was supposed to judge it or not.  
On March 6th 1996, Folha de São Paulo published what would be the integral text of a 
Provisional Measure altering CADE’s competence 234 . Among other changes, the text 
proposed the replacement of article 54 of the 1994 law, determining that MR were to be 
submitted directly to the SDE, and that they should “obey the limits of participation in a 
relevant market, fixated by the President of the Republic” (my italics). In other words, 
CADE’s role as an antitrust authority was being once again submitted to a ministerial 
secretariat, hierarchically subordinated to the Ministry, and the criteria for the analysis of an 
economic concentration were to be determined directly by the Executive’s chief. As described 
by Bello (2005, p. 149), the “mentors” of this change were the Secretary of Economic Law, 
Aurélio Wander Bastos, and the Minister of Planning, José Serra. On March 16th 1996, Folha 																																																								
233 Available at: < http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/1996/2/27/dinheiro/31.html>. Last access on July 15th 2013. 
234 Available at: < http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/1996/3/06/dinheiro/17.html>. Last access on July 15th 2013. 
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de São Paulo affirmed that the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Industry and 
Commerce also endorsed the draft of the Provisional Measure235. 
In the initial months of 1996 – less than two years after the enactment of law 8.884 of 
1994 – the reform of competition policy, as articulated by its architects, was at risk from two 
sides. Institutionally, CADE was being jeopardized by new legal measures to revert its 
autonomy as a modern regulatory agency. In substantive terms, its decisions were perceived 
as not tuned with the imperatives of the economy (and economics), and changes were 
demanded from both within the government and the market. The task was therefore about 
bringing back the future of competition policy, as designed in the reformist initiatives 
between 1988 and 1994, i.e. guaranteeing CADE’s institutional autonomy, and enforcing the 
law accordingly to the precepts of a liberalizing economy. Who better to do that than those 
directly involved in the formulation of this future? 
 
5.2.1 “Antitrust revolution”: neoliberal economics triumphs 
 
The climax of the institutional crisis of 1995/1996 coincided with the imminent end of 
the terms of all commissioners that were in CADE since 1994. The whole composition was to 
be redone in 1996, and that constituted an opportunity for the government to replace those 
responsible for decision-making, and thus change decision-making itself, without 
jeopardizing the institutional design, something opposed by voices in the market and in the 
government (such as lawyers and economists). 
On March 16th 1996, Folha de São Paulo gave a clue about the kind of compromise 
that would enable the preservation of the institutional design brought by the law of 1994: 
“The appointment of the economist Gesner de Oliveira by the Senate to occupy the 
presidency of CADE made Minister Nelson Jobim retreat form his idea of changing the 
antitrust law”236. It was the arrival of a new president – together with 6 other commissioners, 
being three lawyers and three economists – between 1996 and 1997 that sealed a solution to 
the crisis, one that combined both institutional preservation, and, as I will describe, a 
compromise with a decision-making compatible with the aspirations of the government and 
corporations. As Salgado, who was one of the economists appointed, maintained in an 
interview, the composition was a means to “comfort” those that weren’t “satisfied” with 
CADE’s “intervention”: 																																																								
235 Available at: < http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/1996/3/16/dinheiro/7.html>. Last access on July 15th 2013. 
236 Available at: < http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/1996/3/16/dinheiro/7.html >. Last access on July 15th 2013. 
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it [CADE] started with a lot of intervention in the first years, 94 and 95, so 
the market was not nearly satisfied, not at all. [...] The solution they gave 
was: ‘Half economists, half lawyers, and the law stays the same’. Three 
economists and three lawyers, because that would comfort people [the 
market], that the Council would have more equilibrium.  
 
Although the hopes were that with more economists the decision-making of CADE 
would be more compatible with the expectations of the market and the economic policy of the 
government, at least for Salgado, however, the shift of composition did not mean an 
automatic alignment, but rather the constitution of a truly “technical” council: 
 
They thought that with more economists the council would have more 
reasonable decisions. A little mistaken, because they thought reasonable 
decisions meant decisions that let anything go. But on the contrary, people 
became very technical. 
 
As Figure 12 illustrates, the arrival of these “very technical” people in CADE implied 
a radical shift in its composition: while the first group was dominated by lawyers (5 against 2 
economists), the Council inaugurated after the crisis reversed the proportion: 5 economists 
against 2 lawyers. But this was not only a quantitative shift – and that’s where the narrative 
about the “technical” council that was allegedly emerging can be grasped. The economists 
that arrived in CADE as the solution to the conflict precipitated by the Gerdau/Pains case had 
considerably different trajectories from those of the previous formation. Moreover, these were 
also economists that were either involved in the reform of 1993, or who shared the ideals of 
those who were. 
The new president appointed to CADE was the economist Gesner José de Oliveira 
Filho. 
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Table 19. Trajectory: Oliveira 
 
Gesner José de Oliveira Filho, 40237 
 
An economist graduated from USP, Oliveira held a master’s degree in economics obtained at UNICAMP 
where he was supervised by José Serra – by then Minister of Planning of Cardoso. In 1989, he concluded a 
PhD in economics at the University of California, at Berkeley, with a thesis on liberalization policies, and the 
Brazilian experience with the IMF, supervised by Albert Fishlow. Prior to his recruitment to CADE, 
Oliveira’s career combined academic duties, political appointments, and activities in private practice. Between 
1980 and 1984, he was a professor of economics at PUC-SP, and since 1990 he thought at the FGV-SP. In 
1990, he was a consultant at the BNDES on privatizations, and between 1991 and 1993 he worked in the 
private sector, as a consultant of the Swiss Development Cooperation, of a bank, and of a law firm. Back to 
government in 1993, he was appointed Deputy-Secretary of Economic Policy of Gustavo Franco, at the 
Ministry of Finance. When SPE was converted into SEAE in 1995, Oliveira became the Secretary for a few 
months. As a Secretary, it is likely that his appointment to CADE was articulated by the Minister of Finance, 
Pedro Malan, an economist and professor of economics at PUC-Rio, who also obtained his PhD in Berkeley, 
in 1973238. 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
Five commissioners were appointed together with Oliveira in March 1996: the lawyers 
Leônidas Rangel Xausa, and Antônio Carlos Fonseca Silva, and the economists Lucia Helena 
Salgado, Paulo Dyrceu Pinheiro, and Renault Freitas Castro. In April 1997, CADE’s 
composition was completed with the appointment of yet another economist: Arthur 
Barrionuevo Filho. A first indicator of a qualitative shift in respect to the previous council 
was the age average: while between 1994 and 1996 it reached 50 years old, commissioners in 
1996/1997 had a total average of 46 years old. In the first group, commissioners were mostly 
in their late 40s and early 50s. In the council leaded by Oliveira, however, they were mostly in 
the early 40s, and there was Salgado, who was 35. If both lawyers and Pinheiro, who was an 
economist of formation but actually had a career as a diplomat, are not considered, the four 
economists that arrived to “tranquilize” CADE had an average of 39 years old, which 
evidences the emergence of a new generation of economists gaining space in the state 
apparatuses. 
There was a generational shift not only in age, but also in the profile of their studies 
and careers as economists. The two economists in the 1994/1996 council were public 																																																								
237 I was not able to locate Oliveira’s exact birthdate, so I estimated his age based on the year of conclusion of his 
undergraduate course. Normally, a student starts the undergraduate course at the age of 18, and as it ends in 4 
years, by the time of conclusion her age is around 22. Once Oliveira graduated in 1978, it is likely that he was 
born in 1956, and thus was around 40 years old in 1996. The same rationale was applied to estimate the age of 
Salgado, Castro, and Barrionuevo. 
238 Malan was one of the exponents of the PUC-Rio orthodox school of economics, and one of the idealizers of 
the Plano Real. As Loureiro (1997, p. 105) maintains, the Plano Real, as other programs of monetary 
stabilization performed in Latin America followed the neoliberal orientations of fiscal and financial adjustment, 
privatizations, and market liberalization. Illustrative of Malan’s connections to the so-called “Washington 
Consensus” were his roles as the chief negotiator of Brazil’s foreign debt between 1991 and 1993, and as an 
executive director of the World Bank in the periods 1986-1990, and 1992-1993. 
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officials, and only one of them possessed a graduate degree (a master’s in urban and regional 
planning). The newcomers, however, had strong ties to academia, and combined it with 
extensive political involvement, notably in the Ministry of Finance, where all four had served 
or been close to. Three of them were PhD in economics, and two had experiences in the US in 
their graduate studies, at one of the centers of mainstream economics, the University of 
California at Berkeley. The areas of studies of these three economists in their PhDs were also 
tuned to the economic mainstream of the time: two of them developed researches on 
liberalization policies, and one specialized in competition policy. Both in political 
appointments, and academic work, Oliveira, Salgado and Barrionuevo were close among 
themselves, and as a consequence, to the exponents of the economics orthodoxy in Brazil, 
notably the group of PUC-Rio, who by 1995 occupied several positions in the Ministry of 
Finance. 
 
Table 20. Trajectories: Xausa, Silva, Salgado, Pinheiro, Castro, and Barrionuevo 
 
Leônidas Rangel Xausa, 64 
Xausa was a lawyer who graduated from the Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul (PUC-RS) in 
1955. Besides law, he also held undergraduate degrees in Psychology and Philosophy, and MBAs in public 
law at Columbia University (US), and in corporate law at FGV-SP, obtained in 1961. A professor of 
constitutional law and legal history, Xausa combined active political involvement with a generalist knowledge 
in traditional areas of the law. Besides developing private practice in law firms, he was a member of PMDB, 
and a Senator in the early 1990s. 
 
 
Antônio Carlos Fonseca Silva, 44 
Silva graduated in law at the Centro de Estudos Superiores de Maceió, in Northeast Brazil, also 
started an undergraduate degree in economics, but never completed it. Since 1980 he was a Prosecutor at the 
Prosecutor General of the Republic’s office, and held a master’s degree in tax law at UnB (1984), and a PhD 
in intellectual property at the University of London (UK, 1994).   
 
Lucia Helena Salgado, 35 
Salgado’s trajectory until 1993 has already been described on Chapter 4, Table 17. By 1996, Salgado 
had completed her PhD in economics at UFRJ, during which she was a visiting doctoral student at the 
University of California, at Berkeley. As she maintained in an interview, in her period abroad she filled a 
“gap” of her formation: “There, I attended all courses on econometrics, mathematics and industrial 
organization”. Her doctoral thesis was an analysis of the incipient Brazilian antitrust regime, still under the 
law of 1991, focusing on Administrative Procedures. As Salgado reported in an interview, during her visit to 
UCB, she had classes with the exponents of new institutional economics, such as Oliver E. Williamson, Carl 
Shapiro, and Douglass North239. Besides these foreign professors, Salgado also mentioned other people that 
would have been influential in her PhD formation, such as Gustavo Franco, an economist of PUC-Rio and 																																																								
239 Williamson and Shapiro were directly involved with antitrust policy (both had or would occupy positions in 
the DOJ), and antitrust economics. On an article “in tribute” of Williamson, Shapiro (2010, p. 138) gives a hint 
of the line of thinking proposed by his mentor: “Williamson was skeptical of the conventional wisdom of the 
[1960s], which presumed that the purpose and effect of many vertical practices was the enhancement of market 
power and the erection of entry barriers [...] Williamson could see rationales for various vertical practices that 
were based instead on economic efficiency”. In this sense, one of Williamson’s most renown contributions in 
economics would be precisely the formalization of the trade-off between concentration and efficiency that 
constitutes the backbone of the Chicago school of antitrust economics (Williamson 1968). 
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PhD by Harvard University who was the Secretary of Economic Policy of the Ministry of Finance between 
1993 and 1999, and later became the President of the Brazilian Central Bank; Armando Castelar Pinheiro, also 
a PhD at Berkeley and supervised by Fishlow, professor of economics at PUC-Rio, and one of the pioneers of 
the “law and economics” approach in Brazil; and Regis Bonelli, PhD by Berkeley with several joint 
publications with Winston Fritsch and Gustavo Franco. After serving CADE, Salgado resumed her post at 
IPEA. 
 
Paulo Dyrceu Pinheiro, 57 
Although here defined as an economist due to an undergraduate degree in economics obtained from 
the State University of Rio de Janeiro (UERJ) in 1959, Pinheiro was a career diplomat since 1962. He served 
in several embassies and missions abroad, mostly focused on economic bilateral and multilateral negotiations, 
including at the UNCTAD and GATT. 
 
Renault Freitas Castro, 43 
An economist graduated from UnB in 1975, Castro held a master’s in agricultural economics at 
Oxford University (1981). Having worked in the private sector, since the early 1990s he was appointed to 
several positions in the federal government. Until 1990, he worked at the Ministry of Finance, and between 
that year and 1991 he was an advisor of the Ministries of Infrastructure (1990), and Planning (1991). From 
1994 until the date of his appointment to CADE, Castro was an advisor to the Minister of Industry and 
Commerce, Dorothéa Werneck, a PhD in economics at the Boston College (US). After serving CADE, Castro 
worked in the private sector as an economic consultant and executive director of an industrial association. 
 
Arthur Barrionuevo Filho, 40 
 Barrionuevo was graduated in economics from the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul 
(UFRGS), in 1979, and held a master’s in business at the FGV-SP, and a PhD in economics at USP, with a 
thesis focusing on liberalization policies. A professor of economics at FGV-SP, and specialist in 
microeconomics and industrial organization, he was also involved in consultancies related to regulation and 
competition policy. Prior to his arrival in CADE, Barrionuevo worked for an association of infrastructure 
industries, and produced technical opinions in MR in consultancies such as the multinational Arthur D. Little. 
Between 1987 and 1988, he worked at the Ministry of Finance, as an advisor of industrial policy to the 
Minister, Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira. A colleague of Gesner Oliveira at FGV-SP, he had previously been 
invited to teach in an internship program created by Oliveira in the first year of his term as president. After 
serving CADE, Barrionuevo resumed his activities as a professor of economics at FGV-SP, and as an 
economic consultant, acting in competition policy cases. 
 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
As their trajectories indicate, commissioners appointed to CADE at this point were 
close among themselves, and to economists working in other areas of the government, where 
neoliberal policies of privatization and liberalization were being implemented. Oliveira was 
the first to be appointed to CADE, and it is very likely that the invitation came directly from 
the Minister of Finance, Pedro Malan, once he was a Secretary at that Ministry. Although in 
1995 Salgado had already been communicated by Coutinho, CADE’s former president, about 
his intentions to appoint her to CADE, it was only in 1996 that it was actually confirmed, and 
through the hands of Oliveira. As she recalled in an interview, although she didn’t know him 
well, Oliveira communicated with her bringing bad news about the attempt to change the 
1994 competition act, and asking her to help “impede” it. 
Barrionuevo was also recruited by Oliveira, who was his colleague at FGV-SP, and 
recommended his name to Minister Malan. As revealed in an interview conceded to Dutra 
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(2009, p. 68), Castro, the fourth economist to enter CADE in 1996/1996 requested an 
indication to the Minister of Industry and Commerce, Dorothéa Werneck, who then suggested 
his name to the Minister of Justice, Jobim. As Castro maintained, he “felt attracted by the 
transformation that was being operated in the economy by that time, from a closed economy, 
with controlled prices, to an economy that was more open and free” (Dutra 2009, p. 68). 
The two lawyers appointed to CADE had significantly different profiles. While Xausa 
was a generalist in law, and an active politician, Silva was a Prosecutor, with a PhD in a 
“modern” area of the law. None of them, however, was a specialist in competition policy. 
Xausa’s appointment was probably arranged by the Minister of Justice, as they were both 
from the state of Rio Grande do Sul, and members of the same political party. I was not able 
to identify the origin of the appointment of both Silva and Pinheiro. In the case of the former, 
however, it is likely that it came from the Minister of Justice, as he was a lawyer with an 
established legal career. In the case of Pinheiro, once his trajectory didn’t indicate any 
connections to the Ministries of Justice or Finance, it is probable that his appointment came 
from the Ministry of Foreign Relations. 
The sources of appointment of CADE’s president and its commissioners in 1996/1996 
are indicative of an institutional dynamics that integrated the compromise to solve the crisis 
of the Gerdau/Pains case, and that would be a constant in the field’s future developments. 
This was what in many interviews was referred to as a “tacit agreement” between the 
Ministries of Justice and Finance, more specifically the SDE and SEAE, to share and manage 
the appointments to CADE. Between 1996/1997, this agreement was starting to be practiced: 
Oliveira, Salgado and Barrionuevo were appointments of SEAE, and Xausa, Castro, and 
Silva, of the SDE.  
The arrival of this group in CADE, led by an economist, and dominated by 
professionals of the same field, shaped the practice of competition policy in distinct and 
decisive ways. Four aspects can be highlighted as illustrative of the changes brought in the 
first two years under Oliveira’s presidency: the institutional consolidation and autonomy 
affirmation of CADE (Bello 2005), the articulation with other economic policies, the 
internationalization of Brazilian competition policy, and the economicization of antitrust 
policy in Brazil (Onto 2009). 
In the institutional level, Oliveira’s presidency focused on consolidating a modern 
institutional design, in giving visibility to CADE and to its decisions (Bello 2005), and in 
assuring its compatibility with a recently liberalized economy. For instance, CADE started to 
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produce annual reports of activities, and to publicize the complete report of judgment 
sessions, and approved its first internal regulations (Regulamento Interno do CADE240). In 
1998, Oliveira celebrated a Cooperation Agreement between CADE and the Secretariat of 
State Reform to convert CADE into a “pilot-unit of the executive agencies project”, which 
aimed at the “strategic reestructuring and modernization” of the competition agency241. 
Measures of institutional consolidation were combined with several public 
appearances of Oliveira, in which he criticized the “excessive rigor” of CADE’s former 
composition, and assured the market about the inexistence of prejudices in CADE against 
economic concentration (Bello 2005, p. 164-165). As Bello (2005, p. 165) illustrates with a 
quote by Oliveira, his approach was one that accepted economic concentration as a natural 
and global process: “The market doesn’t have to keep up with CADE’s transformations. It is 
CADE that must keep up with the market, and sometimes interfere, giving guidance”. 
Another manifestation of Oliveira in 1997 is equally illustrative of the new attitude in CADE. 
As identified by Bello (2005, p. 185), in discussing the positive effects of the privatization of 
the mining company Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD) in a newspaper article, Oliveira 
stated that: “If society will have to bear the consequences of a loss of welfare caused by 
economic concentration, it will have, however, the benefits of economic development”. 
 The idea of “guidance” was emblematic of the attempt to not establish a conflictive 
relation with the market. Rather, since Oliveira’s appointment, CADE started a relationship of 
proximity, and developed the notion of “educating” and “raising the consciousness” of the 
market: the idea of “competition advocacy” gained space. This was articulated as a 
“civilizational function” (Onto 2009, p. 128) to, as the annual report of 1996 illustrates 
(CADE 1996, p. 25), “diffuse the culture of competition” in a context where “competition is 
still alien to economic relations and its agents” due to “the long period of state intervention 
and the closing of the country”. Concrete measures adopted to implement such “advocacy” 
role entailed hundreds of speeches and participations in conferences by commissioners, 
especially by Oliveira, throughout the country, the creation of an internship program in 
CADE (PinCADE) for undergraduate and graduate students, the elaboration of pamphlets on 
competition policy, and the creation of CADE’s website. 
 Other illustrative examples of CADE’s new attitude toward the market can be 
mentioned. In the end of 1996, for instance, CADE reanalyzed the Gerdau/Pains case, 																																																								
240 Resolution number 10, of October 29th 1997. 
241 Agreement celebrated on September 2nd 1998, available at CADE’s institutional website, on the section 
“Acordos e Convênios”.  
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motivated by a proposition made by Oliveira. In a negotiated process, Oliveira presented three 
alternatives to the corporations for the acquisition to be approved, and one of them – precisely 
what Gerdau chose to do – did not entail a radical measure of total de-investment imposed by 
the previous composition (Bello 2005, p. 177; Gheventer 2005, p. 63). Another example was 
the institution, in August 28th 1996, through CADE’s Resolution number 5, of a fast track for 
“simplified procedures”. According to this regulation elaborated by CADE’s commissioners 
and president, in certain cases, depending on the “nature, specificities, and the degree of 
complexity of the act”, the presentation of a series of documents and information was not 
mandatory for the involved corporations. By the end of 1996, in the midst of all those 
measures, Jobim, who in the beginning of that same year was articulating a measure accused 
of “emptying” CADE’s competences, was making complements to the Council’s new 
decision-making practice (Bello 2005, p. 175). 
 Within the agency’s structure, Oliveira’s presidency also brought changes for CADE’s 
staff. Since 1996, courses in competition defense were organized by CADE in partnership 
with professional associations, universities, and other governmental organs with the 
objectives of, according to the Annual Report of 1996 (CADE 1996, p. 44) “training a 
specialized professional staff to serve public administration”, “preparing specialized directive 
personnel and training technical professionals for the private sector”, and “developing a 
common language and concepts between the public and private sectors, as well as between 
law, economics and connected areas”. The training program, definitely institutionalized in 
1998 as CADE’s Professional Training Program (PCPC), also started to emphasize the 
establishment of “closer relations between CADE and analogous agencies of different 
countries” (CADE 1998, p. 181). 
Among the educational institutions with which CADE celebrated cooperation 
agreements in the first years of the initiative were FGV-RJ, FGV-SP, FGV-Brasília, PUC-SP, 
UFMG, and CEUB. Within the administration, CADE established agreements with BNDES, 
CNPq, IPEA, among others, and in the private sector institutions such as IBRAC, and the 
Institute Roberto Simonsen, of FIESP, were also cooperating with the antitrust agency 
(CADE 1996, p. 45). The proximity to market agents and educational institutions in which the 
modern technology of competition policy was being developed and advanced were yet 
another indication of CADE’s new cooperative attitude toward those it regulated. 
 Another strategy for consolidating CADE’s public image, again notably executed by 
Oliveira, was the articulation of antitrust policy with other areas of economic policy and 
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regulation. The underlying idea was to include CADE as an active part of the process of 
privatization that was being intensified in Brazil by that time. Already in 1996, Oliveira tried 
to insert CADE in the governmental arenas that elaborated the privatization process (Bello 
2005, p. 181). The result, however, was that Oliveira was questioned by the government about 
the attempt to interfere in the privatization process, and CADE remained with his role of 
analyzing the operations related to privatization after they were concluded (Bello 2005, p. 
185). Sectorial regulatory agencies entitled of regulating privatized sectors were also 
connected with CADE in the 1996-1998 period, with the objective of “providing CADE with 
technical support for the enforcement of its attributions, and supporting technical scientific, 
cultural and administrative exchange” (CADE 1998, p. 184). Besides agencies such as the 
ANP, ANEEL, and ANATEL, these agreements also included the Brazilian Central Bank. As 
Bello (2005, p. 237) maintains, these agreements in practice had the effect of “endorsing 
decisions taken by other state organs”. 
 Another agreement celebrated in the early moments of the new composition was with 
the Ministry of Labor. The objective was to “implement programs of professional 
requalification and replacement for workers in risk of dismissal due to MR” (Bello 2005, p. 
180-181). As the only “social appeal” made in Oliveira’s presidency, the agreement, 
according to Bello (2005, p. 180), was a strategy in the “search for consolidating CADE’s 
power”. Opposed in the media, the interest in labor was never actually implemented, at least 
until 1998 (Bello 2005, p. 180). 
 As a group with in international academic and professional connections, CADE’s 
composition between 1996-1998 was also responsible for an unprecedented 
internationalization of the organ. In the Annual Reports of 1996, 1997 and 1998, CADE 
describes initiatives to “globalize competition policy” in which it took part, comprising 
several measures. One of them entailed visits from missionaries of foreign competition 
authorities and international organizations such as the World Bank and OECD to CADE, and 
from CADE’s commissioners, president and staff to antitrust agencies abroad.  
 Another venue of internationalization was occurring through cooperation agreements 
in competition policy, which by 1998 were celebrated with the Argentinean antitrust 
authority, and with the US government. An exchange program of staff from international 
agencies and organisms, such as the Organization of American States (OAS), the World 
Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) was also created. Since 1996, and 
especially through its president, CADE was an active agency in the negotiation of 
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“integration agreements”, notably the Mercosur and the Free Trade Area of the Americas 
(FTAA). In the regional level, the Annual Reports highlight the protagonist role played by 
CADE in diffusing and shaping competition policy in other countries. In 1996, at the 
negotiations of the competition policy chapter of Mercosur, CADE contributed in the 
formulation of the “Mercosur Protocol on Competition Policy”. Among several measures 
proposed, some of them very similar to the 1994 law text, the Protocol established the “wide 
adoption of the rule of reason, avoiding rigid criteria of the per se illicit” (i.e. not illegalizing 
economic concentrations, but only those identified as unreasonable), and the establishment of 
a “schedule for the implementation of a pre-merger review system in the [Mercosur] 
countries”, given that by that time only Brazil had such control (CADE 1996, p. 30). 
 At the FTAA negotiations, CADE contributed to the efforts of “harmonization of legal 
regimes of competition policy in the countries of the hemisphere”, which would be a “goal 
consistent with the interests of the Brazilian government and private sector” (CADE 1996, p. 
31). To do so, measures such as technical cooperation, the “dissemination of best practices”, 
and the joint elaboration of “guidelines for analysis and technical texts” were discussed 
(CADE 1998, p. 147-148). At the World Trade Organization, in 1998 CADE participated in a 
working group to discuss the relations between international commerce and competition 
policy. According to the Annual Report of 1998 (CADE 1998, p. 153), CADE converged 
with the WTO’s diagnosis about the “desirability of defining general principles and pre-
requisites that a national antitrust legislation must have in order to provide legal certainty to 
private agents”, and understood that WTO principles such as “national treatment” and “most-
favored-nation”, were “of particular relevance for the construction of solid institutions for the 
defense of competition in developing countries” (CADE 1998, p. 153). 
 Under Oliveira’s presidency, CADE also began what would become a historical 
participation at the OECD. As described in the 1998 Annual Report (CADE 1998, p. 149-
152), in 1998 CADE participated in a meeting of the Working Group of International 
Cooperation organized by OECD’s Competition Policy Committee focused on debating the 
regulation of transnational concentrations. In that meeting, the Working Group enacted a 
resolution establishing “a standard form for the submission of merger reviews oriented to 
serve as a model for member-states”, which “incorporated the best international practices” 
(CADE 1998, p. 150). In the same document, CADE highlighted being a “pioneer” in that 
sense, as it was the first antitrust authority in the world to adopt the model proposed by the 
OECD (CADE 1998, p. 150). Resolution number 15 of August 19th 1998 would have 
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“departed from the model proposed by the OECD, and adapted it to the Brazilian legislation” 
(CADE 1998, p. 150). In this document, several procedures for the analysis of MR, and key-
concepts of a modern competition policy such as “relevant market”, and “efficiency” were 
defined. 
This movement illustrates not only the internationalization of CADE, but yet another 
process that was being consolidated by the composition inaugurated in 1996: the 
economicization of competition policy. With the arrival of the group led by Oliveira, it is 
possible to observe in CADE’s jurisprudence, resolutions, and ordinances that economic 
concepts were being increasingly mobilized for decision-making (Onto 2009, p. 99). This 
process entailed what mainstream narratives often describe as a “revolution of antitrust in 
Brazil” (Mattos 2003, 2008). 
Indicators of economicization in decision-making can be noticed in Lima’s (1998) 
highly critical study about the methodologies of analysis deployed in decisions made by 
CADE between 1994 and 1996 – precisely the period of transition between the first 
composition and the second242. As this author maintains, during most of this period, the 
analysis of MR was often based on “traditional” antitrust theory – that of Harvard school of 
structure-conduct-performance framework – and on a “legalistic view”, i.e. decisions to 
approve a merger tended to request the fulfillment of all conditions determined in article 54 of 
the 1994 law (Lima 1998, p. 128). Although partially based on the US Merger Guidelines of 
1992, the decision-making by then dominant in CADE wouldn’t incorporate a sophisticated 
“mathematical analysis” into the judgment of MR (Lima 1998, p. 128). That would only have 
happened with the consolidation of a new composition in CADE.  
To a former commissioner, during the 1994-1996 collegiate, decisions would lack 
proper [economic] “foundations”, deploying an approach in which “corporations had to prove 
its innocence”, and “concentration per se harms competition”. Such lack of foundation would 
be illustrated by the imposition of conditions that “had nothing to do with competition”, such 
as “re-training of employees dismissed, and obligations to export”. The new council formed 
in 1996 was the cause of a change, as according to an interviewee “people with a new 
mentality arrived”. 
As Salgado (2003, p. 30) wrote about an emblematic case of which she was the 
rapporteur, the Kolynos/Colgate MR – the first to be analyzed by the council inaugurated in 
1996 – “opened way to introduce in Brazilian antitrust the basic concepts of economic 																																																								
242 Lima (Ruy Santacruz Lima) was the economist that worked in the SPE in 1996 and criticized CADE’s 
decisions in the 1994-1996 period. He was appointed commissioner in 1998. 
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analysis”. According to Onto (2009, p. 101) that case was based on the approach of the US 
antitrust agencies. From that moment on, concepts such as “relevant market”, “market 
structure”, “barriers to entry”, “potential competition”, and “product differentiation” (Onto 
2009, p. 100), as well as market concentration indexes such as the Herfindahl-Hirchsman 
Index (HHI), and the Ci would be present in CADE’s decision-making practice (Gama e Ruiz 
2007) 243. 
As already mentioned, and in consonance to Onto (2009, p. 106), the economicization 
of Brazilian antitrust policy can also be noticed in two resolutions enacted in the first two 
years under Oliveira’s presidency. Resolution number 5, of August 28th 1996, detailed the 
procedures of MR analysis, and established the need of corporations to present a series of 
documents and information about the operation. As Onto (2009, 108) maintains, these were 
requirements of “information to define, ‘measure’ or calculate specific concepts of antitrust 
economic theory”. Resolution 15 of 1998 revoked that enacted in 1996, replicating several of 
its procedural rules, and document requirements, but innovated in making explicit a definition 
of different economic concepts for antitrust analysis244 . As Salgado maintained in an 
interview, “That was when we started to institute all these definitions, such as relevant 
market. That was when we revolutionized. We established CADE’s original landmark”. 
Another and no less important aspect of the changes imprinted by CADE’s new 
composition between 1996 and 1998 concerned the content of decisions. The major reason 
underlying the institutional crisis that affected competition policy by the end of 1995 were the 
restrictions imposed to economic concentrations, which faced a dramatic fall under Oliveira’s 
presidency. By the end of 1996 – 8 months after the new commissioners arrived – CADE had 
decided 16 MR, approving without restrictions 12 of them, and imposing conditions for the 
approval of the other 4 (25%)245. In 1997, of the 41 MR analyzed, 34 were approved without 
restrictions, and 7 with conditions (20,6%). Finally, in 1998, out of the 117 MR presented, 
only 4 (3,5%) suffered some kind of restriction for approval. In the whole period, no 
operation was entirely rejected. 																																																								
243 However, if one takes the polemic Gerdau/Pains MR as an example – precisely a case reputed to be 
unsophisticated in terms of economic analysis – the votes of all commissioners already mobilized economic 
concepts such as “relevant market”, “barriers to entry”, and discussed the implications of the operation in terms 
of “efficiency”. The question thus seems to be around determining what is the correct or legitimate definition of 
these concepts, and how shall their enforcement occur. 
244 The major novelty brought by Oliveira’s presidency in its first two years through resolutions was not the 
establishment of procedures and document requirements for antitrust analysis, but the definition of these 
economic concepts. This is because already in 1995, and thus during CADE’s first composition, Resolution 
number 1 of July 7th 1995 detailed similar procedures and documents.  
245 The data here presented is based on the collection of decisions made by myself, as described on Chapter 3, 
section 3.2.1. 
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The overall average of cases restricted dropped from 77,77% in the period 1994-1996, 
to 8,6% in the period 1996-1998. Moreover, as Bello (2005, p. 225) maintains, in only 4 of 
the restricted cases a condition related to the assets of the involved corporation was imposed – 
which were nevertheless described by this author as “necessary to avoid that the organ was 
faced as merely ornamental” (Bello 2005, p. 176). In the two first years of CADE’s new 
composition, dominated by a new generation of economists, the institutional crisis of the 
beginning of 1996 seemed resolved. During the second mandate of Oliveira, between 1998 
and 2000, new agents would be recruited, but the shaping of CADE as a truly “technical” 
organ achieved under his presidency would be consolidated. 
 
5.2.2 The consolidation of an economic creed 
 
In 1998, the mandates of CADE’s president and of 5 commissioners would expire 
(Barrionuevo was appointed in 1997, so his mandate was guaranteed until 1999). Only 2 
members of the composition inaugurated in 1996 would complete a second mandate: Oliveira, 
the president, and Salgado. Xausa died in May 1998, and Barrionuevo was appointed 
Secretary of Technological Development at the Ministry of Science and Technology in 1999. 
The reasons for the other commissioners not having been re-appointed couldn’t be identified. 
In June 1998, the recomposing of CADE started, with the appointment of two 
commissioners: the lawyer Marcelo Calliari, and the economist Ruy Afonso de Santacruz 
Lima. Three other commissioners – all lawyers – joined the Council between March and July 
1999: João Bosco Leopoldino da Fonseca, Mércio Felsky, and Hebe Teixeira Romano.	
 
Table 21. Trajectories: Calliari, Lima, Fonseca, Felsky, Romano 
 
Marcelo Calliari, 33 
Graduated in law from USP and in economics from PUCSP, both in 1989, Calliari held an LLM in 
trade law, obtained from Harvard University in 1996, and was a PhD candidate in international law at USP. 
Illustrative of his interdisciplinary background, his master thesis focused on the expansion of the WTO into 
areas such as investments, competition policy and environment through the approach of game theory, 
transaction costs and common goods. A columnist and writer of the newspaper Folha de São Paulo between 
1989 and 1995, Calliari served as a correspondent in New York, where he was responsible for covering 
foreign debt negotiations, capital markets, among other themes. Between 1996 and 1997, he was a corporate 
lawyer at a law firm based in São Paulo. Since January 1998, he was a legal advisor of CADE’s plenary, and 
an advisor for international affairs of CADE’s president, Gesner Oliveira. After leaving CADE, in the year 
2000, Calliari became a competition lawyer at one the largest Brazilian law firms: Tozzini Freire Advogados. 
 
Ruy Afonso de Santacruz Lima, 42 
Lima graduated in economics from UFF in 1982, and possessed both a master’s and a PhD degree in 
economics from the UFRJ (supervised by José Tavares de Araújo Junior, and Fábio Erber, respectively). His 
doctoral study, quoted in this dissertation (Lima 1998), focused on (and strongly criticized) the decision-
making methodologies in merger reviews decided by CADE from 1994 to 1996. A professor of economics 
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since 1981, in the early 1980s Lima worked at one of the “Big Eight” accounting firms, Arthur Young & Co. 
An economist of the CVRD (a state-owned mining company) since 1985, in 1986 Lima joined the Ministry of 
Finance, where he would be until 1998. There he occupied positions in price controls organs, such as CIP, 
until he was appointed the coordinator of the Industrial Area of the Secretariat of Economic Policy (SPE), 
then ran by Winston Fristch, between 1993 and 1995. Lima kept the post when the SPE was transformed in 
SEAE. He was the coordinator of the industrial area of SEAE, and analyzed produced technical opinions on 
several Merger Reviews between 1991 and 1994. After serving CADE for one mandate, Lima became a 
professor of economics at UFF, and worked as an economic consultant in competition policy cases. 
 
João Bosco Leopoldino da Fonseca, 55 
Graduated in law from UFMG in 1967, philosophy and neo-latin literature at Faculdade Dom Bosco, 
Fonseca held a PhD in economic law obtained from UFMG in 1989. Between 1968 and 1973, he was an 
attorney specialized in civil and labor law, and from 1973 to 1985 he was a judge in labor and federal courts. 
In 1985, together with a career as a law professor at UFMG (teaching economic law, administrative law, 
constitutional law, logics, among others), he resumed his work in private practice. 
 
Mércio Felsky, 50 
Felsky graduated in law from the Regional University of Blumenau, in the Southern state of Santa 
Catarina, where he was a corporate lawyer, and long involved in local politics. He was appointed Attorney-
General of the city of Blumenau, Secretary of Finances of the same municipality, and president of the State 
Bank of Santa Catarina between 1991 and 1994. Besides his legal career and political appointments, Felsky 
had also occupied several directive positions in different corporations. 
 
Hebe Teixeira Romano, 49 
Romano was a law graduate from UniCEUB, a private university in Brasília, in 1983, and after a 
short period in private practice, became a lawyer of the Federal Attorney General’s office, a law professor and 
occupied several political appointments in the Ministry of Justice since 1986, as an advisor to different 
secretariats. Between 1993 and 1997, she was the chief of staff of the Ministry’s Secretariat of Economic Law 
(SDE), and became substitute-Secretary between 1995 and 1997, elaborating SDE’s technical opinions in 
cases decided by CADE. In 1997, she was appointed chief of staff of the Ministry’s Executive Secretary 
(“vice-Minister”). After leaving CADE, she became the chief of staff of the Federal Attorney General. 
 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
If compared to Oliveira’s first mandate, CADE’s composition got younger in 
1998/1999: the age average dropped from 46 to 44 years old. The arrivals of Lima, who was 
of the same “generation” of economists as Oliveira and Salgado, and Calliari, who could be 
considered part of a subsequent generation, illustrate the continuation of the process of 
rejuvenescence of CADE. At first sight, lawyers gained more space if compared to the 
1996/1998 period, as between 1990 and 2000 they were in the number of 4. However, as 
Calliari had both degrees, it is better to say that the council was professionally balanced – 
with the possibility of considering that the hegemony of economics was still in place, if he 
was considered an economist. 
The qualitative shift performed by the 1996 composition was kept by the 1998/1999 
formation. Although the only “pure” economist appointed in 1998 had no foreign degrees, he 
was also a PhD in economics, and had close connections to the Ministry of Finance, 
especially to the SPE and the group of PUC-Rio. An indicator of Lima’s alignment with the 
approach of those economists was already given in this dissertation: he was the member of 
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SEAE who publicly manifested his opinion against the control of concentrations in Brazil 
during the institutional crisis of 1996. In an interview during fieldwork, Lima maintained a 
similar position: 
 
One possibility is to, maybe, let mergers occur at will. It looks like a liberal 
view. And then you see what you do with conducts. There are not theoretical 
supports to control market structures. Period! Unless in the old relationship, 
as Hovenkamp says (the first book I read about antitrust in 1994!): ‘there 
were four, and now there are three. It’s easier to raise prices.’ 
 
Calliari, the other economist (or “half-economist”) had legal training in the US, and 
managed modern economic approaches, such as the game theory he applied in his master’s 
dissertation. While he can be defined as a corporate lawyer in formation, the other three 
lawyers recruited in 1998/1999 had extremely different profiles. Fonseca was mostly a law 
professor, specialized in economic law, and coming from the UFMG circuit – the same from 
where two commissioners were appointed to CADE before reform, in 1986. All three of them 
were connected to Washington Peluzo Albino de Souza, who had been appointed member of 
the commission who produced the 1988 draft for an antitrust act. Romano and Felsky, 
however, had profiles closer to, respectively, public service and political positions than to 
private practice, or academia. 
The sources of appointment of these new commissioners provide indicators of their 
connections and thus of how the “revolution” performed in the two preceding years was being 
consolidated. Two of these appointments were made by CADE’s president, Gesner Oliveira. 
Fonseca reported in an interview to Dutra (2009, p. 119) that Oliveira invited him to become 
a commissioner. Calliari’s appointment was also intermediated by CADE’s president, as he 
was Oliveira’s advisor since January 1998, and they had worked for the newspaper Folha de 
São Paulo in the late 1980s. Lima’s appointment came from what can be considered the same 
circuit, as Oliveira previously occupied a prominent position at the SPE, in the Ministry of 
Finance. Lima was serving SEAE by 1998 when the Secretary, Bolívar Moura Rocha read his 
doctoral thesis and presented it to the Minister, Pedro Malan, who then invited him to 
compose CADE. 
Although it was not possible to precise how Romano’s appointment occurred, her 
name was probably supported by the Ministry of Justice, as she had been working for a while 
at the SDE. Felsky’s was the only appointment that escaped from the Ministerial influence, as 
it seems to be rooted in the political field. As reported by an interviewee who was active in 
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the SBDC by that time, Felsky was recommended to CADE by Espiridião Amin, a Senator by 
the state of Santa Catarina (the same where Felsky developed his political and legal career), 
and member of a party that supported the government. In talking about Felsky’s appointment, 
the same interviewee recognized that while indications to CADE coming from Congress 
occurred – “although rare” – they had to “pass the test of academic formation and 
professional experience”. Mentioned only in this interview, Felsky’s trajectory in corporate 
law, and his political appointments to economic institutions seems to have granted him 
legitimacy for a position in CADE. He was thus not considered to be an “outlier” of 
competition policy. 
The initiatives that characterized the 1996-1998 period – institutional consolidation, 
articulation with other governmental agencies, internationalization, and economicization – 
intensified from 1998 to 2000. In the institutional level, CADE enacted several resolutions 
concerning, for instance, the “ethical behavior of staff”246, the procedures of consultation247, 
and the regulation of voluntary appeals of decisions enacted by the SDE248. The training 
program of CADE’s staff, established in 1996, continued its activities, and in 1998 counted 
with the participation of a consultant of OECD as one of the professors. Oliveira also 
continued to publicly defend CADE’s activities. On October 27th 1999, for instance, he 
repelled a newspaper article authored by Bello (whose work has been quoted several times in 
this dissertation), who “questioned the efficacy of CADE’s decisions”, as it would approve 
without restrictions 95% of mergers. On that day’s session, Oliveira explicitly contested the 
evaluation, stating that “the author is misinformed, because the international experience 
reveals that antitrust intervention reaches from 2% to 3% of mergers presented”249. In another 
example, dated of July 29th 2000, Oliveira publicly responded to an article authored by a 
journalist that was critical of CADE, stating that he “insisted in the myth of economic 
concentration, as if it was, by itself, necessarily harmful”250. 
During this period, CADE also established several cooperation agreements with other 
governmental institutions, such as the National Sanitation Agency (ANVISA), ANP, and 
organizations outside the state, such as IBRAC and the consumer protection foundation 
PROCON. Within the scope of “competition advocacy”, agreements with educational 																																																								
246 Resolution n. 16, of September 9th 1998. 
247 Resolution n. 18, of November 25th 1998. 
248 Resolution n. 19, of February 3rd 1999. 
249 Session Report n. 145, of October 27th 1999. 
250 Oliveira’s article, titled “Relembrando o caso AmBev”, was published on Folha de São Paulo of July 29th 
2000. 
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institutions were expanded, and probably not by chance included the universities to which 
two of the new commissioners were associated to: the Universidade Regional de Blumenau, 
where Felsky had graduated251, and the UFMG, where Fonseca was a law professor. Still in 
the educational area, in 1999 CADE formed a commission integrated by current and former 
commissioners, law professors (one of which would become a commissioner in the near 
future) and economists to propose the reform of undergraduate curricula in order to include 
subjects on competition policy. The proposal was to be submitted both to Congress and to the 
Minister of Education252. 
 Cooperation was also happening at the international level, as CADE was increasingly 
present in foreign arenas of debate, especially through the representation of Oliveira and 
Calliari. Several visits from staff of the antitrust authorities of Germany, the US, South 
Africa, Argentina, and consultants of the World Bank and OECD can be observed in the 
session reports of the period. Members of CADE also continued to participate in international 
fora to discuss and design competition policy, such as the Mercosur, the OECD, the FTAA, 
and the WTO. Oliveira also represented CADE in two meetings with the “law and 
economics” groups of Stanford University, and the University of California at Berkeley253. 
The economicization of antitrust policy was also advanced between June 1998 and 
July 2000. Exemplary of such process was the enactment of Resolution number 20, of June 6th 
1999. This was the equivalent of Resolution 15 of 1998, but focusing on Administrative 
Procedures. Through this document, CADE established economic concepts such as the HHI 
and the Ci indexes, the definitions of anticompetitive conducts, and presented formulas to be 
applied in the evaluation of conducts. A new frontier for antitrust economics was thus being 
opened in what was then considered a genuinely legal domain, close to traditional criminal 
investigations and based on juridical concepts and logics. 
During Oliveira’s second mandate, CADE’s decision reached what he claimed to be 
the “international standards”. In 1998, out of the 89 MR decided after the composition was 
altered, 3 (3,4%) received some sort of restriction. In 1999, of a total of 219 cases, 3,2% (7) 
had their approval conditioned. In the last six months of Oliveira’s mandate in the year 2000, 																																																								
251 Other two universities from the state of Santa Catarina, the homeland of Felsky, as well as the professional 
association of economists of that state signed agreements of cooperation with CADE while he was a 
commissioner. It is interesting that no institution from that state had previously signed an agreement with 
CADE. 
252 The information is available in the Session Report n. 130, of July 28th 1999. On May 10th 2000 (Session 
Report n. 167), president Oliveira informed that both the Minister of Education and the Commission of 
Education of the House of Representatives “recommended the inclusion of the discipline of economic law in the 
undergraduate courses of law, economics, management, engineering, and connected areas”. 
253 Session Report n. 145, of October 27th 1999. 
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129 MR were analyzed by CADE and 3,1% of them were restricted. As in the previous 
composition, no operation was rejected by CADE. The institutional crisis of 1996 seemed to 
be definitely resolved in both aspects that were at stake. On the side of CADE, the institution 
was being consolidated, internationalized and gaining an increasingly “technical” character 
through economicization. On the side of the market and the government, the restrictive 
behavior that motivated the crisis was part of the past. As Magalhães, one of the architects of 
competition policy reform in Brazil described in an interview, “Gesner de Oliveira lifted 
CADE to where it is today”. 
Maybe not by chance, Felsky announced on the session of July 17th 2000 that the 
publication Global Competition Review suggested that CADE achieved a “position of 
international recognition”254. This celebration was taking place when yet another phase of the 
practice of the field of competition policy in Brazil was beginning. Changes were about to 
happen, but within a line of continuity with the “technical” and “modern” practice of 
competition policy. 
 
 
5.3 Change within continuity, and continuity within change 
 
The period comprised between the middle of 2000 and the end of 2008 – equivalent to 
two presidential mandates in CADE – entailed a series of changes in its composition, and in 
the political context. The appointment of a new president to succeed Oliveira was 
accompanied by a shift in the professional balance inside the Council. Also, in 2003, the 
government changed, and new appointments were made, most intensely in 2004. However, 
while the former was a change occurring within the boundaries established in 1996, the latter 
expressed a line of continuity even in a broader context of political change. 
 
5.3.1 Juridification and economicization combined 
 
Between July 2000 and December 2001, CADE’s composition was completely 
reformulated. Four new commissioners were appointed in 2000 to substitute Oliveira and 
Salgado, who finished their second term, and Lima and Calliari, who served CADE for two 
years. In 2001, other two commissioners were appointed to replace Fonseca and Silva. The 
reasons why a high number of commissioners were replaced before a second mandate are 																																																								
254 Session Report n. 171 of July 17th 2000. 
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hard to precise. It was probably related to CADE’s decision in a polemic merger that attracted 
a lot of public attention and generated controversy: the so-called AmBev case255. According 
to an interviewee, the Minister of Justice appointed in 2000, José Gregori, didn’t want to 
renovate the mandates of anyone who had decided that polemic case, despite of the 
correctness or not of the decision. CADE was to be institutionally preserved, and defining its 
composition was once again a crucial strategy to do so. 
The profile of the new composition was considerably different from that which 
dominated CADE from 1996 to 2000. By the end of 2001, the proportion of lawyers and 
economists was reversed: 4 commissioners and CADE’s president were lawyers, and there 
were only 2 economists. The prevalence of lawyers was tuned with the objective of 
preserving CADE’s image. As reported in an interview, the Minister of Justice felt that it was 
necessary to give CADE the features of a true tribunal: “[The Minister said:] ‘CADE was 
took much exposed on the media. This is not good. CADE is a tribunal, CADE exercises a 
jurisdiction. I want someone in CADE with the profile of a judge’”. 
CADE did become more like a tribunal due to the new composition installed in 2000. 
The substitute of Oliveira as CADE’s president was the lawyer João Grandino Rodas, a 
retired federal judge who, as reported in an interview, “presided CADE’s session with a 
gavel, like in the movies”. The other lawyers were Celso Fernandes Campilongo, Ronaldo 
Porto Macedo Júnior, Roberto Augusto Castellanos Pfeiffer, and Miguel Tebar Barrionuevo, 
and the economists appointed were Thompson Almeida Andrade, and Afonso Arinos de 
Mello Franco Neto. The age average in this period was of 46 years old, the same as between 
1996 and 1998. 
 
Table 22. Trajectories: Rodas, Campilongo, Porto Macedo, Pfeiffer, Andrade, Arinos, Tebar 
 
João Grandino Rodas, 55 
Graduated in law from USP in 1969, Rodas also held undergraduate degrees in music, literature and 
pedagogy, and possessed three master’s degrees (two in law, by the University of Coimbra, Portugal, and by 
Harvard University, and one in diplomacy by The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy), and a PhD in law 
by USP. A professor of international law at USP since 1971, Rodas had previously worked as a corporate 
lawyer in the late 1970s, being the chief of Ford’s legal department in Brazil. Between 1980 and 1993, he was 
a judge in lower and higher courts. In the 1990s, Rodas was the chief of the legal advisory body of the 
Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations between 1993 and 1998, and represented the country at several 
meetings of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). An arbitrator since 																																																								
255 This was the merger review number 08012.005846/99-12, approved with conditions by CADE on March 30th 
2000, through which two Brazilian breweries merged to form AmBev. The market share resulting from the 
operation in the beer sector – around 72% - motivated an intense debate among CADE’s commissioners and in 
the media. While the operation was sometimes opposed due to an excessively elevated concentration, it was also 
defended due to the “efficiencies” it produced, or celebrated as the constitution of a “national champion”. 
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the late 1990s, after his term as CADE’s president between 2000 and 2004, he became the dean of USP, and 
started to produce legal opinions in international law and antitrust. 
 
Celso Fernandes Campilongo, 43 
Campilongo held two undergraduate degrees from USP, in law and philosophy, both obtained in 
1980. He also obtained a master’s degree and a PhD in legal philosophy from the same university, in 1987 and 
1992, respectively. Working as a lawyer at a family law firm, he also conciliated a career as a law professor at 
USP since the early 1990s. Campilongo became one of the exponents of Brazilian sociology of law and legal 
theory. After leaving CADE, Campilongo became Executive-Secretary of the Ministry of Justice, as well as 
kept his career as a law professor and a lawyer – now incorporating more intensily a practice in competition 
law. At USP law school, he was involved with the “PET-CAPES Sociology of Law”, a research group 
coordinated by his former PhD supervisor, José Eduardo Faria – an exponent of Brazilian sociology of law, 
law professor at USP and FGV-SP, and an executive of Itaú bank. 
 
Ronaldo Porto Macedo Júnior, 39 
Macedo held two undergraduate degrees, one in law and the other in social sciences, obtained in the 
mid-1980s, a master’s degree in philosphy (1993), and a PhD in law (1997), all from USP. During his PhD 
research on contract law, he was a visiting doctoral student at Harvard University, where, as revealed in an 
interview, he “was in touch with the economic analysis of law bibliography”, and authors such as Oliver 
Williamson. Since 1992, he is a prosecutor in São Paulo, and after serving CADE went back to his career in 
the Prosecutor’s Office. Prior to his term in CADE, and after it, Macedo was also a law professor, teaching 
courses on legal theory, sociology of law, contract law, and competition. Macedo was also involved with 
“PET-CAPES Sociology of Law research group”, and his PhD supervisor was José Eduardo Faria. 
 
Roberto Augusto Castellanos Pfeiffer, 33 
Pfeiffer graduated in law from USP in 1991, and held a master’s degree in civil procedure obtained at 
the same university in 1998. A prosecutor at the state of São Paulo since 1993, Pfeiffer had professional and 
academic activities related to consumer law. During his undergraduate course in law, he was also a member of 
“PET-CAPES Sociology of Law” research group. In 1999, he served in the staff of a justice of the Brazilian 
Supreme Court, and as a legal advisor of the Ministry of Justice. After his terms in CADE, Pfeiffer resumed 
his career as a prosecutor, and in 2010 completed a PhD in law, focusing on competition policy, at USP. 
 
Thompson Almeida Andrade, 59 
When appointed to CADE, Andrade was a retired public official of IPEA, where he served between 
1976 and 1995, and a professor of economics at UERJ. He graduated in economics from UFMG in 1964, held 
a master’s in economic planning at Vanderbilt University, and a PhD in institutional economics obtained from 
the University of London in 1994. Among his areas of academic activity were regulation, regional and urban 
development, quantitative analysis, simulations, and economectric projections.  
 
Afonso Arinos de Mello Franco Neto, 40 
Member of a prominent Brazilian family of lawyers and politicians, Arinos obtained his 
undergraduate degree in engineering from PUC-Rio, in 1984. In 1988, he earned a master’s degree in 
economics from FGV-Rio, with a dissertation focusing on macroeconomic computational models. In 1993 he 
concluded a PhD in industrial organization at the University of Chicago. As he reported in an interview 
conceded to Dutra (2009, p. 137) his master’s course was organized by Mario Henrique Simonsen, and 
counted with several professors formed in the US with a “quantitative-analytical profile”. In Chicago, he 
attended the classes of Nobel Prizes such as Gary Becker (an exponent of law and economics), and Robert 
Lucas (one of the proponents of neoclassical macroeconomic theory of “endogenous growth” [Herrera 2006]). 
Having worked as an engineer in the early 1980s, since 1993 he was a professor of economics at FGV-Rio, 
teaching graduate courses on microeconomics, international trade, among others. After serving CADE, Arinos 
also worked in providing economic consultancy in antitrust cases. 
 
Miguel Tebar Barrionuevo, 57 
Tebar graduated in law from USP in 1967, and since then was a private practitioner. A member of 
the PSDB, he had occupied several political positions in public administration, such as Secretary of 
Administration and Modernization of the state of São Paulo (1991-1994), coordinator of PSDB’s electoral 
campaign in that state (1994), and was a candidate for the National Congress by the same party in 1994. 
 
Source: elaborated by the author 
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The profile of economists in CADE between July 2000 and July 2002 was similar to 
that of the former composition. Both Andrade and Arinos held PhD degrees in economics 
obtained in the US, were close to academic work, and familiar with quantitative approaches to 
economics, such as economectrics, microeconomics and the economic analysis of law. Arinos 
was what could be reputed as an “expert” for the field of competition policy, and held 
credentials that were highly praised by the view institutionalized in CADE with the hegemony 
of economists since 1996: his PhD, obtained at the University of Chicago, focused on 
industrial organization.  
Lawyers, however, were not only in a higher number at this composition, but also 
started to have a different profile – a trend that would permeate the subsequent years of 
CADE’s composition. Although they did not form a homogeneous group in terms of careers, 
they came from the same circuit: all 5 graduated in USP law school, while prior to them only 
Calliari was from São Paulo. Moreover, 3 of these lawyers were connected to the “PET-
CAPES Sociology of Law” research group at USP law school, coordinated by José Eduardo 
Faria.  
The group of lawyers from USP held credentials that differed from those of the 
previous period – they were more academic, interdisciplinary, and familiarized with 
institutional and legal novelties such as antitrust policy. Macedo’s trajectory is emblematic: as 
he mentioned in an interview, as a visiting doctoral student in Harvard, he had the opportunity 
to get in touch with the law and economics tradition, and the works of economist Oliver 
Williamson. Also in the case of Rodas, who was not part of the “sociology of law” group, but 
yet a professor of international economic law at USP, these connections can be perceived: he 
attended Harvard in the 1970s, participated in several missions to UNCITRAL, and was an 
arbitrator.  
These were therefore lawyers that tended to be more open to the dialogue with 
economics, and thus could represent an antidote to what those who “revolutionized” 
competition policy from 1996 onwards perceived as a problematic “legalistic vision” of the 
1994-1996 period (Lima 1998, p. 124). The only exception to this profile was Tebar, whose 
career developed in the political field, rather than in law. Not by chance, he is one of the 
agents often reputed as an “outlier” in CADE, a “politician” that was not “technical” or 
“academic”. 
 The source of appointments of the president and the commissioners recruited to 
CADE between 2000 and 2001 was also maintained from the previous period: the Ministries 
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of Justice and Finance, especially in the level of secretariats, controlled indications. The 
appointments of the economists Arinos and Andrade were originated at SEAE, in the Ministry 
of Finance256. The Secretary at that time was Claudio Monteiro Considera, who knew Arinos 
from the FGV-RJ, where they were both researchers and professors, and Andrade from IPEA, 
where both of them retired. In the case of lawyers, the close links to SDE were decisive. 
Rodas revealed to be indicated by the Minister of Justice, José Gregori, who was a law 
graduate from USP (Dutra 2009, p. 134). The appointments of Campilongo, Macedo and 
Pfeiffer were articulated by Paulo de Tarso Ramos Ribeiro, who was the Secretary of 
Economic Law of the Ministry of Justice. Ribeiro obtained his PhD in law from USP, in 
1995, under the supervision of Tércio Sampaio Ferraz Junior, and was also a member of the 
“PET-CAPES” group. According to Campilongo, he was recommended to the SDE by Faria, 
who was a close friend of the Minister of Justice, José Carlos Dias, also a law graduate of 
USP257. Tebar’s indication once again differs from the trends identified: according to some 
interviews, he was appointed by Aloysio Nunes, Minister of Justice between November 2001 
and April 2002, former classmate of Tebar at USP law school, and member of the same party, 
the PSDB. 
 In July 2002, with the end of Campilongo’s and Arino’s first term, two other 
commissioners were appointed to CADE258. They were Fernando de Oliveira Marques – a 
lawyer –, and the economist Cleveland Teixeira.  
 
Table 23. Trajectories: Marques, and Teixeira 
 
Fernando de Oliveira Marques, 39 
Marques held degrees in economics and law obtained from PUC-SP in the mid-1980s. A competition 
lawyer and law professor teaching courses on antitrust, he celebrated one of the first cooperation agreements 
between CADE and an educational institution, in 1997, when Gesner Oliveira was the president of the 
Council. 
 
Cleveland Teixeira, 36 
After graduating in economics from USP, in 1981, Teixeira pursued a master’s degree at FGV-SP, 
with a dissertation focusing on the control of mergers reviews in Brazil, supervised by Gesner Oliveira, by 
then CADE’s president. Between 1990 and 1998, he was a consultant in economics, and in 1999 he became 																																																								
256 Besides the reference to SEAE, Arinos also identifies another possible source of support for his appointment 
in the Brazilian Central Bank’s president, Armínio Fraga (Dutra 2009, p. 138). Fraga was an economist 
graduated from PUC-Rio, with a master’s in economics at the same university, and a PhD in economics obtained 
from Princeton University. 
257 During Ribeiro’s period at the SDE, other law graduates of USP were working at that Secretariat: José 
Reinaldo Lima Lopes, who held a PhD in law supervised by Faria, and was in charge of the Department of 
Consumer Protection, and Caio Mário da Silva Pereira Neto, PhD from Yale, who was the director of the 
Department of Economic Protection and Defence of SDE. 
258 Campilongo’s term wasn’t renovated because he became Executive-Secretary of the Ministry of Justice. The 
Minister, by that time, was Paulo de Tarso Ribeiro. 
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the economic advisor of the National Confederation of Commerce’s president. In the same year, he joined 
SEAE, through the indication of his former PhD supervisor. By 2001, Teixeira was Deputy-Secretary of 
SEAE. After leaving CADE, Teixeira created an economic consultancy that, among other areas, works in 
antitrust cases. His partner at the firm is Luis Fernando Rigato, an economist that would be appointed 
commissioner to CADE in 2004. 
 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
 With the arrival of these two commissioners, the age average once again dropped, 
reaching to 40 years old, but the general profile of the council was practically intact: the 
recruitment of agents who combined academic involvement and professional practice. As 
both a lawyer and economist, and with a long career as a professor of economic law and a 
private practitioner of competition policy, Marques can be considered an expert in the subject. 
Moreover, although I classified him as a lawyer due to a professional career as a law 
professor, and being partner of a law firm, Marques’ appointment also indicates a mitigation 
in the professional balance in the Council: at this point, there were 3 commissioners with 
training in economics.  
Similarly, although Teixeira didn’t have an academic career equivalent to Arinos, he 
was working at SEAE, and had experience in antitrust policy. Both appointments came from 
the Ministry of Finance. While Marques mentioned that his appointment was suggested by 
Malan, the Minister of Finance, to Miguel Reale Junior (a lawyer and law professor of USP), 
by then Ministry of Justice, Teixeira’s name was first suggested by his boss at SEAE – 
Claudio Monteiro Considera. Teixeira’s arrival at SEAE in the first place was articulated by 
Gesner Oliveira, who had been his supervisor at the master’s he completed at FGV-SP in 
1998. 
 The dominance of lawyers in the council had effects beyond the anecdotal “gavel” of 
president Rodas. Several measures related to institutional design, and procedures were taken 
between 2000 and 2001. In August 2000, for instance, an inter-ministerial working group 
formed by CADE, SEAE, SDE, the Ministries of Planning, and of Industry and Commerce, as 
well as the Presidency was in charge of proposing a new institutional design for the SBDC259. 
In the same year, a typical legal institute of US law was imported to Brazil: the “leniency 
agreement”. CADE’s Annual Reports of the period also illustrate the possible influence 
toward a legal approach that its composition was exercising. In the year 2000 (CADE 2000, p. 																																																								
259 The proposal was presented to the Presidency of the Republic on November 2002. The document preserved 
the substantive concepts of the law of 1994, redesigning the institutional competences of CADE, SDE, and 
SEAE into a single regulatory agency. These were the first discussions of a long process that would result in the 
new competition act of 2011 (law number 12.529/11), which replaced the law of 1994 and started to be enforced 
in May 2012. 
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140-177), for the first time an item of the Annual Report was integrally dedicated to the 
supervision of the judicialization of CADE’s decisions, being replicated in other reports from 
that moment on. The same report announced the “implantation of a jurisprudential, 
legislative, and doctrinal database about competition defense” in CADE (2000, p. 192). In 
2002, infralegal instruments to deal with the “problem” generated by the “post-merger 
review” system adopted in Brazil were also created: these were the Precautonary Order and 
the Agreement to Preserve Reversibility of Transaction (APRO)260. Through these measures, 
CADE determines that an MR in which it visualizes potential anticompetitive effects cannot 
be consummated until the Council enacts its final decision. 
 Nevertheless, initiatives of the preceding compositions were being replicated, notably 
the conduction of seminars with foreign specialists, lawyers and economists (now including 
members of the former composition), of cooperation agreements with governmental 
institutions, universities and market associations, and the participation on conferences abroad. 
The majority of lawyers was not an impediment for yet another continuity from the previous 
period: the deepening of the economicization of competition policy. On August 1st 2001, a 
joint ordinance signed by the Secretary of Economic Monitoring, Claudio Considera Correa, 
and the Secretary of Economic Law, Paulo de Tarso Ribeiro, enacted the “Guidelines for the 
analysis of horizontal mergers”261. One year later, on December 12th 2002, through an 
ordinance signed by Considera, SEAE published the “Guidelines for the economic analysis of 
predatory pricing”262. Two economists had an active role in designing the guidelines: the 
Secretary Considera, and SEAE’s Deputy-Secretary for regulation, competition policy and 
trade-related matters, Paulo Correa, appointed by Considera in 1999. 
  
Table 24. Trajectories: Considera and Correa 
 
Claudio Monteiro Considera 
Considera held an undergraduate degree in economics from UFF, a master’s degree in economics 
from UnB, and a PhD in economics from the University of Oxford. He was a public official at IPEA, and later 
served at the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE). He was invited to become the Secretary 
of SEAE by his former colleague at IPEA, the Minister of Finance, Pedro Malan. Considera is currently a 
professor of economics at UFF, and a researcher at FGV-Rio. 
 
Paulo Correa 																																																								
260 Resolução n. 28, of June 24th 2002, which instituted the Medidas Cautelares, and the Acordos de Preservação 
da Reversabilidade da Operação. 
261 Portaria Conjunta SEAE/SDE n. 50, of August 1st 2001. A first version of the guidelines had already been 
published through an ordinance signed only by SEAE in 1999, through the Portaria SEAE n. 39, of June 29th 
1999. 
262 Portaria SEAE n. 70, of December 12th 2002. 
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Correa held an undergraduate degree in economics from the UFRJ (1993), and a master’s in 
economics from the University of Western Ontario (1997). Prior to joining SEAE, he was a professor of 
economics, a researcher in the Brazil's National Development Bank (1994-1996) and in Brazil's  International 
Trade Foundation (1992-1994). He also served as an advisor of the Panamanian government in competition 
and trade policies (1997-1999), helping to design Panama’s merger guidelines. He was invited to SEAE by 
Considera through the indication of José Tavares de Araujo Junior, who would replace Considera as Secretary 
with the change of government in 2003. Correa and Tavares knew each other from UFRJ. In 2002, Correa 
joined the World Bank in Washington, as a Senior Economist in the Infrastructure, Private Sector and Finance 
Department in the Latin American and Caribbean region. 
 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
As Considera explained in an interview, the idea to design the guidelines stemmed 
from the “astonishment” that SEAE enacted different opinions on similar situations, and was 
based on foreign experiences, notably the US and Europe: 
 
There was no clear rule on competition defense, so together with Paulo 
Correa we decided to implement something similar to what more advanced 
countries in this area have: a merger guideline. Based on the American 
guideline, on the Panamenian guideline, and some European guidelines, we 
constructed our own.  
 
With the objective of providing “an instrument for the enforcement of the rule of 
reason”, the guidelines to merger reviews presented a detailed definition of several economic 
concepts, established a step-by-step procedure for the analysis of MR, and defined parameters 
of concentration based on indexes such as the HHI and Ci. Similarly, the guidelines for 
predatory pricing defined several antitrust concepts based on economic theories, and 
established economic parameters for the detection of anticompetitive practices. 
Considera was also responsible for implementing other changes that affected 
competition policy. In the institutional level of SEAE, one change was recomposing almost 
entirely the secretariat with a new staff. What motivated the radical shift was the fact that 
“people were all addicted to the idea of price control”. A new generation of economists was 
brought in to replace them, people that, according to Considera, “were recently coming out of 
academia, and that went there without any addictions”. The measure would have inspired 
Paulo de Tarso Ribeiro, who conducted a similar transformation at SDE, which until his 
appointment was directed by Ruy Coutinho do Nascimento – CADE’s president in the 
criticized 1994-1996 period. Both SEAE and SDE were thus being also economicized, or at 
least being aligned to a different economic creed263. 																																																								
263 It is interesting to note that Considera’s predecessor at SEAE was a lawyer, Bolívar Moura Rocha. Rocha 
graduated in law from USP, and obtained a PhD degree from the University of Geneve, in Switzerland, in 
political science, during which he was a visiting student at Georgetown University. Prior to joining the 
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During his term as Secretary, Considera also performed another transformation in 
respect to the procedures to analyze MR at SEAE. As he maintained, “something that has 
always caught our attention was that most part of merger reviews were irrelevant”. The 
solution found by the Secretary was inspired by the American antitrust experience: the 
creation of a “fast track” for cases “with no relevance”. The US antitrust authorities not only 
served as an example, but were also called by Considera to train his staff in subjects other 
than MR. He reported a training course conducted by the DOJ and the FBI to SEAE’s staff 
and public prosecutors about how to conduct investigations in cartel cases. 
In the period between July 2000 and December 2002, several measures within CADE, 
but also in SEAE and SDE, thus gave continuity to the trends initiated in 1996, even if 
through a different composition in terms of professional balance. Decisions taken by CADE 
even suggest that the regulatory standards consolidated in the preceding years were furthered. 
Out of the 1375 MR decided in the period, 98,2% were integrally cleared by CADE, and only 
1.6% were approved with some sort of restriction. Other 2 MR, which in practice comprised a 
single operation, were not approved by the Council, thus meaning the first rejections since the 
1994-1996 period. However, as I will discuss in Chapter 6, these rejections were entirely 
consistent with the neoliberal creed that was being consolidated in the field’s practice.  
 
5.3.2 The confirmation of “autonomy” despite of political change 
 
In 2003, with the change of government (the 8 years of Cardoso’s administration were 
concluded, and Lula took office for his first mandate in January), CADE’s composition was 
once again to be remade. Macedo didn’t complete his first term, due to a judicial battle 
between him and the Prosecutor’s Office where he worked, around the compatibility of the 
appointment with his career as a prosecutor. In the beginning of 2004, Tebar finished his first 
term, and was not appointed for a second mandate. Also in 2004, Rodas and Andrade 
concluded their second and last term, and Marques and Teixeira did not have their terms 
renovated. Teixeira explained in an interview that the new Minister of Justice of Lula – 
Márcio Thomaz Bastos – and his Secretary of Economic Law, Daniel Goldberg, both lawyers 
from USP, wanted to renovate his term. However, due to a delay of 6 months in the 
processing of this appointment in the Federal Senate, he decided not to wait, and left CADE. 																																																																																																																																																																													
government, he served as a legal assistant of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). He was called by the 
Minister of Finance, Pedro Malan, to work on the coordination of foreign debt negotiations, and was later 
appointed Secretary at SEAE. 
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The new composition made by Lula started in the end of 2003, when the lawyer Luiz 
Alberto Esteves Scaloppe was appointed. Together with Scaloppe, Pfeiffer, who had been 
appointed in 2001, had his term renovated for another two years. In the middle of 2004, a new 
president and three other commissioners were appointed. The president was the economist 
Elizabeth Mercier Querido Farina, and commissioners were the lawyer Ricardo Villas Boas 
Cueva, and the economists Luiz Fernando Rigato and Luiz Carlos Thadeu Delorme Prado. 
From the end of 2004 until the end of 2005, CADE was thus composed by three lawyers and 
three economists. 
 
 Table 25. Trajectories: Scaloppe, Farina, Cueva, Rigato, Prado 
 
Luiz Alberto Esteves Scaloppe, 51 
Scaloppe graduated in law from a small private university in the state of São Paulo in 1975, and had 
also undergraduate degrees in business and public administration obtained in the end of the 1970s. Besides 
having attended several specialization courses on traditional areas of the law, such as administrative law, 
criminal procedure, and labor law, Scaloppe held a master’s degree in sociology from PUCSP, and a master’s 
degree in public education, obtained from the Federal University of Mato Grosso (UFMT). Since 1997, he 
was a PhD candidate in legal philosophy at the University of Barcelona (Spain), but by the time of his 
appointment he hadn’t concluded the course. A professor of law at UFMT, he was a public prosecutor in the 
same state. Long involved in politics, Scaloppe ran for the City Council of Cuiabá, and for governor of the 
state of Mato Grosso by the PT in the late 1980s and early 1990s. He had also been the president of Mato 
Grosso’s labor union of teachers between 1986 and 1989. 
 
Elizabeth Mercier Querido Farina, 51 
An economist graduated from USP in 1976, with a PhD in industrial organization obtained from the 
same university in 1983, Farina is often reputed as one of the “pioneers” of antitrust economics in Brazil. She 
was a professor of microeconomics and industrial organization, and dean of the department of economics of 
USP by the time of her appointment, and had experience working as an economic consultant in antitrust cases 
presented before CADE, and in publishing academic pieces about competition policy. As a professor of 
economics, she was involved in a joint project with the Liberal Institute (Instituto Liberal), in which her 
students of microeconomics were taken to visit multinational corporations and “see the real world” (Farina in 
Dutra 2009, p. 220). As Farina informed in an interview to Dutra (2009, p. 220), the creation of the Liberal 
Institute was motivated by the fear multinational corporations had of the treatment distinction between 
national and foreign capital instituted by the Constituiton of 1988. After serving as CADE’s president until 
2008, in 2012 Farina retired as a professor, and became the president of the Sugar Cane Industry Union in 
Brazil (UNICA), the largest industrial association of the sectors of sugar and bioethanol production. In 2013, 
she was appointed a member of FIESP’s Council of Agrobusiness. 
 
Ricardo Villas Boas Cueva, 42 
Cueva concluded his law degree in USP in 1984, and later obtained a master’s in environmental tax 
law from Harvard University (1990), and a PhD in the same subject from the University of Frankfurt at Main, 
in 2001. During his undergraduate degree in law, he was a researcher of “PET-CAPES Sociology of Law” 
group, and had his final graduation work supervised by Tércio Sampaio Ferraz Junior. A prosecutor between 
1985 and 1987, and lawyer between 1987 and 1988, in 1987 he was approved to be an attorney at PGFN. 
Between 1991 and 1994, he was appointed deputy-Attorney-General of his former law professor, Ferraz 
Junior. When appointed to CADE, Cueva represented the PGFN at a collegiate organ within the Ministry of 
Finance that regulated the capital market. After serving CADE until 2008, he worked as legal consultant in 
competition law, and in 2011 was appointed a justice at the Brazilian Superior Court of Justice (STJ). 
  
Luiz Fernando Rigato, 34 
Rigato graduated in economics from USP in 1993, and obtained a master’s degree in corporate 
economics from FGV-SP in 1999, during which he was a classmate of Cleveland Teixeira (commissioner 
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2002-2004). By the time of his appointment, he was a PhD candidate in economics at FGV-SP, supervised by 
Arthur Barrionuevo Filho (commissioner 1997-1999). In the year 2000, by Teixeira’s indication, he was 
appointed Coordinator-General of SDE, a position equivalent of a “chief-economist”, where he stayed until 
the end of Cardoso’s government. After working for a short period as a consultant at a law firm, in 2003 he 
was invited to join SEAE, where he served until 2004, when he was appointed to CADE. After leaving 
CADE, he concluded his PhD thesis in 2005, on competition policy, became a researcher at FGV-SP, and a 
partner of an economic consultancy with Cleveland Teixeira. 
 
Luiz Carlos Thadeu Delorme Prado, 52 
After finishing law school at UFRJ in 1975, Prado graduated in economics from Universidade 
Cândido Mendes, in Rio, in 1977. Here classified as an economist, he has never practiced the law. His 
graduate studies were a master’s in production engineering from UFRJ, obtained in 1982, and a PhD in 
economic history from the University of London, in 1991. A professor of economics at UFRJ since 1994, 
Prado had several publications on economic history, and political economy. As illustrated by his academic 
publications, such as an article titled “Lessons from an old master: John Kenneth Galbraith”, Prado was close 
to Keynesian approaches, as well as to Latin American structuralism. In 2004, he was appointed to coordinate 
the Industrial Directorate of BNDES by Carlos Lessa, nominated president of the bank by Lula. Lessa, a PhD 
in economics by UNICAMP and a disciple of Celso Furtado’s developmentalist economics, served as 
professor of ECLAC in the 1960s, and founded UNICAMP’s Institute of Economics, reputed as a center of 
heterodox economics in Brazil. After leaving CADE, Prado resumed his activities as a professor of 
economics, and has worked as an economic consultant in antitrust cases. 
 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
The composition formed under Farina’s presidency brought new agents into CADE, 
and once again was about to shift the balance between lawyers and economists, but the overall 
tendencies identified since 1996 were being preserved. The group was highly titled: there 
were 3 PhDs, and 2 PhD candidates. Among economists, two of them – Farina and Rigato – 
had similar profiles to those of the previous period. Rigato was already part of the SBDC 
since the year 2000, when he served at the SDE, and Farina was a specialist in industrial 
economics. Prado was a novelty in the council, if compared to the trajectories of other 
economists in CADE. While the prior compositions, and even his colleagues appointed in 
2003/2004 were specialized in industrial economics, microeconomics, and had often 
academic connections to the US economic mainstream, Prado’s work was more focused on 
developmental economics, and political economy, and his theoretical influences were rather 
Keynesian authors, and Latin American structuralism. 
The two lawyers appointed did not contrast to the observed pattern. Cueva was a law 
graduate from USP, connected to the “PET-CAPES” group that dominated the 2000-2004 
composition, with academic experiences in the US, and a professional career combined with 
political appointments since 1991. Scaloppe’s appointment, on the other hand, was an 
equivalent to that of Tebar in 2002. They were both non-experts in economic or competition 
law, and had their careers strongly associated to politics. An important difference among them 
was perhaps that Scaloppe had also developed a legal career, as a public prosecutor. Just as 
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Tebar was reputed as an “outlier” in the previous period, Scaloppe was seen as “not 
vocationed” for antitrust policy. Nevertheless, once the council was dominated by “technical” 
commissioners, his lack of vocation did not affect CADE. 	
The dynamics of appointments was also mostly preserved, as the Ministries of Justice 
and Finance closely controlled the reformulation of the Council. Rigato’s appointment was 
articulated within SEAE, by Secretary José Tavares de Araújo Junior. Farina and Cueva were 
invited by SDE’s Secretary, Daniel Goldberg. As Farina recalled in an interview conceded to 
Dutra (2009, p. 221), Goldberg argued in his invitation that “it was important that [the name] 
came from academia, to be a neutral name at that moment”. In the same interview, Farina 
mentioned that her name had been ventilated to compose CADE in 1998 (Dutra 2009, p. 221), 
so it is likely that the perception that she was “neutral” came from before, also under 
Cardoso’s administration, and probably from within the Ministry of Finance. The sources of 
the appointments of Prado and Scaloppe contrasted to this general trend. As informed by an 
interviewee, Prado’s indication was probably originated at the BNDES, and Scaloppe’s 
appointment, again similarly to Tebar’s trajectory, came from the political field. His name 
would have been articulated by José Dirceu, who was the President’s Chief of Staff by that 
time. 
At first sight, the practice of competition policy in the period 2004-2005, as reflected 
by the result of its decisions, was slightly different from the previous compositions. From 
January 2004 to December 2005, out of the 1002 MR analyzed, 8,08% received some sort of 
restriction, and 1 operation was rejected264. The number of restrictions imposed is lower, 
however, if it is considered that only five operations that received restrictions entailed 53 MR 
presented separately. Thus, if the number of operations restricted was, in practice, of 28, it 
corresponds to 2,9% of restrictions imposed in the period – close to the average in the 
preceding years. 
Between the end of 2005 and the beginning of 2006, three new commissioners were 
appointed to CADE, replacing Pfeiffer and Andrade, who finished their second term, and 
Scaloppe, whose mandate was not renovated265. Two economists and a lawyer were brought 
																																																								
264 This was the MR number 08012.001697/2002-89, decided on February 2004, through which the multinational 
Nestlé bought the Brazilian chocolate and candy industry Garoto. The operation generated a concentration of up 
to 65% in certain markets. 
265 In April 2005, Lula appointed the lawyer Denise Maria Ayres Abreu to CADE, but withdrew the nomination 
in July. Similarly to Scaloppe, Abreu was also said to be connected to José Dirceu. She was his classmate at 
PUC-SP law school, and by 2005 occupied the position of deputy secretary for legal affairs at the Presidential 
Chief of Staff’s office. The cancellation of the appointment was related to the fact that, according to the 
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into CADE, again consolidating the logics of composition that was hegemonizing the field 
since 1996, and shifting the professional balance between lawyers and economists (2 against 
5) to the level observed between 1997 and 1998. The economists appointed were Paulo 
Furquim Azevedo, and Abraham Benzaquem Sicsú, and the lawyer was Luis Fernando 
Schuartz. 
 
Table 26. Trajectories: Furquim, Sicsú, and Schuartz 
 
Paulo Furquim Azevedo, 41 
Furquim graduated in business management from FGV-SP in 1986, and held a master’s and a PhD 
degree in industrial organization and competition policy obtained from USP, in 1992 and 1996, respectively. 
During his PhD, which was supervised by Elizabeth Farina, he was a visiting doctoral student at the 
University of California, at Berkeley, where he was co-supervised by Oliver Williamson. Since the early 
1990s, Furquim was a professor of economics, teaching disciplines such as industrial organization and 
agricultural economics. Two years prior to his appointment to CADE, he joined the FGV-SP as a professor. 
After serving CADE, he resumed his activity as a professor of economics, was appointed a member of 
FIESP’s Council of Agribusiness, and obtained a post-doctoral degree in economics from the MIT. 
Academically involved with competition policy and economic analysis of the law, he has also worked as an 
economic consultant in antitrust cases. 
 
Abraham Benzaquem Sicsú, 53 
Sicsú graduated in production engineering from USP, in 1976, obtained a master’s degree in 
economics from the Federal University of Pernambuco (UFPE), in 1980, and a PhD in economics from 
UNICAMP, in 1985, supervised by Luis Gonzaga Belluzo. A professor of economics at UFPE since the late 
1980s, he has thought courses on industrial economics, industrial organization, economic history, among 
others, and specialized on economic development and technological innovation. Sicsú is also a member of the 
Celso Furtado International Center for Development Policies. 
 
Luis Fernando Schuartz, 39 
A graduate in law from PUCSP, and mathematics from USP, in 1989, Schuartz held a master’s in 
constitutional law from the University of Frankfurt at Main, where he presented a dissertation on the 
independence of the German Central Bank in 1992. He also obtained his PhD degree from Frankfurt, in the 
area of legal philosophy, in 1999. In his academic career, Schuartz conducted courses and published articles 
and books on topics such as legal philosophy, competition law, economic analysis of law, game theory, and 
rational choice theory. Among his publications, there is one quoted in this dissertation (Schuartz 2009), in 
which Schuartz, relying on Richard Posner, analyzes the Brazilian competition policy experience, and 
attributes the “satisfactory quality of enforcement” observed since 1994, among other factors, to the 
expressive influence of economists, and to the impermeability of competition law to “substantive 
constitutional arguments”. In 1992, he worked as a lawyer with Tercio Sampaio Ferraz Junior. By the time of 
his appointment, he was a professor of law at FGV-RJ, and a lawyer at a large law firm in São Paulo, having 
acted before CADE in several occasions.  
 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
Although I was not able to identify how Sicsú was taken to CADE 266 , the 
appointments of Furquim and Schuartz obeyed the general dynamic observed in the previous 
periods: their names emerged from within the SBDC. Furquim was supervised in his PhD 																																																																																																																																																																													
newspaper Valor Econômico of June 29th 2005 (p. A4), the new Presidential Chief of Staff – Dilma Rousseff, 
who would become President in 2010 – required Abreu to stay at her position.  
266 As an economist trained at UNICAMP, it is likely that his appointment was articulated through this network, 
which was the same as Prado’s. 
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thesis by Farina, who by then was CADE’s president, and had worked with her in economic 
consultancies in antitrust cases. It is said that Schuartz, in turn, was first recommended by 
Cueva, who was a commissioner since 2004. They knew each other from the University of 
Frankfurt at Main, were they both did their PhDs in the 1990s. As Schuartz mentioned in an 
interview with Dutra (2009, p. 265), at first he feared that the appointment would compromise 
his academic career, but was convinced to accept the offer by “three friends: Afonso Arinos, 
Ronaldo Porto Macedo Junior, and Celso Campilongo” – all three appointed commissioners 
to CADE between 2000 and 2001. 
The profiles of these three commissioners reveal, on the one hand, a tendency that 
could already be observed in CADE’s historical composition, and on the other, the beginning 
of a possible shift. Furquim and Schuartz had trajectories that were consistent with the 
profiles of economists and lawyers appointed to CADE since 1996. Sicsú, however, Being an 
economist closer to structuralist economics and the UNICAMP school, was the second 
exemplary of a commissioner with a profile that until then was exceptional. By 2008, 
nevertheless, the Council was still dominated by economists that replicated the dominant 
profile in CADE since 1996.  
The continuity noticed in the composition of CADE despite its parallel reformulation 
to the change of government was not restricted to CADE. Also in SDE and SEAE the agents 
appointed in the initial years of Lula’s administration were connected to those who previously 
ran the secretariats. In the case of SEAE the continuity reverberated the broader composition 
of the Ministry of Finance. As Novelli (2010) explains, during Lula’s first mandate, when 
Antonio Palocci was appointed Minister of Finance, the exchange, monetary and fiscal 
policies practiced by Cardoso were to a large extent reproduced. This can be explained by the 
fact that the “nucleus of macroeconomic policy, of the orthodoxy represented, above all, by 
PUC-Rio economists”, and/or economists connected to the international and national financial 
markets, and with training in the US was maintained (Novelli 2010, p. 235). 
In SEAE, between 2003 and 2006, two economists occupied the position of Secretary: 
José Tavares de Araújo Júnior, and Hélcio Tokeshi. In SDE, a young lawyer became 
Secretary in 2003, and stayed in office until 2006: Daniel Goldberg.  
 
Table 27. Trajectories: Tavares, Tokeshi, and Goldberg 
 
José Tavares de Araújo Júnior 
PhD in economics from the University of London, and a retired professor of economics at UFRJ, 
Tavares had been long involved in political positions when appointed to SEAE. In the late 1980s, during 
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Sarney’s administration, he was the executive secretary of the Commission of Customs Policy, and 
implemented a series of deregulatory measures of tariffs to “modernize” the “protectionist system” in place in 
Brazil (Castelan 2010, p. 584). During Cardoso’s government, Tavares was appointed executive secretary of 
the Foreign Trade Chamber. A specialist in international trade, competition policy, and industrial 
organization, he has worked as a consultant for several international organisms, such as the World Bank, 
OAS, and ECLAC. Since he left SEAE, he coordinates an economic think thank, and is a partner of an 
economic consultancy, together with Régis Bonelli, and Armando Castelar Pinheiro (already mentioned in the 
trajectory summary of Lucia Helena Salgado – Table 18). Tavares served at SEAE between March 2003 and 
July 2004. 
 
 
Hélcio Tokeshi, 40 
Tokeshi held an undergraduate degree in economics from USP (1985), a master’s in economics from 
UNICAMP (1988), and a PhD in economics from the University of California, at Berkeley (1996), where, as 
reported in an interview, he attended several courses taught by Oliver Williamson. Between 1983 and 1987, 
he was a junior researcher at the think thank Brazilian Center for Analysis and Planning (CEBRAP), in a 
group formed by José Serra (who would become Cardoso’s Minister of Planning), and integrated by, among 
others, Gesner Oliveira. After working as an economist in a Brazilian corporation, in 1990 Tokeshi was 
appointed to a position at the Secretariat of Economic Policy of the Ministry of Finance, during Collor de 
Mello’s administration, where he was in charge of negotiating with the IMF and foreign private banks, as well 
as of developing simulation models to forecast inflation and set monetary policy targets. Between 1997 and 
1999, he served the World Bank as an economist, and later was hired as a consultant at McKinsey & Co (one 
of the “Big Three” in management consulting services), at the offices in São Paulo and New York. After a 2 
year period in SEAE, between 2004 and 2008 Tokeshi went back to McKinsey & Co, then as an associate 
principal. Since 2009, he is the managing director of Estruturadora Brasileira de Projetos (EBP), a company 
acting as a bid advisor for infrastructure projects. Tokeshi served at SEAE between July 2004 and May 2006. 
 
Daniel Krepel Goldberg, 27 
Graduated in law from USP, Goldberg held a master’s degree obtained from a joint program between 
USP law school and the Harvard University School of Government, and a PhD in competition law from USP. 
During the period at Harvard, he specialized in tax law, and attended courses on microeconomics required by 
the School of Government. As an undergraduate student, he was involved with a research group on theories of 
justice, coordinated by José Reinaldo de Lima Lopes, a professor of law and PhD from USP (supervised by 
Faria) who occupied a directive position at SDE in the year 2000. Prior to joining the government, he was a 
lawyer at Lilla, Huck & Malheiros Advogados, a prestigious law firm in São Paulo. Between 2001 and 2002, 
he was a corporate lawyer at Wilmer, Cutler and Pickering, in Washington D.C. After leaving SDE in 2006, 
he joined the investment bank Morgan Stanley, in New York City, was appointed the head of mergers and 
acquisitions, and later president of the bank in Brazil. In 2011, he created a hedge fund which acts in 
partnership with the multinational investment firm Farallon Capital Management, based in the US.  
 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
As it is possible to observe from their trajectories, both Tavares and Tokeshi were 
connected to economists who produced economic policy at the Ministry of Finance during 
Cardoso’s government. Moreover, they had themselves worked in governmental organs prior 
to the change in the administration, and in positions where some of the characteristic 
neoliberal adjustments (for instance, tariff deregulation and foreign debt negotiation with the 
IMF). Their academic trajectories was also very similar to many of the economists appointed 
to produce competition policy in Brazil: PhD degrees, connections and experience in the field 
of economics in the US, works in the World Bank, and as economic consultants in the market.  
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The were both also close to one of the Brazilian exponents of “law and economics”, 
Armando Castelar Pinheiro, who obtained a PhD in economics from Berkeley, during the 
same period as Gesner Oliveira, and with the same supervisor: Albert Fishlow. Tavares was 
Pinheiro’s partner at an economic consultancy created in 1997, and Tokeshi mentioned in an 
interview to have met Pinheiro, as well as Lucia Helena Salgado while in Berkeley. Besides 
integrating the same research group as Gesner Oliveira in CEBRAP, Tokeshi also mentioned 
in an interview that Oliveira, who had concluded his PhD in Berkeley by 1989, wrote him a 
recommendation letter to support his application to that university.   
Similarly, at the SDE Golderg combined a highly qualified academic profile, with a 
professional career as a corporate lawyer, even working at a law firm abroad, and later 
becoming the president of Morgan Stanley in Brazil. As some of the lawyers that started to 
emerge in the field of competition policy in the previous years, he had some training in 
economics, which he acquired through an experience in the US. He was also connected to 
those who produced competition policy in the previous administration: his supervisor during 
the undergraduate degree at USP was José Reinaldo de Lima Lopes, who held a PhD in law 
supervised by José Eduardo Faria, and was in charge of the Department of Consumer 
Protection of the SDE in the period 1999-2002. 
Although I was not able to identify the source of Tavares’ appointment to SEAE, the 
cases of Tokeshi and Goldberg fit the general dynamic of recruitment observed until 2003. 
Their arrival in government was directly connected to professional contacts. In the case of 
Tokeshi, the invitation came from Bernard Appy, an economist who was his classmate at the 
undergraduate degree in economics at USP, possessed a master’s degree in economics 
obtained from UNICAMP, and was appointed Executive-Secretary of the Ministry of Finance 
by Antonio Palocci. In the 1980s, Appy was a member of the same research group Tokeshi 
participated, coordinated by José Serra, and integrated by Gesner Oliveira in CEBRAP.  
Both Appy and Tokeshi were also in contact when the latter was working at the 
Secretariat of Economic Policy during Collor’s government, and the former was an economic 
advisor of the Worker’s Party in the National Congress267. Similarly, Goldberg’s appointment 
was mediated by a professional contact: the Minister of Justice, Márcio Thomaz Bastos.  																																																								
267 As Novelli (2010, p. 236) maintains, although Appy didn’t have the same academic or professional trajectory 
of the orthodox economists that hegemonized the Ministry of Finance during Cardoso’s government (when 
Pedro Malan was the Minister), and which were preserved in the Ministry by Antonio Palocci, “he was tuned 
with the [orthodox] conduction of macroeconomic policy”. Another evidence of Appy’s alignment with the 
economists appointed during Cardoso’s government can be found precisely in his connection with Tokeshi, and 
as a consequence, with José Serra and Gesner Oliveira in the early years of his career, at CEBRAP. 
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The arrival of these agents into key-positions of SEAE and SDE deepened the 
consolidation of competition policy in the form it was being shaped since the solution of the 
1996 crisis. Tavares, for instance, understood competition policy in similar terms as those 
articulated by Gesner Oliveira in the mid-1990s, and by his predecessor at SEAE. Illustrative 
of this convergence is how Tavares expressed his view of the role of competition policy, and 
of the merger guidelines enacted by Considera in 2002, in a paper dated of 2006: 
 
The major role of the guidelines is to remember that antitrust law does not 
aim at restricting the size of corporations, or at promoting industrial de-
concentration, but at impeding that market power is exercised in detriment of 
public interest (Araújo Junior 2006, p. 2). 
 
He not only endorsed the role of the guidelines in establishing the “rule of reason” and 
thus a regulation compatible to an economic context where concentration must not be illegal 
per se, or it is seen as necessary for corporate “survival”, but criticized its supposed 
connections to the Harvard school of industrial organization: 
 
However, despite its merits, the guidelines are not exempt of limitations, 
most of which are derived from its analytical framework: the Structure-
Conduct-Performance (SCP) of industrial organization theory. [...] Some 
criteria of that manual [...] have been applied with excessive rigor, 
increasing even more the unrealistic nature of the SCP model, and 
sometimes leading to the decisions that are contrary to the objectives of 
antitrust law (Araújo Junior 2006, p. 2). 
 
Tokeshi’s view of the practice of competition policy in Brazil was also one that 
praised the preceding achievements of SEAE. As he maintained in an interview, a “positive 
aspect” of his term was that the staff composed by Considera between 1999 and 2002 in 
SEAE was largely preserved by Tavares:  
 
This is one of the good things that happens in some places, but which in the 
Ministry of Finance is very much consolidated. When Malan was the 
minister, the Secretary was Claudio Considera, and he assembled a highly 
qualified team in SEAE. When Tavares arrived, he changed only a few 
people. When I arrived, I kept the same deputy secretary, Marcelo Santi, 
which later became the secretary of SEAE. 
 
The idea of continuity despite the change in government was also mentioned by yet 
another interviewee, who was in the SBDC in that period. As he maintained,  
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The new secretary appointed by Lula’s government [Tavares] didn’t come 
dismissing all coordinators. On the contrary, he kept all coordinators in their 
positions. By keeping the technical staff, it was a clear sign of ‘No, we are 
keeping competition policy the same’. If he wanted to change the way of 
thinking of competition policy, which has this neoliberal approach, he would 
have changed all coordinators, but he did the opposite.268 
 
Another indicator of continuity concerns the internationalization of Brazilian 
competition policy. As highlighted by Tokeshi, the OECD had an important role in the 
institutional consolidation of antitrust policy in Brazil. Initiated in 1996, when Gesner 
Oliveira was CADE’s president, the “transfer of knowledge”, as Tokeshi defined, between 
CADE and the OECD was intense in his period as secretary – and in both directions: “From a 
certain moment on, or at least when I was in SEAE, we also had what to teach, what to 
exchange, to talk about the experiments we were making, which were relevant to other 
countries”. 
Goldberg’s period in front of SDE was also marked by the consolidation of some 
trends that came from the preceding years of the field’s practice. As he described, it was a 
“golden period, in which several reforms were done”. Reputed in several interviews as the 
Secretary responsible for implementing important “enhancements” in Brazilian competition 
policy, Goldberg significantly modified the institutional dynamics of the system. As he 
maintained in an interview, the measures adopted by him departed from a “technocratic” 
diagnosis of the field: 
 
My approach for the Secretary of Economic Law at the time was, in a good 
sense, a technocratic approach. [We said:] ‘What are the public policy 
objectives, independently of prescriptive judgments about these objectives?’ 
‘Competition must work in Brazil under these rules? These are the rules of 
the game? Why are these tools completely ineffective? 
 
The diagnosis produced through these questions pointed to several institutional and 
policy bottlenecks. For instance, as Goldberg maintained, given that “the country lived 
decades in a system of regulated prices in which the government dictated, through sectorial 
chambers, what should be the price for each sector”, it was “reasonable to imagine that the 
level of cartelization in the economy was way above what should be expected from a 																																																								
268 The explicit reference to a “neoliberal approach” in Brazilian competition policy – quite exceptional in all 
interviews I conducted – is nevertheless interestingly naturalized by this agent. When asked about how he 
identifies himself in terms of economic lines of thinking, he replied that “Competition defense has much to do 
with a liberal policy, a policy in which we must make the market work. We have to impede that artificial barriers 
are created to the good functioning of the market. I go through this line. But from the academic point of view, I 
don’t. From the academic point of view I don’t follow the liberal line. I have an approach that is more socially 
oriented”. 
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competitive economy”. But, as he added, although “with a lake full of fish”, competition 
policy in Brazil had been ineffective in penalizing conducts. 
The explanation for such ineffectiveness, as he maintained, lied on the Secretariat’s 
infrastructure, which was both precarious, and “inefficient”. As he put it, “it is hard to make 
public policy when the system that protects market efficiency is in itself one of the most 
inefficient organs of the Republic”. Different interconnected measures were taken by Golderg 
to revert this institutional “inefficiency”, without implying an expressive growth in SDE’s 
structure. As he defined it, “to use a financial jargon, we raised the operational leverage of 
SDE”.  
These measures entailed, for instance, the unification of MR analysis by SDE and 
SEAE, which until then gave separate technical opinions on each MR and AP case presented 
to CADE, “eliminating redundancy”269. Goldberg implemented a division of labor, in which 
SEAE would focus on analyzing MR, leaving SDE free to concentrate on Administrative 
Procedures (conduct cases). It didn’t imply that SDE didn’t have to manifest itself on MR 
cases anymore, something that was imposed by the law of 1994 and, as Goldberg maintained, 
“lawyers would oppose”. In practice, however, SEAE would perform the analysis and the 
economists at SDE, if they agreed, would endorse SEAE’s opinion. The inclusion of 
economists in SDE was precisely another measure taken by Goldberg to increase “the 
system’s efficiency”. He created a “Center for Quantitative Studies”, bringing economists 
from IPEA into the SDE, which had the role to produce economic analysis in both MR and 
AP cases. This Center would have been important, for instance, to assist CADE in conducting 
econometric studies in MR decisions. 
Both the decision to focus on AP, and the inclusion of economists to conduct 
econometric studies in SDE were, according to Goldberg, based on the objective of 
emphasizing “practices that were more obviously harmful to welfare”, and didn’t go into the 
“academic discussion between Chicago or post-Chicago, because there were so many cartels 
to catch”. As he put it, 
 
This is something much more academic. [...] It is funny: “post-Chicago, 
Chicago, neoliberal, ordoliberals...” A lot of ink spent in this discussion. But 
our approach was much more econometric. It was literally a quantitative 
approach. 
 																																																								
269 This measure was consolidated through a joint ordinance between SEAE and SDE, the Portaria Conjunta 
SEAE/SDE n. 001, of February 18th 2003. 
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According to him, the “econometric approach” is not determined by any economic 
line of thinking. Rather, what is demanded of an econometric study is what frames the 
analysis in terms of antitrust theory – and the framing adopted by him of focusing on cartels, 
was, however, “consciously” influenced by the Chicago school: 
 
The framing does not occur in the view taken by your econometrist. The 
framing occurs in how many cases of each type arrives to your econometrist. 
This is subtle. And we, in fact, did the framing. Maybe a sociologist of law 
would say that it was a Chicagoan framing, as we started with cartels. It was 
not due to an unshakable belief I had, that the market solves everything, 
those silliness people discuss with so much passion and emphasis. But due to 
the fact that despite the market solving everything or not, the fact was that 
nobody discussed the most serious infractions: cartels. So that’s where we 
started. So, in fact, we adopted a framing somewhat Chicagoan, consciously.  
 
 During Goldberg’s term in SDE, the economicization of Brazilian antitrust policy was 
thus both extended into new domains, with the inclusion of economists into the SDE, and 
deepened, due to a new division of labor that left more space for SEAE to become, in 
practice, the sole analyst of MR. The view that cartels constituted the “most serious 
infractions”, and its corollary emphasis on conducts – a consciously adopted “Chicagoan 
framing” – was also a complement to the trends observed since 1996. The shift of approach is 
noticeable in the decisions made by CADE during Goldberg’s term. While between 1994 and 
2002 549 AP were decided by the Council, and penalties were imposed to 17% of them (93 
cases), in the four years of Goldberg’s appointment, 166 cases were decided, and 38% (63) 
received some sort of penalty. 
 The successors of Tokeshi and Goldberg also illustrate the continuity of competition 
policy in the secretariats. Marcelo Barbosa Saintive, who was deputy-secretary of both 
Tavares and Tokeshi, became secretary of SEAE between June 2006 and April 2007. Saintive 
graduated in economics, and held a master’s in the same area from UFRJ. After serving 
SEAE, he became a director at the same company presided by Tokeshi. Goldberg’s successor 
also came from his close circle at SDE. His first deputy-secretary was Barbara Rosenberg, 
who also accumulated the position of director of the Department of Economic Protection and 
Defence of SDE between February 2003 and December 2005. When Rosenberg left SDE, in 
2006, Mariana Tavares de Araújo, who since 2003 worked in SDE in the area of National 
Consumer Defence Policy, was appointed her substitute.  
Mariana Tavares was the daughter of José Tavares de Araújo Junior – the Secretary of 
SEAE between 2003 and 2004. Prior to joining SDE in 2003 through an invitation of 
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Goldberg, Mariana Tavares had also served SEAE in the period between 2001 and 2002, i.e. 
during Cardoso’s government and prior to her father’s appointment as Secretary. Her role at 
SEAE was of an advisor to Secretary Claudio Considera in the area of international affairs. 
As informed in an interview, she met Considera in Washington D.C. while doing an LLM at 
Georgetown on merger reviews. Considera was visiting Washington together with Paulo 
Correa due to a meeting of the World Bank, and was introduced to Mariana Tavares by her 
father. He later made an invitation for her to join SEAE when back to Brazil.  
In February 2007, when Goldberg left SDE, Mariana Tavares became Secretary, and 
served until November 2010. In 2007, Mariana Tavares appointed the Ana Paula Martinez to 
the position of director of the Department of Economic Protection and Defence of SDE – 
occupied by Rosenberg when Goldberg was the Secretary. Martinez, a competition lawyer 
that went back to Brazil after working in an American law firm in Brussels (and which has 
been quoted several times throughout this dissertation), was Goldberg’s wife. 
 
Table 28. Trajectories: Rosenberg, Mariana Tavares, Martinez 
 
Barbara Rosenberg 
Rosenberg graduated in law from USP in 1997, and held a LLM from the University of California, at 
Berkeley (2001), and a PhD in economic law from USP (2004). While an undergraduate student, Rosenberg 
was a member of the “PET-CAPES Sociology of Law” research group. Her PhD supervisor was Hermes 
Marcelo Huck, a law professor and partner of the law firm in which Goldberg worked before joining SDE. 
She was a foreign associate at Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton (New York, 2001-2002), and attorney for 
the Secretariat of the WTO (2001). After leaving SDE, she became a partner and competition lawyer at 
Barbosa Müssnich & Aragão, a member of IBRAC, and of the international task force of the antitrust section 
of the American Bar Association (ITF-AA). She has also been a member of the leniency working group of the 
International Bar Association, and of the ICN. She was twice nominated among the “40 under 40” worldwide 
competition lawyers (2009 and 2012), and the “Best Lawyer Under 40” by the Global Competition Review. 
She has also worked as a lecturer in competition, international trade, and intellectual property at FGV-SP. 
 
Mariana Tavares de Araújo 
A law graduate from PUC-Rio, Mariana Tavares obtained an LLM in competition law from 
Georgetown University in 2001. She was appointed an advisor to the Secretary of SEAE between 2001 and 
2002, and in 2003 she joined the SDE, where she stayed until 2010. Between 2007 and 2010, Tavares was the 
Secretary of SDE. After leaving the government, in 2011 she became a partner and competition lawyer at 
Levy & Salomão Advogados – the same firm in which Bolívar Moura Rocha, Secretary at SEAE between 
1996 and 1998, is also a partner. 
 
Ana Paula Martinez 
A law graduate from USP (2003), Martinez held a master’s degree in international law from the same 
university (2008), and an LLM obtained from Harvard University (2006), both focusing on competition law. 
Her undergraduate and master’s dissertations were supervised by CADE’s president between 2000-2004, João 
Grandino Rodas. A member of the New York State Bar, and a consultant of the ICN, Martinez was an 
associate in competition law of Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton LLP in Brussels (the same law firm in 
which Rosenberg worked), between 2006 and 2007. She has also worked as a consultant for UNCTAD, 
World Bank, and the government of Colombia in competition policy, and was included among the “Top 
Women in Antitrust” by the Global Competition Review, and is considered one of the 500 top competition 
lawyers of the world by the Who’s Who Legal. Since 2011, she is a partner and competition lawyer at at Levy 
& Salomão Advogados. 
Source: elaborated by the author 
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Until 2010, even after Goldberg left SDE, the Secretary was ran by highly 
internationalized corporate lawyers, with both academic and professional experiences in the 
US, and socially close to him. As these lawyers were involved in the gestation of the series of 
measures Goldberg implemented while Secretary, their appointment can be seen as the 
continuation of the period. In 2008, nevertheless, CADE’s composition was almost entirely 
changed, and a phase of competition policy under a new president started, combining both 
elements of continuity, but also bringing signs of change. 
 
5.4 Contradictory movements  
 
 The period between 2008 and 2012 was marked by changes in CADE and in 
government. Within the competition authority, two different presidents were in charge of 
running the institution. Also, in 2010, Dilma Rousseff, of Lula’s party, was elected President 
of the Republic, and started a new administration in 2011. Within this context, a set of 
contradictory movements can be noticed in the agents recruited to produce competition 
policy. On the one hand, indications of continuity of the previous years could be noticed, such 
as the appointment of a president to CADE that was directly connected to Goldberg. On the 
other, agents with a profile more aligned with those who until then were marginal in the field, 
such as Prado and Sicsú, gained more space. Not by chance, it is in reference to this period 
that the narratives of “politicization” and “interventionism” are often mobilized. 
 
5.4.1 Indications of continuity 
 
 Between January and November 2008, 6 of the 7 seats in CADE were changed. 
Farina, Cueva, Rigato and Prado, all appointed in 2004, finished their second mandates in the 
middle of 2008. Schuartz and Sicsú served for only one term, and left CADE in 2007. Only 
the economist Paulo Furquim, initially appointed in 2004, remained in council, and finished 
his second mandate in December 2008. With the end of most mandates of the council 
presided by Farina and dominated by economists, once again the pendulum swung to the side 
of lawyers. In 2008, 5 lawyers and 1 economist were appointed to CADE, forming the council 
that would enforce competition policy practically until the end of 2009. 
 The lawyers were Arthur Sanchez Badin, appointed president, Fernando Magalhães 
Furlan, Vinicius Marques de Carvalho, Carlos Emmanuel Joppert Ragazzo, and Olavo Zago 
Chinaglia. The economist was César Costa Alves de Mattos. For the most part, a line of 
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continuity can still be traced from these appointments to the previous formations of CADE. 
However, as I will describe, agents with a different profile gradually arrived in CADE from 
2008 to 2011, in parallel to what several interviewees referred as a “politicization” of the 
council, or its more “interventionist” attitude. 
 
Table 29. Trajectories: Badin, Furlan, Carvalho, Ragazzo, Chinaglia, Mattos 
 
Arthur Sanchez Badin, 32 
Graduated in law from USP in 1998, Badin was connected to the “PET-CAPES Sociology of Law” 
research group. After graduation, he became a partner at Lilla, Huck & Malheiros Advogados between 1999 
and 2002, together with Daniel Goldberg. He obtained an MBA in corporate law from PUC-SP in 2001, and 
one in competition defence and regulation from FGV-SP in 2005 (supervised by Arthur Barrionuevo Filho, 
who served as a commissioner in CADE between 1996 and1999). In 2003, Badin became the Chief of Staff of 
Goldberg at SDE. While in SDE, he participated in the agenda of microeconomic reform advanced by the 
Secretariat of Economic Policy of the Ministry of Finance. In 2005, he served as Executive-Secretary of the 
Brazilian Reinssurance Institute, a by then state-owned reinssurance company. According to Badin, he “stayed 
there 6 months contributing to the sanitation of the company, preparing it for privatization, for breaking the 
monopoly”. Also in 2005, he was appointed Attorney-General of CADE, and occupied this position until 
2008, when he became CADE’s president. After leaving CADE in 2010, he obtained a master’s degree in 
economic law from USP, supervised by Hermes Marcelo Huck, a partner of the firm where he worked in the 
late 1990s, became the chief of the legal division of the Camargo Corrêa (2011), a multinational Brazilian 
corporation, an arbitrator at FIESP’s Center of Conciliation, Mediation, and Arbitration, and a lecturer of 
economic and regulatory law at FGV-RJ. 
 
Fernando Magalhães Furlan, 39 
Furlan held two undergraduate degrees by the time of his appointment: in law, obtained from UnB in 
1993, and in management, obtained from the State University of Santa Catarina (UDESC), in 1990. Besides 
having a master’s degree in International Relations, and a PhD in Political Science, both obtained from the 
University of Paris I – Pantheón Sorbonne, between 2000 and 2006, Furlan had also attended a program on 
management of governmental performance, organized by Harvard University School of Government and 
School of Business (2005), and a program on international economic diplomacy at Georgetown University 
(2004). A professor of law in Brasília between 1995 and 1998, since the early 1990s Furlan occupied 
positions in government. Between 1991 and 1993, he was a legal advisor at the National Congress, first of his 
father’s office, a representative elected by the PPB, and later in the office of Inocêncio Oliveira, of the PFL. In 
1994, he became a public official at the Brazilian Supreme Court (STF), and served until 1995. He also 
worked as an executive of foreign relations at the Brazilian food conglomerate Sadia SA (1995-2001), and as a 
foreign associate of McDermott, Will & Emery, in Chicago and Washington (1996), and of O’Connor and 
Company (1997) in Brussels, in the areas of international trade and World Trade Organization (WTO). In 
2001, after participating in the internship program PinCADE, Furlan was appointed Attorney-General of the 
council, and served until 2003. From 2003 to 2007, he was the Chief of Staff of the Ministry of Development, 
Industry, Commerce and the Director of the Department of Economic Defence. The Minister between 2003 
and 2007 was Luiz Fernando Furlan, who until then was the CEO of Sadia SA and Furlan’s cousin. After 
serving as a commissioner for two years, Furlan was CADE’s president between 2010 and 2012. Since 2013, 
he owns a consultancy firm on competition policy, international trade, and regulation. 
 
Vinicius Marques de Carvalho, 30 
A law graduate from USP law school (2001), Carvalho held a joint PhD degree obtained from USP 
and University of Paris I – Pantheón Sorbonne in commercial law, supervised by Calixto Salomão Filho, a 
competition lawyer and law professor, and Eros Roberto Grau, an exponent of Brazilian economic law, and 
justice of STF. While an undergraduate student, Carvalho was a member of the “PET-CAPES Sociology of 
Law” group at USP, supervised by José Eduardo Faria, and was Faria’s teaching assistant in 2002. Between 
2001 and 2006, Carvalho served in different political appointments connected to the Worker’s Party: at the 
city council of São Paulo, in the House of Representatives of the state of São Paulo, and as a legal advisor in 
the Federal Senate. In 2006, he became a federal public official in the career of “Specialist in Public Policies 
and Governmental Management”. Between 2006 and 2007, he was an advisor of CADE’s president, Farina, 
and between 2007 and 2008 he was the Chief of Staff of the Special Secretariat for Human Rights, an organ 
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connected to the Presidency of the Republic. After serving as a commissioner between 2008 and 2010, 
Carvalho was appointed Secretary of SDE, and in 2012 he became CADE’s president. 
 
Carlos Emmanuel Joppert Ragazzo, 31 
Graduated in law from PUC-Rio (1999), Ragazzo obtained an LLM in Competition and Regulation 
Policy from the New York University in 2002, a master’s degree in law from UERJ, in 2005, and a PhD 
degree in law from UERJ in 2008. When appointed to CADE, Ragazzo was the Coordinator-General for 
Competition Defence of SEAE, to which he was appointed in 2003. A public official in the career of 
“Specialist in Public Policies and Governmental Management” since 2005, between 1997 and 2001 he was a 
corporate lawyer at Pinheiro Neto Advogados. In 2002, he was a legal intern at the Federal Trade 
Commission, in the US, and was admitted to the New York State Bar. By the end of 2002, he also participated 
in the internship program of CADE – PinCADE. After serving for almost two mandates as a commissioner, 
Ragazzo was appointed to a new position created in CADE by the recent law of 2011: general superintendent. 
 
Olavo Zago Chinaglia, 33 
Graduated in law from USP in 1996, Chinaglia obtained an MBA in corporate law in 2003, and a 
PhD in corporate law from USP in 2008. A professor of business law since 2002, Chinaglia was a corporate 
and competition lawyer since graduation, working as an associate at L. O. Baptista Advogados (1997-1999), 
Tozzini, Freire, Teixeira e Silva Advogados (1999-2000), and later as a partner at Advocacia Del Chiaro 
(2000-2006 – founded by José Del Chiaro, former SDE between 1989 and 1991), and Velloso, Pugliese e 
Guidoni Advogados (2006-2008). Chinaglia was the son of Arlindo Chinaglia, a congressman of the Worker’s 
Party (PT) and president of the House of Representatives by the time of Olavo’s appointment to CADE. After 
leaving CADE in 2012, since 2013 Chinaglia is a partner and coordinator of the competition law area of 
Veirano Advogados, and a consultant of the International Competition Network (ICN). 
 
César Costa Alves de Mattos, 43 
Mattos graduated in economics from UnB in 1986, obtained a master’s degree in economics, with a 
dissertation of stabilization policies, from PUC-Rio in 1991, supervised by Gustavo Franco, and a PhD in 
economics from UnB in 2001, with a thesis on regulatory reform of the telecommunications sector. During his 
PhD, he was a visiting student at Oxford University. In 2005, he was a visiting scholar at the Haas School of 
Business of the University of California, at Berkeley. The author of several publications on antitrust 
economics, Mattos edited two books about economic analysis of competition policy and the “antitrust 
revolution in Brazil”, both quoted in this dissertation (Mattos 2003, 2008). At least one of his publications was 
co-authored with Gesner Oliveira, CADE’s president between 1996-2000. As a professor of economics, 
Mattos thought several courses on “economic analysis of law and regulation”, microeconomics and 
competition policy. In 1995, Mattos was approved a public official in the position of financial analyst at the 
Ministry’s of Finance National Treasury. In 2002, he became an economic advisor of the National Congress. 
Also active in political positions, between 1993 and 1994 he was an advisor to the World Bank’s mission in 
Brasília, in 1994, Mattos was part of the technical staff of Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s campaign, and later 
became the advisor of José Serra and of PSDB’s office in Congress. Between 1996 and 1999, he was an 
assistant to CADE’s president, Gesner Oliveira (with whom he had worked previously at the Secretariat of 
Economic Policy), and in 2002 he was appointed deputy secretary of international affairs at the Ministry of 
Finance, where he stayed until May 2003, despite the change of government. Between 1999 and 2001, he was 
hired as an economic consultant at the multinational law firm Baker & McKenzie. After leaving CADE in 
2010, Mattos resumed his career as a public official in the National Congress. 
 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
 The profiles of the agents appointed in 2008 for the most part obeyed the logics 
institutionalized in the field since 1996. Besides Badin, the other 5 agents appointed were all 
PhDs, and four of them had experiences abroad, notably in the US. Among law graduates, 4 
of them were corporate lawyers before joining the government, practicing competition law 
before CADE in major law firms. As many other lawyers recruited in the early 2000s, both 
Badin and Carvalho were also former members of the “PET-CAPES” group at USP. The 
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profile of the only economist appointed in 2008 – Mattos – was also similar to that observed 
in the preceding years: an expert on microeconomics, with experience in the US (at the 
University of California, at Berkeley, as several other economists), and prior passages in the 
Ministry of Finance. The trend of rejuvenescence was also intensified in this period, as the 
average of the Council reached its lowest level in history: 35 years old. 
 Similarly, the predominant mechanism of recruitment in 2008 was that identified in 
other compositions: a combination of social capital (for instance, friendship ties), and 
professional capital, such as having been previously connected to competition policy in other 
governmental agencies. Badin, for instance, was the Chief of Staff of Goldberg in SDE, and 
later became his “best man” when the former Secretary married Ana Paula Martinez, who was 
appointed director of one of SDE’s areas in 2007. Badin was also a partner of the same law 
firm where Goldberg worked prior to joining SDE in 2003. His appointment as CADE’s 
Attorney-General in 2005 was supported by Goldberg. Furlan had also worked in CADE 
before being appointed commissioner. In 2001, by the indication of CADE’s president, João 
Grandino Rodas, with whom he had contact during his internship in CADE, and due to his 
research on international trade law, he became CADE’s Attorney-General. As he revealed in 
an interview, in 2005 he had already been invited to become a commissioner by Goldberg. He 
didn’t accept the invitation because he had recently taken a position at the Ministry of 
Industry and Commerce, as requested by his cousin, the Minister. 
 Ragazzo’s appointment to CADE was equally related to his previous participation in 
the SBDC. In 2002, he was recruited to SEAE after the suggestion of the economist 
Cleveland Teixeira, who worked in the Secretariat between 1999 and 2001, and became a 
commissioner in CADE between 2002 and 2004. When in SEAE, Ragazzo’s appointment 
was recommended by the Secretary. Similarly, Carvalho had a previous experience in CADE, 
as an advisor of the president Elizabeth Farina, between 2006 and 2007. His arrival in CADE 
by that time was probably related to his approval as a public official, as CADE requested that 
several of these “specialists” were to be located in the Council. In 2008, his appointment as a 
commissioner was probably mobilized by the Presidency of the Republic, as Carvalho was 
long involved with the Worker’s Party, and worked at the Secretariat of Human Rights, 
subordinated to the President. 
 Mattos also had previous experiences in the SBDC, both in CADE (as an advisor of 
Gesner Oliveira) and in the Ministry of Finance. Although he had connections to the previous 
administration, senator Eduardo Suplicy, of the Worker’s Party, redacted an opinion that, 
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after reconstructing Mattos’ trajectory, including his political appointments during Cardoso’s 
administration, concluded that “the candidate has an academic formation and a professional 
practice that give him credentials to the performance of the position to which he was indicated 
by the President”270. On October 2008, Mattos, an economist of an orthodox strand, was 
approved a commissioner in CADE.  
Interestingly, the appointment of Mattos, gestated at SEAE, occurred after an 
important change of the profile of key-agents in the Ministry of Finance. In March 2006, the 
Minister of Finance Palocci was substituted by the economist Guido Mantega, who was the 
president of BNDES, held a PhD in sociology and is often reputed as part of the non-
orthodox, developmentalist line of thinking. Mantega changed most of Palocci’s team, which 
was still reminiscent of Malan’s staff or ideologically aligned to them, appointing several 
heterodox economists.  
For instance, the Secretary appointed to SEAE in May 2006 was Nelson Henrique 
Barbosa Filho, an economist graduated from UFRJ and with a PhD in economics obtained 
from the New School for Social Research. Mantega had also appointed the substitute of 
Barbosa Filho – Pinheiro Silveira – to the Ministry of Finance. Thus, although there was a 
potential shift of profile in the Ministry, an orthodox economist such as Mattos was appointed 
to CADE by SEAE, corroborating Novelli’s (2010, p. 236) idea that despite the changes 
brought by Mantega, “there was no significant alteration in the orientation of macroeconomic 
policy”. 
 In respect to the last commissioner appointed in the period – the lawyer Chinaglia – 
although it was not possible to directly identify the source of his appointment to CADE, he 
had similar connections to those appointed with him in 2008, or before: a high social and 
political capital – as his father was the president of the National Congress in 2008, and a 
member of the government’s party – and a long career as a competition lawyer in major law 
firms in São Paulo, where several former commissioners and presidents also worked. Another 
indicator of Chinaglia’s connection to the field is the fact that he had been a student of 
Elizabeth Farina’s (CADE’s president between 2004-2008) in a specialization course, as 
declared by Farina in an interview to the newspaper Folha de São Paulo, in which she 
evaluated the commissioners appointed to succeed her271. 
																																																								
270 Opinion (Parecer) number 1.028 of 2008, enacted on October 7th 2008 by senator Eduardo Suplicy (PT) in 
the evaluation of the Message to the Federal Senate (Mensagem ao Senado Federal) number 172 of 2008, p. 4. 
271 Folha de São Paulo, July 21st 2008. 
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 Given both the profiles and the dynamics of appointment of the president and 5 
commissioners appointed in 2008, the rules of the field, as instituted in 1996, were being 
preserved: “technical” appointments of highly educated corporate lawyers, especially with 
experience in the US, and/or previously connected to the field of competition policy, and an 
economist close to mainstream economic theory and methods. An exception that confirms the 
rule was the aborted appointment of the Marxist economist Enéas Costa de Souza in 
November 2007. Graduated in economics and philosophy from the Federal University of Rio 
Grande do Sul, former president of the Regional Development Bank of the Extreme South 
(BRDE), and professor of economic history, Souza was confirmed by the Senate, but in 
August 2008 declined the appointment272. 
 
5.4.2 “Politics” and “interventionism” return 
 
After Badin’s first term as president, by the end of 2010 a new set of changes in 
CADE’s composition started to take place. Badin was not appointed to a second term, 
according to the news of the time, due to his degraded relationship inside CADE, and to 
conflicts with the Ministry of Finance273. Furquim also finished his second term in the end of 
2009, and Vinicius Carvalho was appointed Secretary of Economic Law in March 2010. Also 
in 2010, Mattos finished his term, and wasn’t appointed for another one.  
Thus, in 2010, Fernando Furlan was appointed CADE’s president, and a considerable 
part of his mandate would be conducted within a different council. Between the end of 2009 
and the beginning of 2011, four new commissioners were appointed to CADE. They were the 
lawyers Alessandro Octaviani Luís, and Marcos Paulo Verissimo – both appointed in 2011 –, 
and the economists Ricardo Machado Ruiz, and Elvino de Carvalho Mendonça – appointed in 
2009 and 2011, respectively. 
 
 																																																								
272 The newspaper Folha de São Paulo (02/08/08, “Economista renuncia a vaga no Cade”) speculated that 
although Costa claimed health and professional reasons to decline the appointment, his retreat would a “strategy 
of the government” to open a new spot in CADE to place Badin, who was being appointed for president, but 
faced the opposition of some corporations due to his work in persecuting cartels at SDE. 
273 According to the news website G1 (22/05/2010), SEAE wouldn’t support Badin’s appointment for a second 
term because CADE’s president would have criticized the government (and by extension the by then less 
orthodox Ministry of Finance) in respect to the strategy of using public banks to induce interest rates decrease in 
Brazil. As Badin declared to Folha de São Paulo on August 10th 2010, converging with the Brazilian Central 
Bank’s president, Henrique Meirelles, “The time when it was believed that it is possible to reduce prices through 
decrees is gone” – a similar discourse to that found in the reformist initiatives of the early 1990s, and endorsed 
by the orthodox economists in the administration, such as Meirelles. 
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Table 30. Trajectories: Octaviani, Verissimo, Ruiz, Mendonça 
 
Alessandro Octaviani Luís, 36 
A law graduate from USP (1999), Octaviani held a master’s degree in political science (2005), with a 
dissertation titled “Hegemony and the Law: a reconstruction of Gramsci’s concept”. He also obtained a PhD 
degree in economic law (2008) from the same university, supervised by Gilberto Bercovici, with a thesis titled 
“Genetic resources and development: the Furtadian and Gramscian challenges”. Octaviani was a partner at 
Ernesto Tzirulnik Advocacia between 1998 and 2004, a law firm specialized in insurance law, where he had 
experience with competition law, although not directly in merger reviews. Between 2004 and 2010, he had his 
own law firm: Octaviani & Massonetto Advocacia, specialized in economic law and technological innovation 
law. Since 2008, he is a professor of economic law at three law schools in São Paulo: USP, FGV-SP, and 
Mackenzie. Between 2003 and 2007, he was a guest professor at “PET-CAPES Sociology of Law” group, 
teaching courses on Karl Marx, Max Weber, Antonio Gramsci, and political economy. Since 2008, he 
coordinates a research group at USP law school named “Law and underdevelopment: the Furtadian 
challenge”, which discusses the theory of underdevelopment of Celso Furtado, an exponent of Latin American 
structuralism, and topics such as technological innovation, international finances, “agencies of orthodox 
macroeconomics”, and the restructuring of the developmental state. Octaviani participated of CADE’s 
internship program, PinCADE, in the late 1990s, as an undergraduate student. In the year 2010, Octaviani 
signed a petition organized by professors of public universities in support of Dilma Rousseff’s candidacy. 
 
Marcos Paulo Verissimo, 37 
Verissimo graduated in law from USP in 1997, and obtained a master’s degree (2002) and a PhD 
(2006) in law from the same university, with researches focusing on the judicial review of regulatory 
agencies, and the judicialization of public policies in Brazil, respectively. In 2005, he was a visiting scholar at 
Yale law school. Between 1999 and 2003, he was an associate lawyer at Machado, Meyer, Sendacz e Ópice 
Advogados, a large law firm in São Paulo, and between 2003 and 2007 he was a partner at a law firm founded 
by him. From 2007 to 2009, he was a full time professor at FGV-SP, and coordinated a specialization course 
on economic competition law in partnership with CADE. Since 2010, he is a law professor at USP, teaching 
undergraduate courses such as “Public freedoms”, and “Political and electoral systems”. By the time he was 
appointed to CADE, in 2011, he was serving as Chief of Staff of BNDES’ president for two years.  
 
Ricardo Machado Ruiz, 45 
Ruiz obtained an undergraduate degree in economics from UNICAMP, in 1988, and a master’s 
degree in economics from the same university (1994), with a dissertation on industrial restructuring in Brazil 
in the 1980s and 1990s, supervised by Luciano Coutinho, an exponent of Brazilian heterodox economics, and 
who since May 2007 is the President of BNDES. Ruiz obtained his PhD degree in economics from the New 
School for Social Research, in 2003, with a thesis that discussed Paul Krugman’s Computable General 
Equilibrium Model. A full time professor of economics at UFMG since 1995, Ruiz has taught undergraduate 
and graduate courses on theories of regional and urban development, microeconomics, industrial organization, 
antitrust and regulation economics, among others.  
 
Elvino de Carvalho Mendonça, 42 
Mendonça obtained an undergraduate degree in business management from PUC-Rio in 1994, a 
master’s in economics from UFF (1999), and a PhD in economics from UnB (2003). Since 1997, he is a part 
time professor of economics, teaching courses on macroeconomic and microeconomic theory, and industrial 
organization. Mendonça’s core career is as a public official. Initially appointed Analyst of Finances and 
Control at the Secretariat of the National Treasury of the Ministry of Finance in 2003, he joined SEAE in 
2006, as a member of the staff responsible for analyzing merger reviews. After serving CADE until 2013, 
Mendonça joined the Ministry of Mines and Energy, as a director of the area of Mineral Policy Management. 
 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
The trajectories of most of the lawyers and economists recruited between 2009 and 
2011 – the last appointments under the law 8.884 of 1994 – indicate a shift in respect to the 
dominant profile of the preceding compositions. In the case of lawyers, instead of corporate 
				 304	
lawyers with a considerable private practice in antitrust, and academic or professional 
experience in the US, the two lawyers appointed were mostly academic jurists. Moreover, 
their training and expertise, although in economic law, followed contrasting theoretical 
traditions in respect to those of lawyers that dominated the field of competition policy until 
then. Octaviani, for instance, as revealed by his academic agenda, combined theoretical 
insights of Latin American structuralism (Celso Furtado) with Gramscian theory to study 
Brazilian underdevelopment and its connections to the law. Illustrative of how Octaviani’s 
profile and approach differs from that of lawyers historically dominant in CADE is how he 
connects competition policy to Constitutional objectives:  
 
My political trajectory is one of reflection, militancy, and vote on the left of 
the political spectrum, and some people asked me if it wouldn’t contradict 
with being here [in CADE]. But this is pacific for me. What I came to do 
here is on the Constitution, and my trajectory is attached to the Constitution. 
[...] I am the son of Constitution of 1988, articles 219 and 3rd of the 
Constitution274. 
 
Although Verissimo’s socio-legal approach to the judicialization of public policies 
and regulation, as well as his relatively long career in private practice are not distinctive in 
respect to the several sociologists of law that occupied positions in CADE notably from 2000 
onwards, since 2007 he was a full time professor. Moreover, he was the Chief of Staff of 
BNDES’ president by the time of his appointment – a governmental institution renown to be 
the center of neo-developmentalist policies and heterodox economic thinking since Lula’s 
administration. 
The cases of the two economists appointed in 2011, however, indicate both a 
continuity and a rupture in respect to the historical trends of the field. As Octaviani, Ruiz can 
be situated within the “structuralist” economic thinking. He obtained a master’s in economics 
from UNICAMP, a historical center of heterodox economics in Brazil, under the supervision 
of Luciano Coutinho – who was BNDES president, with whom Verissimo worked –, and a 
PhD from the equally heterodox department of economics of the New School for Social 
Research. In locating himself among different economic lines of thinking, Ruiz defined where 
he is placed in antitrust economics: “In public policy and in antitrust I am a structuralist. [...] 																																																								
274 Article 3rd of the Brazilian Constitution of 1988 establishes the “fundamental objectives” of the Republic: to 
build a fair, free, and solidary society; to guarantee national development; to eradicate poverty and 
marginalization, and to reduce regional and social inequalities; and to promote general welfare, without 
prejudices of origin, race, sex, color, or age. Article 219, in turn, defines that the “market integrates the national 
patrimony and will be encouraged in a way to enable cultural and socio-economic development, the welfare of 
the population, and the technological autonomy of the country”. 
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So I tend to place a behavioral solution [to economic concentrations] as the less interesting for 
a competition problem. I always prefer a structural intervention”. Also differently from most 
economists previously appointed to CADE, Ruiz had no professional or academic 
connections to SEAE. 
Mendonça, on the other hand, somewhat replicated the trend found in the trajectories 
of most economists that served CADE previously. A public official at SEAE, although 
Mendonça pursued his graduate degrees in institutions hardly associated with the economic 
mainstream, he obtained an undergraduate degree from PUC-Rio, which in the 1980s and 
1990s was the center of orthodox economic thinking in Brazil. Additionally, his intellectual 
affiliation, as he defined in an interview, was that of a “classic liberal”: 
 
I am not a neoclassical economist, I’m not an economist of the School of 
Chicago. I’m a classical economist. I’m of Adam Smith’s school, David 
Ricardo’s school, not of Robert Lucas’ school. I’m not Chicago school, I 
don’t believe in efficiencies.  
 
Together with the trajectories of these lawyers and economists, the source of 
appointments was also not identical to the tendencies of the previous compositions, at least in 
two cases. Octaviani’s appointment can be traced to SDE. As he mentioned in the interview, 
the invitation came from the Minister of Justice, José Eduardo Cardozo, and was 
intermediated by his former partner at the law firm in which he worked with insurance law. It 
is likely, however, that as in the preceding years, the Secretary of Economic Law – by then 
the former commissioner and future president of CADE, Vinicius Carvalho – contributed to 
his choice. Carvalho was Octaviani’s contemporary at USP law school, and close to the same 
academic circle (e.g. Carvalho’s chief of staff when he became CADE’s president in 2012 
held a master’s degree supervised by Octaviani’s supervisor, Gilberto Bercovici).  
Mendonça’s appointment was linked to SEAE. Although Secretary Nelson Barbosa 
articulated his appointment, the invitation was officially made by Antonio Henrique Pinheiro 
Silveira (the same Secretary that appointed Mattos in 2008). The appointments of Verissimo 
and Ruiz, however, probably represent a novelty. Although I was not able to interview 
Verissimo, and Ruiz mentioned not to know where the invitation came from, they both had 
connections to BNDES president, Luciano Coutinho. Coutinho was Verissimo’s boss, and 
had supervised Ruiz in his master’s dissertation at UNICAMP. 
It was precisely in parallel to the arrival of agents with a distinct profile if compared to 
the previous compositions, and through different sources of appointment, that the perceptions 
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of “politicization” and “interventionism” sprout. These ideas, often present to describe the 
1994-1996 period, but hibernating since the solution of the 1996 institutional crisis, are 
frequently mobilized to characterize CADE especially from 2011 onwards, although two 
structuralist economists such as Prado and Sicsú had already been in CADE before. 
The “politicization” of the field would have occurred, in the view of some 
interviewees, due to the alignment of CADE with governmental objectives of industrial 
policy, notably conducted by the BNDES. As a former member of the SBDC maintained in an 
interview, a “1950s theory” of privileging “national champions” is an “ideological” 
perspective that would have been present, although “subliminally”, in a recent decision. The 
extract of another interview illustrates a similar perception: “It’s very subtle, you can’t get 
that from the decision, but you get that from the discussion, from the council’s composition. 
There are people more connected to this kind of reasoning”. 
Another interviewee referred to the emphasis given by this recent composition on the 
policy dimension of the field: “I heard it for the first time: “Competition defence policy275. 
There is no policy to me. There is only theory”. A similar understanding that a proper 
application of antitrust theory would be lacking in a recent period was offered by yet another 
interviewee through an example of a decision taken by CADE in a merger in the educational 
sector: 
There was a speech on the phenomenon of the “financialization of 
educational relations”. Whatever that means! CADE started to worry about 
the financialization of Brazilian education. Something like: “capitalism is 
dominating education”. And what is the problem for antitrust? There is no 
problem! 
 
The shift of the profile of CADE’s composition has also been perceived as implying 
more “interventionism”, and being more “left-wing”, or even “socialist”. As the extract from 
an interview with a former member of the SBDC illustrates, CADE would have recently 
become more “interventionist”, with an “anti-capital mentality”: 
 
I perceive a more left-wing council. [...] From the ideological point of view, 
I think that there is a generalized perception today in the market that CADE 
nowadays has something more interventionist, a little more anti-capital 
mentality than before.  
 
The critical tone embedded in the diagnosis of CADE’s increasing reliance on 
“industrial policy” objectives, and most notably its growing “interventionism” thus indicate a 																																																								
275 In Portuguese, the translation of policy is política, which also means politics. 
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perceived return to the 1994-1996 period. Similarly to the initial years of the reformed field, 
the profile of the agents in charge of producing competition policy was different from that 
consolidated since 1996 and throughout the years as a “technical” landmark. However, what 
the ascendancy of these new agents indicate is not necessarily a retreat of the economicization 
of antitrust policy, or a lack of technical character (what indeed several other interviewees 
recognize), but a potentially qualitatively different economicization, referenced by economic 
and legal theories other than those that became hegemonic since 1996. 
 
5.5 The monopoly of competition 
 
In the beginning of the chapter, I announced the objective of mapping the hierarchies 
that operate in the field of competition policy in Brazil, and argued that such exercise enables 
grasping the field’s structure: its rules of functioning, the dominant habitus, and its disputed 
purposes – and thus its potential connections to neoliberalism. I departed from what in 
fieldwork revealed to be often shared perceptions about the historical composition of CADE: 
the definitions of what constitute a “technical” council – which would be the historical rule 
for CADE –, the deviant cases of “outliers”, and the recent trends of “politicization” and 
“interventionism”.  
As Bourdieu advises (2004, p. 17), in order not to incur in the “fetishism of the text”, 
these discourses are not to be taken for granted as a means to assess the social phenomenon 
studied. In the case of this research, the very discussion about the linkages between the field 
of competition policy and the political and intellectual tenets of neoliberalism would be 
embargoed by the very characterization of CADE as “technical”. There would be no politics 
in a purely “technical” environment, and thus inquiring the relations with a political 
phenomenon such as neoliberalism simply wouldn’t make sense. However, these narratives, 
as those reviewed in Chapter 1, provide interesting clues about the rules operating in the field. 
They can be useful for the investigation of the field as long as they are confronted with the 
field’s objective structure, its agents, positions, and practices.  
This is precisely what I sought to perform in this chapter. I reconstructed the 
composition of CADE and key-positions of the field of competition policy in Brazil in 
chronological order, from the first composition to enforce the reformed law of 1994, until the 
last council formed to apply it. My strategy was to describe the trajectories of the agents that 
occupied these positions, and relate them to both the political and economic context of the 
time, and to the actual practice observed in each moment. Taken together, these elements 
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evidenced the centrality of agents with a certain profile to assure that the “politics of 
enforcement” (Suchman and Edelman 1996) of competition policy would mirror the 
objectives advanced by reformist initiatives of the early 1990s.  
As discussed in the end of Chapter 4, the establishment of a new regulatory arena was 
no assurance that the practice of competition policy would respond accordingly to the 
expectations that motivated reform. Right in the first two years under the law of 1994, an 
institutional crisis provoked by a series of interventions performed by CADE almost led to a 
new set of legislative and institutional changes. The reformed field was only a newborn, and 
was already at risk. The solution found to assure a “correct”, or “technical” enforcement, 
tuned to the international trends in antitrust policy and to the broader impulses of 
liberalization, without however jeopardizing the recent reform, relied on CADE’s 
composition. 
Economists gained more space, but most importantly, a shift of profile of both lawyers 
and economists was observed when the new council initiated its term in 1996. Some of the 
reformists were called to perform the task of resuscitating the rationale behind the creation of 
the field. Their recruitment, to a great extent articulated by a small group of professionals that 
was directly involved with the creation of the field, sought to preserve what was supposed to 
be an “autonomous” sphere of regulation, thus guaranteeing that it remained independent 
from “politics”, or “government”. On the other hand, it also aimed at institutionalizing an 
enforcement that was not incompatible with the imperatives of market liberalization. 
As it is possible to observe from the mapping of the producers of competition policy 
conducted above, since the solution to the crisis of 1996 was implemented, agents aligned 
with this view dominated the field. The long period inaugurated after the crisis is precisely 
what interviewees frequently characterized as a “technical” practice, despite the eventual 
presence of “outliers”. A monopoly of competition policy in Brazil was thus established in 
1996, and remained nearly untouched at least until the end of 2004, when agents with a 
different profile started to emerge in the field, but most notably in 2010. 
After having presented the trajectory study of the agents of the field of competition 
policy, it is thus necessary interpreting what sorts of capital authorizes some lawyers and 
economists to hold this monopoly, (and thus what makes them “technical”), who is seen as 
not belonging to it (i.e. what makes an “outliers”), and who is perceived as, to use other 
antitrust jargons, the agents that somehow ruptured the field’s “barriers to entry” and started 
to “contest” such power and habitus (those responsible for “politicization” and 
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“interventionism”). Moreover, it is now necessary to assess if and how these profiles connect 
to what in Chapter 2 I affirmed to be the roles of lawyers and economists in performing 
neoliberal reforms. 
 
5.5.1 Corporate lawyers meet sociologists of law 
 
As in the process of competition policy reform, lawyers recruited to the transformed 
field were often academically and/or professionally close to the market that they sought to 
regulate. This pattern, however, took time to be consolidated. In the initial years after reform, 
with the exception of Ruy Coutinho and Neide Malard, lawyers in CADE were mostly public 
officials with peripheral involvement in political positions, and were far from being experts in 
the modern technologies of regulation and antitrust. Even Coutinho and Malard, despite being 
involved in liberalizing measures conducted by Collor de Mello, were already in an advanced 
stage of their careers, and still resembled a more the traditional profile of a lawyer.  
Even during the presidency of Gesner Oliveira, lawyers still tended to have the 
characteristic trajectory of what Dezalay and Garth (2002a) defined as the “politicians of the 
law”, i.e. jurists combining political involvement with a practice in traditional areas of the 
law. The appointments of Antonio Carlos Fonseca, who although being a public official had a 
PhD in the UK – which was still was an unusual center for a lawyer to pursue graduate 
education, if compared to Continental Europe –, and Marcelo Calliari were the harbingers of a 
shift. It was thus only some time after the solution of the institutional crisis of 1996, 
symbolized by the ascendancy of Oliviera as CADE’s president, that a more modern profile 
of lawyer started to emerge. 
In the year 2000, when lawyers became the majority of the council, a generational and 
intellectual shift was being completed. Lawyers in CADE got younger, and closer to private 
practice than to public service. This was also a geographical shift. Between 1994 and 1999 the 
11 lawyers appointed came from 9 different universities, and 7 different states, including the 
Northeast and South regions, which wouldn’t be present in the forthcoming years. From the 
year 2000 onwards, however, out of the 16 lawyers appointed to CADE, 14 graduated in the 
state of São Paulo, and most interestingly, 11 held degrees from USP. 
If compared to lawyers recruited in the first 5 years of the reformed field’s existence, 
these lawyers were professionally and academically distinct. Several of them came from 
private practice in their own firms, or in large Brazilian and foreign corporate law firms, 
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acting as competition lawyers prior to their appointment, and even being members of bar 
associations in the US. After serving CADE, they also often became competition lawyers, 
achieving new prominent positions in corporations, or in large law firms. When lawyers 
recruited to CADE weren’t experts in competition policy (be it professionally or 
academically), they gained such status, and frequently became legal consultants for 
corporations or their very attorneys.  
Such trend was not restricted to CADE. Also SDE was from a certain point on 
dominated by corporate lawyers from USP, with close ties among themselves. Paulo de Tarso 
Ribeiro, who had been supervised in his PhD by Tércio Sampaio, recruited José Reinaldo 
Lima Lopes to SDE in 1999, through the indication of José Eduardo Faria (who would also 
have suggested the names of Campilongo, and Ronaldo Porto Macedo for CADE). Lima 
Lopes was Daniel Goldberg’s supervisor at USP, who became SDE in 2003, and while there, 
recruited Barbara Rosenberg, Arthur Badin and Mariana Tavares. Finally, Tavares later 
recruited Goldberg’s wife, Ana Paula Martinez, to SDE. With the exception of Tavares, who 
was nevertheless also a corporate lawyer, they were all from USP. In this small group that 
controlled SDE between 1999 and 2010, all lawyers were at some point associated with some 
of the largest Brazilian law firms, and three of them had experience as corporate lawyers in 
the US or Europe. 
Even when not professionally distinguishable from the previous group of lawyers (e.g. 
when they were public officials, prosecutors, etc), those who hegemonized the field since 
2000 held considerably different academic credentials. Formal studies in the United States, or 
at least familiarity with the American legal tradition, and with economics were constants 
among those who produced competition policy. There were even lawyers who had 
undergraduate degrees in economics recruited to CADE. Experiences with US law were very 
often focused on areas close to economics, such as, for instance, Ronaldo Porto Macedo’s 
contact with Oliver Williamson’s work when he was in Harvard, or Carlos Ragazzo’s LLM in 
regulation and antitrust at NYU. Another example, although outside CADE, was Daniel 
Goldberg, Secretary at SDE. As he maintained in an interview, it was during his joint LLM 
between USP and Harvard that he attended courses on microeconomics. Not by chance, the 
measures he undertook while in SDE, as well as the very vocabulary he used in interview to 
narrate them, are very much influenced by a mainstream microeconomic approach to both 
public management and antitrust policy. Similarly, Badin, who was part of Goldberg’s team 
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at SDE, and later became CADE’s Attorney-General and president, described his 
participation in several “microeconomic reforms” together with the Ministry of Finance. 
A curious finding in the academic trajectory of these lawyers was the repeated 
connection with areas such as the sociology of law, and legal philosophy, especially in the 
cases of those coming from USP. The numerous linkages of lawyers from USP with the 
“PET-CAPES Sociology of Law” group are illustrative of that. The intriguing frequency of 
sociologists of law formed by USP interested in practicing antitrust regulation was explained 
by the commissioner (and sociologist of law) Campilongo in an interview as the product of 
two factors276. First, because São Paulo is a financial and industrial center, the department of 
legal philosophy of USP law school would integrate professors working close to economic 
issues: “so there will be a professor who is an advisor in a bank, another who is Minister of 
Foreign Relations, and another who works at FIESP”277.  
Second, for Campilongo, the “interdisciplinary nature of antitrust policy” would be an 
incentive for the participation of academics of the area of sociology of law, which have 
“versatility for empirical research, and openness for the dialogue between law and social 
sciences, political science, and philosophy – half the way for the dialogue with economics”. A 
third factor could be added to Campilongo’s explanation: sociology of law can be seen as an 
academic field more permeable to foreign references outside the Continental Europe axis, 
which has historically been particularly influential in traditional areas of the law. Due to their 
academic practice, sociologists of the law are often interested in “legal novelties”, and in the 
last two decades of the twentieth century antitrust policy was anything but traditional or old-
fashioned in Brazil. 
Still in the academic arena, several of these lawyers were previously connected to, or 
eventually became involved with educational institutions such as FGV-SP and FGV-RJ, in 
which “corporate law expertise” has been historically reproduced in Brazil (Dezalay and 
Garth 2002a, p. 207). Many of these lawyers thought courses on regulation and antitrust in 
undergraduate, and MBA courses promoted by those institutions for the training of new 
competition lawyers. 																																																								
276 Doing a research within the domain of sociology of law in which the agents of the studied field are 
themselves sociologists of law generated interesting situations (and additional difficulties in interviews). For 
instance, in the interview with Campilongo, he explicitly pointed to the common trajectories of several 
commissioners recruited to CADE, and provided an explanation for the relation between this area of research 
and the production of antitrust policy. In other words, Campilongo spontaneously offered a reconstruction of the 
field. 
277 The “advisor in a bank” mentioned by Campilongo was precisely José Eduardo Faria, who worked in Itaú, 
and the one who “works at FIESP” was Tércio Sampaio Ferraz Junior – mentioned several times in the 
reconstruction of the reform of competition law in Brazil, and who was Faria’s PhD supervisor. 
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Once lawyers with this profile have dominated the field for a long time, and are part of 
what interviewees often refer to as a “technical” policy-making, it is easy to identify the 
“outliers” and to explain why fears of “politicization” and “interventionism” arise. On the one 
hand, those often referred to as “outliers” of the field were all lawyers with precisely the 
traditional profile of the “politician of the law”. They were not as formally educated as those 
who started to hegemonize the field since 2000, and even when possessed graduate studies, 
these were often obtained in traditional areas of the law, and in Brazil. Their professional 
careers were also closer to political groups and positions, and not in modern corporate law 
firms, or regulatory arenas. Also, their sources of appointment were not endogenous to the 
field, that is, they were introduced to the field by agents of the political field, such as senators 
and ministers, and thus distant from the “technical” world. 
On the other hand, the recent suspicion of “politicization” and “interventionism”, 
present between 1994 and 1996, was revived when equally young lawyers, but with different 
credentials started to be appointed. Even when highly educated and internationalized (for 
instance, Vinicius Carvalho held a PhD obtained in France), these lawyers did not come 
majoritarily from long careers in corporate law, had no formal or intellectual connections to 
the US legal tradition, and were not adepts of an economicized legal expertise. Additionally, 
while two of them had more evident links with the government’s political party and followed 
a line of economic law that directly links economic regulation to constitutional objectives 
such as “national development” and “poverty eradication” (alien concepts in a mainstream 
view of competition policy), the third was a high rank assistant of BNDES – a symbol of 
developmentalist policies in Brazil. 
Once the praise of competition policy as a “technical” arena vis-à-vis the eventual 
appearance of “outliers”, and the recent expressions of “interventionism” or “politicization” is 
parallel to the dominance of a certain profile of lawyers, it is possible to visualize a hierarchy 
that structures the field. The “correct” practice of the field depends on the presence of lawyers 
who are familiar with the imperatives of a liberalized market and with the proper doctrines 
and methods to regulate it, be it due to their professional experience as the representatives of 
corporations, or due to their academic openness to the dialogue with economic science, most 
notably microeconomics. In several of the cases described above, these “abilities” were 
combined. The success of the Brazilian antitrust field in becoming a “technical” arena, 
however, could hardly be achieved if together with corporate lawyers and the sociologists of 
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law, a group of economists equally reliant on the modern technologies of economic regulation 
developed in the US weren’t recruited to share the monopoly of competition policy. 
 
5.5.2 Berkeley boys (and girls) and their disciples 
 
 As described in the beginning of the chapter, the arrival of economists in CADE – or 
better said, the arrival of a certain type of economists in CADE – was decisive for the solution 
of the institutional crisis precipitated in 1996. Moreover, those called to put out the fire in the 
mid 1990s were eventually followed by other economists with similar trajectories and views 
on competition policy. If compared to the two economists in CADE during the extensively 
criticized period of 1994-1996, those recruited from 1996 onwards had considerably different 
professional and academic trajectories. Similarly to lawyers, while the first members of 
CADE were public officials with no title higher than a master’s degree obtained at a Brazilian 
university, economists since Oliveira’s presidency – and including him – were mostly from 
academia, acted as consultants for corporations and international organizations such as the 
World Bank, and were highly educated, notably abroad. The period following the crisis also 
brought a generational and geographic turn: since the field became “technical”, economists in 
CADE were often trained in the mid to late 1980s, and although USP alone formed 5 of them, 
other 6 had at least one passage through a university based in Rio de Janeiro. 
Although the professional origins of these economists indicate some degree of 
convergence, it is their academic background that evidences the formation of a nearly 
homogenous group. Be it through direct and explicit connections, or due to second degree 
relationships, no less than 8 economists were linked to the so-called “New Institutional 
Economics” (NIE)278. The hegemony of economists affiliated to NIE was established early in 
the development of the field, notably with the council presided by Gesner Oliveira, from 1996 
to 2000. Similar to the agents of the legal field, the hegemony exercised by economists of this 
strand was permanently in place throughout time, and started to be contested only in a recent 
past. 
																																																								
278 As Craig and Porter define (2006, p. 102), “broadly, NIE argues that efficient transactions (and, as we will 
see, ‘accountabilities’) depend on three ingredients: first, information, in the sense of both expertise and 
knowledge that can make better informed choices (in markets), second, laws, contracts and their efficient 
enforce- ment (supporting markets), and third, contest, in the sense of having com- petition (e.g. to contract to 
provide services) between multiple different players (that is, market competition). In short form, these three 
precepts of NIE could be rendered as ‘Inform, Enforce, Compete’”. 
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The links of economists recruited to produce competition policy to NIE were 
identified in different ways. Four of them, appointed in different moments of history (and in 
different governments) obtained their PhDs, or were at least visiting students, at the 
University of California, at Berkeley, where exponents of this economic tradition were 
teaching, such as Oliver Williamson, Douglass North, Carl Shapiro, and Albert Fishlow. 
These American economists were connected to the trajectories of several economists as 
influential references, or even more directly, as supervisors of their graduate researches. Other 
economists, although not formally connected to Berkeley or prominent new institutional 
economists, can be situated within this tradition based on their academic activities. This is the 
case, for instance, of Elizabeth Farina, who although did not obtain her graduate degree at 
Berkeley, was the supervisor of Furquim when he was a visiting student at that university, and 
also participated in meetings of the International Society for New Institutional Economics 
since 1998 (including a conference at UCB). These economists were largely responsible for 
the recruitment of yet another group of professionals that was not formally connected to NIE. 
For instance, Oliveira, who had been supervised by Fishlow, indicated the names of Arthur 
Barrionuevo and Cleveland Teixeira to integrate CADE, who in turn later articulated the 
entrance of Rigato in the field. 
Although NIE has placed itself as a specific stream of economic theory through the 
criticism of what it saw as unrealistic assumptions of neoclassical economics – as the works 
of Ronald Coase, Williamson, and North illustrate – it “shares some basic attributes of the 
dominant neoclassical approach”, such as the “emphasis on self-seeking and rational 
behavior, and the neglect of the role of power in shaping the evolution of institutions” 
(Burlamarqui et al 2000, p. x). As Chang (2002, p. 547) maintains, a key common premise to 
NIE and neoclassical economics is the “market primacy assumption”, which understands 
“state intervention and the other non-market, non-state institutions (e.g., the firm) as man-
made substitutes for the ‘natural’ institution called the market” 279. The famous adage coined 
by Williamson (1975, p. 21) – “in the beginning there were markets” – is illustrative of such 
assumption280. Similarly, Erber (2011, p. 44) identifies that what underlies the “institutionalist  
convention” is the belief of the “efficacy and legitimacy of the market as the main institution 
entitled of organizing and conducting the economy and society through the efficient 
distribution in the use of resources”. Implicit in this belief, he argues, is the “neoliberal thesis 																																																								
279 Similarly to what I have been sustaining in this section, Chang (2002, p. 554; 557) also argues that “NIE 
models” are part of “neoliberal theories”, or constitute a “branch of neoliberal economics”. 
280 As Ankarloo and Palermo (2004, p. 414) argue in a highly critical article, such assumption characterizes NIE 
as a theoretical approach that holds an “idealized vision of capitalist economic relations”. 
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that, even if the market is not in line with the competition ideal, failures introduced in the 
process of efficiently allocating resources through other institutions, notably the state, are 
even higher” (Erber 2011, p. 45). 
Not only a positive program describing “reality”, this assumption also encompasses a 
normative content in respect to the “role of the state” (Chang 2002, p. 549): if the market is 
“natural”, it is preferable as an arena for economic relations, vis-à-vis the state, and non-
market mechanisms of “intervention” are secondary. A second defining feature of NIE as part 
of “neoliberal economics” that can be grasped from Chang’s (2002, p. 549) characterization is 
the proposal of yet another hierarchy: that politics “distorts” the “rationality” of the market 
system. The corollary of this assumption is the “depoliticization” of the economy by, for 
instance, “strengthening the rules on bureaucratic conduct or by setting up ‘politically 
independent’ policy agencies bound by rigid rules (e.g., independent central bank, 
independent regulatory agencies)”.  
As part of the theoretical endeavor of neoliberal economics, NIE became a 
complementary policy program to the objectives previously pursued through structural 
adjustments, privatizations, and liberalization: the production of efficient markets. Illustrative 
of such role was the conversion of NIE into the theoretical basis of the “institutional turn” 
taken by the Washington Consensus in the late 1990s and early 2000s (e.g. as reflected in the 
World Bank’s famous document “Building institutions for markets”, of 2002)281. Market 
efficiency, as in the initial years of neoliberal reforms, was still at the center of both 
theoretical efforts and policy translations of NIE. As Craig and Porter (2006, p. 17) maintain, 
similarly to orthodox economic thinking, NIE was equally “premised on a mentality of 
governance that required the prior and effective disaggregation of government”, as it would 
often constitute “an ‘obstacle’ to the free flow of information and adequate competition”. The 
primacy of the market was only to be guaranteed by the appropriate institutions. 
Despite its “constructive” tone (Craig and Porter 2006, p. 17) in respect to institutions, 
NIE has been thus focused on engendering specific types of institutional and legal 
arrangements: market-efficient institutions. In the policy domain, far from being incompatible 
with the “first phase” of neoliberal reforms of structural adjustments for promoting market 																																																								
281 As Cameron (2004) shows, the World Bank incorporated the NIE framework at least since 1997, but most 
intensely in 2002, when a series of “second-generation reforms” were systematized into a single agenda. These 
reforms “built upon the earlier neoliberal reforms” and allegedly sought to “to strengthen judicial systems, 
banking regulations, and capital markets, combat government corruption, make bureaucracies efficient and 
responsive to client needs, and decentralized administrative, fiscal, and political power from central to 
subnational levels of government” (Cameron 2004, p. 97). 
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shocks and liberalization (Santos 2006, p. 267-268), NIE therefore brings in a complementary 
agenda. While the macroeconomic tenets of neoliberal fiscal and monetary policies, as well as 
privatizations opened way for the construction of “free markets”, it was quite logical that an 
institutional apparatus appropriate to keep these measures effects’ in place would be 
necessary. NIE entails, in this sense, a set of theoretical foundations and policy recipes to 
consolidate the outcomes of neoliberal macroeconomic reforms. As Craig and Porter (2006, p. 
103) maintain, the “doctrines” of NIE “fitted tidily within the liberal market paradigm, while 
portending a clear role for the state in facilitating efficient, almost spontaneous governance”. 
The compatibility, or better said, the complementarity of both “phases” of economic 
reforms as integral parts of the same project can be identified in the very trajectories of 
economists recruited to produce competition policy in Brazil. Several of them had been 
academically or professionally involved with economists that performed the “first generation” 
reforms in Brazil. I am here referring to the PUC-Rio nucleus that hegemonized 
macroeconomic policy-making in the Ministry of Finance and in the Central Bank, especially 
during Cardoso’s government, but as Novelli (2010) and my data indicates, still under Lula’s 
administration. The names of economists such as Winston Fritsch, Pedro Malan, Armínio 
Fraga, and Gustavo Franco can be identified in the trajectories of many of those appointed 
commissioners, presidents, and secretaries in the SBDC. Moreover, some of the new 
institutional economists recruited to produce competition policy had even worked in the 
design and implementation of structural adjustments prior to joining the field. 
Given their ages – economists who became commissioners and CADE’s presidents 
were around 40 years old or younger sine the mid 1990s – they were members of a generation 
of economists that succeeded those who imported the Washington Consensus into Brazil 
between the late 1980s and early 1990s. While the first neoliberal reforms were conducted by 
agents closer to what in Chile has been often identified as the “Chicago boys” (Dezalay and 
Garth 2002a, Montecinos 2009), the step further, not by chance, was to be performed by 
agents holding the expertise of market-efficient institutions. As this expertise started to 
consolidate in the field of economics precisely in the 1980s (notably at the University of 
California, at Berkeley), economists that were being trained by that time got in touch with 
what was an emerging mainstream approach282.  																																																								
282 A rudimental yet illustrative indicator of consolidation of NIE as a mainstream approach in the 1980s is the 
Nobel Prize in economics. In the 1970s and 1980s Nobel laureates of the Chicagoan and neoclassical strand such 
as Kenneth Arrow (1972), Friedrich Hayek (1974), Milton Friedman (1976), George Stigler (1982), and Harry 
Markowitz (1989) were dominant. New Institutional Economists started to arise in some early later, especially in 
the 1990s: Ronald Coase was the laureate in 1991, and Douglass North in 1993. In the 1990s, Chicagoan 
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As professors, academics and policy makers, throughout the 1990s they would 
become propagators of this expertise, recruiting yet another generation of economists. Among 
the economists that were part of the SBDC since 1996 until the late 2000s, a “genealogical 
tree” of NIE can be noticed. The trajectory of Gesner Oliveira, reputed as a key character for 
the consolidation of antitrust in Brazil, is illustrative in this respect. Trained in Berkeley 
during the 1980s, he became a professor at FGV-SP, where he was the supervisor of 
Cleveland Teixeira and a colleague of Arthur Barrionuevo. Another student of Oliveira’s, and 
Teixeira’s graduate classmate by that time was Luiz Fernando Rigato, who was supervised by 
Barrionuevo. If taken as part of a same group, these agents form a network that was present in 
CADE almost uninterruptedly from 1996 to 2008. Similarly, president Elizabeth Farina, a 
member of the NIE academic association, supervised Furquim, who was a visiting doctoral 
student of Oliver Williamson at Berkeley. With Farina and Furquim, another branch of 
representatives of the NIE school was in CADE between 2004 and 2010. 
Another indicator of the linkage of NIE to neoliberalism can be noticed in the several 
connections of economists recruited to CADE with the “Law and Economics” movement in 
Brazil – the  “ideology of business law” (Engelmann 2011, p. 29- 30) that “provide[s] a set of 
prescriptions to deregulate through law” (Dezalay and Garth 2002a, p. 170). In the trajectories 
of economists recruited in different periods, such as Lucia Helena Salgado (1996-2000), José 
Tavares Araújo (2004-2006), Elizabeth Farina (2004-2008), and Paulo Furquim Azevedo 
(2006-2010), the influences of or professional relations with L&E scholars were identified. 
An illustrative example of the proximate relations between Brazilian disciples of NIE and 
L&E is a book edited by Decio Zylberstajn and Rachel Sztajn (2005) in which the preface 
was signed by Elizabeth Farina (while she was CADE’s president), and there are articles 
authored by Oliver Williamson, Paulo Furquim, and exponents of Brazilian L&E such as 
Armando Castelar Pinheiro, Pérsio Arida, besides the editors. These L&E scholars have been 
academically and professionally close to agents of the PUC-Rio nucleus that performed the 
liberalization and privatization reforms in the early 1990s, such as Winston Fritsch and 
Gustavo Franco, and with economists that acted in the SBDC under different governments. 
Considering the 17 economists appointed commissioners and presidents, besides 7 
somehow connected to New Institutional Economics, other 4 economists could also be place 
within the adjacencies of NIE as part of the economic mainstream. For instance, Afonso 
Arinos, who was trained in Chicago and a disciple of Robert Lucas and Gary Becker. Other 																																																																																																																																																																													
economists such as Gary Becker (1992) and Robert Lucas (1995) were still the vogue, and Oliver Williamson 
would receive the prize only in 2009. 
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examples were Ruy Santacruz, Thompson Andrade, and César Mattos, all connected to the 
governmental exponents of the PUC-Rio group. Close to the liberal paradigm, albeit critical 
of the Chicagoan approach was also Elvino Mendonça, who defined himself as a “Sherman 
Act” economist. 
The dominance of economists with the described profile was stable during most of the 
period between 1996 and 2012. Since 2004, however, economists with a heterodox 
background started to emerge among the appointments to CADE. They were Abraham Sicsú, 
Luiz Delorme Prado, and Ricardo Ruiz – all connected to UNICAMP, a center of heterodox, 
Keynesian and structuralist economics in Brazil, and/or professors and policy-makers of the 
Brazilian developmental bank (BNDES) that are exponents of that school, such as Carlos 
Lessa and Luciano Coutinho. As with lawyers appointed in the recent period, it is precisely in 
the context where these economists started to gain space that the narratives of 
“interventionism” and CADE’s “politicization” in respect to the government’s industrial 
policy goals emerge. The “technical” council, characterized by the sovereignty of NIE and 
orthodox economists, was thus been challenged – but never actually lost the majority of the 
council. 
 
5.5.3 The neoliberal mode of production of competition regulation 
 
 As the reconstruction of competition policy field historical composition reveals, the 
arrival of agents possessing a specific set of capitals was parallel to a movement allegedly 
directed to both protect the institutional design of an autonomous regulatory agency devised 
in the early 1990s, and to assure a “technical” regulatory practice. Such description was 
present not only in the discourses of the agents directly involved in the institutional crisis 
precipitated in 1996, but also in how Onto (2009) and Bello (2005), for instance, explain the 
shift of CADE’s composition. According to Onto (2009, p. 83), the extensive inclusion of 
economists in CADE was motivated by an attempt of “rationalizing” antitrust policy, and 
“reducing of political conflicts”. Similarly, Bello (2005, p. 92) argues that a consensus was 
established around appointing “experts”, motivated by the government’s worry that new 
political conflicts would arise.  
However, as described in this chapter, and beyond the impressions or explanations 
offered by the very agents involved in those episodes, assuring the monopoly of competition 
policy to a certain profile of policy-makers was a matter of winning a political conflict, not 
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only of reducing or avoiding new ones. What was at stake in 1996 was the compatibility of a 
recently reformed field with broader transformations of the state and the economy, notably the 
neoliberal measures of deregulation and privatization. CADE had to be tuned with the new 
context.  
The “government” itself was a source of opposition to antitrust policy, or at least to 
the antitrust policy that was being produced between 1994 and 1996. Professionals previously 
involved in the reformist initiatives of the early 1990s had a crucial role in composing a 
political compromise that enabled both the protection of the institutional design, and offered 
an insurance of a new practice, one that wouldn’t clash with the impulses of a liberalizing 
economy. In concrete terms, the crisis to be solved was not only about the alleged 
“irrationality” of decisions during the 1994-1996 period, but most importantly concerned the 
very content of these decisions, which were considered excessively interventionist for a 
modern practice. Not by chance, the arrival of mainstream economists after 1996 was 
paralleled by the decrease in the number of restrictions, what was often celebrated by the 
agents involved in the field as the adequacy of Brazil to international standards. 
 The compromise to “solve” the conflict initially implied the hegemony of mainstream 
liberal economists, mostly of the NIE and Chicagoan traditions, in the field of competition 
policy. The consolidation of the field as a “technical” arena was later deepened by the 
maintenance of this profile of economists, and also through the inclusion of corporate lawyers 
and sociologists of law. Together, these lawyers and economists were the agents seen as 
legitimized by an expertise fit to the regulatory agency paradigm, and understanding of the 
“needs” implied by other neoliberal reforms. Most lawyers came from the world of corporate 
law, and were familiar with and/or enthusiasts of the modern dialogue between law and 
economics. The majority of economists recruited to produce competition policy, in a similar 
sense, were trained in a line of thinking that combined the tenets of neoliberal economics with 
an attention to the institutional aspects of the economy. Eventual outliers, albeit pointed to in 
several interviews and easily identifiable in the trajectory study, didn’t have any possibilities 
to affect the field, as they were isolated cases, and never nearly composed a majority in a 
single council. 
 The phenomenon of the institutional crisis of 1996, and the criticisms to the first two 
years of the field’s practice under a reformed law fit, in this sense, the explanation offered by 
Dezalay and Garth (2002a) about the neoliberal transformation of the state and the economy. 
As these authors suggested in respect to the broad changes in the state in Brazil (Dezalay and 
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Garth 2002a, p. 102), also in the case of competition policy the movement toward a “modern” 
arena of practice was largely operated by economists of a new generation coming from São 
Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, with graduate degrees in the US, who discredited both 
developmental economics, and the generalist knowledge of lawyers. The way Lima (1998, p. 
124), who became a commissioner in 1998, and was previously in SEAE, described the 1994-
1996 period as having a “legalistic view without economic foundations” is illustrative of such 
clash. As economists were already in CADE in that period, the criticism can be also seen as 
directed to them, who were public officials long imbricated in the apparatuses of the 
developmental state. The neoliberal roots of the reformed field of competition policy thus lie 
on the profile of the agents that integrated it. 
 As I described in the chapter, it is possible to visualize how the positions occupied by 
those agents, and thus their capitals and normative stances, are reflected in the concrete 
shaping of the field, i.e. in their position-takings. Lawyers recruited to CADE, SDE, and 
SEAE, for instance, deployed legal expertise in a similar way to that historically present in 
Brazil. They were “institution builders” of competition policy, and acted as “statesmen” 
managing a governmental apparatus. An example of this role can be identified beyond the 
very activity of producing regulation within the state. Lawyers were central for the creation of 
legal “solutions” for “institutional problems” within the Brazilian System of Competition 
Defence, such as the “duplicate” system of analysis by SDE and SEAE, or in establishing a 
“fast track” procedure for “simple cases”. The implementation of a leniency system in 
Brazilian competition policy was also to a great extent articulated by lawyers that integrated 
the SBDC. They negotiated and disputed the incorporation of this legal instrument imported 
from the US experience, as it generated potential tensions with Brazilian criminal law and the 
expectations of more “traditional” lawyers of the Prosecutor’s Office. 
As in the past, lawyers also provided their usual “rhetoric of universality and 
neutrality” to the field of competition policy (Dezalay and Madsen 2012, p. 438). Illustrative 
of such contribution was the very arrival of a large contingent of lawyers in the year 2000, 
after two mandates of a council dominated by economists. As by that time CADE was being 
exposed to public opinion, the appointment of a majority of lawyers sought to confer a 
“jurisdictional” character to CADE, turning it into a proper tribunal, and thus protecting it 
from political clashes. 
However, due to their professional and academic trajectories, the content of the legal 
expertise infused by these agents in the field of competition policy was considerably different 
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from the traditional legal “forma mentis” (Venancio Filho 2004, p. 294). Lawyers helped 
advancing the economicization of antitrust policy accordingly to the international standards 
informed by mainstream economics. Illustrations of these contributions can be noted 
especially in SDE, such as the change of focus to conducts, leaving SEAE with the priority of 
analyzing merger reviews, the creation of a Department of Quantitative Studies which hired 
econometrists within an organ of the Ministry of Justice (which also assisted CADE in several 
cases), and the joint-ordinances with SEAE to establish modern guidelines for decision-
making. The fact that these measures initiated in the late 1990s and early 2000s occurred in 
parallel to the arrival of lawyers with a “dollarized” expertise and professional practice is thus 
not a mere coincidence. Lawyers frequently coming from corporate law, and holding 
international credentials in the US, were essential to institutionalize formal means and 
substantive contents in the field of competition policy. 
Similarly, economists mostly connected to the NIE strand of neoliberal economics 
were since early responsible for aligning CADE with the broader transformations of the state 
and the economy in the awake of neoliberalism. This was achieved through different 
strategies. One of them was the increasing economicization of antitrust policy, as crystallized 
by the ordinances enacting guidelines for the analysis of mergers and conduct cases. The 
economic methods and parameters established in these guidelines reflected, on the one had, 
what Fourcade (2009b, p. 90) identifies as the dominant “market-oriented” knowledge and 
“professional culture” of economists, which relies on scientific and extremely quantified 
methods as a means to freed decision-making from politics. 
Another strategy frequently mobilized by economists, and most notably in the initial 
years after the institutional crisis of 1996, was the internationalization of Brazilian antitrust 
policy. CADE was included in transnational networks of experts in competition policy, such 
as the ICN and the OECD, venues where the diffusion of standards and “best practices” 
among professionals and worldwide antitrust authorities occurred. Also, members of the 
SBDC actively tried to articulate antitrust policy with other arenas of economic 
transformation which were characteristic of the global neoliberal project of liberalizing 
markets. Exemplary of such attempts was the involvement of CADE, notably pushed by 
economists, in the discussions of competition regulation in the (eventually failed) creation of 
the FTAA, and of the WTO283. 																																																								
283 I herein subscribe to Chorev and Babb’s (2009, p. 460) understanding of the WTO’s “global system of 
market-liberalizing economic rules” as a “key institution of neoliberal governance”. However, as these authors 
maintain in a comparison of the “systems of rules” of the WTO and the IMF, the former “provides some political 
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Through this set of measures advanced by lawyers and economists in the practice of 
the field, Brazilian competition policy was being aligned with the broader political and 
economic impulses that characterized the neoliberal transformation of the economy and the 
state. In substantive terms, although the law of 1994 already consolidated the tenets of 
neoliberal antitrust policy developed in the US in the 1980s, as the agents of the field saw it, 
the law was being poorly enforced. It was thus through the hands of corporate lawyers and 
mainstream economists that the modern standard for antitrust policy gained specific 
methodologies and parameters to be applied – and moreover, that it was effectively and, 
according to those standards, correctly applied.  
 Illustrative of such shift is what Lima (1998, p. 124) characterized as a “sensitive 
modification” of the “legalistic view” of competition policy that dominated CADE until 1996. 
For this author, such perspective, which would also include a “lack of attention to the trade-
off between efficiency and market power”, was changed by the new composition that arrived 
in CADE in 1996 – precisely the one that inaugurated the monopoly of competition policy by 
mainstream economists, and later opened way for corporate lawyers. Economic efficiency, the 
motto of neoliberal economics – and most notably its “trade-off” with market power, as Lima 
defines – gained space only when agents that possessed an expertise oriented for its 
achievement managed to occupy positions in CADE, SDE and SEAE. 
 Such roles performed by corporate lawyers and mainstream economists in shaping the 
field of competition policy in its very practice enable delineating yet another conclusion, now 
about regulatory reforms in general. As described in Chapter 1, mainstream narratives tend to 
adopt a synchronic approach to depict the process of reform. However, as illustrated by the 
struggles to redefine legal enforcement and to institutionalize a certain model of practice, be it 
through decisions, or through infra-legal instruments such as the guidelines, reform did not 
cease with the enactment of the law of 1994. The transformation of this arena of economic 
regulation into a “modern” field continued in time, and was conditioned by disputes around 
imposing the purposes to be pursued by competition policy, and the means to do so. Thus, as 
Twining (2005a, p. 34) suggests, the diffusion of a legal technology such as that embedded in 
the reform of competition policy in Brazil involved a “long drawn out process, which, even if 
																																																																																																																																																																													
leverage to developing countries, which is completely absent under the IMF procedures”, and thus constitutes “a 
much less ideologically coherent and consistently ‘neoliberal’ organization than the IMF” (Chorev and Babb 
2009, p. 463). Similarly, Phillips (2003, p. 329) characterizes the FTAA as an integral part of the “strategies of 
economic liberalization and neoliberal restructuring that took root across the region over the course of the 
1990s”. 
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there were some critical moments [e.g. the enactment of the law], cannot be understood 
without reference to events prior and subsequent to such moments”. 
 The diachronic nature of the reform process is connected to another dimension in 
which a contrast between the data presented and the discourses of mainstream narratives can 
be noticed: the relation between the import of an institutional framework such as competition 
policy and the local conditions of the importing context. As discussed in Chapter 2, local 
conditions affect the way in which a legal technology is imported, and the form it takes in 
practice. A central component of the “indigenous” factors that may impact a reform process is 
what Twining (2005a, p. 35) calls “pre-existing law” – which, as I understand it, is more 
useful if understood in a broader sense, as the local legal field, and in the case of competition 
policy, also the field of economics.  
The 1996 crisis is illustrative in this sense. Although the law of 1994 was already in 
place, those entitled of initially enforcing it occupied positions in their respective professional 
fields that revealed to be incompatible to the expectations of other agents. These were the 
agents holding the sorts of capitals which, at that point of time, enabled them to achieve 
prominent positions in the field, and who assimilated the new technology and translated it into 
concrete decisions through their expertise. In the case of lawyers in CADE from 1994 to 
1996, this was not a highly economicized expertise, and in the case of economists, it was not 
tuned with neoclassical economics and its later developments. In the initial years of the field’s 
practice after the enactment of the law, competition policy was therefore still rooted very 
much in the traditional hierarchies of the fields of law and economics, which were specific 
configurations of the Brazilian context, and which albeit fast, would only change after the 
new law. Therefore, besides having developed diachronically, reform did not fill a vacuum, as 
there was still a legal and economic inheritance in place. The very agents responsible for 
operating a recently created or reformed field constituted an element of “path dependence” 
(Dezalay and Garth 2002a, p. 13).	
 Also, for the most part, the advancement of reform in the practice of the field of 
competition policy indicates that rather than a permanent clash between law and economics as 
distinct forms of “expertise of government” (Dezalay and Garth 2002a), lawyers and 
economists were allies in a joint endeavor. Given that the criticism of the “legalistic view” 
was directed to lawyers with a traditional profile, such alliance was likely possible due to the 
economicization of lawyers themselves. The result of such generally cooperative relationship 
was a powerful shielding of the field from politics, as it combined the expertise held by the 
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“men of science” (Schneider 1998, p. 79) symbolized by economists, and lawyers possessing 
a “tool for ordering politics without necessarily doing politics” (Dezalay and Madsen 2012, p. 
438)284. 
As the trajectory study presented above revealed, besides the “modern” legal 
framework established in 1994, and the posterior measures to institutionalize the parameters 
for a proper enforcement of competition policy and advance reform, the “success” of the field 
as a “technical” arena was highly dependent on a social mechanism: the politics of 
composition. Since 1996, when mainstream economists started to hegemonize the field, and 
later on 2000, when corporate lawyers and sociologists of law joined them, positions in 
CADE, SDE and SEAE were predominantly occupied by a nearly homogeneous group. As 
the several connections among the agents that composed the field indicate, recruitments were 
mostly endogenous, and relied on social capital originated in professional, academic and even 
personal and familial relationships. The field itself created a device to reproduce agents 
accordingly to its practice. Examples of such attempts were the internship program PinCADE, 
in which three commissioners had previously participated, and the series of cooperation 
agreements with universities. Such mechanism contributed to giving stability to the 
enforcement pattern inaugurated in 1996, and provided a means to a perennial practice 
notwithstanding changes in government – or in the field’s jargon, despite of “politics”.  
The strength of such internalized social control over the access to the field can be 
observed in at least two senses. First, agents that were politically connected to the government 
of Fernando Henrique Cardoso managed to stay in the field of competition policy during 
Lula’s administration, by jumping from one position to another, by having their terms 
renovated by a different government, or by being appointed by one political party despite of 
explicit connections to its main adversary. Second, those agents whose background and 
trajectory were most distinct from the majority of corporate lawyers, or mainstream 
economists were recruited through channels other than CADE, SDE and SEAE. Not by 
chance, the adjectives of “outlier”, “political”, and “interventionist” often match the operation 
of an instrument of recruitment that was exogenous to the field. 
Such self-feeding mechanism had yet another potential of stabilizing the hegemonic 
habitus of the field due to the fact that the agents appointed to CADE, as well as to the 
ministerial secretariats, after serving their terms, often worked in private practice, as attorneys 																																																								
284 An exception that confirms the rule was identified in Neide Malard’s interview, in which she criticizes the 
“currently exaggerated” use of economic analysis that “copies American textbooks”. Malard was a 
commissioner in the period of 1994-1996, criticized precisely by its “lack” of “economic foundations” (Lima 
1998). 
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for corporations, and economic consultants. As Badin stated in an interview, “in the theater of 
antitrust, [he] had exercised all roles: that of a defender, as a lawyer; that of an accuser, as the 
chief of staff of SDE; that of custus legis, as the Attorney-General; and that of president”. 
Playing different roles in the “theater of antitrust” was a rule for almost all corporate lawyers, 
and mainstream economists that worked in the SBDC – before and/or after their appointment. 
The effects of the “revolving doors” of CADE to the field’s practice are hard to precise 
empirically, but can nevertheless be potentially assessed.  
For instance, the combination of commissioners’ increasingly low age average with 
the typical dynamics of “changing sides” touches the issue of jurisprudence formation. As 
young commissioners today will still have a long career as the representatives of the market 
tomorrow – if a subversion of the “rational actor” perspective of orthodox economics is here 
allowed – the field’s structure produces incentives for a moderate regulatory behavior. 
Otherwise, an “interventionist” decision-making by one agent may become the precedent that 
hinders her defense of a corporation in a (not so distant) future. Also, the achievement of 
certain positions in the market may be later jeopardized285. 
Another example of the roles exercised by social ties in the field’s practice came up in 
by an interviewee when discussing the strategy for hiring economic consultants for cases 
presented before CADE. According to the interviewee, the choice is not only “technical”, but 
depends on “CADE’s composition”:  
 
Who do we feel that is more influential there today? If the rapporteur [of the 
case] is commissioner X, who is he most friends with? Commissioner X was 
consultant’s Y student. Y was X’s PhD supervisor. So if I present an opinion 
by Y, X will probably say: ‘So Professor Y wrote this, let me read’. On the 
other hand, if there is an intellectual dispute, there is no point presenting the 
opinion of a certain consultant. It doesn’t matter if I like consultant Z. If the 
rapporteur doesn’t, you must dismiss it. It is not based only on professional 
qualification. It is based on to whom are you sending the opinion. 
 
Beyond the speculative exercise about the potential effects of such social ties that 
operate in the field of competition policy, it is nevertheless possible to affirm that due to the 
agents mobility between the “state” and the “market”, the links between the “regulators”, 
symbolized by CADE, SDE, and SEAE, and those “regulated” are generally extremely close. 
																																																								
285 On this issue, the interview of Malard is once again extremely critical of the development of the field since 
the mid-1990s. According to her, the young age of commissioners appointed to CADE and SDE may be related 
to the “tolerance with big business”, once after serving the council regulators often become “big lawyers of big 
corporations”. It is interesting to notice that during her term, CADE had the highest age average of the period 
1994-2012, as all commissioners were public officials already retired, or in the end of their careers. 
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The field of competition policy is thus hegemonized by an expertise that is not only 
“cognitively and professionally” “market-oriented” (Fourcade 2009b, p. 8-9), but also socially 
close to it. This is because the recruitment to the field has predominantly both demanded and 
offered experiences of socialization with the market. 
The fact that corporate lawyers, sociologists of law and mainstream economists with 
similar profiles dominated the field since 1996 does not mean a universally consensual 
decision-making practice. Divergences occurred among commissioners, as reflected in the 
non-unanimous decisions taken by CADE286, within the SBDC (for instance, in the different 
opinions enacted by SDE and SEAE), and between the regulatory authorities and the agents it 
regulated. Since the field became controlled by the described agents, however, these conflicts 
have been largely restricted to what Bourdieu (2004, p. 29) defined as “struggles in reality”, a 
process “fueled by interest, dedication, belief, etc in the issues at stake” (Dezalay and Madsen 
2012, p. 441). These clashes took place within the boundaries established cooperatively 
between NIE economists and corporate lawyers. Regulators and regulated corporations 
struggled on the basis of an agreement about the “technical” competition policy.  
The very structure of the field – its rules of functioning and dominant visions – has 
therefore been relatively stable. Struggles in the field’s “representation” were solved for a 
long period of time since 1996, when the battle to define “the field’s logic and taken for 
granted limits” and “its consecration mechanisms” (Dezalay and Madsen 2012, p. 441) was 
won by lawyers and economists defending the primacy of the market, and the need to 
adequate competition policy to the impulses of a liberalizing economy. The series of 
measures that advanced the reform of the field comprised the strategies mobilized by a certain 
group of agents to achieve such objective.  
It was only recently, based on the references of the field’s agents to the recent trends 
of “politicization” and “interventionism”, that more fundamental struggles over the field’s 
structure (re)emerged. These are battles that contest the boundaries of the field, its hierarchy, 
and rules of functioning. Agents, capitals and stances that were outside the frontiers 
previously established received the adjectives of “outlier”, “political”, and “interventionist”. 
However, these battles to achieve the monopoly of competition policy are still too recent to 
have its effects noticed. As I will try to show in the next Chapter, the broad consensus over 
the field’s structure and practice, forged out of a clash, and based on political compromises, 																																																								
286 The number of divergences in CADE’s decision-making is however largely minoritarian. In the universe of 
decisions I reconstructed for the present study (described in Chapter 3), 5958 decisions in MR were made by 
CADE between 1996 and 2010. Out of these, more than 95% were unanimous. 
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and strategies mobilized by corporate lawyers and mainstream economists, implied concrete 
effects that are in accordance to its agents’ positions and stances. In other words, the ideals of 
the 1990s reform, expanded and deepened especially since 1996, managed to produce 
outcomes to the economy and society that are functional to the neoliberal political and 
economic project. 
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CHAPTER 6 
The products of competition policy in the economy and society 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the proposal of assessing the linkages of competition 
policy reform with neoliberalism is built upon two pillars. One comprises the identification of 
the roots of the field of competition policy within the neoliberal economic and political tenets 
through the analysis of the agents that created a modern field and who occupied it after 
reform. As discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, this dimension entailed, respectively, the 
reconstruction of the historical episodes that culminated in the creation of the 1994 
competition act, and the description of the field’s dynamics from its creation until 2011. The 
second pillar encompasses the evaluation of if and how the outcomes produced by the field on 
the economy and society fit into the characteristic features of neoliberalism. This is the task to 
be addressed in this Chapter. 
In Chapter 1, I reviewed how mainstream narratives in legal and economic 
scholarships, as well as in diffusion studies, portray these outcomes. They often depart from 
the assumption that competition law is explicit and authoritative, and therefore it does what it 
says. The corollary of this premise is that competition policy in Brazil, as it announces its 
aims to “promote competition” and “protect consumers”, performs the roles of controlling the 
market, moderating capitalism, and generating general benefits for society and economic 
agents. By employing vague notions of “success” and “failure” in the evaluation of these 
roles, and often through claims based on impressionistic empirical sources, mainstream 
narratives tend to endorse a formalistic view of competition policy’s responses to economic 
phenomena, functionalizing its outcomes within the very endogenous narrative of the legal 
text, and thus depoliticizing the effects of economic regulation. In such descriptions, since the 
outcomes of competition policy enforcement are a matter of compliance with a clear-cut legal 
framework, neoliberalism is ignored or even neglected as a political and economic 
phenomenon. 
What I propose as an alternative narrative about the connections of the practice of 
competition policy with neoliberalism combines conceptual tools to develop an empirical 
study of outcomes with a substantive theory about the defining elements of the neoliberal 
economic and political project. As described in Chapter 2, I deploy a “law in action” approach 
to grasp competition policy’s facilitative-regulatory and constitutive roles in the economy and 
society, and confront it with what a critical political economy of neoliberalism identifies as its 
characteristic features: the global concentration and expansion of capital into liberalized 
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markets, the hegemony and autonomization of financial capital, and the constitution of a 
“consumer citizenship”. 
As described in Chapter 3, I adopted different methodological strategies to pursue the 
analysis of each of these three features. These constitute the actual structure of the present 
chapter. In sections 6.1 and 6.2, I present the results of the first strategy: a quantitative study 
of CADE’s decision-making in Merger Reviews (MRs) and Administrative Procedures (APs), 
respectively. The goal, in these sections, is to identify what kind of economy the field of 
competition policy facilitates/regulates, and how. In section 6.3, to evaluate how Brazilian 
competition policy deals with the pressures for the hegemony of financial capital, I describe 
how CADE has historically regulated financial capital, and how the very jurisdiction of 
competition policy over this sector has been contested within and outside the field. In section 
6.4, I tackle the last dimension highlighted in Chapter 2: the constitutive “conceptual 
dichotomies” produced by competition policy in respect to “consumers” and “workers”. By 
identifying how the field incorporates or repels these categories I analyze what societal model 
it helps to constitute. In the Chapter’s closing section, in light of the empirical material 
presented, I go back to hypotheses stated in Chapter 3 to discuss the linkages between the 
outcomes of competition policy in Brazil and the structuring of neoliberalism. 
 
6.1 The regulation of economic concentrations 
 
 As described in Chapter 3, the largest part of the regulation produced by the Brazilian 
competition policy field has historically been focused on economic concentrations. Through 
the so-called Merger Reviews (MR), CADE has decided on the legality of corporate 
concentrations that occur, for instance, in the form of mergers, acquisitions and joint-
ventures. In this section, I present the results of the quantitative study based on a sample of 
871 MR decided by CADE between 1994 and 2010. This sample provides a comprehensive 
and representative view of the phenomena that demanded the field’s operation during 
practically the whole period under the reformed law of 1994. Moreover, the study developed 
on the basis of this sample enables constructing a profile of economic concentrations that 
“entered” CADE and, at the same time, of the field’s responses to them. In section 6.1.1, I 
describe the profile of the operations submitted to CADE according to the variables described 
in Chapter 3. In section 6.1.2, I analyze how CADE regulated these operations, i.e. how 
certain economic concentrations were treated, and what regulatory responses the agents that 
operate the field gave them. At the end of this section, I summarize the findings and complete 
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the picture of how CADE regulates economic concentrations by briefly describing the profiles 
of cases entirely rejected by the antitrust authority. 
 
6.1.1 The economy that concentrates 
 
From a general overview of operations it is possible to visualize a first pattern in the 
economy regulated by competition policy in Brazil. Although economic concentrations 
decided by CADE occurred in 29 different economic sectors, almost 70% of all operations 
presented before the Brazilian competition authority occurred in only 10 economic sectors, 
most of which where there had been significant privatizations and deregulation in the 1990s. 
The so-called “Essential and Infrastructure Services” sector, which comprises activities of 
production and distribution of electricity, gas, water, sanitation, and telecommunications, had 
the highest incidence. Traditionally monopolized by the state, these activities were largely 
liberalized for private activity in the early 1990s, especially through the privatization of state-
owned enterprises. In the electricity sector, for instance, no less than 16 state-owned 
corporations were privatized, such as CEEE Centro-Oeste, CEEE Norte-Nordeste, SAELPA, 
and Eletropaulo. In the gas sector, corporations such as Riogás, Gás Noroeste and Gás Sul 
were also privatized.  
 The second sector in the ranking was also one in which the market was largely 
liberalized: the chemical and petrochemical industry. It comprises activities related to the 
exploration and refinement of oil, the production of petrochemical elements, synthetic and 
artificial fibers, lubricants, asphalt, industrial gases, paints, fertilizers, among others. I also 
included in this sector the activity of fuel distribution developed by gas stations. Similarly to 
the infrastructure sector, the petrochemical and chemical industry was largely opened for 
private agents in parallel to the constitution of the field of competition policy. In the oil 
sector, for instance, the Constitutional Amendment 09 of 1995 broke the state monopoly over 
this natural resource, opening the way for foreign corporations to explore for oil in Brazil. 
Also, at least 22 industries controlled by the state were privatized in this sector in the 1990s, 
notably in the fertilizers sectors, as in the case of Ultrafértil, Arafértil, and Fosfértil, or was 
opened to outside investors, such as in the case of Petrobras. 
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Table 31. MRs – Economic Sectors 
Economic Sectors 
 
% 
 
 
Cumulative % 
 
Essential and Infrastructure Services 12.1 12.1 
Chemical and Petrochemical Industry 9 21.1 
Informatics and Telecommunication Industry 7.7 28.8 
General Services 6.5 35.3 
Automotive Industry and Transports 6.2 41.5 
Pharmaceutical and Hygiene Industry 5.7 47.2 
Metal Industry 5.7 52.9 
Mechanical Industry 5.4 58.3 
Communication and Entertainment 4.2 62.5 
Food Industry 4.2 66.7 
Transportation and Storage Services 3.5 70.2 
Mineral Extraction 3.4 73.6 
Electro-electronic Industry 3.3 77 
Retail Sector 3.2 80.1 
Financial Services 2.4 82.5 
Plastic and Rubber Industry 2.3 84.8 
Non-Metallic Mineral Products Industry 2 86.8 
Agriculture 1.9 88.7 
Civil Construction 1.7 90.4 
Beverage Industry 1.5 91.9 
Insurances and Pension 1.5 93.4 
Pulp and Paper Industry 1.3 94.7 
Textile Industry and Leather Products 1.3 96 
Wholesale Trade 1.1 97.1 
Soft Mechanical Industry 1 98.1 
Tobacco Industry 0.7 98.8 
Livestock farming 0.5 99.3 
Furniture Industry 0.5 99.7 
Wood Industry 0.3 100 
Total 100 
 Source: elaborated by the author 
The incidence of concentrations was noticeable in two other sectors, which were also 
largely opened to private agents through measures of deregulation or privatization. The 
“General Services” sector, fourth in the rank, comprises a variety of activities, such as 
hospitals and medical services and security. Sixth in the rank, the “Metal Industry” was 
extensively privatized in the 1990s. Exemplary of this process were the privatizations of nine 
state-owned corporations, such as CSN, CST, Usiminas, Forjas Acesita SA, COSIPA, and 
COSINOR. 
A second pattern that may be added to the sectors of economic activity in which 
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economic concentrations occurred is that of the means through which they occur. Almost 
82% of operations were acquisitions, followed by 7.3% joint-ventures. Mergers comprised 
less than 4% of concentrations regulated by the Brazilian antitrust authority. Operations of 
concession of public services corresponded to only 1.6% of operations, and a series of other 
forms that I classified under the label “Others”, comprising the increase of capital of a 
corporation that was subscribed by investors without, however, altering the control of the 
business, and distribution contracts among corporations.  
 
Table 32. MRs – Type of operation 
Type of operation % 
Acquisitions 81.7 
Joint-Ventures 7.3 
Other 5.8 
Mergers 3.6 
Concessions 1.6 
Source: elaborated by the author 
Most operations presented to CADE were of national scope, that is, restricted to the 
Brazilian market. A considerable proportion of almost 43%, however, was of global scope, 
which means operations of a scope larger than the Brazilian market, including it or not. 
Frequent exemples of this type of operation in the database were those in which foreign 
corporations, even if one of them was not active in Brazil, were involved in concentrations 
elsewhere, through global mergers or acquisitions, and notified the Brazilian antitrust 
authority. 
 
Table 33. MRs – Scope of operations 
Scope % 
National 57.1 
Global 42.9 
Source: elaborated by the author 
Although occurring in sectors largely affected by destatization, and mostly comprising 
acquisitions and operations of national scope, specific operations of privatization compose 
only a minority of cases decided by CADE between 1994 and 2010: 2.4%.  
Together with this general profile of the sectors and types of operations decided by 
CADE, the analysis of what sorts of capital mobilize the field is also extremely relevant to 
understand its roles properly. The table below describes in descending order of incidence the 
different movements of capital embedded in economic concentrations. I considered the origin 
of the controlling capital of each corporation involved in an operation to construct the 
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classification. The symbol “>” indicates a movement of inclusion by the enterprise on the left 
side of the symbol of one on the right side. The symbol “–”, in turn, depicts relations that are 
not of inclusion, such as join-ventures. 
 
Table 34. MRs – Capital movement 
Capital movement % 
Foreign > Foreign 44 
Foreign > Brazilian 19 
Brazilian > Brazilian 12.7 
Brazilian – Foreign 7.5 
Foreign – Foreign 7.3 
Brazilian > Foreign 6.2 
Brazilian – Brazilian 3.2 
Total 100 
Source: elaborated by the author 
The first information that emerges from the table is that 63% of economic 
concentrations entailed the acquisition of new assets by a foreign firm, be it by the acquisition 
of another foreign corporation, or of Brazilian businesses. The proportion of concentrations 
favoring foreign firms is higher, however, if movements of cooperation among foreign firms, 
or between them and Brazilian enterprises are added to this number. In doing so, it is possible 
to observe that 77,8% of cases regulated by the Brazilian competition authority involved 
some sort of concentration benefiting foreign firms. Concentrations solely in favor of 
Brazilian corporations, in turn, comprised 22,1%, and were mostly focused on the acquisition 
of another national enterprise. 
Unraveling the movement of capital in a time series provides yet another set of 
information, as the figure below indicates. According to the aggregated data, in most of the 
17-year period analyzed, acquisitions of foreign corporations dominated CADE’s decisions 
portfolio287. However, as it is possible to notice, there are some historical trends in the 
directions taken by economic concentrations. Although acquisitions among Brazilian firms 
were highly present in the initial years of the period, already in 1997 a trend that would 
permeate CADE’s decision-making until 2004 can be observed: most concentrations 
benefited foreign corporations, be it in the form of acquisitions, or joint-ventures with 
Brazilian companies or other foreign firms. 																																																								
287 The lines of the chart begin only in 1996 because cases in 1994 and 1995 are of a small number in the sample, 
and are thus ignored when annual frequencies were generated. This is due to the weighting of cases. In other 
graphs I present below, the same phenomenon can be observed. In the sample, there is one case decided in 1994, 
and another decided in 1995. Both of them were acquisitions of a Brazilian corporation by a foreign company. It 
is likely that the observed dominance of foreign acquisitions was already in place since the first year of the 
reformed field’s activity. 
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Figure 9. MRs – Capital movement in time (1994-2010) 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
Moreover, given that the year CADE usually made a decision a while after the 
operation was submitted, the “boom” of concentrations generated by foreign firms coincides 
with the series of deregulation, liberalization and privatization measures in Brazil. 
In the mid 2000s, however, this trend started to shift. In 2005, although acquisitions 
involving only foreign firms reached a historical peak (68.4% of MR decided by CADE), two 
novelties can be observed. On the one hand, other forms of concentration pushed by foreign 
companies became less relevant, as acquisitions of Brazilian firms by foreigners dropped 
from 19.4% in 2004 to virtually zero in 2005, and joint-ventures between Brazilian and 
foreign firms decreased from 10.3% to 3.5% in the same period. On the other, Brazilian 
companies started to be more numerous on the acquiring pole of concentrations, a movement 
that began already in 2003. Most notably, acquisitions of foreign firms by Brazilian 
corporations, which were largely marginal, gained space in 2003, and in 2006, when 23.3% of 
concentrations were of this type, it became the second highest form of operation. In parallel to 
this shift, acquisitions among Brazilian firms almost continuously grew from 2004 onwards, 
even surpassing concentrations among foreign companies in 2009. This is precisely the period 
when, as discussed in Chapter 2, “developmentalist” measures would have heated the 
Brazilian market, and incentives for national corporations were given through instruments of 
“industrial policy”. This shift also coincides with the aftermath of the global financial crisis, 
in which global mergers and acquisitions decelerated. 
Another pattern concerning the profile of the capital that mobilizes the Brazilian 
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antitrust field emerges if the countries of origin of corporations involved are considered. 
Within concentrations in which assets were permanently transferred (acquisitions and 
mergers), companies controlled by capital identified with 37 different countries figured in the 
acquiring pole of the operation. However, almost 80% of operations benefited companies 
from only 6 countries. While Brazilian firms acquired assets in 25% of these operations, 
companies based in the United States accounted for 35.7% of acquisitions, followed by 
Germany (5.9%), the United Kingdom (4.6%), France (4.5%), and the Netherlands (3.2%). 
 
Table 35. MRs – Origin of capital acquirers 
Country % Cumulative % 
United States 35.7 35.7 
Brazil 25.7 61.4 
Germany 5.9 67.3 
United Kingdom 4.6 71.9 
France 4.5 76.4 
Netherlands 3.2 79.6 
Spain 3.1 82.7 
Canada 2.5 85.3 
Italy 2 87.3 
Switzerland 1.6 88.9 
Japan 1.1 90 
Others 10 100 
Source: elaborated by the author 
Among the “others” are mostly European corporations of 8 different nationalities, 
Latin American companies of 6 countries, and Asian corporations from Singapore, China, and 
India, in this order. Most interestingly, in 1.6% of operations the acquiring companies were 
based in countries often reputed as tax havens, such as the Cayman Islands, Jersey, Bermuda, 
the Netherlands Antilles, and Panama. Together they account for the same proportion of 
operations as countries such as Switzerland, which is ranked within the top-10 acquiring 
countries. It is likely, however, that the actual control of corporations of those origins is based 
elsewhere, although it was not possible to confirm this from the available sources. 
On the side of the “acquired” capital, 39 countries appear in CADE’s decisions. 
Although more diverse, the distribution is also highly concentrated: corporations based in 10 
countries were those acquired in 90% of cases. The positions, however, are slightly different. 
Brazilian corporations are naturally at the top, comprising almost 40% of acquired capital, 
followed by the United States, with 25,5%. 
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Table 36. MRs – Origin of capital acquired 
Country % Cumulative % 
Brazil 38.3 38.3 
United States 25.5 63.8 
Germany 6.9 70.7 
United Kingdom 5 75.8 
France 4.9 80.6 
Netherlands 3.1 83.7 
Switzerland 2.3 86 
Italy 2.1 88.1 
Japan 1.4 89.5 
Canada 1.1 90.6 
Others 9.4 100 
Source: elaborated by the author 
Countries that appeared repeatedly as “incorporators” were also frequently on the 
passive pole of the operation. Interestingly, with the exception of the US, among the top 5 
countries that can be observed on both sides of economic concentrations, they were all more 
frequently acquired than acquirers of capital. Also in this dimension corporations based on tax 
havens appear in a relatively considerable amount, if compared to individual countries. 
Companies with declared origin in Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Virgin Islands, and the 
Bahamas comprised 1,5% of acquired capital. 
Among concentrations involving Brazilian corporations, in 7,5% of them state-owned 
capital was present. State capital was observed in different ways: as participation held by 
governmental bodies, especially the BNDES (most notably its holding that invests in private 
companies, BNDESPar), pension funds, and state-owned corporations. Businesses directly 
controlled by the government were also the acquirers in 3,1% of concentrations. 
       
Table 37. MRs – State-owned capital 
State-owned capital % 
Overall 7.5 
Acquiring pole 3.1 
Source: elaborated by the author 
As with capital movement, the distribution of acquisitions by state-owned capital in 
time provides another glimpse into the profile of the economy regulated by competition 
policy, especially if compared to situations in which state-owned capital was acquired, i.e. 
privatizations. In the graph below, I depict the distribution of privatizations and acquisitions 
by state-owned corporations in the analyzed period. The annual percentage corresponds to the 
total amount of operations of each type present in the sample. 
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Figure 10. MRs – Privatizations and state-owned capital in time (1994-2010) 
 
 
Source: elaborated by the author 
In line with the trends identified in the capital movement variable, the selling of state-
owned assets parallels the period dominated by foreign acquisitions. Similarly, while in this 
period acquisitions by Brazilian corporations were a minority, the buying of other firms by 
state-owned corporations started only in the early 2000s. Most interestingly, it grew and 
peaked during the so-called “developmentalist” period, when acquisitions by Brazilian firms 
in general also grew. This growth was also highly concentrated in the petrochemical sector, as 
among the acquisitions involving state-owned capital, 55.8% were mobilized by Petrobras – 
the Brazilian state-owned oil company. 
The third element that composes the picture of the economy regulated by CADE 
concerns the characteristics of economic concentrations that demanded the field’s attention in 
the period. Among the operations analyzed by CADE in the period, in 40% of them the 
antitrust authority recognized the existence of some kind of concentration. More than one 
third of operations (34.8%) implied horizontal integration, and in 5.6%, although horizontal 
concentration was not identified, vertical integration was observed. 
 
Table 38. MRs – Type of integration 
Type of integration % 
Vertical 5.6 
Horizontal  
(including vertical or not) 34.8 
Source: elaborated by the author 
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 The relatively limited proportion of cases in which some sort of integration was 
observed may be related to a recurrent argument often referred to in mainstream narratives, as 
well as in interviews, that most cases analyzed by CADE were not “important”, or had no 
“real competition concerns”. According to these views, due to what would be excessively 
encompassing legal definitions of the 1994 law, especially the threshold for MR mandatory 
submission, several cases with no possibility of generating anti-competitive effects were 
obliged to enter CADE288.  
 On average, horizontal integrations resulted in a concentration of the structure of 
supply of 24.89%, with a standard deviation of 22.40%, which indicates an important 
variance within the sample. In other words, the degrees of integration implied by MR were 
highly varied. This variance can be observed when the resulting levels of concentration are 
grouped in strata. Since horizontal integration was observed by CADE in 34,8% of cases, in 
65.2% of them the level of concentration assigned was zero. Most operations that implied 
some sort of concentration of this type (19.2%) were circumscribed to the legal limit 
established by the 1994 law: up to 20% of the relevant market. In 15.7% of cases, horizontal 
integration was above this standard. 
  
Table 39. MRs – Level of concentration 
Level of concentration % 
0 65.2 
0.1-20% 19.2 
21-40% 8.7 
41-60% 4.7 
61-80% 1.1 
81-100% 1.2 
Total 100 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
 The percentage of market share incorporated in operations where horizontal 
concentration was observed (what I call “Δ concentration”) ranged from close to zero to 
97.60%. The average of “Δ concentrations” was of 7.4%, with a standard deviation of 10,8%, 
which reflects the mentioned variance. As the table below illustrates, most horizontal 
concentrations entailed a maximum accumulation of market share by the acquiring agent of 																																																								
288 One of the frequently proposed explanations states that since the law 1994 stipulated that any operation 
involving at least one corporation with an annual revenue of 200 million Reais must be submitted to CADE, 
several small acquisitions by large groups ended up demanding regulatory approval. Although I am here 
describing the general trends of CADE’s decision-making, the focus on operations that actually generated some 
sort of concentration enables overcoming eventual problems implied by this massive presence of so-called 
“irrelevant cases”. 
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10%, which encompasses the overall average. More than 90% of horizontal integrations 
implied, in this sense, less than 20% of concentration. 
 
Table 40. MRs – Market share Δ 
Market share Δ % 
0-10% 77.9 
10.1-20% 12.9 
20.1-30% 3.7 
30.1-40% 3.4 
40.1-50% 0.7 
50.1-60% 1 
60.1-70% 0.1 
70.1-80% 0.1 
80.1-90% 0.1 
90.1-100% 0.2 
Total 100 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
 The table below crosses the level of concentration with the market share Δ observed in 
each level. Concentrations of up to 20% obviously had a maximum Δ of the same amount, but 
as the table illustrates, they were mostly around 10%. The incorporation of Δ higher than 
60%, although they were observed in the sample, became proportionally irrelevant in running 
the representations in terms of percentages. This is due to the small number of cases at these 
higher levels. For instance, for Δ between 60.1-70%, only one case was identified; between 
70.1-80%, two cases; between 80.1-90%, one case; and between 90,1-100%, two cases. 
 
Table 41. MRs – Market share Δ / Level of concentration 
 
Market share Δ 
Level of 
concentration 0-10% 10.1-20% 20.1-30% 30.1-40% 40.1-50% 50.1-60% 
0.1-20% 93.4 6.6 0 0 0 0 
21-40% 70.7 24 4 1.3 0 0 
41-60% 53.7 14.6 12.2 12.2 2.4 4.9 
61-80% 55.6 33.3 11.1 0 0 0 
81-100% 10 10 20 40 10 10 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
When concentrations implied a level higher than that of the legal limit of 20%, a 
higher Δ can be observed. What is interesting to notice is that between concentration levels of 
41-60% and 61-80%, most Δ were of a maximum of 20%, what means that economic agents 
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who already held a market share of at least 20% were increasing their proportion of market 
control289. 
In cases in which the level of concentration was close to monopolist positions (levels 
between 81 and 100%), market share Δ was better distributed, although small Δ were a 
minority. This means that these positions were achieved through a considerable incorporation 
of market share, most notably of shares between 30.1 and 40%. Even in those situations, 
however, and similarly to the previous cases, companies that achieved at least 80.1% of 
market share already held a considerable amount of the market: at least 40% when Δ was 
between 30.1 and 40%. The economic phenomena regulated by the field of competition 
policy that implied the highest levels of concentration were therefore largely composed by 
increases of the shares held by agents that already controlled a considerable amount of the 
markets. 
Like operations in general, horizontal integration was also concentrated in certain 
economic sectors. Among the 27 areas of economic activity regulated by CADE, 10 of them 
comprised 70% of horizontal concentrations.   
 
Table 42. MRs – Economic sectors of horizontal concentrations 
Economic Sector % 
Essential and Infrastructure Services 11.6 
Informatics and Telecommunication Industry 11.2 
Chemical and Petrochemical Industry 9.2 
Food Industry 6.9 
Electro-electronic Industry 5.9 
General Services 5.9 
Pharmaceutical and Hygiene Industry 5.6 
Metal Industry 5.6 
Automotive Industry and Transports 4.3 
Mechanical Industry 4 
Others 29.89 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
The proportion in each sector is more or less consistent with the overall distribution of 
sectors in CADE’s regulatory practice. Hence, liberalized and privatized economic areas 
counted for most effective concentrations decided by CADE. The levels of concentration 
generated in the analyzed cases varied, however, among these sectors. Although those that 																																																								
289 Although the table indicates that 0% of operations resulting in levels of concentration between 61% and 80% 
had market share Δ higher than 30%, 5 cases with such profile were identified in the sample. Their absence in 
the table is due to the different weights each case received in the stratified sample. 
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congregate the largest amount of concentrations generally figure in all levels, other sectors 
that were less represented in the sample, or even in the distribution of cases with horizontal 
integration are frequent in certain strata. Nevertheless, the highest level of concentration was 
dominated by sectors in which several privatizations and deregulation measures happened, 
such as the “Chemical and Petrochemical Industry”, the “Informatics and Telecommunication 
Industry”, and the sector of “General Services”, which together account for 75% of the 
highest concentrations decided by CADE, even though they represent 23.2% of the sample. 
 
Table 43. MRs – Economic sectors in each level of concentration 
Level of concentration Economic sector % 
0.1-20% 
Essential and Infrastructure Services 15.50% 
Informatics and Telecommunication Industry 
Chemical and Petrochemical Industry 8.90% 
Electro-electronic Industry 
Mechanical Industry 6.50% 
 
    
20.1-40% 
Informatics and Telecommunication Industry 17.30% 
Pharmaceutical and Hygiene Industry 10.70% 
Chemical and Petrochemical Industry 8.00% 
Metal Industry 
Essential and Infrastructure Services 6.70% 
Food Industry 
 
    
40.1-60% 
Retail Sector 14.60% 
Mineral Extraction 9.80% 
Chemical and Petrochemical Industry 
7.30% 
Pharmaceutical and Hygiene Industry 
Metal Industry 
Essential and Infrastructure Services 
General Services 
Food Industry 
      
60.1-80% 
Retail Sector 
20.00% Beverage Industry 
Metal Industry 
Chemical and Petrochemical Industry 
10.00% Electro-electronic Industry 
Automotive Industry and Transports 
Transportation and Storage Services 
 
    
80.1-100% 
Chemical and Petrochemical Industry 
25.00% Informatics and Telecommunication Industry 
General Services 
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Pharmaceutical and Hygiene Industry 12.50% 
Retail Sector 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
With respect to the movement of capital observed in operations regulated by CADE, 
concentrations involving Brazilian firms implied horizontal integrations more often than those 
in which a foreign company participated. As the table below illustrates, the highest proportion 
of concentrations in each kind of capital movement was of acquisitions among Brazilian 
firms, followed by the acquisition of a foreign company by a Brazilian corporation. Those 
operations in which foreign capital expanded, in turn, generated horizontal concentrations in a 
lower amount. 
 
Table 44. MRs – Horizontal concentration according to capital movement 
Capital movement Horizontal Concentration 
Brazilian > Brazilian 48.60% 
Brazilian > Foreign 40.00% 
Foreign > Brazilian 32.10% 
Foreign > Foreign 32.00% 
Brazilian - Brazilian 46.40% 
Brazilian - Foreign 23.10% 
Foreign - Foreign 37.50% 
Source: elaborated by the author 
   
  That acquisitions among Brazilian firms implied a higher amount of horizontal 
concentrations is quite logical, since they were operations involving firms that already acted 
in the Brazilian market. The lower presence of horizontal concentrations when foreign firms 
were in the active pole of the relation may be explained by two reasons. First, among those 
solely involving foreign companies (Foreign > Foreign, and Foreign – Foreign) many were 
global operations in which one or even all companies had no direct activity in Brazil, and 
horizontal concentration was thus not observed. Second, in those situations in which foreign 
firms acquired or cooperated with Brazilian companies, the lower degree of horizontal 
integration suggests that in many cases they entered the Brazilian market for the first time, i.e. 
there was no juxtaposition of activities. In other words, these were operations of expansion of 
foreign capital into Brazil, which didn’t necessarily imply horizontal integration.  
For instance, in 25 of the MRs captured in the sample in which a foreign firm acquired 
assets of a Brazilian corporation, CADE considered the operation a simple “restructuring of 
shares”, as a new share-holder entered the company, or explicitly acknowledged the 
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“substitution of economic agent” and the “entering” of a foreign competitor into Brazil. In 22 
of these cases, no horizontal integration was observed by CADE. Examples of such cases are 
the MR numbers 11/1994, 08012.005226/1998-57 and 188/1997, in which foreign companies 
bought Brazilian firms, and that implied levels of concentration of 65%, 50% and 38%, 
respectively, and not variations of market shares. 
 Although less prone to generate horizontal integrations, when they did, operations 
involving foreign firms generally resulted in higher levels of concentration. The table below 
illustrates the frequency of each level of concentration according to the capital movement. 
Only operations that resulted in horizontal concentrations are considered. As it illustrates, the 
most frequent level of concentration generated by operations only involving Brazilian firms 
was between 0-20%. 
 
Table 45. MRs – Level of concentration according to capital movement 
 
Level of concentration 
Capital movement 0-20% 21-40% 41-60% 61-80% 81-100% 
Brazilian > Brazilian 57.4 18.5 14.8 5.6 3.7 
Brazilian > Foreign 57.1 28.6 14.3 0 0 
Foreign > Brazilian 41.5 26.4 20.8 5.7 5.7 
Foreign > Foreign 55.3 27.6 14.6 1.6 0.8 
Brazilian X Brazilian 84.6 15.4 0 0 0 
Brazilian X Foreign 56.2 31.2 6.2 0 6.2 
Foreign X Foreign 62.5 20.8 4.2 0 12.5 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
When it comes to the expansion of foreign capital into the country, however, the 
frequency of higher levels of concentration increased. In the movement “Foreign > 
Brazilian”, for instance, 58.5% of operations generated horizontal concentrations higher than 
the legal limit. In 32.2% of these operations, the resulting level of concentration was even 
higher than 40%. The relationship between levels of concentration and capital movement thus 
reveals that MRs decided by CADE not only reflect the entrance of foreign firms into the 
country, but also the consolidation of their participation in the Brazilian market.  
The proportion of market share incorporated in operations that implied horizontal 
integration (Δ) also reveals that foreign companies achieved higher proportions of the market 
if compared to Brazilian firms. While more than 80% of acquisitions by Brazilian firms 
implied a market share Δ of a maximum of 10%, the acquisition of capital by foreign 
corporations at this level was 77.7% in the case of another foreign company being acquired, 
and 66% when a Brazilian company was bought. Although to a lower degree, as the table 
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below reveals, similar trends can be observed in other capital movements that benefited 
foreign companies. This means that operations through which foreign companies consolidated 
their position in the Brazilian economy not only generally implied higher levels of 
concentration, but also a more intense process of concentration. 
 
Table 46. MRs – Market share Δ according to capital movement 
 
Market share Δ 
Capital movement 0-10% 10.1-20% 20.1-30% 30.1-40% 40.1-50% 50.1-60% 
Brazilian > Brazilian 86.8% 5.7% 1.9% 3.8% 0.0% 1.9% 
Brazilian > Foreign 81.8% 13.6% 4.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Foreign > Brazilian 66.0% 15.1% 9.4% 3.8% 1.9% 3.8% 
Foreign > Foreign 77.7% 16.5% 3.3% 1.7% 0.8% 0.0% 
Brazilian - Brazilian 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Brazilian - Foreign 78.6% 21.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Foreign - Foreign 79.2% 8.3% 0.0% 12.5% 0.0% 0.0% 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
 Finally, in respect to operations related to privatizations, 45% of them implied 
horizontal concentrations, which is a higher proportion if compared to the overall average of 
34.8% horizontal integrations in the sample. In these cases, the level of concentration implied 
by operations was also slightly different from that of general cases implying horizontal 
concentrations. MRs of privatizations contained higher levels of concentration in certain 
strata. For instance, while the general distribution in the level 0-20% was of 19.2% of cases, 
privatizations were of 25%.  
 
Table 47. MRs – Level of concentration in privatizations 
  Level of concentration (%) 
  0-20% 21-40% 41-60% 61-80% 81-100% 
Privatization 25 15 5 0 0 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
Privatizations also implied more concentrations between the level of 21-40% than the 
general sample. Since the market share Δ of these operations are also confined to the intervals 
of 0-10% (77.8%) and 10.1-20% (22.2%), it is possible to assume that privatizations that 
compose the sample were mostly acquisitions by companies that until then didn’t hold large 
proportions of the sector. An illustration of this profile can be seen in two MRs that concerned 
privatizations in which CADE did not detect horizontal concentrations: 11/1994 and 
53500.002120/1998. Both of them were acquisitions of state-owned corporations by foreign 
companies, and were considered by CADE as a mere substitution of economic agent, as they 
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entailed the transfer of assets to companies that didn’t previously hold market shares in the 
same market. In such a context, the transfer of state control over an economic sector to a 
private agent (in one of them of 65% of the market) was seen as a “pro-competitive 
operation”, as no “modification in the level of concentration” was detected290. 
 
6.1.2 Regulatory responses to economic concentrations 
 
Having described the profile of the economy regulated by the field of competition 
policy in Brazil, I now portray how these economic phenomena were regulated by CADE. In 
other words, in this section I empirically assess how the field facilitates and regulates the 
operations described above. This description entails two dimensions: first, the depiction of the 
profile of economic concentrations that suffered some kind of restriction by CADE; second, 
the identification of the types of restrictions imposed. 
As described in Chapter 3, in the universe of decisions made by CADE between 1994 
and 2010, the proportion of cases that suffered some sort of restriction was 4.9%. In the 
sample here analyzed, a similar number was found: 5.3%. As the graph below evidences, the 
proportion of restrictions in the initial years grasped in the sample was higher than the overall 
average in the initial years of the analyzed period, dropping since 1997 and stabilizing by 
2003. The years of 1994 and 1995 are not depicted in the graph due to the small number of 
decisions of those years in the sample. However, as discussed in the previous chapter, from 
1994 to mid 1996, CADE imposed restrictions in 77.77% of MRs – the reason for the 
institutional crisis precipitated in 1996. With the arrival of new commissioners in 1996, the 
number of restrictions dropped dramatically: 25% of the 16 MRs decided by this group in 
1996 were approved with restrictions, 20% of 41 MRs in 1997, and finally 3,5% of the 
universe of 117 MRs in 1998. 
Although the graph cannot be taken as a perfect representation to these initial years, 
since decisions from the period are of a small number, it does evidence the fall of restrictions 
implied by a new profile of commissioner that dominated the Council. It also illustrates how 
the decision-making pattern initiated in the middle of 1996 was relatively stable over time – 
which may also be related to the dominance of the field by agents of the same circle. 
 
 																																																								
290 Extracts from the rapporteur’s opinion enacted in the MR number 53500.002120/1998, p.4. 
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Figure 11. MRs – Types of decision in time (1994-2010) 
 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
Both in the universe of decisions and in the sample, some oscillations can be 
observed. The graph indicates that in 2004 occurred a raise in the level of restrictions, which 
can also be noticed in the universe of decisions. From this moment to 2008, the annual 
average of restrictions in the sample was of 8,6%, never below 7%, and even reaching 10,6%. 
However, also due to the small number of cases restricted, it is not possible to infer that in 
this period CADE became more restrictive. Since the number of restricted cases in the 
universe is very low, a single case corresponds to a high percentage of the total of cases 
restricted. Thus, the addition of one case may increase substantially the proportion of cases 
restricted in one year.  
Moreover, the increase in the proportion of restrictions may be related to yet another 
reason: several of the MRs restricted between 2004 and 2008 were connected to a single 
economic phenomenon. For instance, the analyzed sample comprises 74 cases decided in 
2004, of which 30 were approved with restrictions. Out of these 30, however, 14 MRs were 
concentrations mobilized by a single corporation that produces elevators and provides 
maintenance services – Elevadores do Brasil Ltda, controled by the firm Elevadores Otis 
Ltda, which in turn belonged to the US group United Technologies CO –, which acquired 
service contracts of several smaller Brazilian firms.  
 
 
 
0%	10%	
20%	30%	
40%	50%	
60%	70%	
80%	90%	
100%	
1994	 1995	 1996	 1997	 1998	 1999	 2000	 2001	 2002	 2003	 2004	 2005	 2006	 2007	 2008	 2009	 2010	
%	Without	Restrictions	%	With	Restrictions	
				 347	
Table 48. MRs – Cases with restriction (2004-2008) 
Year 
Total of 
cases 
Cases with 
restriction Cases connected 
2004 74 30 1 operation connected to 14 MRs 
2005 54 21 2 operations connected to 3 MRs each 
2006 39 14 1 operation connected to 2 MRs 
2007 57 20 2 operations connected to 2 MRs each 
2008 96 41 
1 operation connected to 6 MRs + 1 operation connected to 5 MRs +  
2 operations connected to 2 MRs each 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
Almost half of restrictions imposed in this year that were captured in the sample were 
thus linked to, in practice, a single movement of concentration. As the table above indicates, 
similar phenomena were also noticed in the subsequent years. If a restriction was imposed to 
one of these MRs, it was likely extended to the others. Thus, since the number of restricted 
cases is small both in the universe and in the sample, this multiplication of restrictions in what 
was actually a single movement of concentration led to an important proportional addition of 
restrictions, as a single case counts for an important percentage within the group of restricted 
cases. It is therefore not possible to conclude that CADE’s behavior in these years was more 
restrictive, but rather that the imposition of restrictions was largely stable over time – which is 
consistent with the finding described in the last chapter, that the field was historically 
dominated by a relatively homogeneous group of decision-makers291. 
As with MRs in general, restrictions were concentrated in certain economic sectors. 
Ten sectors congregate 77% of all restrictions imposed by CADE. Surprisingly, however, not 
in the same proportion of cases presented in each of those sectors. As the table below 
illustrates, sectors that by far account for most restrictions imposed by the Brazilian antitrust 
authority were those of “General Services” and “Chemical and Petrochemical Industry”, 
followed by the “Food Industry”. 
 
Table 49. MRs – % of restrictions in economic sectors 
Economic Sector % of Restrictions 
General Services 18.20% 
Chemical and Petrochemical Industry 15.90% 
Food Industry 9.10% 
Retail Sector 6.80% 
Pharmaceutical and Hygiene Industry 4.50% 
Non-Metallic Mineral Products Industry 4.50% 																																																								
291 Indicative of the stability of CADE’s decision making in time is the result of the Likelihood Ratio for the 
association between type of decision and year of decision: 0,134 – way above the level of significance of 0,05. 
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Mineral Extraction 4.50% 
Metal Industry 4.50% 
Essential and Infrastructure Services 4.50% 
Beverage Industry 4.50% 
Others 33.00% 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
Out of the 10 sectors most frequently present in CADE’s decisions, only 6 figure 
among those in which restrictions were more intensely imposed. This is an indication that the 
sectors in which more concentrations happened received less restrictions, most notably the 
areas of “Essential and Infrastructure Services” and “Informatics and Telecommunications 
Industry”, which together comprised almost 20% of all operations analyzed by CADE. 
Exceptions to this trend are the “Chemical and Petrochemical Industry” and the “General 
Services” sector, which entailed more than 15% of operations and respond for 34% of 
restrictions. Moreover, with the exception of the “Non-Metallic Mineral Products Industry”, 
they all figure among those that generated higher levels of concentration, even though they 
were not frequent areas of economic activity in the overall sample. 
A finding that supports this idea is the proportion of restrictions within each sector. As 
the table below illustrates, sectors that were frequent among those which generated higher 
levels of concentration, such as the “Beverage Industry”, “General Services”, and “Non-
Metallic Mineral Products Industry” appear as those that were proportionally more restricted 
by CADE. In these areas of economic activity, as well as in sectors such as the “Retail 
Sector” and others, the percentage of restrictions is from two to three times higher than the 
overall average of restrictions observed in the sample. 
Table 50. MRs – % of restrictions within economic sectors 
Economic Sector % of Restrictions within Sector 
Beverage Industry 15.4 
General Services 14.0 
Non-Metallic Mineral Products Industry 11.8 
Wholesale Trade 11.1 
Retail Sector 11.1 
Food Industry 11.1 
Textile Industry and Leather Products 9.1 
Chemical and Petrochemical Industry 9.0 
Pulp and Paper Industry 8.3 
Insurances and Pension 7.7 
Mineral Extraction 6.9 
Agriculture 6.2 
Source: elaborated by the author 
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In respect to the scope of operations, the types of decisions enacted by CADE also 
tended to be concentrated. While operations of national scope counted for 57.1% of cases, and 
of global scope corresponded to 42.9% of MRs presented, the proportions of restrictions in 
each category were much more unbalanced. Out of all restrictions imposed by CADE, almost 
85% tackled operations of national scope. This means that while MRs of national scope were 
restricted 7.8% of the time (higher than the overall average), global operations received 
restrictions in only 1.9%.  
 
Table 51. MRs – Restrictions and scope of operations 
Scope % With Restrictions % of Restrictions 
National 7.8 84.8 
Global 1.9 15.2 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
Although there is an association between the scope of the operation and the type of 
decision taken by CADE, the difference likely reflects the lower incidence of effects to the 
Brazilian market encompassed by global operations292. While operations of national scope by 
definition were connected to the Brazilian market, several of those of global dimension 
entailed at least one corporation that did not perform any activities in Brazil.  
 In respect to capital movement, the types of decision tended to be associated with 
three forms of operations. As the table below indicates, five types of movement were above 
the overall average of restrictions, and only the movements involving exclusively foreign 
corporations were below it. 
 
Table 52. MRs – Restrictions and capital movement 
Capital movement % with restriction 
Brazilian - Foreign 12.3 
Brazilian > Brazilian 10.8 
Foreign > Brazilian 7.9 
Brazilian - Brazilian 6.9 
Brazilian > Foreign 5.6 
Foreign > Foreign 1.8 
Foreign - Foreign 1.6 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
																																																								
292 The Pearson Chi-Square test for the association between scope and type of decision resulted in .000, thus 
indicating a statistically significant association. 
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The highest incidences of restrictions were located, respectively, in the movements 
“Brazilian – Foreign” and “Brazilian > Brazilian”. As the tests of association ran in the 
analysis indicate, in both cases there was a statistically significant association, which means 
that these forms of capital movement do tended to be more restricted than the overall 
sample293. A third type of capital movement in which an association with restrictive decisions 
was detected was that of “Foreign > Foreign”294. In this case, as the percentage of restrictions 
is almost three times below the average, the result suggests that acquisitions among foreign 
firms tend to be less restricted than other forms of capital movement. In the other four species 
movements, although they indicate a level of restrictions above the average of 5,3% observed 
in the sample, or in the case of “Foreign – Foreign” way below it, no statistical association 
was noticed295.  
These results cannot be interpreted automatically as institutional “preferences” in 
respect to the movements of capital. In the case of the movement “Brazilian – Foreign”, in 
which the highest amount of restrictions was observed, the association with restrictive 
decisions must be specially nuanced. This is due to the same cause that explains the 
“inflation” of restrictions in the year of 2004. Out of the 35 cases of the type “Brazilian – 
Foreign” with restrictions that compose the sample, 16 were connected to the mentioned 
corporation that produces elevators. Decided between 2004 and 2006, these cases correspond 
to 45% of the “Brazilian – Foreign” movement that was restricted in the sample. Thus, if 
these cases were taken as part of a single economic phenomenon, restrictions in this type of 
movement would be much lower. 
The statistical association between the high amount of restrictions and the movement 
“Brazilian > Brazilian”, as well as the low incidence of conditions imposed for operations of 
the form “Foreign > Foreign”, must also be taken cautiously. The different responses given to 
each type of movement cannot be separated from the fact that while operations of the form 
“Brazilian > Brazilian” virtually always implied effects on the Brazilian market, those of 
“Foreign > Foreign”, as already mentioned, encompassed several operations of global scope 
without any effects on Brazil. Thus, it is understandable why operations that almost always 
imply effects to the market regulated by CADE were more restricted, while those that often 
didn’t were less restricted. 																																																								
293 The Pearson Chi-Square test for the association of the movements “Brazilian > Brazilian” and “Brazilian-
Foreign” with the decision type resulted in, respectively, 0,005 and 0,008. 
294 The Pearson Chi-Square test for this movement was 0,000, suggesting a strong association. 
295 The Pearson Chi-Square for these movements were the following: 0,098 in “Foreign > Brazilian”; 0,692 in 
“Brazilian – Brazilian”; 0,928 in “Brazilian > Foreign”; and 0,173 in “Foreign – Foreign”. 
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However, these findings are specially relevant in the case of the movement “Foreign > 
Brazilian”, the second most frequent type of movement in the overall sample. Although 
higher than the average, the percentage of restrictions imposed in this case was not 
statistically significant. Since they entailed the acquisition of Brazilian corporations, these 
operations can be compared to the “Brazilian > Brazilian” movement. Curiously, thus, while 
the latter received restrictions above the average, the former were not so in a statistically 
significant amount. Moreover, as presented in the previous section, the movement “Foreign > 
Brazilian” more often implied higher levels of concentration and the incorporation of larger 
amounts of market share if compared to the movement “Brazilian > Brazilian”. It is thus 
possible to assume that the entrance of foreign capital in Brazil through the acquisition of 
foreign corporations tended to be less restricted than the concentration among Brazilian firms. 
The incidence of restrictions in cases involving privatizations was also higher than the 
overall average: 9.5% of cases involving privatization were restricted. However, given that 
these cases are largely a minority in the analyzed sample, the tests of association indicate no 
statistical significance to these averages296. Therefore, even if higher at first sight, restrictions 
in privatizations do not deviate from the overall tendency observed in the regulatory practice. 
In respect to the types of integration observed in the sample, as the table below 
indicates, the percentage of restrictions is higher than the average for both vertical and 
horizontal concentrations.  
 
Table 53. MRs – Restrictions in types of integration 
Type of integration % of restrictions 
Vertical 8.3 
Horizontal  
(including vertical or not) 10.2 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
However, a statistically significant association was identified only in cases that 
implied at least some horizontal concentration297. This means that, as it could be expected, the 
imposition of restrictions tends to be associated with the existence of horizontal integration. 
																																																								
296 In the Pearson Chi-Square test of association between privatizations and decision type, the result was 0,379, 
and in the case of acquisitions by state-owned corporations, it was of 0,169. 
297 In the case of vertical integration, since the sample does not provide enough cases for running a Pearson Chi-
Square test, I relied on Fisher’s Exact Test, whose result was 0,313. In cases implying horizontal concentrations, 
in turn, Pearson Chi-Square test could be used, and resulted in 0,000, indicating a strong association with the 
imposition of restrictions. 
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As the table below indicates, the proportion of restrictions imposed also tended to 
increase accordingly to the level of concentration. In other words, the higher level of 
concentration implied by operations, the more restricted they were298.  
 
Table 54. MRs – Restrictions in levels of concentration 
Level of concentration % with restriction 
0-20% 4.2 
21-40% 11.8 
41-60% 15.0 
61-80% 22.2 
81-100% 60.0 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
In dismembering the analysis of association between the type of decision with each 
level, however, it was possible to observe that the association is statistically significant in 
only three extracts: those between 21-40%, 41-60%, and 81-100%299. This means that, on the 
one hand, it is not possible to assume a relation between the lower proportion of restrictions 
imposed in the level 0-20% if compared to the average, and on the other, the higher 
percentage of restrictions in the level 61-80%. 
In any case, the crossing of these variables indicate that although restrictions were 
imposed above the average in certain levels, in four of them the majority of operations was 
not restricted, even if they surpassed the legal limit of a 20% market share. Between 21-40% 
concentration levels, almost 88% of operations were approved without restrictions, and 
between 41-60%, 78% of operations were not contested by CADE. Thus, in practice, the vast 
majority of cases generating levels of concentrations of up to 80% were majoritarily 
approved. 
In respect to the market share Δ implied in operations regulated by CADE, the 
association between the degree of incorporation and the imposition of restrictions was also 
observed. As the table below illustrates, the higher the percentage of market share embedded 
in operations, the larger the proportion of cases restricted300. Market shares higher than 50% 
																																																								
298 The Likelihood Ratio for this association was of 0,000, indicating a strong connection between the imposition 
of restrictions and the level of concentration. 
299 The Fisher’s Exact Test for these levels were of, respectively, 0,014, 0,015, and 0,000. In the other two 
extracts (0-20% and 61-80%), the results did not indicate a statistically significant association, resulting in, 
respectively, a Pearson Chi-Square of 0,484, and a Fisher’s Exact Test of 0,078. 
300 The Likelihood Ration for the association between the market share Δ and the type of decision resulted in 
0,001, indicating a connection between the variables. 
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are not displayed in the table due to the small number of cases present in the sample, which 
do not generate a relevant percentage in running the aggregate data. 
 
Table 55. MRs – Restrictions and in market share Δ 
Market share Δ % with restriction 
0-10% 7.2 
10.1-20% 15.4 
20.1-30% 36.4 
30.1-40% 10.0 
40.1-50% 50.0 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
In evaluating the association in each level of market share separately, in only two 
cases the association was statistically confirmed: those between 10.1-20%, and 20.1-30%. In 
the other levels, the association was not statistically relevant (notably due to the decreasing 
amount of cases in the sample when Δ increases). However, as the increase from the second 
to the third levels were statistically relevant, it is likely that as Δ increases, so does the 
proportion of restrictions.  
A more comprehensive understanding of how the Brazilian field of competition policy 
regulates economic concentrations demands not only an overview of what sorts of cases are 
restricted, but also what kinds of restrictions are imposed and when. Within the analyzed 
sample, among the 5.3% of MRs that suffered some form of restriction by CADE, and in the 
vast majority of them behavioral conditions were imposed for the approval of the operation. 
 
Table 56. MRs – Types of restriction 
Type of restriction % 
Behavioral 88.5 
Structural 11.2 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
As the table above indicates, in only 11.2% of cases restricted, a structural condition 
was imposed, i.e. in only a minority of cases the actual market concentration was tackled 
through the imposition of measures to de-concentrate the market. In the overall sample, this 
means that while 94.7% of economic concentrations were approved without conditions, 4.7% 
received only behavioral restrictions, and 0.6% of them were structurally limited in a certain 
way. Among cases that received a structural restriction, quite logically, all of them implied 
horizontal integrations. 
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Within behavioral restrictions, a relevant pattern emerged from the sample: 68.3% of 
these restrictions focused only on so-called “non-compete clauses”. These are contractual 
clauses often signed between the agents involved in an economic concentration determining 
that during a certain period of time and/or in a determinate geographical region the acquired 
agent will abstain for developing the same economic activity that is being transferred. In 
CADE’s decision-making, thus almost 70% of behavioral restrictions only stipulated changes 
in this clause, often imposing the reduction of the “non-compete clause” duration from 10 to 5 
years, and its delimitation to the relevant market of the operation, which frequently meant the 
adoption of a local or regional geographical area, rather than national. This type of restriction 
correspond to 3.2% of the whole sample, and thus if it was excluded from the analysis, more 
substantive forms of behavioral restrictions actually entailed only 1.5% of cases. 
Given the small number of cases restricted with a structural condition (22 out of 204 
with restrictions that integrate the sample of 870 MRs), the possible association of the type of 
restriction with variables that entailed a series of different values – such as the year of 
decision and the economic sectors involved – was not statistically significant. This means that 
the imposition of structural restrictions is very likely unrelated to those aspects. Similarly, in 
the case of the scope of the operations restricted, although those of national dimension 
received structural conditions in a higher proportion than those of global scope (12,1% 
against 6,7%), there was no significant statistical association between the variables 
analyzed301. 
Relations with the types of restriction can be nevertheless identified when the profile 
of the capitals involved in operations, as well as its impacts in terms of market shares are 
analyzed thoroughly. In the crossing the different types of capital movement with the 
imposition of structural restrictions among cases that received some sort of restriction (n = 
204), it is possible to notice that most of these conditions affected acquisitions of Brazilian 
firms by foreign corporations, followed by acquisitions by Brazilian companies (be it of 
national or foreign capital). 
 
Table 57. MRs – Types of restriction and capital movement 
Capital movement % with behavioral restrictions % with structural restrictions 
Brazilian > Brazilian 90.4 9.6 
Brazilian > Foreign 53.8 46.2 
Foreign > Brazilian 87.7 12.3 																																																								
301 For this relation, the Fisher’s Exact Test resulted in 0,540. 
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Foreign > Foreign 96.9 3.1 
Brazilian – Brazilian 71.4 28.6 
Brazilian – Foreign 97.1 2.9 
Foreign – Foreign 100 0.0 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
However, as the table also illustrates, the proportion of structural restrictions imposed 
to each capital movement differs. Those capital movements in which the proportion of 
structural restrictions were highest involved the accumulation of capital by Brazilian firms: 
“Brazilian > Foreign”, in which almost half of operations restricted received a structural 
condition, and “Brazilian – Brazilian”. In testing the association between these variables, 
however, the only capital movement in which a statistically relevant connection was 
identified was that of “Brazilian > Foreign”302. Nevertheless, as in other situations mentioned 
above, this result must be nuanced, since different MRs connected to a single economic 
operation compose the sample. In the case “Brazilian > Foreign”, out of the 6 MRs in which a 
structural condition was imposed, 4 were linked to 2 operations in which the same corporation 
acquired assets from the same source303. Thus, if instead of 6 cases this variable is seen as 
comprising 4 MRs, the association with the capital movement “Brazilian > Foreign” likely 
disappears. In this case, the type of restriction imposed cannot therefore be associated with the 
capital movement entailed by operations regulated by CADE. 
The higher incidence of structural restrictions in integrations benefiting Brazilian 
corporations is rather likely connected to the levels of concentration they generate. As already 
stated, these were the capital movements that more often entailed high degrees of 
concentration. The table above illustrates the proportion of each type of restriction imposed 
according to the level of concentration implied by the economic concentration304.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
302 Fisher’s Exact Test for the association between “Brazilian > Foreign” and the type of restriction resulted in 
0,001. 
303 These cases were the following: MR numbers 08012.005226/2000-88 and 08012.005250/2000-17, through 
which the formerly state-owned mining company Companhia Vale do Rio Doce acquired foreign capital 
detained by the same group, and MR numbers 08012.011047/2004-11 and 08012.009419/2004-31, through 
which corporations of the cement sector owned by the Brazilian group Votorantim acquired assets of the same 
subsidiary of a Swiss conglomerate. 
304 The Likelihood Test for these variables resulted in 0,001, thus indicating a statistically relevant association. 
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Table 58. MRs – Types of restriction and level of concentration 
Level of concentration % with behavioral 
restrictions 
% with behavioral 
restrictions excluding 
“non-compete clause” 
% with structural 
restrictions 
0-20% 4.2 0.0 0.0 
21-40% 11.8 2.6 0.0 
41-60% 12.5 2.7 2.5 
61-80% 11.1 11.1 11.1 
81-100% 30.0 20.0 30.0 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
In respect to behavioral restrictions, it is possible to identify that in most levels the 
imposition of this type of condition is above the overall average only after an operation 
implied more than 20% of concentration. Although the proportion does not increase in a 
relevant amount until the 61-80% level, in the highest stratum of concentration almost a third 
of operations received some sort of behavioral restrictions. 
However, if the majority of restrictions related to the “non-compete clause” are 
excluded from the analysis to evaluate the imposition of more substantive behavioral 
conditions, it is possible to formulate two conclusions. First, that within the legal limit of 20% 
no substantive behavioral restrictions were imposed, and between 21% and 60% they 
comprise a large minority of conditions. Second, only in the two highest levels substantive 
behavioral restrictions were frequent: in the level 61-80%, all restrictions were of this kind, 
and in the level 81-100%, two thirds of behavioral conditions were substantive. Thus, 
substantive behavioral restrictions tend to grow according to the increase in the level of 
concentration – but nevertheless comprise a vast minority in the sample. 
Similarly, in respect to structural conditions, the proportion of restrictions rises in each 
stratum. Interestingly, however, no structural restrictions were identified when operations 
generated up to 40% of concentration. In other words, operations in the sample resulting in up 
to 40% of concentration had never faced a challenge by CADE in respect to the very control 
of market share. Moreover, only in a minority of these cases substantive behavioral conditions 
were imposed. Additionally, from this point to 80%, no less than 89% of MRs were approved 
without structural conditions. As with behavioral restrictions, it is only in the highest level 
that the proportion becomes more relevant, reaching a third of cases – which can nevertheless 
be interpreted as an indication that in operations that result in close to monopolistic positions, 
two thirds are not structurally challenged. 
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In respect to the market share Δ implied by restricted operations that involved 
horizontal integration, conclusions must be drawn cautiously. Since the presence of restricted 
cases in the universe and by extension in the sample was extremely low, so was the number of 
restricted cases in many Δ strata, and thus the value of a single case may significantly 
influence the whole proportion analyzed. I was able to identify an association with the types 
of restriction in the first 5 extracts created for the analysis305. As the table below illustrates, 
behavioral restrictions were higher than structural conditions in Δ up to 30%. Structural 
restrictions, on the other hand, proportionally increased as the level of concentration raised, 
reaching a third of operations restricted that implied a market share acquisition of 40.1% to 
50%. 
Table 59. MRs – Types of restriction and market share Δ 
Market 
share Δ 
% with behavioral 
restrictions 
% with behavioral restrictions 
excluding “non-compete clause” 
% with structural 
restrictions 
0-10% 7.2 5.5 0.4 
10.1-20% 10.3 7.5 5.1 
20.1-30% 27.3 16.7 9.1 
30.1-40% 9.1 9.1 9.1 
40.1-50% 33.3 0.0 33.3 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
 The finding that Δ up to 30% led to more behavioral than structural restrictions is 
specially relevant if it is taken into account that, as shown in Table 41, most operations that 
resulted in level of concentrations of 41-60% and 61-80% were achieved through this amount 
of market share acquisition. The market share Δ of a maximum of 30% was observed in 
80.5% of operations that resulted in concentrations between 41-60%, and in 100% of 
operations that implied a level of integration of 61-80%. Therefore, not only level of 
concentrations of up to 40% did not receive structural restrictions, but these were also lower 
than behavioral conditions in most concentrations that resulted in levels between 41% and 
80%. 
 
*** 
 The trends mapped in the sample in respect to the types of economic phenomena 
regulated by competition policy, and the way it regulates it can also be noticed in the 8 cases 
ever entirely rejected by CADE out of the 5959 MRs decided between 1994 and 2010, which 																																																								
305 The Likelihood Ration for this association in the first 5 extracts resulted in 0,000, but indicated no statistical 
significance when Δ was above 50%. This may be related to the small number of cases that fit into that category, 
which does not enable to extract any conclusions. 
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were excluded for the sample to be analyzed separately. Corresponding to 0.13% of economic 
concentrations that entered the field of competition policy in Brazil, these MRs are no 
exception to what was described. As the table below indicates, they fit, for instance, the 
profile of cases that received structural restrictions (in this case, the very de-constitution of 
the operation), as they all implied levels of concentration above 60%, being 5 in the highest 
level constructed for analysis: between 80% and 100%. 
 
Table 60. MRs – Rejected cases 
Year of 
decision Economic Sector Capital movement 
Level of 
concentration 
Market  
share Δ 
1994 
Non-Metallic Mineral 
Products Industry Brazilian – Brazilian 68.0 ? 
1994 
Automotive Industry and 
Transports Foreign > Foreign 95.5% 83.0 
2000 Agriculture Brazilian – Brazilian 85.0 ? 
2000 Agriculture Brazilian – Brazilian 70.0 ? 
2004 Food Industry Foreign > Brazilian 100.0 28.0 
2008 
Non-Metallic Mineral 
Products Industry Foreign X Foreign 98.0 27.0 
2009 General Services Brazilian – Brazilian 100.0 24.9 
2010 
Non-Metallic Mineral 
Products Industry Brazilian > Brazilian 71.0 13.0 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
 Although in three of these cases I was unable to identify the market share Δ implied 
by the operation, in other 4 it was possible to observe that, as in the sample, most 
concentrations resulting in the highest levels of horizontal integration entailed shares of up to 
30%. This means that corporations that already held a considerable amount of the market 
frequently mobilized the rejected operations, as most of those structurally restricted. 
 The actual extension of rejections, which is already minimal if compared to the 
universe of decisions, can nevertheless be even more nuanced if some specificities involved in 
at least 6 operations are taken into account. For instance, two of the rejected MRs were 
decided in the first year of competition policy enforcement in Brazil under the reformed law 
of 1994306. One of them was precisely the very first MRs presented to CADE. As discussed in 
Chapter 5, this was the period in which CADE, by then with a composition formed by more 
traditional lawyers and economists, was extensively criticized by its “excessive” 
interventionism. Thus, if only cases that happened after the “revolution” of economics in 																																																								
306 The first was the acquisition among two Brazilian firms in the roof tiles sector (Eternit and Brasilit), and the 
second was an international operation through which Álbarus S.A. Indústria e Comércio acquired Rockwell do 
Brasil S.A., both subsidiaries of two US conglomerates. 
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1996 are considered (a total of 5953 in the universe of MRs that I mapped), the proportion of 
restrictions drops slightly from 0,13% to 0,10%. 
 Already under the period inaugurated by the “revolutionary” council of 1996 two 
other MRs rejected also had special contours. These were the operations involving several 
producers of alcohol fuel extracted from sugar cane. One of them, presented on March 1999, 
proposed the creation of a joint-venture named “Brasil-Álcool S.A.”, which would be 
responsible for coordinating the export of sugar and alcohol of 84 Brazilian corporations, and 
implied a concentration of 70% of the national market307. The other operation, presented to 
CADE on May 1999, entailed an “agreement” subscribed by 181 Brazilian corporations of the 
sector to submit the commercialization of alcohol fuel exclusively to a company that was 
being created with that purpose, the “Bolsa Brasileira do Álcool”, and implied a concentration 
of 85% of the national market308. 
 Both operations were a strategy of the Brazilian alcohol industry – landowners and 
sugar cane producers – to face the effects of the deregulation and liberalization policies that 
were being implemented since the early 1990s, but most intensely by the end of that decade. 
The sugar cane and alcohol sectors in Brazil historically counted with extensive participation 
of the state. In 1975, following the oil crisis of 1973, the Brazilian state started to subside the 
development of alcohol fuel as an alternative to the supply of oil derivatives, notably gas. 
Prices were administered, and exports of sugar and alcohol, for instance, controlled by a 
governmental organ named “Institute of Sugar and Alcohol” (IAA). In 1990, among the 
several measures taken by Collor de Mello to abolish price control mechanisms, the 
extinction of the IAA was determined309. With the enactment of the law 8.178 of 1991, 
through which several formerly administered prices were liberalized, the sugar cane sector 
was deregulated. Only in 1998, however the movement would be completed: through the 
ordinance number 275 of the Ministry of Finance, it was determined that the prices of sugar, 
sugar cane and alcohol were to be fully liberalized on February 1st 1999310. 
 As the lawyer who represented those firms in the mentioned MRs – Magalhães, the 
same that worked in the reform of the field – affirmed in an interview, those measures nearly 
“broke” the sector: 
 																																																								
307 MR number 08012.002315/1999-50. 
308 MR number 08012.004117/1999-67. 
309 Decree 99.240 of May 7th 1990. 
310 Attempts were to implement this measure were happening since 1996, but were eventually postponed until 
1999.  
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The government put the alcohol sector, which was always administered, into 
the market. Price was administered, production was administered, 
everything. All of a sudden, it was gone. [...] The sector was broken. The 
administered price was 35 cents, and became 12 cents. 
  
 The idea behind both MRs was thus to “survive” these measures. The first MRs 
comprised the creation of an “official cartel”, to be legalized by CADE. As Magalhães 
explained, this operation aimed at “blocking 20% of the national stocks of alcohol within the 
industries, to decrease the supply and raise the prices”. According to him, the reception at 
SEAE was far from supportive, as he was told that “That was an industry protected by the 
government, with governmental money, and it should be let to break, since the efficient 
industries must survive, as the American model dictates”.  
 The second MRs, which congregated most producers in the country, also aimed to 
institute some sort of price administration – this time by market agents themselves. Instituted 
in 1999, the corporation created for such end was since the begging and intentionally of 
limited duration: to exist until April 2000 (the deadline could be extended until April 2001). 
At this point is where the nuance of these cases becomes clear: both MRs were rejected by 
CADE only on November 2000, thus after more than a year and a half each of them was 
presented. In the meantime, the “official cartel” was in effect, achieving its goals of 
administering production and recovering prices hammered by deregulation.  
Although these MR figure as “rejected” cases in CADE’s decisions portfolio, in 
practice they can be seen as cases that produced its effects and were not actually challenged 
by regulation. Moreover, these cases reveal how 2 of the only 8 rejections imposed by CADE 
were absolutely aligned with the broader impulses of deregulation and liberalization. Thus, if 
these cases are not considered as proper rejections, the proportion of cases integrally 
prohibited by CADE after it became “technical” drops once again, as only 4 cases subsist: 
from 0.10% to 0.06%. 
 In 2004 and 2009, two other cases rejected by CADE contained idiosyncrasies that are 
worth mentioning. The first was the acquisition by the Swiss company Nestlé of Brazilian 
chocolate industry Garoto311. Presented in 2002, the MR was rejected by CADE in 2004, 
giving start to a judicial battle that is still unresolved. In practice, until now the 2004 decision 
has not been enforced312. The other case, of 2009, dealt with the transfer of health insurance 																																																								
311 MR number 08012.001697/2002-89. 
312 Unsatisfied with CADE’s decision, Nestlé asked for the judicial review of the MR rejection, sustaining that 
CADE would have violated the deadline for evaluating the concentration, and its decision would be thus null. 
The latest news about the case suggest that the Judiciary has decided to determine CADE to cast a new decision, 
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clients and rent contracts of a hospital located in a countryside city of the state of Rio Grande 
do Sul to a local medical cooperative313. What is interesting about this case is that the 100% 
of market concentration CADE observed to impose the rejection concerned the market of a 
single municipality of less than 300 thousand inhabitants. This was thus a case of extremely 
localized dimension, not an integration of broader scope or higher economic impacts. 
 
 
6.2 The regulation of corporate conduct 
 
 While the regulation of economic concentrations stands for what mainstream 
narratives define as the “preventive” role of CADE, the control of the so-called 
“anticompetitive conduct” and “restrictive practices” of corporations comprises what is seen 
as a second key-pillar of the Brazilian antitrust authority’s activities: its “repressive” function. 
This role is performed through Administrative Procedures (APs) in which CADE decides if a 
certain conduct such as the formation of a cartel infringes the competition act, and if so 
stipulates measures to revert the conduct and monetary fines. Differently than MRs, and quite 
logically, APs are not initiated by the corporations that are the actual subjects tackled by 
CADE. Rather, they may begin through the representation of different agents: individuals, 
corporations that accuse other companies of anticompetitive conduct, governmental organs 
such as the Public Prosecutor’s Office, secretariats of the Executive power, and the 
Legislative power in its distinct federative levels (from municipalities’ councils to the 
National Congress), non-governmental organizations such as consumer defense institutions, 
and the SBDC organs itself – be it CADE, SDE, or SEAE. 
 As described in Chapters 1 and 5, the regulation of anticompetitive conduct through 
AP is often seen as historically precarious by mainstream narratives and the agents involved 
in the field of competition policy. Given the extensive demand produced by the more than 6 
thousand MRs decided by CADE between 1994 and 2010, during most of this period APs 
would have not achieved a prominent position among the authority’s priorities. Only in 2003, 
these narratives almost unanimously suggest, with the arrival of a new group of professionals 
in SDE, APs gained a new impulse. The so called “shift of focus” from MR to AP promoted 
since then would in turn represent a modernizing turning point in the field’s history, as the 
																																																																																																																																																																													
but an appeal to the Brazilian Supreme Court would still be opened to the antitrust authority. See for instance, 
the article published in Valor Econômico of March 5th 2012, titled “Presidente do CADE se diz impedido de 
analisar caso Nestlé-Garoto”. 
313 MR number 08012.008853/2008-28. 
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regulation of conduct is often seen by the mainstream antitrust thinking as the priority to be 
pursued in regulation, instead of economic concentrations. 
  In this section, I thus present the results of the quantitative study based on a sample of 
483 AP decided by CADE between 1994 and 2010. As with MR, this sample provides a 
representative view of the phenomena that demanded the field’s operation during practically 
the whole period under the reformed law of 1994. Moreover, the study developed with this 
sample enables constructing a profile of “conduct” that “entered” CADE and, at the same 
time, of the field’s responses to them. It thus complements the empirical description of what 
economy is regulated by competition policy in Brazil and how it’s regulated. In section 6.2.1, 
I describe the profile of the economic phenomena regulated by CADE through AP 
accordingly to the variables described in Chapter 3. In section 6.2.2, I analyze how CADE 
regulated these phenomena. 
 
 6.2.1 The economy that is disciplined  
 
 Given that CADE was already entitled to decide APs before the 1994 reform (as 
discussed in Chapter 4, one of the main novelties of reform was precisely the inclusion of a 
mandatory merger review system), and that this type of procedure has traditionally taken a lot 
of time from the moment it is initiated until the final decision by CADE314, most APs that 
compose the sample were not initiated in the year they were decided. Some of them began 
even before the 1994 reform. The cases that compose the sample can be thus divided in three 
groups according to the historical period they begun: prior to the 1994 reform, after the 1994 
reform until 2003, and from 2003 onwards. The division within the period under the 1994 
competition act is based on what mainstream narratives and the reconstruction of the field 
conducted in Chapter 5 indicate as the “shift” toward AP in 2003. By highlighting this period, 
although it entails only a few cases, it will be possible to compare it to the moments prior to 
such so-called turning point. 
 In the analyzed sample, 85% were initiated already under the 1994 competition act, 
but a considerable amount (15%) had begun prior to reform. Among the former, as the table 
below illustrates, 79.4% started between 1994 and 2003, and only 5.6% after 2003. Given the 
																																																								
314 For instance, according to CADE’s annual reports, the annual average for the SBDC to decide an AP in 1996 
was of 840 days and in 1998, 1748 days. Although faster in the 2000s, the length of trials was still considerable: 
in 2005, the average was of 461 days; in 2006, of 414; in 2007, of 503; in 2008, of 268; in 2009, of 361; and in 
2010, of 567. 
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large length average of the transit of an AP within the SBDC, the latest procedures that 
compose the sample date of 2007. 
 
Table 61. APs in time 
Period % 
Pre-1994 15 
1994-2002 79.4 
2003 onwards 5.6 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
 If compared to the economic sectors that generated MRs, the economy regulated by 
AP is less varied. Instead of 29 sectors in which economic concentrations were observed, the 
regulation of corporate conduct comprised 26 areas of economic activity. Moreover, APs 
were much more concentrated in a few sectors in comparison to MRs. As the table below 
indicates, 8 economic sectors comprised more than 90% of APs decided by CADE between 
1994 and 2010. Only three sectors entailed almost three quarters of decisions, and a single 
area of economic activity – that of “General Services” – accounted for more than half of APs 
in the sample. 
 
Table 62. APs – Economic sectors of conduct 
Economic sector % Cumulative % 
General Services 52.6 52.6 
Pharmaceutical and Hygiene Industry 12.5 65 
Non-Metallic Mineral Products Industry 7.8 72.9 
Chemical and Petrochemical Industry 6.4 79.3 
Transportation and Storage Services 4.2 83.4 
Food Industry 2.6 86 
Retail Sector 2.1 88.2 
Beverage Industry 2.1 90.2 
Essential and Infrastructure Services 2 92.3 
Communication and Entertainment 1.2 93.5 
Agriculture 0.8 94.3 
Civil Construction 0.7 95 
Wholesale Trade 0.7 95.7 
Financial Services 0.6 96.3 
Mineral Extraction 0.5 96.8 
Automotive Industry and Transports 0.5 97.4 
Textile Industry and Leather Products 0.4 97.8 
Plastic and Rubber Industry 0.4 98.2 
Informatics and Telecommunication Industry 0.3 98.5 
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Electro-electronic Industry 0.3 98.8 
Insurances and Pension 0.3 99 
Wood Industry 0.3 99.3 
Metal Industry 0.2 99.5 
Mechanical Industry 0.2 99.7 
Tobacco Industry 0.2 99.9 
Livestock farming 0.1 100 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
 The difference with respect to MR is not only related to the lower variety and the 
higher concentration in certain sectors, but also to what sectors were most frequently tackled 
in AP. Among the top 5 sectors regulated through Administrative Procedures, only 2 were 
also present in the five most frequent areas in which economic concentrations happened 
(“General Services”, which was fourth, and the “Chemical and Petrochemical Industry”, 
which was placed second). Sectors such as the “Pharmaceutical and Hygiene Industry” (6th in 
MR), the Non-Metallic Mineral Products Industry” (17th in MR), and “Transportation and 
Storage Services” (11th in MR), appear among the 5 areas most frequently regulated in AP. 
 The dominance of the “General Services” sector in the sample can be explained by the 
presence of multiple processes in only two sub-sectors that together accounted for more than 
90% of APs in this area: health insurance and medical services, and private education. The 
former comprised 32.7% of all cases classified as “General Services”, which means a 
presence of 17.2% in the overall sample. As I will detail later on this section, these were 
mostly cases in which health insurance companies structured in the form of cooperatives of 
doctors – notably Unimed315 –, unions of professionals of the health sector, and hospital 
associations were charged with price fixing, and anticompetitive conduct implied by 
exclusivity agreements, which impeded professionals from serving other health insurance 
companies or hospitals. As maintained by a former commissioner of the period 1994-1996, 
the multiple APs involving Unimed were initiated by the pressure of “large health insurance 
companies that wanted to reach cities in the countryside”. 
APs connected to the private education sector corresponded, in turn, to 57.9% of 
procedures classified in the “General Services” sector, corresponding to 30.4% of the whole 
sample. In the sample, there were more than a hundred APs initiated in 1997 and 1998 																																																								
315 According to its official institutional history (available at www.unimed.coop.br), Unimed was created in 
1967, and is the largest cooperative of doctors in the world. Present in 83% of the Brazilian territory, it is 
composed by 360 local and regional cooperatives that provide health insurance services to 19 million clients 
(approximately 32% of the health insurance market in the country). With a membership of more than 110 
thousand doctors, Unimed owns 116 hospitals and a variety of equipment and other facilities for health services. 
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targeting private schools in a single region – the Federal District of Brazil – for abusive and 
concerted increase of tuition fees. As Figure 4 in Chapter 3 illustrates, the abnormal number 
of APs in the year of 1997 is directly connected to these procedures. This is because although 
the conduct investigated by CADE were common to several schools, each institution was the 
object of a separate procedure. Thus, what in the sample was around 30% of all APs decided 
by the field, are all related to a single economic phenomenon. 
The fourth most frequent sector regulated through APs – “Chemical and 
Petrochemical Industry” – also deserves clarification at this point. This is because I classified 
within this sector not only the production of petrochemical supplies, but also its distribution. 
Within the 5.5% of APs that fell in this sector, 33.3% of them involved corporations and 
associations that distributed gasoline and gas – most notably gas stations, and its local and 
regional associations. Thus, a third of corporations tackled by APs in this sector were not the 
large producing corporations, but the distribution concessionaries, often owned by Brazilian 
medium-sized companies. 
The distribution of APs in the three periods mentioned above according to economic 
sectors reveal some trends. As the table below illustrates, APs initiated before the 1994 
reform were mostly concentrated around two sectors: “Non-Metallic Mineral Products 
Industry”, and “Pharmaceutical and Hygiene Industry”. The first comprised a series of 
investigations initiated in 1992 targeting cement producers, who were accused of combining 
the sale of the product with its transportation. These APs were mostly decided between 1998 
and 2001. The considerable presence of the “Pharmaceutical and Hygiene Industry”, in turn, 
is due to a set of APs also initiated in 1992 against several foreign pharmaceutical companies, 
in which it was alleged that they arbitrarily increased prices. This is precisely the set of 
procedures referred in Chapter 4 to which former president Itamar Franco was related, as he 
took a position against several of those corporations. These procedures were decided between 
1996 and 1998. 
 
Table 63. APs – Economic sectors in time 
Pre-1994 
 
1994-2002 
 
 
2003 onwards 
 
Non-Metallic Mineral Products 
Industry (42.30%) General Services (60.70%) General Services (43.30%) 
Pharmaceutical and Hygiene Industry 
(21.10%) 
Pharmaceutical and Hygiene 
Industry (11.70%) 
Essential and Infrastructure 
Services (13.30%) 
General Services (11.30%) Chemical and Petrochemical Industry (6.80%) 
Non-Metallic Mineral Products 
Industry (6.70%) 
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Retail Sector (5.60%) Transportation and Storage Services (4.70%) Beverage Industry (6.70%) 
Food Industry (5.60%) Food Industry (2.30%) Mineral Extraction (6.70%) 
Beverage Industry (5.60%) Beverage Industry (1.60%) Chemical and Petrochemical Industry (6.70%) 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
The period beginning in 1994 indicates a change in the profile of the economy 
regulated by APs. The “Pharmaceutical and Hygiene Industry” was still the second sector of 
highest incidence, and followed the same profile as the preceding period. However, the sector 
in which most operations occurred was that of “General Services”. As already mentioned, the 
large proportion of cases in this sector is due to the fact that one single economic 
phenomenon related to the increase of tuition fees by private schools in the Federal District. 
All cases connected to that matter were initiated between 1994 and 1995, and although they 
were mostly decided in 1997, they were also analyzed in 1998 and 1999. Health insurance 
and medical cooperatives also gained space in this period, although they already appeared in 
1992. Among all cases initiated between 1994 and 2002 in the sample, 18.3% investigated 
agents of that type. This number corresponds to 84.3% of all cases focused on health 
insurance and medical cooperatives tackled by CADE in the whole period studied.  
The period after the turning point of 2003 must be interpreted cautiously, as only 30 
cases out of 483 that compose the sample were initiated since that moment. Nevertheless, it is 
possible to observe the continuity of a trend initiated after 1994: the “General Services” sector 
was that of highest incidence of APs from 2003 onwards. Within this sector, most cases were 
still related to health insurance companies and medical cooperatives (37% of all APs decided 
initiated form 2003 onwards). Also as in the previous period, cases in the sector of “Non-
Metallic Mineral Products” focused on the already practices involving cement producers. The 
novelty of this period was the relevant presence of the “Essential and Infrastructure Services” 
sector, with 13.3%. 
Another considerable difference of APs in comparison to MR can be noticed in respect to the 
scope of the economic phenomena regulated. While around 43% of economic concentrations 
regulated by the field of competition policy were of global scope, these comprised only 0.3% 
of conduct investigated by CADE. It means that 99.7% of the economic phenomena tackled 
in this dimension were circumscribed to the Brazilian market. There are two other indicators 
that reinforce the prominent presence of phenomena restricted to Brazil among APs decided 
by CADE. One is the proportion of cases that concerned local or regional markets, as opposed 
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to economic activities of national or global scope: in the sample of APs analyzed, 64% of 
them were at best regional, not reaching the entire national territory.  
The other is the origin of the corporations involved in conduct investigated by the 
Brazilian competition authority. As the table below indicates, the vast majority of APs 
targeted only Brazilian corporations. Again differently from MRs, in which 84% of economic 
concentrations involved foreign companies (and 51.3% involved only foreign firms), foreign 
capital was subjected to conduct regulation in only 18.4% of cases, being 16% in an exclusive 
form. 
Table 64. APs – Origin of capital investigated 
Capital investigated % 
Brazilian 81.6 
Foreign 16.1 
Brazilian and Foreign 2.3 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
 Putting the different types of capital regulated through APs in time, a shift can be 
noticed. In all three periods targeting Brazilian corporations was a constant. However, while a 
higher proportion of the APs initiated in the period prior to the 1994 reform tackled foreign 
companies (be it together with Brazilian firms or in an exclusive form), after reform the focus 
on national agents was largely dominant. 
 
Table 65. APs – Origin of capital investigated in time 
Capital involved Pre-1994 1994-2002 2003 onwards 
Brazilian 68.1 84.1 85.2 
Brazilian and Foreign 4.2 1.6 7.4 
Foreign 27.8 14.4 7.4 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
 As the table above illustrates, around a third of APs started before 1994 challenged 
foreign firms, and after that this number was never above 16%. The higher incidence of 
foreign corporations prior to 1994 is connected to the economic sectors challenged in that 
period. The “Pharmaceutical and Hygiene Industry” corresponded to almost 21% of APs 
initiated before 1994, and 70% of cases in this sector involved foreign firms (66.7% only 
foreign companies, and 3.3% foreign and Brazilian companies). In turn, almost all companies 
investigated in the “General Services” sector were Brazilian: 97.2%. Thus, when the focus 
shifted to this sector, the presence of Brazilian firms became more relevant. 
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 While in the overall sample around 84% of APs targeted Brazilian firms (exclusively 
or not), as in MR foreign corporations investigated in APs were concentrated in a few 
countries: Germany, France, the UK, and most notably the US. These were the same foreign 
countries that were most frequently involved in economic concentrations. 
 
Table 66. APs – Countries of origin of corporations investigated 
Country % 
Brazil 83.8 
United States 10.7 
Germany 3.9 
France 1.9 
United Kingdom 1.4 
Spain 1.0 
Other < 1.0 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
 In a relevant proportion of APs, CADE investigated corporate associations and unions 
of professionals. As the table below illustrates, 17.4% of APs targeted corporate associations, 
and in another 12.9% of cases at least one of the investigated agents was an association of 
professionals, such as unions or cooperatives.  
  
Table 67. APs – Corporate associations and professional unions 
 
% 
Corporate associations 17.4 
Professional unions 12.9 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
The high incidence of cases involving professional unions is mostly related to the 
several cases targeting Unimed, which, as mentioned, is a cooperative of doctors. Among the 
APs that investigated conduct in the health services sector, 96.4% of them had a corporate 
association or union of professionals in the passive role. As the table below illustrates, cases 
involving corporate associations were most frequent in sectors such as “Civil Construction”, 
“Mineral Extraction”, the “Food Industry”, “Financial Services”, “Communication and 
Entertainment”, and “Chemical and Petrochemical Industry”. In the sector of “Chemical and 
Petrochemical Industry”, the high percentage of unions in the passive pole is motivated by 
APs that investigated associations of gasoline and gas distributors. 
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Table 68. APs – Economic sectors of conduct 
Economic sector % Corporate association 
Civil Construction 66.7 
Mineral Extraction 66.7 
Food Industry 38.5 
Financial Services 33.3 
Communication and Entertainment 33.3 
Chemical and Petrochemical Industry 32.3 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
 The relevant presence of associations and unions is yet another indicator of the often 
regional scope of conduct regulated through APs. In the case of corporate associations, 89.3% 
of them were of regional scope, mostly comprising companies that acted in a single federate 
state. In APs in which professional unions were investigated, 96.8% of them were of regional, 
and most of the time local scope, encompassing a single city. 
 APs decided by CADE were initiated by 16 different actors. Most procedures, as the 
table below evidences, began due to the mobilization of the organs that compose the SBDC, 
as APs initiated by SDE, the Ministry of Finance and CADE comprise around 45.7% of the 
sample. The SDE alone counts for 34.5% of APs, which is quite logical, as this was the organ 
whose main priority was to undertake investigations. However, the proportion of cases 
attributed to this Secretariat is probably overstated, as in the initial years covered by the 
sample it was not possible to identify with certainty that all procedures in which the author is 
said to be SDE were not connected to a representation by another author. This is because 
several procedures only indicated SDE as the author, but it is likely that some of them started 
elsewhere. For instance, in collecting data, several of the APs targeting the “Pharmaceutical 
and Hygiene Industry” were said to be initiated by SDE, but as presented in Chapter 4, many 
of them were mobilized by former president Itamar Franco. 
 
Table 69. APs – Authors 
Author % 
SDE 34.5 
Professional/Sectoral Associations 13.7 
Brazilian corporation 12.7 
Ministry of Finance 10.1 
National Congress 8.3 
MP 6.2 
PROCON 4.6 
Individuals 3.8 
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Foreign corporation 1.8 
State-owned corporation 1.2 
CADE 1.1 
State governments 0.5 
Local/Regional Legislatives 0.4 
Regulatory agencies 0.4 
Presidency 0.3 
NGO 0.3 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
 If other public institutions such as the National Congress, the Prosecutor’s Office, and 
Regulatory agencies are included with those that composed the SBDC, it is possible to 
identify that 66.4% of APs were initiated by organs connected to the government. This group 
also includes PROCONs (Programa de Proteção e Defesa do Consumidor), public 
institutions connected to the National System of Consumer Defence established in the state 
and municipal levels in charge of protecting consumer rights.  
 Thus, APs explicitly initiated outside governmental organs were identified in 33.6% of 
cases – a third of conduct investigated by CADE. These entail, on the one hand, 
representations made by individuals and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO), which 
was observed in only one case. Several of the “Individuals” identified as the initiators of APs, 
however, were not “consumers” affected by a potential anticompetitive conduct, but 
professionals that worked in the sector where the violations would have occurred. Thus, for 
instance, 42.1% of APs mobilized by “Individuals” were in the health services sector and 
concerned cases of exclusivity agreements imposed by medical cooperatives to doctors. These 
individuals were likely doctors that did not agree with such practice. 
 Despite the dominance of APs initiated within government, corporate agents directly 
mobilized a relevant amount of cases: a total of 29.4%, if representations by a single 
Brazilian, foreign or state-owned companies, and professional and sectoral associations and 
merged together. Moreover, corporate agents alone were the second and third most frequent 
authors of APs initiated. Almost a third of APs was thus related to intra-capital disputes. 
Among these, foreign corporations were present in only a minority of cases, which is yet 
another indicator of the predominantly national character of the economy regulated through 
APs. 
 As the table below indicates, the types of capital tackled by APs often differed 
accordingly to the authors of the representation, here divided into four groups. In procedures 
initiated within the SBDC, the vast majority targeted Brazilian corporations, and only 5.5% 
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focused solely on foreign firms. The higher proportion of APs initiated by governmental 
organs that investigated foreign companies is connected to the fact that the National Congress 
started several APs to investigate multinational firms of the  “Pharmaceutical and Hygiene 
Industry” (about 54,2% of APs in this sector were initiated by the National Congress). This 
was due to a Congressional Investigation Committee (CPI) installed in Congress to 
investigate the pharmaceutical sector in Brazil between 1999 and 2000. The Committee 
concluded for the existence of cartels in drugs production, and its findings were sent to SDE 
in order for APs to be initiated. 
 
Table 70. APs – Investigated corporations according to authors 
Authors % Brazilian % Brazilian and Foreign % Foreign 
SBDC 93.2 1.4 5.5 
Governmental organs 70.0 2.0 28.0 
Corporate agents 70.4 4.2 25.4 
Individuals/NGO 94.7 0.0 5.3 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
 More interestingly, proportionally much more APs initiated by corporate agents 
tackled foreign firms than those started by the organs of entitled of enforcing competition 
policy in Brazil: SDE, CADE or the Ministry of Finance. This is related to two phenomena. 
One, all APs motivated by a representation of a foreign firm tackled another foreign 
company, thus indicating disputes among foreign capital. These happened in only three 
sectors: “Transportation and Storage Services” (in a case involving the alleged abusive 
imposition of tariffs in harbors), “Essential and Infrastructure Services” (in cases among 
telecom corporations), and in “Financial Services”. Not by chance, the three sectors were 
related to areas directly connected to the expansion of foreign capital into Brazil. The other 
phenomenon is that 30.6% of APs initiated by Brazilian corporations required the 
investigation of practices of a foreign firm. Thus, about a third of procedures begun by 
Brazilian companies entailed a dispute with foreign capital. 
 Another interesting feature among the profile of APs mobilized by these different 
authors that is connected to the origins of capital involved concerns the proportion of cases 
focusing on conduct restricted to a regional scope.  
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Table 71. APs – Regional cases according to authors 
Author % regional cases 
SBDC 70.5 
Governmental organs 57.0 
Corporate agents 57.7 
Individuals/NGO 73.7 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
 While the majority of APs initiated by the SBDC, governmental organs, or individuals 
and NGOs tackled conduct of local or regional dimension, those mobilized by corporate 
agents were more focused on cases of national scope or higher. The difference is especially 
relevant if cases begun by corporate agents are compared to those initiated by CADE and 
SDE: while only 29.5% of the latter were of national or larger scope, 42.3% of the former 
involved cases larger than a regional dimension. This is related to the fact that APs initiated 
by corporations more often investigated conduct of foreign corporations, which were 
frequently involved in economic sectors and markets of a national dimension. 
 The presence of these different authors in time has also been relatively stable. As the 
table below illustrates, only from 2003 onwards a more substantive difference emerged: 
corporate agents became the main authors of APs initiated since that year. Also, the 
participation of the SBDC as the author of representations decreased, which may reflect the 
consolidation of the field of competition policy as an arena of regulation before other, non-
governmental agents. However, as already discussed, given the small number of cases in the 
sample from this last period, any inferences suggesting that the regulation of corporate 
conduct became more significant must be taken cautiously. 
 
Table 72. APs – Authors in time 
Author Pre-1994 1994-2002 2003 onwards 
SBDC 58.9% 44.4% 25.9% 
Governmental organs 11.0% 23.0% 18.5% 
Corporate agents 28.8% 28.5% 48.1% 
Individuals/NGO 1.4% 4.2% 7.4% 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
 The final and no less important aspect that enables understanding what kind of 
economy is regulated through APs concerns the actual types of conduct that are investigated. 
These were classified in 13 categories, listed below according to their proportion in the 
sample. Grouping cases according to the type of economic phenomena they were related to 
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was a hard task, as some of them entailed a variety of types of conduct. Classifying them 
according to the legal norm they supposedly violated was considered, but revealed itself to be 
a difficult task, as there could be multiple articles referred in a single case, or even no legal 
reference in cases that the investigated corporation was not convicted. Rather than a strict 
legal definition, I thus decided to define groups according to the general theme of the conduct 
attributed to the corporation or corporations investigated. Some categories do coincide with 
legal norms, such as “Abusive price increase” or “Cartel” formation, or were classified by a 
legal norm because it was not possible to identify a broader theme – this was the case of APs 
classified in the type “Creating difficulties to the constitution, performance or development of 
competitor”. 
Other classifications, however, are not specific legal norms, such as “Disputes among 
concessionaires and resellers” 316 , “Supply shortages / Supply refusal” 317 , “Exclusivity 
agreements” 318 , “Combined sales” 319 , “Price / Buyer Discrimination” 320 , “Contractual 
relations”321, and “Tax exemptions”322. I chose to adopt this form of categorization since it 
better reveals the economic nature of conduct, and thus avoids the homogenization promoted 
by legal categories. Finally, types of conduct that appeared only once in the sample were 
grouped in the type “Others”323. 
 
Table 73. APs – Types of conduct 
Type of conduct % 
Abusive price / Abusive price increase 42.5 
Price fixing 15.9 
Exclusivity agreements 12.2 
Cartel 10.3 																																																								
316 Under this category I placed all APs in which the alleged anticompetitive conduct was related to commercial 
relationships between corporations and their concessionaires or resellers.   
317 This category entailed cases in which the anticompetitive conduct investigated was related to the refusal or 
shortages of supply from one company to another. 
318 This category comprised conduct connected to the exclusivity imposed on a certain corporation or individuals 
in relation to another company. Examples of this kind were the several APs in the health services sector in which 
exclusivity clauses prevented  doctors from serving outside the cooperative to which they belonged. 
319 Cases in which the accused conduct comprised the combined commercialization of one service or product to 
another. 
320 Cases in which a corporation was accused of discriminating among its buyers in the price of products or in the 
access to them. 
321 This category comprised cases in which the anticompetitive conduct investigated was related to contractual 
clauses or agreements between corporations, such as one-sided clauses, or the breach of a contract. 
322 Under this category I placed cases in which the existence of tax exemptions for certain corporations were 
accused of being anticompetitive factors. 
323 There are only 4 cases in this category. One entailed a conduct of “falsifying products”, another was an AP 
initiated to investigate a corporation that did not present an MR to CADE, the third an AP discussed the 
anticompetitive effects of a strike of workers, and the last was the accusation of an illegal concentration due to 
the formation of a joint-venture. 
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Combined sales 5.7 
Disputes among concessionaires and resellers 4.4 
Price / Buyer Discrimination 2.7 
Supply shortages / Supply refusal 2.3 
Create difficulties to the constitution, performance or 
development of competitor 1.8 
Underselling 0.8 
Contractual relations 0.6 
Tax exemptions 0.4 
Market dominance 0.4 
Others 1.1 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
 As the table above illustrates, the vast majority of APs dealt with conduct related to 
the manipulation of prices – be it the abusive establishment or increase of prices, or the 
fixation of prices among different agents. Another 24,8% of APs encompassed conduct that 
concerned relations among competitors. This portion is comprised by conduct such as 
“Exclusivity”, “Disputes among concessionaires and resellers”, “Supply shortages / Supply 
refusal”, “Price / Buyer Discrimination”, “Create difficulties to the constitution, performance 
or development of competitor”, “Contractual relations”, “Tax exemptions”, and “Market 
dominance”. 
 The conduct tackled by APs varied in the three periods constructed for analysis. The 
table below depicts the most frequent types of conduct investigated in each period. The only 
two types of conduct that together comprised 50% of procedures prior to the reform of 1994 
were not those of more relevance in the subsequent periods.  
 
Table 74. APs – Most frequent types of conduct in time 
Period Types of conduct (% within period) 
Pre-1994 
Combined Sales (30.6%) / Disputes among concessionaires and resellers (20.8%) / Abusive 
Price / Abusive Price Increase (15.3%) 
1994-2002 Abusive price / Abusive price increase (50.4%) / Price Fixing (17.0%) / Exclusivity (12.0%) 
2003 onwards Exclusivity (40.7%) / Cartel (18.5%) / Price / Buyer Discrimination (14.8%) 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
 After reform until 2002, procedures investigating the abusiveness of prices, their 
increase, or fixation entailed more than 60% of procedures. Since 2003, “Exclusivity” became 
the type of conduct with highest incidence. This variance is likely connected to the different 
economic sectors emphasized in each period. As the table below illustrates, types of conduct 
are generally associated with the economic sector tackled by Administrative Procedures. In at 
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least 7 of the 10 most frequent sectors in APs, certain types of conduct were much more 
frequent than others:  
  
Table 75. APs – Most frequent types of conduct according to economic sector 
Economic sector Type of conduct (% within sector) 
General Services 
Abusive price / Abusive price increase (52.8%) / Price Fixing 
(20.5%) / Exclusivity (18.5%) 
Pharmaceutical and Hygiene Industry 
Abusive price / Abusive price increase (81.0%) / Price Fixing 
(3.4%) 
Non-Metallic Mineral Products Industry 
Combined sales (59.5%) / Cartel (18.9%) / Disputes among 
concessionaires and resellers (18.9%) 
Beverage Industry 
Price Fixing (36.4%) / Supply Shortages / Supply Refusal 
(27.3%) 
Retail Sector 
Disputes among concessionaires and resellers (40.0%) / 
Exclusivity (20.0%) 
Essential and Infrastructure Services 
Price / Buyer Discrimination (46.4%) and Abusive price / 
Abusive price increase (27.3%) 
Communication and Entertainment 
Create difficulties to the constitution, performance or 
development of competitor (33.3%) / Abusive price / Abusive 
price increase (16.7%) / Price Fixing (16.7%) 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
 Thus, as described on Table 63, since the “Non-Metallic Mineral Products Industry” 
and the “Retail Sector” were those which most procedures before 1994 investigated, and 
given that they largely focused on the mentioned types of conduct, the high presence of 
“Combined sales” and “Disputes among concessionaires and resellers” can be explained by 
the sector regulated. The same phenomenon can be observed in the period 1994-2002 – the 
largest in the period and largely related to “Abusive prices”, and after 2003, in which 
“Exclusivity” was present in several procedures of the “General Services” sector, notably 
health insurance cooperatives. 
 Also, as the economic sectors investigated were also often associated with different 
authors of representations that initiated APs, types of conduct also differed according to who 
began the procedure. APs initiated by the SBDC were mostly related to “Abusive pricing and 
Abusive price increases” (63.2%). The same thing with procedures mobilized by 
“Governmental institutions”, although to a lesser extent (47%). In the case of APs mobilized 
by “Corporate agents”, the distribution was much more varied: conduct related to 
“Exclusivity” comprised 28.9% of APs, “Price Fixing” entailed 17.6%, and those 
investigating “Abusive price”, and “Disputes among concessionaires and resellers” 9.9% and 
8.5% respectively. This finding converges with the idea already mentioned that different 
authors often tackled different sectors, and thus distinct types of conduct. As the data 
illustrates, and quite logically, “Corporate agents” were more frequently mobilizers of APs 
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that investigated allegations of anticompetitive conduct occurring in an intra-capitalist 
dimension, i.e. among corporations. 
 Another indicator of the connection between the types of conduct regulated and the 
economic sectors tackled by APs can be noticed if the reach of these types of conductt are 
considered. Conduct associated with sectors in which most APs were of regional character, 
were also naturally mostly regional. For instance, 86.4% of APs focusing on “Exclusivity”, 
69.8% of APs investigating “Abusive Price / Abusive increase of price”, and 63.3% of 
investigations of cartels were local or regional. In opposition, 89.3% of “Combined sales” 
allegations, 90.5% of APs dealing with “Disputes among concessionaires and resellers”, and 
72.7% of “Supply shortages / Supply refusal” accusations were of a broader scope. Types of 
conduct were thus also associated with the scope of conduct regulate through APs. 
 
6.2.2 Regulatory responses to corporate conduct 
 
 As the table below indicates, the proportion of APs that suffered convictions in the 
sample is exactly the same as the universe of CADE’s decisions: 22.4%. This means that 
almost 80% of conduct cases analyzed by CADE were dismissed without any sort of penalty. 
 
 
Table 76. APs – Types of decision 
Type of decision % 
Dismissed 79.6 
Convicted 20.4 
Total 100 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
 Although 26 sectors were identified in the sample of APs regulated by CADE, 
convictions were present in precisely half of these areas of economic activity. Moreover, a 
single sector, that of “General Services”, accounted for almost three quarters of all 
convictions enacted by the Brazilian antitrust authority. Within this sector, most convictions 
were related to health services. APs connected to this area actually entailed 67.7% of all 
convictions enacted by CADE. As the table below indicates, besides that sector, decisions that 
imposed penalties on the investigated corporation were dispersed among 12 other areas.  
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Table 77. APs – Convictions in economic sectors 
Economic sector 
% of 
convictions 
% with 
convictions 
General Services 72.0 28.3 
Chemical and Petrochemical Industry 8.0 25.8 
Transportation and Storage Services 6.0 30.0 
Communication and Entertainment 3.0 50.0 
Pharmaceutical and Hygiene Industry 2.0 3.3 
Retail Sector 2.0 20.0 
Mineral Extraction 1.0 33.3 
Agriculture 1.0 25.0 
Informatics and Telecommunication Industry 1.0 50.0 
Automotive Industry and Transports 1.0 33.3 
Essential and Infrastructure Services 1.0 11.1 
Livestock farming 1.0 100.0 
Beverage Industry 1.0 10.0 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
 Some of these sectors were not the most frequent within the sample, and that is why in 
at least three of them the percentage of cases with convictions (second column of the table 
above) is 50% or even 100%. This means that half or all of the small number of cases in those 
sectors were convicted. Given the restricted number of cases in these sectors, it is hard to infer 
that they tended to be more convicted than others.  
 In sectors such as “General Services”, the “Chemical and Petrochemical Industry”, 
and the “Pharmaceutical and Hygiene Industry”, however, since they were among the 5 most 
frequently present in CADE the percentage of cases with convictions above the average can 
be seen as indicative of a relevant incidence of penalties324. Another finding that supports this 
idea is that the “Non-Metallic Mineral Products Industry”, which was the third sector with 
more cases in the overall sample (7.8%), does not account for a single conviction. 
 As described in the previous section, economic sectors regulated by APs were often 
associated with corporations of different origins, and markets of distinct scopes. Hence, 
convictions were also concentrated in respect to other variables. For instance, nearly 95% of 
convictions affected only Brazilian corporations. If APs tackling both Brazilian and foreign 
companies are considered, national firms penalized by CADE were present in 96% of cases. 
As the table below illustrates, the different types of capital involved in APs were convicted in 
																																																								
324 The Likelihood Ratio test for the association between the type of decision (to convict or not) and the 
economic sectors of corporations regulated through AP resulted in 0,000, thus indicating a statistically relevant 
association. 
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notably distinct proportions325. Moreover, the presence of foreign companies was associated 
with less convictions, being almost 5 times lower if compared to APs concerning only 
Brazilian firms. 
 
Table 78. APs – Convictions according to capital investigated 
Capital investigated % of convictions % with convictions 
Brazilian 94.9 23.6 
Brazilian and Foreign 1 9.1 
Foreign 4.1 5.2 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
 Since APs that solely concerned Brazilian firms were often focused on regional 
markets, convictions were also more frequent in this scope326. While 6,4% of procedures 
involving markets of national or higher scope were convicted, those of local or regional 
dimension were more than 4 times more frequently convicted: 28.2%.  
Given that regional markets counted for an important amount of convictions and, as 
described in the previous section, that these markets often involved agents that represented 
some sort of corporate or professional associations, convictions also tended to be higher in 
those cases. As the table below illustrates, almost 80% of all convictions observed in the 
sample were related to corporate associations and unions of professionals327. 
 
Table 79. APs – Convictions of corporate associations and unions 
 
% of 
convictions 
% with 
convictions 
Corporate associations 26.5 31 
Professional unions 53.1 83.9 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
 More interestingly, as the table above illustrates, penalties imposed to unions of 
professionals – notably those of doctors, as already discussed – comprised more than half 
convictions that compose the sample. 
 As depicted on Table 65, since the presence of Brazilian corporations in the passive 
pole of APs, and by extension the regulation of sectors in which they were more frequent rose 																																																								
325 The Likelihood Ration test for the relation between the types of capital and types of decision was of 0,000, 
what indicates a statistically relevant association between those variables. 
326 The Pearson Chi-Square test for the relation between the regional character of AP and the type of decision 
was 0,000, which reveals a statistically relevant association. 
327 In the case of corporate associations, the Pearson Chi-Square test resulted in 0,008, and in the case of unions 
of professionals, in 0,000. In both cases, thus, there is a statistically significant association with the type of 
decision. 
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in each of the three periods in which APs were initiated, and given that convictions are 
associated with these sectors, they also became more frequent in time328. As the table below 
illustrates, while APs that begun prior to reform were convicted in 5,6% of cases, this 
proportion more than tripled after reform, reaching almost 50% of cases initiated after 2003. 
 
Table 80. APs – Convictions in time 
Period % of convictions % with convictions 
Pre-1994 4.1 5.6 
1994-2002 82.7 21.2 
2003 onwards 13.3 48.1 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
 The higher number of convictions in cases initiated after 2003 is an indication of what 
mainstream narratives suggest to be a “turning point” in CADE’s “repressive roles”. 
However, as described, this increase was also the consolidation of a shift of focus initiated in 
the mid 1990s toward cases involving Brazilian firms, most notably in regional markets, and 
in sectors such as health insurance, thus encompassing several unions of professionals. 
 Convictions were also more frequent in APs initiated by certain authors – notably 
those outside the state. As the table below evidences, 62.3% of convictions occurred in cases 
mobilized by corporate agents, individuals or NGOs. The higher incidence of convictions in 
APs initiated by these authors is connected to the sectors in which they more frequently 
denounced anticompetitive conduct, precisely those more often penalized.  
 
Table 81. APs – Convictions according to authors 
Author % of convictions % with convictions 
SBDC 23.5 10.4 
Governmental organs 14.3 14 
Corporate agents 54.1 37.3 
Individuals/NGO 8.2 42.1 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
 Not only these authors counted for a larger amount of cases convicted, but the 
proportion of cases initiated by them that were penalized was also much higher than APs 
initiated by the SBDC or other governmental organs. Moreover, while the percentage of 
convictions in cases initiated within the field of competition policy, or by other agents of the 
																																																								
328 The Likelihood Ration for the association between the period in which AP were initiated and the type of 
decision resulted in 0,000, thus suggesting an association. 
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state were considerably below the overall average of 20.4%, those mobilized outside the field 
were around two times more penalized329. 
 As discussed in the previous section, there are important associations among the 
sectors regulated by APs, the dimension of markets, the types of capital investigated, the 
period in which procedures were initiated and the agents that mobilized them. Thus, since the 
types of conduct were also connected to these variables, so was the type of decision for the 
distinct kinds of conduct regulated through APs. In this sense, as the table below reveals, 
although I grouped conduct in 14 categories, convictions were imposed in only 9. No AP 
tackling conduct such as “Disputes among concessionaires and resellers”, “Underselling”, 
“Contractual relations”, “Tax exemptions”, and “Others” was penalized. This is an indication 
that most of the types of conduct more clearly related to divergences among corporations 
were not seen as faulty by CADE, even though most convictions occurred in APs mobilized 
by corporate agents. 
 
Table 82. APs – Convictions in types of conduct 
Type of conduct 
% of 
convictions % with convictions 
Exclusivity 42.9 72.4 
Price fixing 34.7 45.2 
Cartel 13.3 26.5 
Abusive price / Abusive price increase 4.1 2.0 
Create difficulties to the constitution, performance or 
development of competitor 2.0 25.0 
Market dominance 1.0 50.0 
Price / Buyer Discrimination 1.0 10.0 
Supply shortages / Supply refusal 1.0 9.1 
Combined Sales 1.0 3.6 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
 Also, nearly 43% of convicted APs concerned disputes around exclusivity clauses. As 
already presented, these were mostly found in the health services sector, in which medical 
cooperatives imposed the condition of exclusivity for associated doctors, and which counted 
for more than 67% of all convictions made by CADE. Another theme in which a high 
incidence of convictions was observed concerned conduct related to price manipulation. As 
depicted in the table, almost 40% of convictions entailed “Price fixing” conduct, and 
																																																								
329 The Likelihood Ration test for the association between the authors of AP and the type of decision resulted in 
0,000, thus indicating a strong association. 
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“Abusive price / Abusive price increase”330. Thus, in the exercise of its “repressive” role, an 
important portion of conduct penalized was precisely related to practices that, as described in 
Chapter 4, were to be tackled through reform, such as the manipulation of prices. 
 
6.3 The regulation of financial capital 
 
 As discussed in Chapter 2, one of the characteristic features of neoliberalism is the 
hegemony of financial capital, materialized in its free expansion into new domains of 
economic activity and increasing concentration. In describing the methodological strategies to 
address the connection of what I called the process of “financialization” embedded in the 
neoliberal economic project, however, I anticipated that such link cannot be properly grasped 
in the field of competition policy through the quantitative analysis of decisions produced by 
CADE because the financial sector comprises only a limited number of cases. Moreover, as I 
referred, the actual pertinence of antitrust regulation of the financial sector motivates a heated 
debate among the agents of the field. The jurisdiction of the field in respect to financial 
capital comprises a struggle among the agents of the field and others outside it.  
I thus suggested that the analysis of the actual dispute to determine whether and how 
the field of antitrust policy should regulate the financial sector is a useful entry-point to 
evaluate its connections to neoliberalism in this dimension. In this section, I thus describe in 
detail how antitrust expertise is positioned in respect to financial capital and the judicial 
review of CADE’s decision-making. In the first part (6.3.1), the focus is on presenting what 
sorts of financial phenomena are regulated by CADE, and how they are regulated. In the 
second part (6.3.2), I turn to the active construction of financial exceptionalism to the field’s 
jurisdiction. From these descriptions, I understand it will be possible to visualize how the 
field has built a nuanced approach to financial capital in respect to other economic sectors, 
notably based on appeals to a specific form of expertise. 
 
6.3.1 Concentrations and conducts in the financial sector 
 
As described in the two previous sections, MR and AP decided by CADE concerning 
the financial sector comprise a small proportion of cases. Within economic concentrations, 
those classified as happening in the area of “Financial Services” entailed 2.4% of MRs (17 																																																								
330 The Likelihood Ratio for the relation between types of conduct and types of decision resulted in 0,000, thus 
suggesting a statistically significant association. 
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cases in the sample of 871), and within conduct they constituted 0.6% of APs (3 cases in the 
sample of 483). Although 2 of those MRs suffered some kind of restriction by CADE (both 
behavioral), given their weight in the sample, these conditions are virtually inexistent. 
Similarly, in APs none of the three cases were convicted by CADE. 
The extension of the financial sector’s presence in the two samples, as well as the fact 
that they entailed minor or practically none intervention by CADE is in itself interesting 
information. In both “preventive” and “repressive” roles of the field, if compared to other 
sectors, concentrations involving financial institutions were far less present. They were also 
intact after being submitted to regulation, fitting the overall profile of decision-making, i.e. of 
majoritarily not tackling concentrations structurally, and of imposing penalties to a small 
fraction of conduct. 
However, a detailed analysis of these cases’ profiles, especially of MRs in the 
financial sector, reveals other valuable trends for a point of view interested in understanding 
the connections of competition policy to neoliberalism. Among the 17 MRs classified by 
CADE as occurring in the financial sector, 16 were acquisitions and 1 fit into the category of 
“Other” types of operations, as it didn’t comprise the acquisition of assets, as I will detail 
later. Out of these, 11 were of national scope, and 6 reflected global operations. As in the 
overall sample, most operations entailed the accumulation of capital by foreign companies. 
 
Table 83. Financial sector in MRs 
Scope Capital movement 
11 National 8 = Foreign > Foreign 
6 Global 4 = Foreign > Brazilian 
 
3 = Brazilian > Brazilian 
 
1 = Brazilian > Foreign 
 
1 = Brazilian - Brazilian 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
Only three of these operations implied some sort of horizontal integration. Among 
them, 2 led to levels within the legal limit of 20% (2.0% and 7.1%), and another one 
surpassed 40%. In all of them, the market share Δ was within the first stratum of analysis, i.e. 
much inferior to 10%. In only one of these cases, however, the concentration was properly 
among financial institutions. As the table below reveals, most of the operations classified as 
happening in the “Financial Sector” in the analyzed sample comprised financial institutions 
acquiring assets of firms in productive sectors, what I call the “financialization of productive 
sectors”. These entailed, for instance, acquisitions of shares of companies in the “Chemical 
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and Petrochemical Industry”, “Electro-electronic Industry”, and in the “Plastic and Rubber 
Industry” by banks such as the Lehman Brothers and ABN AMRO, or financial institutions 
such as Allianz331. Other cases of this type were the acquisition of a company in the 
“Agriculture” sector by an investment corporation held by a corporation of the “Non-Metallic 
Mineral Products Industry”, and the acquisition of assets of a firm of educational services by 
a hedge fund332.  
 
Table 84. Types of concentration in the financial sector 
Financialization of 
productive sectors 
Financial institutions 
 
Financial 
management / 
services 
6 6 5 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
In all those cases, the approval of CADE without restrictions was based on the 
argument that since the acquirer does not develop activities in the same sector of the company 
whose assets were acquired, there is no horizontal concentration or vertical integration. 
Rather, these operations are said to constitute a mere “transfer of shares”. 
Other 5 MRs selected in the sample were acquisitions involving companies that 
provide services of support to properly financial institutions, such as financial analysis and 
information, credit protection, and informational technologies. All of them were mobilized by 
foreign firms, who acquired other foreign firms in two cases, and Brazilian companies in the 
other three. In none of them CADE observed horizontal concentrations, as they involved 
companies that were not active in Brazil and were thus entering the market through the 
operation. In one of these MRs, a restriction was imposed, in line with the trends observed in 
section 6.1: the modification of the geographical and temporal amplitude of the “Non-
Compete clause”. 
Cases involving properly financial institutions besides those in which an acquisition of 
assets of productive sectors were observed were identified in 6 other cases. One of them was 																																																								
331 In the MR numbers 08012.003344/1999-93 (Páteo Participações e Consultoria de Comércio Exterior, Banco 
Sul América S/A, Banco Bba Creditanstalt e Nevada Woods S/A) and 08012.004066/2000-50 (Pharmacia 
Corporation, Lehman Brothers Merchant Banking Partners II L.P., Hercules Incorporated e WSP Inc), assets of 
companies in the “Chemical and Petrochemical Industry” were acquired. In MR numbers 08012.004265/2000-68 
(Allianz Capital Partners GMBH e E.ON Aktiengesellschaft) and 08012.001941/2008-07 (ABN AMRO 
Participaties Fund IV B.V. e Eurochannels Holding B.V.), respectively, assets of firms in the sectors “Plastic and 
Rubber Industry” and “Electro-Electronic Industry” were acquired. 
332 These were, respectively, the MR numbers 08012.006865/2008-18 (RVBE – Empreendimentos Ltda. e Agrisa 
Agro Industrial São João S.A.) and 08012.005387/2009-18 (Fundo de Investimento em Participações - Brasil 
Gestão e Administração, Kroton Educacional S.A.). 
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not an acquisition of shares, and was thus classified as of the type “Others”. It entailed, in 
turn, the acquisition, by two commercial banks, of information about the clients of two 
airlines333. Hence, only 5 of the 17 MRs that compose the sample in the “Financial Sector” 
entailed concentrations of financial institutions. While 4 of them involved banks, one 
comprised an acquisition between two foreign hedge funds focused on investments on 
developing countries334. Two other operations were acquisitions in the insurance sector by 
banks, one of which implied a level of 7.1% of concentration due to the incorporation of 1.1% 
by the acquiring firm335.  
The other 2 MRs, in turn, concerned concentrations in the banking sector. In one of 
them, CADE decided that it was a mere “restructuring”, as the major shareholder was 
mobilizing the acquisition336. The other, however, motivated the second restriction observed 
in the sector in MR. This was the acquisition of a bank owned by the state of São Paulo by 
Banco do Brasil, a bank owned by the Federal government337. Implying more than 40% of 
concentration in certain relevant markets of various municipalities, the MR had its approval 
conditioned to the creation of a call-center to inform and enable the portability of accounts 
held by customers of the acquired bank. 
While MR in the “Financial Sector” replicated the overall trends observed in the 
regulation of economic concentrations, the investigation of conduct in this area of economic 
activity was distinct in respect to the general profile of APs traced in section 6.2. As 
described, most APs focused on Brazilian corporations and markets of regional dimension. 
However, in the financial sector, types of conduct were of national dimension and foreign 
companies were present in all three APs. 
One similarity in respect to the overall sample was the prevalence of APs mobilized 
by corporate agents: in the “Financial Sector”, all 3 APs entailed intra-corporate disputes. 
Two of them concerned credit card corporations. In one of them, American Express 
denounced Visa for the abuse of dominant position due to the imposition of difficulties in 
entering certain markets338. In the other, the union of retailers of the Federal District 
(Sindicato do Comércio Varejista do Distrito Federal) represented against Visa, American 																																																								
333 MR number 08012.005476/2009-56 (Banco Bradesco S.A., Banco do Brasil S.A., VRG Linhas Aéreas S.A.). 
334 MR number 08012.008378/2008-90 (DEG - Deutsche Investitions - Und Entwicklungsgesellschaft mbH, 
Tolstoi Investimentos S.A.) 
335  MR numbers 08012.009114/2003-49 (Unibanco Aig Seguros S/A e Phenix Seguradora S/A.) and 
08012.004833/2009-69 (Banco Bradesco S.A; Morelia S.A.; Cortines S.A.). 
336 MR number 08012.003307/2003-96 (Dresdner Bank Brasil S/A – Banco Múltiplo e Dresdner Bank Brasil S/A 
Corretora de Câmbio, Títulos e Valores Imobiliários). 
337 This was MR number 08012.011736/2008-41 (Banco do Brasil S.A., Banco Nossa Caixa S.A.). 
338 AP number 08000.022500/1996-66. 
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Express, Visa, Redecard and the Brazilian Association of Credit Card Services reclaiming the 
abusive increase of credit card administration taxes by those corporations339. The third APs 
identified, also mobilized by a Brazilian corporation against a foreign company, comprised a 
claim of underselling in the sector of automobile consortium340. As already mentioned, in 
none of them did CADE recognize the existence of anticompetitive conduct. 
As described, the practice of competition policy in respect to the financial sector 
follows the general trends identified in the broader economic phenomena regulated in MR and 
AP. However, the most telling element in the field’s practice about the relation between 
competition policy and the financial sector concerns its diminished presence as an object of 
regulation – which, as described in the next section, has been actively constructed. 
 
6.3.2 Clashes of expertise in the regulation of finance  
 
The actual submission of economic concentrations occurring in the financial sector to 
the regulation of the Brazilian competition authority has been a topic of heated doctrinal 
debate. These disputes concern the reach of the field’s jurisdiction over the financial sector, 
i.e. around determining if CADE is entitled of regulating concentrations involving financial 
institutions, if this task is exclusive of the Brazilian Central Bank (BACEN), or if 
competences are shared. Legal battles around this issue sprouted in the Brazilian field of 
competition policy at least since the early 2000s, and can be noticed in legal doctrine341, in 
judicial disputes, and in legislative struggles. 
The controversy involving the financial sector translates the dispute of competences 
between CADE and the Central Bank into a conflict of norms. On one side of the dispute 
there is the law 4.599 of 1964, which created the Brazilian Central Bank as a modern 
monetary agency, and established the “exclusive competence” of BACEN to authorize the 
“transformation, merger and incorporation” of financial institutions342. In 1997, the law 9.447 
reinforced this competence, stating that in certain cases BACEN can determine “corporate 
reorganization, including incorporations, mergers and splits”343. On the other side, there is the 
reformed competition act of 1994, which established in a general form CADE’s jurisdiction 																																																								
339 AP number 08012.006242/1997-68. 
340 AP number 08012.003578/2000-18 (Rodobens Administração e Participação Ltda. and DAIMLE 
RCHRYSLER Administradora de Consórcios S/C LTDA). 
341 See, for instance, the books edited by Campilongo et al (2002), Goldberg (2008), and Maranhão and César 
(2012), which gather articles authored by lawyers and economists defending different positions on the topic. 
342 Article 10, X, item “c” of the law 4595/64. 
343 Article, III, of the law 9447/97. 
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over economic concentrations, without mentioning any kind of exception in terms of 
economic sector.  
The competence to regulate economic concentrations in the financial sector thus 
seems to be granted by both BACEN and CADE, each by a different norm. The legal dispute 
involving these norms is whether the law of 1964 is hierarchically superior to the 1994 
competition act, or on the contrary, if the reformed antitrust norm, enacted after the law 
creating BACEN and specific to competition, revoked the Central Bank’s competence, 
entitling CADE to regulate the sector, or even if both competences coexist and are 
complementary (Maranhão and Osmo 2012, p. 7). In more substantive terms, the struggle is 
around defining if and in what circumstances should financial concentrations be subjected to 
competition regulation, as in some cases involving “systemic risk” they would be necessary to 
“preserve” the financial system’s “health” and “stability”, independently of its potential 
anticompetitive effects. 
The first episodes of the controversy date from the initial years of the reformed field. 
In 1995, the Brazilian Securities Exchange Commission (CVM) informed SDE about an 
acquisition involving two banks, and asked that Secretariat about the need to inform the 
SBDC of concentrations in the financial sector (Arcanjo Neto 2006, p. 10). Although it 
affirmed that the competence was exclusively that of BACEN, SDE sent the inquiry to 
CADE. In August 1996, CADE’s commissioner responsible for analyzing it, still a member of 
the Council’s first formation under the 1994 law, overruled SDE’s opinion on the issue, 
sustaining that it had no legal competence to make such a statement, and asked the agency’s 
Attorney General’s Office (ProCADE) to issue an opinion (Arcanjo Neto 2006, p. 12). 
ProCADE then issued a “dubious and cautious” opinion, recognizing BACEN’s jurisdiction 
over concentrations in the financial sector, but also the need to “contemplate CADE’s 
participation, given its technical expertise” (Arcanjo Neto 2006, p. 12-13). In November 
1996, this opinion was sent to BACEN in order to initiate an inter-institutional dialogue. In 
March 1997, however, the Central Bank’s Attorney’s Office issued an opinion stating that 
BACEN is solely entitled to regulate the sector (Arcanjo Neto 2006, p. 13). As an interviewee 
revealed, by the time that the friction between the two authorities was starting – which 
coincided with the major concentrations in the sector in Brazil344 –, the Central Bank would 																																																								
344 Between 1995 and 1996, the federal government instituted two programs of restructuring of the Brazilian 
financial sector which comprised measures to concentrate the banking sector: the Stimulus Program to the 
Restructuring and Strengthening of the Financial System (PROER), focused on private banks, and the Incentives 
Program to the Reduction of Public State Banks (PROES), which supported the privatization of banks owned by 
state governments. Later on this section, I detail the effects of these programs in terms of concentration. 
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not only have responded to CADE, but directly instructed financial institutions not to submit 
concentrations to the antitrust agency: “The Central Bank called the banks and said, explicitly 
– ‘You don’t go to CADE. The first to go to CADE will have to deal with me. You are all 
prohibited to go to CADE”. 
 In the view of the same interviewee, CADE was not “strong enough” in responding to 
BACEN, behaving differently than it did in respect to other economic sectors, most notably 
the industry. Although it claimed to be competent, in practice it didn’t reclaim the 
presentation of Merger Reviews as in other sectors: 
 
All concentrations in the banking sector during the late 1990s and early 
2000s were published on the papers, everyone knew about them. And in 
industrial concentrations I received many letters from CADE saying: ‘I read 
in the papers that you merged, but I didn’t receive your MR’. By the late 
1990s there was this magazine of an American group that they gave for free 
in the airport. In the end of it, there were four pages saying who bought 
whom. If your operation was in that magazine, you could expect that you 
would receive a notification from CADE in the next week. I got many of 
those. But why didn’t they notify banks? I’m not stupid enough to raise the 
issue... 
 
In 1997, when CADE was already under the presidency of Gesner Oliveira and with a 
considerably different composition, as mentioned in Chapter 5, a series of cooperation 
agreements started to be concluded by the competition authority with other governmental 
agencies: among them, the Central Bank. In May 1997, for instance, CADE and BACEN 
concluded a “Technical Cooperation Agreement” to exchange information, and perform joint 
activities with their personnel. However, in June of the same year, BACEN endorsed its 
Attorney Office’s opinion enacted in March, affirming its exclusive competence over the 
financial sector (Arcanjo Neto 2006, p. 14).  
The Central Bank’s insistence on controlling concentrations in the financial sector 
cannot be separated from the context of the time. As described in Chapter 5, by 1997 there 
was still a suspicion about competition policy by market agents, as the 1994-1996 Council 
was seen as extremely interventionist. For instance, in the same month of 1997 that BACEN 
reaffirmed its jurisdiction, the economist Gustavo Franco, who was connected to the PUC-Rio 
circle, and was by then a Central Bank director and in the following month became BACEN’s 
President, articulated the same fears and criticisms that were coming from the market and 
other governmental spheres. In a speech he gave in CADE, Franco argued that the organ 
adopted a “more liberal view on economic power concentration, focusing on the control of 
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conduct, especially of state-owned companies”, and criticized the “nonsense of price control 
mechanisms that the competition law maintained” (Bello 2005, p. 211).  
As described by lawyers and economists involved with the field of competition policy 
at that time, BACEN’s radical position was to a great extent constructed not by its President, 
but by the bureaucrats who occupied directive positions in the Bank. As one of the 
interviewees reported, 
 
Discussions with Gustavo Franco and Armínio Fraga [BACEN’s president 
between 1999 and 2002] were peaceful. The big problem was with the 
Central Bank’s technical body. When a director sat down to discuss, there 
was no discussion. They didn’t even look at you, barely greeted you, 
because they thought they were of a different cast, a different lineage.  
 
In 1998, through Resolution number 15, CADE reacted to BACEN’s latest move, and 
re-stated its competence to regulate the financial sector by including it among the areas of 
economic activity to be regulated through merger reviews. Despite this move, the inter-
institutional relations between CADE and BACEN seemed stable, as in February 2000 a joint 
ordinance between the two agencies was signed, creating an “Interinstitutional Group of 
Technical Cooperation”, which among other attributions was entitled to elaborate a proposal 
for solving the controversy over the competence to regulate the financial sector345. 
After this ordinance, however, CADE examined two MRs that entailed concentrations 
involving financial institutions 346 . According to Arcanjo Neto (2006, p. 14) and the 
information provided by some interviewees, CADE’s decision to act in these concentrations 
motivated BACEN to “change its posture”, triggering a reaction that would result in a 
landmark of the controversy. BACEN’s response was articulated by its Attorney General’s 
Office, which made an official inquiry to the Attorney-General of the Union (AGU), by then 
Gilmar Mendes, later appointed justice of the Brazilian Supreme Court by President Cardoso, 
asking for a legal opinion to settle the controversy. The “conflict of competences” was 
established (Arcanjo Neto 2006, p. 17). Interestingly, this was the period when CADE’s 
composition was shifting. In the year 2000, a Council composed mostly by lawyers 
substituted that consisting of a majority of economists since 1996 – and as a lawyer reported 																																																								
345 Portaria Conjunta n. 1, of February 9th 2000. 
346 One was the acquisition of Consórcio Rodobens by Daimler-Chrysler, decided on February 6th 2000, and the 
other was the capital increase of BNY International Financing Corporation in Banco Credibanco, decided on 
October 4th 2000 (Arcanjo Neto 2006, p. 14). In a quote of CADE’s Attorney General manifestation about the 
controversy, approved by the Council’s plenary, these MR are said to be exemplaries of concentrations 
“presented by some financial institutions ad cautelam”, which indicates that other institutions were not 
presenting operations of concentration to CADE (Arcanjo Neto 2006, p. 17). 
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in an interview, “this is a fight of lawyers. You and I can produce good arguments for both 
sides”.  
According to an interviewee, the resort to AGU was once again product of the actions 
of BACEN’s bureaucracy, as the “Central Bank’s young Turks” were “lobbying” inside the 
Bank and in AGU for a favorable opinion. Around the same time, as another interviewee 
revealed, SEAE was acting together with BACEN’s President, Armínio Fraga, in order to 
elaborate a consensual solution, in which economic concentrations in the financial sector 
would be under CADE’s supervision, but the Central Bank could claim “systemic risk, as 
they called it, and take over the issue – breaking a bank was something not desired”. 
However, as this interviewee maintained, this negotiated solution would have been blocked 
by the “lobby of the financial sector and of the Central Bank itself”. Thus, divergences were 
also occurring within BACEN. 
Through the Parecer GM-020 decision of April 5th 2001, AGU responded to the 
consultancy made by the Central Bank. Against BACEN, which defended its exclusive 
competence to analyze concentrations in the financial sector, CADE’s Attorney’s Office, as 
well as the Ministry of Justice maintained the need for a complementary jurisdiction between 
the monetary and the antitrust authorities. The position defended by CADE and the Ministry 
was that of a “complementary competence” in the regulation of economic concentrations and 
an exclusive jurisdiction of CADE in conduct cases. In this sense, BACEN would have 
exclusive competence to decide about economic concentrations only if a “prudential 
question” was at stake, i.e. if the case generated risks to the “stability” of the financial system. 
If not, CADE would be entitled to analyze a merger involving financial institutions. As 
explained by an interviewee the idea of “complementary competences” means that “if [a case] 
is important, the Central Bank must rule”. 
This take on the controversy was supported by a study authored by Gesner Oliveira in 
2001, a year after he left CADE’s presidency (Oliveira 2001), which was attached to CADE’s 
Attorney’s Office report to AGU. Based on a review of the international experiences of the 
regulation of the banking sector, and on an economic, institutional and legal approach to the 
issue, Oliveira’s policy paper advocated a complementary jurisdiction between BACEN and 
CADE, in which the Central Bank would be responsible for the “tasks of technical and 
economic regulation”, while CADE would “enforce antitrust law” (Oliveira 2001, p. 12). In 
practice, the proposal meant that BACEN would review concentrations under a prudential 
perspective, and if it didn’t represent a risk, CADE could assess it. Conduct of financial 
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institutions, in turn, would be entirely subjected to the regulation of the competition authority. 
As Oliveira maintained (2001, p. 52), his proposal “rejected two extreme and simplistic 
views”: 
On the one hand, the notion that economic concentration would be 
necessarily beneficial to the financial system due to the reduction of the 
systemic risk. On the other, that concentration would inevitably elevate the 
risk of abuse of economic power in the financial system. 
 
Rather than reflecting a dichotomy between these views, Oliveira (2001, p. 52) 
understood that the implementation of a shared jurisdiction was part of a “need for a 
sequential evolution” in the regulation of the financial sector, a step further in the 
“restructuring of the Brazilian financial system” initiated in the early 1990s. The first “phase” 
of this evolution would be one of “antitrust exemption” to concentrations among financial 
institutions, in which “authorities introduced institutional changes necessary to the adaptation 
of the national banking system to the new international parameters, as well as to the price 
stability obtained with Plano Real” (Oliveira 2001, p. 53). According to Oliveira’s paper, 
these “new parameters” were largely established between 1994 and 1999, based on “the 
facilitation of incorporation of institutions facing solvency difficulties, reinforcement of credit 
security and depositors protection, tariff liberalization and the sanitation of the public 
system”, i.e. privatizations (Oliveira 2001, p. 53)347. 
In other words, the “phase” of “antitrust exemption” would be a necessary step to 
achieve a “stable and competitive environment” (Oliveira 2001, p. 53). The shared 
jurisdiction reclaimed by Oliveira and endorsed by CADE’s General Attorney’s Office in 
2001 thus did not exclude the exclusivity of the Central Bank in regulating financial 
concentrations, as it would be part of a “necessary”, although by then superseded phase. 
Rather, it implied a model of regulation to be applied to a financial sector that was already 
substantively restructured despite antitrust regulation.  
The complementary role of CADE that was defended in that document was thus not 
incompatible with BACEN’s worries about possible blockages to concentrations in the 																																																								
347 Oliveira (2001, p. 55) illustrates the restructuring of the Brazilian financial system with the following 
elements: the decrease in the number of banks after 1994 from 273 to 233; the promotion of “adjustments” in 
104 institutions, involving liquidation, incorporation, and transfer of assets; and incentives to privatization of 
state banks. In the data he provides in the paper (Oliveira 2001, p. 55-57), it is possible to visualize what was in 
practice understood as a “stable and competitive system”: a lower number of banks, a decrease in the 
participation of state-owned banks (for instance, while in 1994 state banks held 13,4% of net assets of the 
market, in 1998 it was about 3.1%), and an increase in the participation of the private sector, notably of foreign 
agents (for instance, in 1994 banks with foreign control detained 5,9% of assets in the market of banks, and by 
1998 this number increased to 19,5%). Another study that illustrates how the 1990s was the period in which the 
banking sector most intensely concentrated was done by Troster (2003). 
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financial sector, as articulated by Gustavo Franco in 1997. As an interviewee maintained, this 
was also a worry of banks, “which feared that CADE would retard the approval of 
concentrations”. An indicator of this claim of compatibility can be found in Oliveira’s (2001, 
p. 50) quote in CADE’s annual report of 1998, when he was the agency’s president, which 
affirmed that “CADE has not been considering the increase of market concentration level as a 
necessary and/or sufficient condition to an operation to be considered potentially harmful to 
competition”. In what looks like a defense of CADE’s practice, Oliveira (2001, p. 50) argued 
that “a sample of CADE’s decisions proves that the existence of numerous cases in which 
approvals with or even without conditions were given”. And he added: “in some procedures 
the HHI even reached the maximum of 10000 (pure monopoly) and they were approved” 
(Oliveira 2001, p. 50).  
Mobilizing several legal arguments to evaluate the dispute, and even debating the 
study developed by CADE’s former president, AGU decided that the Central Bank had 
“exclusive competence” to analyze economic concentrations in the financial sector, 
dislocating CADE from its “preventive” roles in respect to the financial sector. The opinion 
was approved by the President of the Republic on the same date. As an interviewee described 
it, this was a “political opinion” that consolidated the “law of the strongest”: “in politics, the 
strongest prevails, and obviously the Central Bank was stronger”. 
Instead of settling the struggle, AGU’s opinion inaugurated another round of legal 
disputes. The debate from this moment on was not only about who had the jurisdiction over 
the financial sector, but also if AGU’s opinion, when confirmed by the President, was legally 
binding on CADE. In 2001, in analyzing a MR in which a Swiss financial group acquired part 
of the assets of a Brazilian financial institution, CADE affirmed its jurisdiction to regulate 
concentrations in the sector348. The bottom line of the decision was that AGU’s opinion was 
not binding on CADE, given the institutional autonomy guaranteed to a regulatory agency 
(Maranhão e Osmo 2012, p. 9). The case was controversial among commissioners. CADE’s 
president, by then the lawyer João Grandino Rodas, and the case’s rapporteur Hebe Romano 
(also a lawyer) understood that BACEN had exclusive jurisdiction over the sector, although 
AGU’s opinion was not binding. However, the other five commissioners decided that CADE 
was competent to evaluate the operation, and that there were “complementary” competences 
shared by the two institutions, in which BACEN had exclusive jurisdiction in “exceptional 
hypotheses” of “systemic risk” (Maranhão and Osmo 2012, p. 10). 																																																								
348 This was the MR number 08012.006762/2000-09 through which the group Zurich Financial Services 
acquired part of the capital of a subsidiary of Grupo Finasa, decided on November 28th 2001.  
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Following this decision, BACEN became more “worried” about the regulation of 
financial concentrations, as an interviewee revealed. The Bank sent “10 of its experts to attend 
one of PinCADE’s events, created a sort of ‘antitrust division’ inside the Bank, enacted 
ordinances, and so on”. However, although the case was approved without restrictions by 
CADE and BACEN seemed more cooperative, tensions continued. In November 2002, the 
battle entered the legislative arena. The Executive submitted to the National Congress a bill 
proposed by the Ministers of Finance and of Justice (by then Paulo de Tarso Ribeiro), which 
explicitly established the exclusive competence of BACEN to regulate concentrations in the 
financial sector349.  According to the bill’s justification (item 7), its objective was to “assure 
the prevalence of considerations pertinent to the strengthening of the system over issues 
related to potential harms to the economic order”. In this view, BACEN would be “the 
regulatory authority which is closest to the market under its supervision”.  
Almost one year later, another bill was started in the Federal Senate. The Senate’s 
President, Antonio Carlos Magalhães, submitted a bill that established complementary 
jurisdictions between CADE and BACEN350. The bill provided that the Central Bank is 
entitled to exercise a first analysis of a merger in the financial sector. If it understands that the 
operation may affect “the reliability of the financial system”, BACEN is responsible for the 
final decision. If not, the case is passed to CADE, which decides on its legality. In the 
justification of the bill, Senator Magalhães presented a criticism of the Central Bank’s 
regulation of the sector, stating that:  
 
Brazilian society has not observed satisfactory actions of the Brazilian 
Central Bank, the organ responsible for regulating the National Financial 
System, to solve the harms caused by the lack of competition in such an 
important economic sector. 
 
In October 2002, the struggle once again shifted its focus by entering the judiciary. 
Two banks involved in a merger (Banco BCN S.A. and Banco Bradesco S.A.) were required 
by CADE to submit the operation to its evaluation through a MR. In disagreement with the 
agency’s decision, the banks asked a Federal court to revoke CADE’s decision. In 2003 the 
court decided that the banks were not obliged to submit the operation to CADE, so the agency 
appealed to a Regional Federal court (TRF). Five years later, in 2007, the TRF of the 1st 																																																								
349 Projeto de Lei Complementar n. 344/2002. The last movement of the bill in Congress dates of 2005. 
350 Originally presented in the Senate as the Projeto de Lei do Senado n. 412/2003, it was approved and later sent 
to the House of Representatives, where it became the Projeto de Lei Complementar n. 265/2007. The last 
movement in Congress was on February 26th 2014, when the Constitution, Justice and Citizenship Committee 
decided that the bill is constitutional and may proceed in the legislative process. 
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Region decided in favor of CADE, even excluding the binding character of AGU’s opinion 
(Maranhão and Osmo 2012, p. 11). The corporations then appealed to the Superior Court of 
Justice, which in 2010 decided in favor of the banks, liberating them from the obligation to 
submit the operation to CADE and affirming the binding effects of AGU’s opinion 
(Maranhão and Osmo 2012, p. 12). However, it never decided on the substantive aspect of the 
jurisdictional conflict between CADE and BACEN, which since then waits for a decision of 
the Brazilian Supreme Court (Maranhão and Osmo 2012, p. 13). 
In 2008, a truce between CADE and BACEN can be identified. The Attorney Offices 
of both institutions signed a joint document that required AGU to review the opinion issued in 
2001 (Maranhão and Osmo 2012, p. 14). The proposal replicated the content of the bill of 
2007, thus establishing that BACEN would be exclusively entitled to regulate concentrations 
in the financial sector if the case concerned the stability of the financial system. If not, CADE 
would subsequently consider the case. Also around these years, as an interviewee who 
worked in the field by then revealed, CADE was working closely with the Central Bank to 
“heal the wounds of the previous period”. This cooperation involved talks to “make the 
Central Bank adopt Merger Guidelines for analyzing concentrations in the banking sector, in 
an attempt to anticipate the bill that was in Congress since 2002”. As described in the 
previous section, CADE nevertheless continuously decided cases involving financial 
institutions in the years following the signature of the 2008 protocol. 
It is thus not surprising that the controversy was once again revived a few years later, 
already in the period in which, as described in Chapter 5, CADE started to be seen as more 
“interventionist” and “politicized”. In 2011, SDE received a representation of a Federation of 
workers accusing the state-owned commercial bank Banco do Brasil of practising 
anticompetitive conduct related to the imposition of exclusivity clauses in credit contracts 
(Maranhão and Osmo 2012, p. 15)351. SDE rejected the representation, stating that since the 
investigated corporation was a financial institution, BACEN would be entitled to regulate it. 
The Secretariat based its decision on the interpretation that AGU’s opinion of 2001 had 
binding effects, obliging the submission to BACEN. CADE’s plenary did not accept SDE’s 
decision, and determined that the AP should proceed. In his decision, the rapporteur Marcos 
Paulo Verissimo affirmed CADE’s complementary jurisdiction over the financial sector, and 
maintained that AGU’s opinion had no binding effects (Maranhão and Osmo 2012, p. 16). 
CADE’s plenary unanimously endorsed the decision.  																																																								
351 AP number 08700.003070/2010-14, initiated by the Federação Interestadual dos Servidores Públicos dos 
Estados do Acre, Alagoas, Amapá e outros. 
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CADE’s decision was dated August 2011. Eight months later, the Central Bank started 
a counter-offensive. In April 2012, BACEN issued an ordinance establishing its exclusive 
competence to regulate concentrations involving financial institutions352. Interestingly, in this 
document BACEN details the steps that shall be followed by economic concentrations 
presented to be regulated, even giving the same name to the procedure as that in the SBDC – 
Ato de Concentração (MR) –, and incorporating traditional concepts of competition policy, 
such as “relevant market”, “barriers to entry”, and the “efficiency” gains to be promoted by 
the operation. In this context, although I was not able to determine whether it was due to 
BACEN’s latest move, after almost two years stuck in the National Congress, the bill 
proposed in the Senate that established the complementary jurisdictions of CADE and 
BACEN was revived in July 2013. 
Versions of these positions – from views sustaining the exclusive control of BACEN 
over concentrations in the financial sector, to compromise proposals that advocate a shared 
competence – were identified in the interviews conducted with the agents of the field of 
competition policy. Interestingly, I was not able to identify a diametrically opposed position 
to the exclusive jurisdiction of BACEN, i.e. a view that CADE must be solely entitled to 
regulate concentrations in the sector, in any interviews or in the reconstruction of the 
controversy.  
Even within the field of competition policy there are those who advocate the 
desirability of BACEN holding exclusive jurisdiction over concentrations in the financial 
sector. Often this position is maintained by the resort to the peculiarities of the financial 
sector, which would make unfeasible any kind of regulation of concentrations by CADE, even 
if in a “complementary” way. This is because, as some lawyers and economists interviewed 
maintained, the division of competences between CADE and the Central Bank would imply 
the risk of generating bank runs. As a former commissioner suggested when discussing the 
bill that established a shared competence presented in the Senate in 2003: 
 
The bill offers a solution [to the controversy] stating that every Merger 
Review that generates a prudential problem cannot be analyzed by CADE. 
But the problem is: how can the Central Bank announce that there is a 
prudential problem? It is complicated for the Central Bank to say that. 
BACEN may ignite a bank run. [...] So maybe the best is to divide: CADE 
regulates conduct, and BACEN concentrations. 
 
																																																								
352 Circular n. 3.590, of April 26th 2012. 
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Interviewees also frequently tied a shared or, even more radically, an exclusive 
jurisdiction for CADE over the financial sector to what seems to be the lack of a specific 
“expertise” in the field of competition policy. As two former commissioners explained, the 
position held by BACEN – most notably by its bureaucracy – was motivated by a worry about 
CADE’s limitations. One of them, for instance, argued that “their worry was that CADE 
wouldn’t have enough agility, that CADE would disturb it, that CADE didn’t know the 
financial sector well, that it didn’t know its needs well” (my italics). The other linked this 
worry to the presence of lawyers in the field of competition policy: 
 
 [BACEN’s bureaucracy] had this view that it would be crazy to let CADE 
stick its nose into the issue. They thought the financial sector was too 
important to at some point be left for a prosecutor to decide about it. [...] 
There was this prejudice against jurists, against lawyers. They thought 
lawyers had no experience, not even lawyers working in the financial sector. 
For them, lawyers had no idea about this. They would be amateurs. 
 
 Other interviewees, who defended BACEN’s exclusive jurisdiction over the financial 
sector, also referred to the need for a specialized expertise in order to regulate it. According to 
two former commissioners, the financial sector would be “too sensitive” and “too complex for 
CADE”, and “no place for amateurs”. Similarly, a third former commissioner maintained that 
while “the financial sector is about macroeconomics, issues decided by CADE are 
microeconomic”. 
Together with sections 6.1 and 6.2, the description of how the field of competition 
policy relates to financial capital thus portrays both the kind of economic phenomena it 
regulates, and how it regulates it. Hence, among the empirical tasks derived from the 
framework sketched in Chapter 3 to analyze the relationship between competition policy and 
neoliberalism, the one still pending is to describe the outcomes of antitrust regulation at a 
societal level. In the next section, I therefore explore what are the constitutive roles of the 
field for society. 
 
 
6.4 The subjects protected by antitrust: between consumers and workers 
 
On the very first day of my fieldwork visit to the federal capital Brasília, I got a cab 
and asked the driver if he could take me to CADE’s building, at “SEPN 515 Conjunto D, Lote 
4”. Brasília’s encrypted addresses are very peculiar, and it takes time for a visitor to 
understand them. I wasn’t familiar with them, and couldn’t give the driver any indication 
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besides the official address. After I told him the place I wanted to go, the driver just nodded, 
but remained silent. Cabdrivers in Brasília go up and down to governmental buildings all the 
time, transporting politicians, businessmen, bureaucrats, lobbyists, etc. I was confident he 
knew where to take me. After a while, however, the driver looked back through the mirror, 
and with a strong accent of the Northern Brazilians who constructed Brasília and first 
populated its once desert landscape, he asked: “CADE is that institution for consumer 
protection, right?”. Somewhat hesitant, I confirmed – “Yes, that institution for consumer 
protection”. After no more than 10 minutes we arrived at CADE’s building. 
The driver’s question illustrates the public image of the Brazilian antitrust authority, 
historically constructed by the institution itself and by the agents of the field of competition 
policy. It also converges with how mainstream narratives describe the field’s role in society. 
As reviewed in Chapter 1, antitrust policy is said to have the role of protecting consumers 
through the promotion of competition. In economic terms, this social category is depicted as 
that of the direct “beneficiaries” of regulation. Under a legal point of view, consumers are the 
“subjects” entitled to the rights protected by antitrust policy. 
In Chapter 2, I described how the construction of the primacy of “consumers” as an 
organizing category of society in respect to the state and the economy has been an integral 
part of the neoliberal project. As argued, together with the “outcomes” of competition policy 
explored in the previous sections, a defining feature of neoliberalism can be found in a social 
dimension: the transformation of citizenship and the creation of neoliberal subjects, to which 
the category of consumers, or the “citizen-consumer” fits smoothly. This, I maintained, is one 
side of the coin – the positive social agenda engendered by neoliberalism. The other side is 
that of the deconstruction of social forms that are not useful to or compatible with the 
economic and political tenets of the neoliberal project. As discussed in Chapter 2, among the 
social forms most notably targeted in this negative dimension is “labor”. 
As presented in Chapter 3, given the relation between neoliberalism and the attempt to 
dissolve a social model erected on the “capital-labor” relation and replacing it by that of 
“capital-consumer”, the proposal to assess competition policy’s linkages to neoliberalism on a 
social dimension was translated into an analysis of how the category of “labor” is 
incorporated into the practice of the field of competition policy. In other words, in this 
dimension of the “outcomes” of competition policy, the focus lies on understanding how the 
antitrust field “digests” social categories such as “workers”, “employees”, and “labor”. As 
argued, this inquiry comprises the “constitutive” roles of the analyzed field in society, 
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complementing the “facilitative-regulatory” roles towards the economy, and provides 
parameters to evaluate if and how they relate to the neoliberal project’s implications in a 
social dimension, as maintained by the critical political economy from which I depart. 
To pursue such an analysis, as described in Chapter 3, in this section I present how 
CADE and the agents of the field deal with “labor” in decision-making. In the first part of this 
section, I portray the different ways in which labor-related issues appear in the regulation 
produced by the field of competition policy. The empirical sources for this description are the 
procedures analyzed by CADE and its decisions. In the second part, I present the views and 
normative stances of the agents of the field regarding the incorporation of “labor” as an 
element of competition policy. This description is based on interviews conducted with 
lawyers and economists involved with the field. 
 
6.4.1 The selective absence of “employment” 
 
The reform of competition policy that resulted in law 8884 of 1994 included 
“alterations in the employment level” as an element to be considered by CADE in the 
imposition of conditions for the approval of Merger Reviews353. As described in Chapter 4, 
one of the agents of reform who later became a commissioner in CADE – the economist 
Lucia Helena Salgado – couldn’t specify the exact origin of this norm, but attributed it to 
lawyers who worked in the commission. Moreover, in her view, the inclusion of 
“employment” concerns in antitrust law would be “unorthodox”, but compatible with both the 
European inspiration of Brazilian competition policy, and with “our tradition of a welfare 
state”. 
Such a perspective can also be noticed in the first annual reports published by CADE, 
precisely when Salgado was a commissioner. In the 1996 report, for instance, the Council 
dedicated some pages to publicizing how it understood the relation between competition 
policy and labor, and to present initiatives taken to “attenuate the impact” of the process of 
“industrial restructuring through mergers, acquisitions, and joint-ventures” on the 
employment level (CADE 1996, p. 35). According to the official report, such phenomena 
“although they may increase efficiency, sometimes present negative effects on the 
employment level”, as in most cases a concentration “involves the reduction of staff and/or 
the relocation of human resources to different geographical markets” (CADE 1996, p. 35-36).  																																																								
353 Article 58, first paragraph of the law 8884/94. 
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These effects were said to be a “negative externality” that would be faced by 
competition policy, as its “ultimate goal is the maximization of welfare, which implies the 
minimization of social and private costs” – including in “the labor market” (CADE 1996, p. 
36). The “most perverse side” of unemployment generated by the “context of corporate 
restructuring” would be the “low versatility of the dismissed labor force”, which faces an 
“unreceptive labor market for the specializations developed in the former employment” 
(CADE 1996, p. 37). In CADE’s report, this was characterized as a specific form of 
unemployment – “frictional unemployment” – “generated by the lack of compatibility of the 
workers’ qualifications at the moment of dismissal with the profile demanded by the market” 
(CADE 1996, p. 37). In other words, “frictional unemployment” would occur when workers 
are unemployed but there is a “reasonable demand for labor in the market”.  
CADE’s annual report of 1996 describes an initiative to “attenuate or even avoid the 
social and economic costs associated with frictional unemployment” (CADE 1996, p. 37). 
This initiative was the creation of a “Protocol of Productive Restructuring and Professional 
Retraining”, signed by CADE and the Secretariat of Professional Formation and Development 
of the Ministry of Employment and Labor on February 19th 1997. Under this protocol, CADE 
would seek to “re-train” the workers dismissed as a result of economic concentrations, thus 
“preventing short term frictional unemployment from becoming long term structural 
unemployment, much more deleterious in terms of social and familiar disaggregation” 
(CADE 1996, p. 37).  
In doing so, CADE would “neutralize the macroeconomic inefficiencies generated by 
movements associated with the seeking of microeconomic efficiency”, and contribute to the 
pursuit of “full employment”,  “consecrated as a constitutional principle of the economic 
order” (CADE 1996, p. 38). Such programs of “re-training” were even more ambitious, 
according to CADE’s report, as they wouldn’t be “restricted to the formation of a labor force 
for already constituted corporations”, but also seek “training with the objective of developing 
small businessmen who would create their own businesses” (CADE 1996, p. 38). The 
transformation of dismissed workers into businessmen was seen by CADE as a “healthy 
process, as it increases competition, especially in the services sector, and moreover, it opens 
space for a new attitude of entrepreneurship and competition” (CADE 1996, p. 1998). 
Linking this initiative as a form of achieving the goal stated in the norm of the 1994 law that 
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mentioned “full employment” as a condition to be fulfilled through TCD, CADE’s 1996 
report mentions two cases decided by the Council that would illustrate such concerns354. 
The reports of activities of the years subsequent to 1996 also mentioned the attention 
given by CADE to the topic of labor, although to a lesser extent. In the 1997 report, the only 
references to the issue are the signing of the protocol with the Ministry of Employment and 
Labor, which is inserted among the activities developed by the council that year, together with 
a conference organized on the same date about “Employment and Competition”, with the 
participation of the Ministers of Justice and Labor, CADE’s president (Gesner Oliveira), and 
others.  
In the report of 1998, the only reference to labor appears in a quote from a doctoral 
thesis about competition policy in Brazil authored by Ruy Santacruz Lima (Lima 1998), by 
then a commissioner in CADE, used to describe the authority’s practice in the previous years. 
In this quote, Lima (1998, p. 119) affirms that most restrictions established by CADE until 
then were of a behavioral type, including those “related to employment”. These, according to 
him, would demand a “reasonably sophisticated bureaucratic apparatus” that would in turn 
“create a form of intervention incompatible with the modern regulation of markets” (Lima 
1998, p. 119). Also according to this quote endorsed by CADE’s annual report, the imposition 
of commitments related to the “employment level” would “attach reins to the strategic 
planning of a corporation and in the execution of its commercial policy”, and “reduce the 
liquidity of assets, hardening its subsequent sales, and inhibiting investments”, besides 
“making corporate decision-making more rigid, and reducing the efficiency of the firm, and 
thus of the market” (Lima 1998, p. 119). 
In the early 2000s, a last explicit reference to labor issues can be identified in the 
reports of CADE. The annual report of 2001 mentions the participation of one of CADE’s 
commissioners in a seminar conducted in Brasília about “Globalization and its consequences 
for the Brazilian worker”. As I will detail later on this section, the same commissioner was 
involved in the discussion of employment conditions to be imposed in one of CADE’s most 
famous cases. After this reference, and besides some citations of cases in which the 
“employment” issue was raised, labor matters are absent from CADE’s report. The concerns 
with labor were thus more present in the Council’s official reports precisely when the field 
was still consolidating and seeking its legitimacy as an arena of regulation – whether before 
other governmental institutions, the market, or society as a whole. 																																																								
354 MR 27/1995 (Colgate/Kolynos), and MR 16/1994 (Grupo Gerdau/Korf GmbH). 
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But how have these concerns been translated into concrete regulatory practices? 
Following a strictly formalist evaluation of competition policy’s roles in society, it could be 
affirmed that, given the presence of a norm on the “employment level” in the 1994 law, as 
well as institutional discourses described above, not only “consumers” are protected by 
antitrust law in Brazil, but also “employment”. However, given that the conceptual 
framework adopted in this research intends to reach conclusions about the field’s outcomes on 
the economy and society based on the “law in action”, I will now present elements that show 
how this norm has actually been enforced. 
Since “employment level” appears as one of the elements that may establish the “Term 
of Commitment to Performance” (TCD) that can be signed by CADE and corporations on 
which conditions are imposed for the approval of a concentration, this is the first and most 
obvious place to look for the presence of “labor” in the practice of antitrust policy. Of the 93 
TCDs issued by CADE from 1994 to 2013, only 7 of them refer to workers, labor or 
employment, as depicted below in chronological order. As the table indicates, these were 
mostly issued during the period that inaugurated a properly “technical” antitrust policy in 
Brazil, from June 1996 to the year 2000. All of the 4 TCDs issued in this period determined 
an obligation to establish programs for the “retraining and reinsertion” of workers dismissed 
due to the concentration’s “efficiency” in the labor market. 
 
Table 85. TCD with employment clauses 
MR Corporations TCD date TCD clause Type of condition 
0019/1994 Ajinomoto Co. Inc., Oriento Indústria e Comércio S.A 28/02/96 
Second Clause, 
item "E" Employment level  
0024/1995 Crown Química S.A., Grace Produtos Químicos e Plásticos Ltda. 12/3/97 
Second Clause, 
item "E" 
Retraining & 
Reinsertion 
0027/1995 K e S Aquisições Ltda., Kolynos do Brasil S.A. 19/03/97 
Clause 3.7, items 
"D" and "E" 
Retraining & 
Reinsertion 
0079/1996 
Alcan Alumínio do Brasil S.A., 
Alumínio Penedo Ltda., PANEX 
S.A. Indústria e Comércio 
1/4/98 Second clause, item "L" 
Retraining & 
Reinsertion 
08012.00584
6/1999-12 AmBev 19/04/00 Clause 2.4 
Employment level 
+ Retraining & 
Reinsertion 
08012.00442
3/2009-18 Perdigão S/A, Sadia S.A. 13/07/11 Clause 3.3 Employment level 
08012.00187
5/2010-81355 
Cimpor Cimentos do Brasil Ltda, 
Votorantim Cimentos S.A 4/7/12 Clause 3.1.4 Employment level  
Source: elaborated by the author 																																																								
355 This MR is related to other 4 operations analyzed separately by CADE in which the same company figured in 
the acquiring pole: MR numbers 08012.001879/2010-60, 08012.002018/2010-07, 08012.002259/2012-18, and 
08012.002018/2010-07. In all of them, the same TCD was established. 
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These programs were mostly understood as training the labor force to look for jobs in 
another sector or company. For instance, in MR 27/1995, the program entailed offering 
employees dismissed as the result of the operation from jobs in literacy training, technical 
courses about industrial production such as “total productive maintenance” and “focused 
factory”. 
In all TCDs in which “Retraining & Reinsertion” measures were established, these 
were not seen as incompatible with the dismissal of workers as the result of the merger 
analyzed, but rather as a mitigating instrument for a process that was not to be necessarily 
avoided. In MR 24/95, for instance, the obligation was to “develop a program of reinsertion 
of professionals who will be eventually dismissed” (my italics). Similarly, in MR 
08012.005846/1999-12, clause 2.4 of the TCD defined that the corporation resulting from the 
analyzed merger would have to “promote programs of retraining and reinsertion of workers 
whose dismissal is directly associated with the constitution or selling of assets, or to the 
deactivation of its production lines” (my italics). Even in this MR, in which, as depicted in the 
table above, “Retraining & Reinsertion” conditions were combined with the maintenance of 
the employment level, dismissals were not to be blocked. In a report about the TCD’s 
implementation, CADE’s commission responsible for monitoring conditions imposed in 
decisions (Comissão de Acompanhamento de Decisões – CAD/CADE) affirmed that “clause 
2.4 does not oblige AmBev to keep or readmit employees nor to guarantee to dismissed 
employees employment in other corporations”356. 
The other 3 TCDs in which labor-related clauses were identified are part of two other 
periods that, as described in Chapter 5, are seen by the field as qualitatively different. The 
first was concluded within the first MR depicted in the table above by the end of CADE’s first 
composition as a reformed antitrust authority, in February 1996. In a considerably different 
way than how CADE inserted conditions connected to employment after the arrival of the 
council led by Oliveira, this decision explicitly determined that the acquiring corporation was 
obliged to “guarantee the maintenance of the existing employment level in its industrial units 
connected with the production of” a specific chemical component in whose relevant market 
concentration was understood as high by CADE. Item “E” of this TCD’s second clause 
nevertheless mentioned two possible exceptions to this rule: “with the exception of dismissals 
for cause, and those implied by changes in the productive process”. 																																																								
356 Nota Técnica 24/2004 of CAD/CADE in the monitoring of the TCD signed in MR n. 08012.005846/1999-12. 
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The other two TCDs on the list were also enacted in another period qualitatively 
different from that which the agents of the field identify as of a predominantly “technical” 
council. In 2011 and 2012 – when CADE allegedly was once again becoming more 
“politicized” and “interventionist” – these TCDs imposed solely “employment level” 
conditions. However, if analyzed closely, it is possible to identify a peculiarity in the use of 
this type of clause. In both MRs, the obligation to maintain the “employment level” 
determined by CADE was related to assets that were to be alienated as a condition for the 
approval of the operation. In MR 08012.004423/2009-18, decided in 2011, CADE determined 
that the corporations involved should “demand from the acquiring company [of the assets to 
be sold] the guarantee that the current level of employment of all units transferred will be 
maintained for a minimum of 6 months after the acquisition”. This was thus similar to the first 
TCD on the table, in 1996, although with a deadline. In MR 08012.001875/2010-81, decided 
in 2012, however, the clause on “employment level” had the main goal of protecting the value 
of the assets that were to be alienated. As CADE determined in clause 3.1.4 of that TCD,  
 
during the [confidential period] for the achievement of the obligation of 
alienating the assets described above, the corporation agrees to maintain 
intact the productive units that will be alienated, preserving tangible and 
intangible assets, its market value and the general employment level. 
 
This condition seeks to avoid the dismissal of labor force before the asset transfer 
determined by CADE could hamper the productive potential of those assets, which were to be 
sold precisely with the objective of strengthening another competitor. 
Besides TCDs, in the analysis of MRs that compose the sample described in section 
6.1, I was also able to identify 8 cases that enable visualizing yet distinct forms in which 
labor-related issues appear in the production of antitrust policy in Brazil. In 6 of them, 
employment was connected with the conditions imposed for the approval of the operation. As 
the table below reveals (also in chronological order), the first MR of the group established the 
maintenance of the “employment level” as one of the conditions for the approval of the 
operation, together with other behavioral clauses. This is consistent with the mobilization of 
this type of labor-related condition identified in TCD, as the MR was decided in the initial 
years of decision-making under the reformed law. 
The other 5 MRs illustrate another way in which labor can be noticed in CADE: the 
imposition of modifications in non-inducement clauses, i.e. contractual clauses agreed by the 
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corporations involved in the operation in which it is determined that one company will not 
induce or influence the other firm’s workers to become its employees. 
 
Table 86. Employment measures in MRs without TCD 
MR Corporations Decision date Type of condition 
11/1994 
CILPE - Companhia de Industrialização de Leite do 
Estado de Pernambuco, Yolat Indústria e Comércio 
de Laticínios Ltda 
23/11/94 Employment level 
08012.00327
4/2001-12 The B.F. Goodrich Company e Dana Corporation 6/3/02 
Non-inducement 
clause 
08012.00299
0/2004-25 
JMS do Brasil Participação Ltda. e J. Malucelli 
Seguradora S.A. 27/10/04 
Non-inducement 
clause 
08012.00091
8/2004-63 
Sudamericana Agencias Aéreas y Marítimas S.A. e 
Metalnave S.A. Comércio e Indústria 15/12/04 
Non-inducement 
clause 
08012.00077
7/2005-60 Bemis Company Inc. e Dixie Toga S.A. 27/04/05 
Non-inducement 
clause 
08012.00224
3/2005-78 Novartis AG e Hexal AG 18/05/05 
Non-inducement 
clause 
Source: elaborated by the author 
 
In MR 08012.003274/2001-12, the only condition was the reduction of the period of 
the non-inducement clause from 10 to 5 years, in line with conditions concerning non-
compete clauses, as described in section 6.1. In the other 4 MRs, the condition imposed by 
CADE involved the modification of the substantive scope of the clause. For instance, in MR 
08012.002990/2004-25 and 08012.000777/2005-60, CADE determined that the non-induce 
clause that prohibited shareholders and their relatives from acting as consultants or 
autonomous professionals in the sector of the operation did not encompass the possibility of 
working as an employee of a competing firm. Similarly, in MR 08012.002243/2005-78, 
CADE determined that exceptions to the non-inducement clause were to encompass 
“employees”, together with other categories mentioned in the contract, such as lawyers, 
investment bankers, and accountants. In several of these decisions, CADE’s commissioners 
based the imposition of such conditions on the right to labor guaranteed in the Constitution of 
1988. 
In another MR identified in the sample, the topic of employment was also present, 
although not as a condition for the approval of the operation. This was the MR 
08012.006483/2005-41, decided on October 13th 2005, in which CADE describes the 
operation as “the acquisition by Mecalux of the shares of ThyssenKrupp  
Ingeniería y Sistemas S.A., its assets, liabilities, employees and contracts” (my italics). In this 
sense, “employees” appear among the assets acquired by one corporation. The approach to 
“employment” as an asset appears on yet another set of regulatory instruments mobilized by 
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CADE: the “Agreement to Preserve Reversibility of Transaction”, or APRO. As described in 
Chapter 4, the APRO entails a kind of “precautionary order”, concluded between CADE and 
the corporations involved in an operation, in which the Council detected a high potential of 
anticompetitive effects. Through the APRO, corporations agree to preserve the corporate 
structures existing prior to the concentration, until the analysis of the MR is concluded by the 
authority. 
Of the 32 APROs listed by CADE in its institutional website357, I was able to locate 
labor-related clauses in 15 of them, depicted in the table below in chronological order. In all 
of these APROs, the maintenance of the “employment level” was specified by CADE to the 
corporations.  
 
Table 87. APRO with employment clauses 
MR Corporations APRO date APRO clause 
08012.006976/
2001 
BR Participações e Empreendimentos S. A., G. Barbosa e 
Cia. Ltda. e Serigy Participações e Empreendimentos Ltda. 3/7/02 "F" 
08012.001697/
2002-89. Nestlé Brasil Ltda / Garoto SA 27/03/02 - 
08012.011518/
2006-45 MAHLE Gmbh and Dana Corporation 21/03/07 I.1.2 
08012.002813/
2007-91 Petróleo Brasileiro S/A and Braskem S.A 25/04/07 V 
08012.002816/
2007-25 
Ultrapar Participações S.A.Refinaria de Petróleo Ipiranga 
S.A. 25/04/07 V 
08012.002818/
2007-14 
Ultrapar Participações S.A. / Petróleo Brasileiro S/A and 
Braskem S.A / Refinaria de Petróleo Ipiranga S.A. 25/04/07 V 
08012.002820/
2007-93 Petróleo Brasileiro S/A Refinaria de Petróleo Ipiranga S.A. 25/04/07 V 
08012.003302/
2007-97 
Companhia de Bebidas das Americas - AmBev / José de 
Sousa Cintra 16/05/07 I, "C" 
08012.003267/
2007-14 GTI S/A / VRG Linhas Aéreas S/A 30/06/08 6 
08012.004423/
2009-18 Sadia S.A. / Perdigão S/A 8/7/09 2.4, "C" 
08012.003189/
2009-10 
Medley S.A. Indústria Farmacêutica / Sanofi-Aventis 
Farmacêutica Ltda. 26/08/09 3.2, "I" 
08012.010473/
2009-34 
Companhia Brasileira de Distribuição / Casa Bahia 
Comercial Ltda. 3/2/10 2.2, "A" e "B" 
08012.005889/
2010-74 
Fischer S.A. - Comércio e Indústria e Agricultura / 
Citrovita Agro Industrial Ltda. 20/10/10 2.3, "G" 
08012.010038/
2010-43 Diagnósticos da América S.A. / MD1 Diagnósticos S.A. 26/10/11 2.2, "E" 
08012.008378/
2011-95 VRG Linhas Aéreas S.A. / Webjet Linhas Aéreas S.A. 26/10/11 2.1.5 
Source: elaborated by the author 
These clauses specified, for instance, that during the period of duration of the APRO, 
corporations would not implement “substantive changes in the involved companies that imply 																																																								
357 Available at: < http://www.cade.gov.br/Default.aspx?a59968ac47c44bde36d547de2bfe051ff71735f1070919 
>. Last accessed on November 19th 2013. 
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the dismissal of workers, and the transfer of personnel among its facilities”, or that they 
would “maintain the employment level, with the exception of changes implied by the normal 
course of business and the economic context”. In some cases, CADE attached to the APRO’s 
“employment level” clauses the prohibition of “unjustified dismissals of workers as a strategy 
to integrate corporations”.  
As the examination of this element related to labor illustrates, in the APRO the 
“employment level” was to be protected while CADE analyzed the operation, as it was 
considered a component of the assets of the corporations. The approach to “employment 
level” as an asset is confirmed by the final outcome of CADE’s decisions in these MRs. 
Among these 15 operations in which an APRO was established, 13 of them were approved 
with conditions, of which 4 with some sort of structural restriction, and 1 was rejected. 
However, in only one of them was the maintenance of the “employment level” part of the 
conditions – MR number 08012.004423/2009-18, described among the TCDs with labor-
related clauses, in which CADE imposed the protection of employment during 6 months by 
the company that would acquire the assets that were to be sold as a structural restriction358. 
Thus, in 12 of the 13 operations in which an APRO protecting the “employment level” was 
issued and in which restrictions were imposed on the approval of the MR, it did not become a 
condition. 
Besides the presence of “employment” clauses as conditions imposed through TCDs 
or decisions in MRs, as well as its protection as an asset in APRO, there is a fourth place in 
which labor-related issues can be noticed in the practice of competition policy. This entails 
the mobilization of arguments related to the effects of operations on employment by 
corporations that submit MRs to CADE. Within the sample of MRs analyzed in section 6.1, 
one such case was identified. In analyzing the MR 08012.007085/1998-06, CADE (more 
precisely SEAE’s report, on page 630 of the procedure) describes the arguments presented by 
the involved corporations to support the operation’s approval. Among these arguments, which 
SEAE places within the “evaluation of efficiencies”, there is the suggestion that the operation 
would “increase [...] the labor force by 15% - from 108 to 120 direct jobs, together with the 
increase of exports and the decrease of prices”. 
In other cases, the “employment level” was treated not as being increased by the 
merger, but rather as to be protected by it – coincidently, these cases comprised 3 of the 8 																																																								
358 In another MR (08012.006976/2001) in which an APRO was established, employment also appears, not as a 
condition, but as an “option” for the company acquiring the assets to be sold under the determination of CADE. 
As the TCD issued in that MR stated, “the acquirers must have the option to acquire [a certain product and 
blend], as well as to employ key-workers of the acquired company” (my italics). 
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MRs to have ever been entirely rejected by CADE, as mentioned in section 6.1. In the two 
MRs involving corporations in the sugar cane and alcohol fuel sector, the “employment level” 
was argued as a justification for the formation of an official cartel. As the corporations 
maintained in the presentation of the MRs, among other reasons, the merger was needed due 
to “reasons of preponderant national economic interest”, which encompassed the protection of 
“1 million direct jobs (representing more than 40% of rural workers in the state of São Paulo 
alone)”359. In the vote taken in the year 2000, the case’s rapporteur did not acknowledge such 
allegation, maintaining that the corporations did not “present evidence that the [merger] 
benefited the maintenance and the improvement of the conditions of workers”, and that 
although the sector “is responsible for a high number of jobs in the country”, the MRs 
“implied no benefits to workers”360. 
In another MR rejected by CADE – the acquisition of Garoto SA by Nestlé do Brasil 
Ltda., also referred in section 6.1 –, the debate around the “employment level” can also be 
identified, besides its presence in the TCD. In this operation, the use of the “employment 
level” argument was not a corporate strategy, as in the case mentioned above, but rather a 
claim of other agents in society. The operation was presented to CADE in 2002, and the 
Council enacted a decision that rejected the MR in 2004. In the meantime, given the Brazilian 
“post-merger review” system, the operation produced effects, i.e. Nestlé exercised control 
over Garoto even before CADE’s decision, although limited by the APRO signed in 2002. In 
2004, CADE required Nestlé to sell all assets of Garoto to a competitor, and defined the 
several ways in which it should happen.  
Among the forms laid down by CADE for the reversal of the operation, one was that 
the acquiring company could “not include all the assets that corresponded to the productive 
capacity of the sold company”, meaning that Garoto’s equipment and machinery could be 
sold to different buyers. This possibility raised several concerns in the regional government of 
Espírito Santo, the state where Garoto’s factory was based, and in the Union of Workers of 
the Food Industry of Espírito Santo (Sindialimentação), which organised employees of that 
company. The worry, articulated, for instance, by the mayor of the city that hosted Garoto361 
and by Congressmen of Espírito Santo362, was that the dispersal of the company’s assets 																																																								
359 MR 08012.002315/1999-50, p. 16-17. 
360 Rapporteur’s vote, p. 80. 
361 See, for instance, an article published by newspaper Folha de São Paulo on February 4th 2004, entitled “For 
mayor, decision on Garoto threatens jobs and collections in Vila Velha” (Para prefeito, decisão sobre Garoto 
ameaça empregos e arrecadação em Vila Velha. 
362 On February 18th 2004, representative Manato (PDT/ES) made a speech at the National Congress’ plenary, 
criticizing CADE’s rejection of the operation, which would imply “financial, employment and credibility 
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would imply its total deactivation. In a statement of 2011, when the case had already been 
before the courts for 7 years, the labor union of Espírito Santo maintained that “possibility of 
fragmenting the industry” in the selling of assets “may affect not only the 3.500 workers of 
the company, but the whole production chain around Garoto, considered part of the heritage 
of the state”363. In this case, it was thus CADE’s rejection of the MR – especially the way in 
which this rejection was determined – that generated fear in governments and workers that 
massive dismissals could occur. 
The Brasil-Álcool and Nestlé-Garoto cases illustrate what some interviewees 
considered to be a recurrent practice in competition policy: the mobilization of arguments 
related to employment to exercise pressure on CADE. As a former member of the SBDC 
described it, this type of argument would be an “easy way for a corporation that merges and 
intends to raise prices as a result of the merger to mobilize public opinion in its favor: ‘If you 
oblige us to sell, we will lose many jobs’”. According to the same agent, politicians would 
also resort to these claims: “No governor says ‘We are defending our campaign sponsors’. 
They always say: ‘We are defending jobs’”. In a similar way, another former commissioner 
maintained that this type of argument is “A kind of introduction, by corporations, of a social 
question inside the decision-making practice of the antitrust authority. It is very common for 
corporations to bring it up, when it’s in their interest”. 
 
6.4.2 Legal competences and economic trade-offs 
 
The trends identified in how CADE incorporates labor-related claims into its 
regulatory practice can be attributed to the dominant view shared by most agents of the field 
about its pertinence within competition policy. As interviews revealed, this perspective entails 
distinct and sometimes interconnected arguments which can be grouped around three lines. 
These might explain why employment has appeared only marginally as a condition 
determined in decision-making, and frequently in the form of “Retraining & Reinsertion” 
measures, or mostly treated as an asset when the “employment level” is at stake. 
																																																																																																																																																																													
losses”. A similar manifestation came from Senator Gerson Camata, also from Espírito Santo, who accused 
CADE’s decision as being “against Brazil”, since in 2002 “the governor [of Espírito Santo] and the Senators of 
that state looked for someone who could buy [Garoto] in order to guarantee employment”. The speech of 
Camata is available at the Federal Senate’s Diary of February 6th 2004, p. 02871-02872. 
363  Extracts from an article produced by and published in the union’s website. Available at; 
<http://sindialimentacao.blogspot.com.br/2011/08/sindialimentacao-e-cade-discutem-em.html>. Last accessed 
on November 20th 2013. 
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The first line of reasoning noticed in several interviews is that competition policy 
wouldn’t be an adequate device to deal with labor-related issues. In this group can be placed 
arguments that stressed that CADE has no legal competence to deal with employment 
matters, and/or that the topic does not belong to competition policy concerns. As a former 
member of the SBDC maintained, while stressing that although he held that position he was 
“not neoliberal”, inserting labor concerns in the regulation of “corporate transactions” decided 
by CADE would be “wrongful” and even “stupid”: 
 
Employment levels must be a central concern for the state. But it is not in 
deciding on or governing a corporate transaction that it must be done. This is 
a wrongful and stupid way to do it. It should be done through inflation 
control, the improvement of public accounts, inducing competitiveness in 
the economy, education. I am not affiliated to PSDB, I am not a neoliberal. 
But that’s what I think. 
 
Another interviewee highlighted the possible “usurpation” of competence that may 
occur if the antitrust authority deals with the topic: 
 
Imagining that CADE can unilaterally impose a restriction that, for instance, 
concerns the maintenance of the employment level, is not trivial. This is an 
issue that raises at least two questions: is this really within the scope of 
competition law? To what extent doesn’t it usurp a competence that is not 
ours? [...] I’ve seen many opinions arguing that CADE has no right to deal 
with the topic, also because labor law would offer enough instruments for 
that purpose.  
 
In this agent’s view, the concern with labor has however exercised influence in CADE 
due to the pressures of the public opinion: “This became a social demand, which is a problem. 
We have seen that the press and society have expectations about CADE that are not proper for 
an antitrust authority”. Another interviewee manifested a similar view. To her, although 
employment was included in the law of 1994 as an element to be observed in the celebration 
of a TCD, it was something “alien” to competition policy: 
 
Employment must not be the objective of competition policy. This is not our 
objective. Gesner [Oliveira] did something about protecting employment. 
There was also article 58 [of the 1994 law] about the TCD that you had to 
consider employment. But I think this is absolutely alien to competition 
policy. Competition policy must not get into this issue. It’s a mistake. 
 As suggested by another former interviewee, although the law opened a way for the 
inclusion of employment concerns, “economic theory” wouldn’t support it: 
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According to economic theory, this is not a fundamental worry. But the law 
gave a margin for a certain interpretation that it was possible to 
accommodate interests that were external to competition in the analysis. 
 
The same interviwee maintained that, in practice, the view of what he called 
“economic theory” on labor prevailed, as there was a consensus among commissioners about 
“what matters” within “CADE’s competence” – “the welfare of consumers”. 
 
We had a consensus that, in the end, the net welfare of consumers is what 
matters in a merger review, and that it’s not very reasonable to include these 
external factors because it is something that is not under CADE’s 
competence. 
 
 As several interviewees affirmed, the idea that CADE has no competence to evaluate 
the implications of concentrations in terms of unemployment does not mean that they 
understand it as an irrelevant question. Rather, as a former commissioner affirmed, “this is an 
extremely important question, but not because it is important that CADE is competent”. 
The lack of competence of the field of competition policy to dig into the effects of 
concentrations on labor is related to a second line of reasoning frequently identified in the 
interviewees’ responses: the trade-off between economic efficiency and employment level. As 
many respondents mentioned, economic concentrations seek to obtain efficiency, and this 
often includes the reduction of the labor force, which implies dismissals. As a former 
commissioner affirmed: 
 
A merger seeks to generate efficiencies. And this production of efficiency 
may mean “cutting heads off”. If two companies are merging, you won’t 
need two managers, you won’t need two heads of production. You 
concentrate that into a slimmer structure and gain more efficiency. 
 
 In the view of another former commissioner, this would be a somewhat unavoidable 
“perverse” side of economic concentrations, especially in cases implying the replacement of 
“man” by technology, as in the example mentioned in the following response: 
 
Every merger has a perverse side: you substitute man by a machine. So you 
decrease your costs, and raise your profits. When you cut expenses, the first 
thing to do is to cut expenses with man – people that work. 
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 The imposition of obligations of “Retraining & Replacement” are explained as a 
measure to moderate processes implied by more efficient structures. As the same interviewee 
maintained in the interview, the creation of such obligation, even if “anti-economic”, as the 
interviewee defined it, would be a “human aspect” that could be considered. 
 Although most agents of the field see the trade-off between economic efficiency and 
labor protection as practically unavoidable, its affirmation in the decision-making process is 
not necessarily obvious. As a former member of the SBDC affirmed, resorting to the 
argument of “competence” to escape from the debate about employment was sometimes a 
better strategy to deal with claims of employment protection, rather than stating that in the 
end dismissals “promote benefits to society” in reducing costs, especially when pressures 
came from labor unions:  
 
Several labor union leaders that feared dismissals visited me. I never told 
them what I really thought. They visited, I listened to them, but one of the 
problems was that [dismissals] are a way of generating efficiency. 
Unfortunately, it was on the Merger Reviews: “We will save [in the sense of 
“saving money”] people. We will fire this many people”. [...] The idea is 
that it promotes benefits to society, which means reducing costs. So people 
visited us, and they didn’t realize that this was a benefit for the company, 
that it counted in favor of the company in capital account surplus. And the 
increase of capital account surplus would somehow affect consumers. [...] 
But we didn’t say that it was an advantage for the corporation. We said that 
it was something we couldn’t deal with. (The comment in italics is mine)  
 
The trade-off between efficiency and employment is also often mitigated by the agents 
of the field – notably economists – through the idea that although a merger may imply 
dismissals in the short term, in the long run it actually generates more employment. As a 
former commissioner affirmed to justify why employment clauses are not within CADE’s 
competence and thus should not be imposed, “competition generates employment”: 
 
I’m against [including employment in decision-making]. None of my TCDs 
had employment clauses. This is not a function of competition policy. It 
depends on the school [of thought]. For me, competition generates 
employment. I don’t have to worry about the employment level. I have to 
worry about the rules of competition, because it will affect the interaction 
among agents. 
 
As another interviewee maintained, the employment generated through competition 
after a merger is also qualitatively different: 
 
				 411	
The merger process itself may lead to a reduction [of employment], but this 
reduction is in the short term, because if the operation actually produces 
efficiency, it will generate another kind of employment, with another type of 
qualification and in another place. 
 
Another interviwee replicates this perception in an even more economic fashion: 
 
When you have a competitive merger, as opposed to an anticompetitive 
merger, you will be generating jobs in net terms. There will be losses of jobs 
in gross terms, but in net terms more employment will be created, which 
compensates the former. 
 
Although the agents of the field frequently understand labor-related issues to be 
outside the domain of competition policy, and to constitute an inevitable trade-off with 
economic efficiency pursued through concentrations, its presence is often “authorized” in at 
least one aspect of regulation produced by CADE. This is precisely the instrument in which I 
detected a recurrent presence of “employment level” clauses: the APRO. As a former 
commissioner maintained, the post-merger review system instituted by the law of 1994 
generated the “problem” of preserving the assets of corporations that CADE could potentially 
determine to sell – including employees. The clauses established in APROs to maintain the 
“employment level” were introduced to solve this issue, rather than, as this commissioner 
affirmed, “a concern about labor rights”: 
 
It is natural that in these operations you have people dismissed. But there 
was a problem that could happen in the [law of 1994]. A problem that now 
[with the law of 2011] has been solved. You could promote a merger and 
wait for CADE’s decision. So you made the merger and started “cutting 
heads off”. This was a frequent problem. If CADE suspected that it was a 
potentially dangerous operation, it made an APRO, and put in a clause 
stating that the corporation couldn’t dismiss anybody: “you can’t fire 
directors, you can’t change key-positions”. [...] It wasn’t so much a worry 
about labor rights. It was much more a worry with maintaining the health of 
corporations. 
 
This view was replicated by other agents, such as another former commissioner who 
stressed the centrality of the “asset of human capital” for corporations: 
 
What did worry us? Cases of APRO, because when we had no pre-merger 
review system, this was a problem. I don’t want unemployment if that asset 
of human capital is something essential to the corporation – for instance, a 
manager who holds the knowledge over some areas so that, if he is 
dismissed, it will deteriorate the company as an asset. Hence, it was 
basically focusing on the prior objective of preserving the reversibility of the 
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operation, preserving the health of assets. But employment as a final goal, as 
a commissioner in CADE, I don’t believe it is my objective.  
 
This rationale could be transformed into a structural condition for the approval of an 
operation, when the selling of assets was imposed by CADE. As a former commissioner 
maintained in quoting the example of a case identified in the previous section within those in 
which a TCD involving an employment clause was present, such a condition may refer to this 
concern about preserving an asset of the corporation:  
 
In CADE, there was a growing perception that in many sectors some jobs 
entail a tacit knowledge about the company, which is essential for the 
production of its final good. So if you disarticulate this structure for a period 
of time, you may disarticulate the final product. The president of [a 
corporation] has no idea about those things. Those who really know it are 
the employees. So they had to stay for a while, for that set of assets to be 
adequately transferred to the acquirer. (My comments in italics) 
 
Since employment is frequently seen as not belonging to the field, or at most an asset 
to be protected, several interviewees associate its incorporation beyond those limits into 
decision-making as a sign of a non-“technical”, or an “ideological” regulation. As a former 
commissioner suggested, analyzing employment effects in MRs is “not very technical, 
because this is not the objective [of competition policy]. CADE is there to protect 
consumers”. In a similar line, another former commissioner mentioned the inclusion of labor 
concerns as an indication of “ideological” decision-making: 
 
It would be ideological, for instance, to consider the following: ‘I will not 
analyze the impact of an operation in terms of its net effects for society 
because I consider that the most important thing is that CADE decides that 
employment must be guaranteed, even if it means  consumers paying more. 
 
In both examples, as in other extracts quoted, what is seen as the proper objective of 
competition policy is sacrificed by the inclusion of labor concerns: the protection of the 
interests of “consumers”. 
Converging with the trends identified in Chapter 5, these criticisms often target the 
initial years of decision-making under the new law of 1994 (between 1994 and 1996), and the 
recent past, from 2011 onwards. Not by chance, these are the two periods in which, for 
instance, most TCDs imposing clauses concerning “employment level” were identified. As an 
interviewee suggested, the inclusion of the topic in decision-making gradually “disappeared” 
after a while, especially due to the “influence of economics”: 
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It [employment clauses] eventually disappeared, and nowadays it is not 
much talked about. Also due to the strong influence of economics, and 
because it was gradually accepted that [dismissals] are part of the 
contingencies of concentrations. 
 
As former commissioner maintained, in the beginning of the 1990s the inclusion of 
“employment level” arguments evidenced that “people didn’t know what competition policy 
was about” – and this approach resurged in a recent past: 
 
People didn’t know what competition policy was about, but due to culture. It 
was very confusing. There was many things such as “You have to assure the 
employment level somewhere”. [...] And you observe some TCDs of 2010, 
2011 with structural clauses, more objective in theory, but still raising this 
issue of “employment level”. 
 
Not by chance, those agents who are often reputed as “outliers” of the field, or those 
in charge of producing competition policy since the recent past, when it became “politicized” 
and more “interventionist”, are associated with the incorporation of employment issues into 
antitrust policy. For instance, in explaining why “labor issues” are not under CADE’s 
competence, a former commissioner mentioned that a lawyer who joined the Council – and 
who was considered in several interviews an “outlier” of the field – once conducted several 
public hearings with labor unions to discuss the Nestlé-Garoto case, and its impacts on 
workers. These hearings, according to this interviewee, motivated the judicial review of 
CADE’s decision, as the courts considered them a “new fact” generated by the antitrust 
authority, and which violated the corporations’ rights. 
Other examples of the convergence between the periods in which CADE is seen as not 
so “technical” and the insertion of employment concerns can be found in how commissioners 
themselves defend the appreciation of the issue. For instance, a commissioner who served on 
CADE between 1994 and 1996 affirmed in an interview that “employment” should be one of 
the “efficiencies” of economic concentrations: 
 
I thought it was interesting that one of the efficiencies of the operation was 
employment, because if efficiency must be shared with society, how is it 
possible to approve a merger that results in a large number of unemployed 
people? I always shared the understanding that it is possible for a 
competition authority to consider the maintenance of employment as an 
efficiency. 
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Similarly, the views expressed by agents who are part of the more recent period of an 
alleged “politicization” of CADE about the inclusion of employment concerns in antitrust 
policy are much less conflicting than the dominant perspective so far described. As the 
interview with a former commissioner revealed, the compatibility of measures directed to 
protecting employment with competition policy is articulated with a criticism of the 
“fundamental logic” of the field: 
 
The fundamental logic of competition legislation can be summarized in the 
following way: in capitalism, corporate structures can concentrate and get 
bigger. And the legislation puts a ‘comma’: ‘Now, if it will cause too much 
trouble, the final result will not happen’. This is the logic of competition law. 
When it says that it is possible to concentrate and get bigger, the legislation 
itself opens the way for the process of reducing the labor force, of 
dismissals, etc. This is a portion that is internal to this legislation. 
   
Despite the understanding that the legislation itself opens the way for dismissals, the 
same commissioner maintained that the “employment concerns” do have a place in decision-
making. This is articulated through a legal approach to competition policy that contrasts to 
that observed in the majority of agents, and to a sort of “subversion” of the concept of 
“efficiency”, as most agents of the field share it: 
 
Does that mean that concerns about employment, employment level, labor 
policies are excluded from this decision-making agenda? No. Why? First, 
this internal logic that organizes competition law is inside a political order 
that is composed by many other logics. All these logics are submitted to an 
organizational structure that is the Constitution, which in turn establishes in 
article 170 the principle of full employment. This principle by itself ‘de-
absolutizes’ the insularity of competition in respect to employment. [...] 
Second, within decision-making, the question of employment is introduced 
by corporations themselves. Hence, it is not external to competition policy. 
Third, efficiency and the maintenance of productive structures can be 
composed by the maintenance of employment, because employment equals 
tacit knowledge.  
 
Another former commissioner who served CADE in the same period also expressed a 
view that maintains the compatibility between employment concerns and competition policy, 
and even affirmed that he dealt with the topic to a “lower extent than expected”: 
 
I expected more [discussions about employment levels]. It was not very 
much demanded in CADE. This is not precisely an antitrust theme, but I can 
give you an example in which it came up in a very clear way and made us 
take action. In case [X], for instance, the volume of assets to be transferred 
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[due to CADE’s imposition] was very large. There was a large volume of 
employment at stake. Thousands of jobs. [...] Our decision was to determine 
that whoever acquired those assets would keep the employment level for 6 
months. People can come in or out of the plant, but the level shall remain 
stable. 
 
Not by chance, these views are expressed by agents that joined CADE when it 
resumed the establishment of “employment level” clauses in TCD – which was present in the 
initial years, but became peripheral, if not entirely absent after the council entered what is 
frequently perceived as its “technical” phase, from 1996 onwards. 
 
 
6.5 Outcomes for a neoliberal economy and society 
 
 Based on the description of the types of economic phenomena regulated by the field, 
and how it regulates them, as well as on an inquiry into how competition policy deals with 
certain social groups in its practice, it is now necessary to discuss the findings in light of the 
conceptual framework from which I departed. In this final section I therefore discuss if and 
how the trends identified in the practice of the field fit what I affirmed to be the defining 
features of the neoliberal project for the economy and society. 
 
6.5.1 The economy facilitated by competition policy 
 
The description of CADE’s decision-making in respect to Merger Reviews conducted 
above empirically illustrated what kinds of economic phenomena are regulated by the field of 
competition policy in Brazil, as well as how they are regulated. From the data presented, it is 
possible to visualize that the economic phenomena that demand the field’s regulation 
resemble the economic impulses characteristic of neoliberal globalization: most operations 
occurred in economic sectors affected by privatization and liberalization measures (Filgueiras 
2006); they mostly appeared in the form of acquisitions (Chesnais 1996, p. 91); and the vast 
majority of cases entailed the expansion and concentration of foreign capital, especially from 
the US, but also from other countries of the “center” of the capitalist system, such as 
Germany, the UK and France, be it in the form Foreign > Foreign, or Foreign > Brazilian 
(Harvey 2007, p. 80). 
 In detailing the profile of these economic concentrations, I showed that about a third 
of operations (35%) entailed some sort of horizontal integration, and that 15.6% implied 
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levels of concentration above the legal limit of 20% established in the competition act of 
1994. The highest degrees of concentration, as well as the largest amounts of market share 
acquired in these operations were more often related to acquisitions of Brazilian firms by 
foreign companies, if compared, for instance, to acquisitions among Brazilian corporations. 
This finding indicates that an important portion of the majority of operations involving 
foreign firms represented the consolidation and expansion their positions in the Brazilian 
market. 
Although in the majority of cases horizontal concentrations were not identified, 
especially due to the global character of a large number of operations, several of them 
revealed a process of arrival of foreign capital into Brazil, where foreign corporations had no 
prior activities. Interestingly, decisions in MR legalized many of these operations, even if 
they maintained high levels of concentration, due to the understanding that since they did not 
represent horizontal integrations, they constituted a mere “substitution of agents”. A similar 
argument was identified with respect to privatizations, in which state-owned monopolies were 
transferred to private parties. In this sense, the new frontiers of accumulation opened by 
liberalization, deregulation and privatization measures were to a great extent respected by 
competition policy decision-making. Moreover, CADE largely endorsed operations involving 
companies that held close to or effective oligopolistic and monopolistic positions when 
operations did not imply an increase of market power, but solely a transfer of ownership. 
 The analysis of the types of restrictions imposed by CADE revealed, in turn, that not 
only were conditions imposed in a minority of cases that generated some sort of integration, 
but also that substantive conditions were even more rare. In the case of behavioral restrictions, 
the vast majority of corporations that received this type of condition were required to perform 
adjustments in the “non-compete clause”. With respect to structural restrictions, besides 
showing that they reach a tiny number of cases – which indicates an “institutional preference” 
for behavioral conditions, instead of challenging the market structure –, the empirical 
evaluation of CADE’s decisions evidenced how this type of condition is associated with the 
level of concentration implied by operations: the higher the level, the larger the proportion of 
structural conditions. Nevertheless, even in the highest levels of concentration, the majority of 
operations were approved without any questioning of the market share generated by it. 
Moreover, the absence of any sort of structural restriction in levels up to 40% reveals that 
CADE in practice “legalizes” any economic concentration that complies with this limit. Thus, 
although the formal legal limit is 20% of market share, the idea of 40% as a proportion that 
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does not generate antitrust concerns has been instituted in regulatory practice. As described in 
Chapter 4, this was precisely the limit that the agents of reform most aligned with the 
neoliberal economic tenets and connected to international experiences wanted to establish in 
the law.  
Also, the analysis of the only 8 cases ever to be rejected by CADE tends to confirm 
these trends – and not only because they compose a nearly irrelevant proportion of MRs 
decided. As shown above, these decisions rarely targeted foreign capital, and when they did, 
rejections were either part of a period that anteceded the field’s effectively “technical” phase, 
or were in practice ineffective, as the dispute was judicialized. When targeting Brazilian 
firms, the two MRs involving the sugar cane sector illustrate how the field was functional for 
the neoliberal pressures of liberalization: rejections were imposed on concentrations 
motivated precisely to try to resist pressures from the opening of the economy.  
Hence, as suggested by the discourses of agents mapped in Chapters 4 and 5, as well 
as the economic theory that underlies neoliberalism, the analysis of decisions shows that 
economic concentrations and the size of corporations has not been a major determinant in the 
imposition of restrictions. Not only were no operations that generated levels of concentration 
of up to 40% structurally challenged, but also above this level the determination of de-
concentration was always largely a minority. 
If compared to the economic phenomena analyzed in Merger Reviews, the description 
above also indicates that a considerably different economy is regulated through 
Administrative Procedures. Many sectors most frequently investigated in APs were not 
among those often regulated in MRs. Industrial sectors of high economic and strategic 
importance that figured in the top-10 sectors regulated in MRs were never above 0.5% of 
cases investigated in AP. Also, while in MRs the distribution of cases among economic 
sectors was more varied, APs tended to concentrate in 5 economic sectors, which together 
comprised almost 85% of procedures. The presence of “General Services” with more than 
50% of APs decided by CADE illustrates the accentuated focus of the field’s “repressive 
roles” in respect to certain economic sectors. 
 Connected to this difference are also the distinct scopes of the economic phenomena 
regulated by CADE through MR and AP. While economic concentrations of a global scope 
and involving sectors of national dimension were present in a considerable number of MRs, 
Administrative Procedures revealed a regulatory activity much more interested in national 
and, most notably, in regional dynamics. Not by chance, Brazilian companies were involved 
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in the vast majority of conduct investigated by CADE, while foreign capital, on the contrary, 
was present in most MRs. Foreign companies present in APs were mostly located in the 
“Pharmaceutical and Hygiene Industry”, and although they were all decided under the law of 
1994, several of these procedures dated from a period prior to the reform of competition 
policy – i.e., before the modern reform of antitrust took place. 
Moreover, the local and regional character of CADE’s “repressive roles” was also 
revealed when convictions were analyzed: more than half of APs in which penalties were 
imposed had a union of professionals on its passive pole – and as described, these were 
mostly of regional scope. The types of conduct more often persecuted and convicted by 
CADE were strictly related to the sectors, kinds of capital involved, and scope of economic 
phenomena it investigated. 
 In the description above, I also showed that besides being focused on regional 
economic phenomena, mostly targeting Brazilian corporations, and in investigating unions 
and associations in a considerable proportion, an important proportion of APs also constituted 
a mechanism to solve disputes among corporations. Not only were around 30% of APs 
authored by corporate agents, but these were far more penalized by CADE than investigations 
started by the SBDC itself or other governmental organs. Also, more than half of convictions 
occurred in APs begun by corporations, thus indicating that CADE has mostly repressed 
conduct contested by agents of the market. The so-called “shift of focus toward AP” that 
began in 2003 accentuated these trends. CADE became more incisive in imposing penalties 
since then, but mostly on the very sectors, capitals, scope, and conduct observed since the mid 
1990s. 
 Hence, in the arena of conduct, competition policy has largely served to discipline 
local agents – notably those who traditionally negotiated with the state the rules of 
competition in the model of price control – and to solve intra-capital disputes. In targeting 
those agents, the expansion of foreign groups into the Brazilian market – a general trend 
observed in MRs – has also been favored, notably in the cases of health services, which 
comprise the vast majority of penalties imposed. The targeting of conduct related to prices is 
an indication that in this dimension the field has focused on attacking practices that, as 
described in the reform process, were seen as the most harmful in the economy. Therefore, the 
claim of a “shift of focus” from MR to AP, which by itself characterizes an understanding that 
concentrations are hardly problematic per se – and which fits the dominant neoliberal 
economic thinking –, is also a shift in terms of the type of economy to be regulated: from 
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economic phenomena involving foreign capital and its expansion and accumulation, to the 
disciplining of Brazilian corporations and regional markets, and most notably of national 
groupings in the form of associations or professional unions. 
 Based on the empirical assessment of the profile of the economy regulated by CADE 
through both MR and AP, and the regulatory patterns identified, it is possible to draw a more 
general conclusion about what in Chapter 2 I framed as the field’s “facilitative-regulatory” 
roles. The Brazilian antitrust agency’s decision-making thus evidences that it tends to, on the 
one hand, facilitate economic concentration, especially in privatized and liberalized economic 
sectors, and on the other, more frequently in favor of foreign capital that expands into the 
Brazilian market. If APs are brought into the picture, these trends are even reinforced, as the 
targets of CADE’s “repressive roles” were almost entirely Brazilian economic agents, and 
especially regional and local associations. 
 In the “regulatory” dimension of the legal field, the question raised was to determine 
how “political processes and more subtle institutional processes shape the form and impact of 
regulation on the economy and infuse economic interests into the law”, and vice-versa 
(Edelman and Stryker 2005, p. 543). Crossing the “facilitative” roles of competition policy 
with the analysis of the field’s construction and dynamics (Chapters 4 and 5, respectively), it 
is thus possible to visualize how this regulatory system has been instituted in such a way as 
not to hamper the expansion and concentration of capital.  The “economic interests” 
mentioned by Edelman and Stryker (2005, p. 543) were detected in the very genesis of the 
field and in the battles to assure that its practice would occur and be preserved accordingly. It 
is not by chance, thus, that its outcomes, as reflected by MR and AP, mirror the field’s 
structure, agents, positions and habitus – including the “deviant” decision-making in the 
period prior to the 1996 revolution. In other words, CADE’s decision-making, rarely 
confrontational to concentrated market structures, is a reflection of the reform of the field, 
which, although in a far from pacific way, institutionalized the neoliberal understanding that 
high levels of economic concentration are justifiable if it proves to be “efficient” (Davies 
2010). 
 The field’s “facilitative-regulatory” role has thus been similar to what Sklar (1988), 
Picciotto (2011), Freyer (1992) and others describe in respect to antitrust policy in the US 
between the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries: to legitimize 
the transformation of the economy into an oligopolistic system of competition. In the case of 
Brazil, this process of legitimation occurs in a radically different economic context. Its 
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practice nevertheless evidences that competition policy has largely legalized and thus 
legitimized the accumulation of foreign capital, be it through global operations or through the 
entrance of foreign capital into a recently liberalized market, and also of national 
corporations, who have equally benefited from the minor interference of CADE in market 
structures. This finding converges with other studies that stress the relationship between 
competition policy and neoliberalism in facilitating economic concentrations in other settings, 
such as in Europe (Buch-Hansen and Wigger 2011; Wigger 2008), and in the United States 
(Davies 2010, Eisner 1991). 
As Sklar (1988, p. 166) explains in the analysis of the corporate reconstruction of 
capitalism in the US, also in the case herein discussed antitrust policy did not cause 
“corporate reorganization” – the causes of this phenomenon of concentration and global 
expansion of capital “lay elsewhere”: in the market and in politics. Nevertheless, to link the 
findings with Sklar’s study once again, it is also possible to conclude in respect to the field of 
competition policy in Brazil that “while regulating corporate administration of the market to 
keep it within the bounds of reasonableness and the claims of the public interest, [antitrust] 
sanctioned and legitimized it” (Sklar 1988, p. 168). 
 
6.5.2 Financialization and financial exceptionalism 
 
In order to address the relationship between competition policy and what in Chapter 2 
I identified to be another defining feature of neoliberalism – the hegemony of financial capital 
–, in the third section of this chapter I complemented the description of what economy is 
regulated by the Brazilian antitrust field and how it is regulated with a focus on economic 
phenomena related to financial capital. The description of how financial capital is regulated 
by antitrust explored two distinct and yet complementary spaces. 
On the one hand, based on the sample of MRs and APs analyzed on sections 6.1 and 
6.2, I identified what sorts of economic phenomena are related to financial capital and how 
they are regulated. The description evidenced that both the incorporation of productive sectors 
by financial capital, as well as concentrations and conduct among financial institutions are 
subjected to the field’s regulatory practice. From the data presented, it was possible to see 
that, in consonance to the general trends in MR and AP, CADE has imposed no structural 
restrictions on the different types of operations involving financial capital, or penalties for 
alleged anticompetitive conduct. 
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These findings indicate the existence of connections between the concrete outcomes of 
antitrust policy and neoliberalism in at least two senses. First, as described in Chapter 2, what 
makes the hegemony of financial capital a defining feature of neoliberalism is the 
unprecedented extension of financial capital in the contemporary economy, and the 
“increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial 
institutions in the operation of the domestic and international economies” (Epstein 2005, p. 3) 
– which includes its expansion into domains of the so-called “real economy”. This is what can 
be defined as the process of “financialization”. As CADE’s decisions grasped from the 
sample of MRs indicate, operations in which financial institutions such as hedge funds 
acquired assets of companies in the productive sector comprise a recurrent type of economic 
phenomena regulated by competition policy. It was even possible to locate an example of 
what Chesnais (1996, p. 239-240) understands to be another facet of financialization: the 
financial sector becoming a new area of activity for industrial groups, which in the case 
identified, acquired assets of an industrial group working in a different economic sector 
through a hedge fund. 
In all cases of this type – which are probably of a higher number, since I only 
considered those classified by the antitrust authority as occurring in the “Financial Sector” – 
CADE approved the operation without restrictions. Given the practice institutionalized in the 
field, this was quite logical, since if a financial group acquires assets of a productive sector, it 
is hardly a case of horizontal concentration, as the “products” of the involved corporations are 
largely different. In this sense, the financialization of productive sectors is naturalized in the 
field’s practice as any other kind of concentration. Another example of such naturalization 
can be found in Chapter 5 (section 5.4.2), where I described how the very mention of the term 
“financialization” in a case in which a hedge fund acquired assets of a corporation of the 
educational services sector by a commissioner of the so-called “politicized” or 
“interventionist” period motivated a severe criticism by an agent of the “technical” phase of 
CADE.  
Also, concentrations among financial institutions thrived with no major setbacks in 
CADE’s regulation, thus facilitating yet another space of the process of financialization: the 
quantitative expansion of financial capital’s activities and profits (Kotz 2008, p. 5). Moreover, 
it was illustrated that the financial sector enjoyed “antitrust exemption” precisely during the 
period in which it most intensely concentrated, be it due to CADE’s leniency, to BACEN’s 
pressures and threats on banks, or both.  
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The most telling element to see the linkage between competition policy and 
neoliberalism in respect to financial capital is, however, the very struggle to determine if and 
how it should be submitted to competition regulation. The second dimension explored in the 
chapter was thus how the actual regulation of financial capital by the field of competition 
policy is at the center of intense jurisdictional disputes within the field and between it and 
other spheres of government. As described, the position that advocates BACEN’s exclusive 
jurisdiction finds support even within the field of competition policy. Despite the existence of 
contrasting positions about the issue, and beyond the “fight of lawyers” that has dominated 
the controversy, it was possible to identify that independently of the position, BACEN is 
granted the last word at least in “important cases”. 
Reasons to sustain such a prominent role for the Central Bank were often based on 
appeals to expertise, and to what is depicted as an unavoidable “need” to prevent financial 
concentrations from being subjected to antitrust regulation in some cases frequently, thus 
indicating a sort of financial exceptionalism to antitrust regulation exercised by the field of 
competition policy. Such active deconstruction of competition policy’s jurisdiction over 
financial capital and the reinforcement of BACEN’s competence reveals another connection 
between the practice of the field and neoliberalism. This is because, as maintained in Chapter 
2, the creation and affirmation of “independent central banks” was an integral part of the 
series of neoliberal institutional reforms of economic regulation that took place most notably 
in the 1990s (Carruthers et al 2001, Arestis and Sawyer 2005). In the case of Brazil, the 
shaping of BACEN according to international standards occurred practically in parallel to the 
reform of competition policy (Loureiro 1997, p. 110-111). Moreover, since the 1990s the 
Brazilian Central Bank was gradually dominated by neoliberal ideology – most notably 
monetarism –, and became the main operational organ of economic policy in the Cardoso 
administration (Novelli 2001, p. 188). Hence, as the dominant autophagic stance of the field 
of competition policy in transferring its competence to regulate the financial sector to 
BACEN is inseparable from the features and roles exercised by the Bank, this movement 
implied the assurance that an institution even more clearly aligned with neoliberal economic 
tenets would be in charge of regulation. 
The deconstruction of competition policy’s jurisdiction over the financial sector 
becomes even more revealing if compared to another frontier in which the field has engaged 
in jurisdictional battles. This is the intersection between the field of competition policy and 
more traditional institutions of the legal field, most notably the Judiciary. As in relation to the 
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Central Bank, this jurisdictional battle has also been fought through appeals to expertise. In 
several of the interviews conducted, the agents of the field indicated that the Judiciary should 
abstain to interfere in the merit of CADE’s decisions, among different legal arguments, due to 
a lack of “expertise” in antitrust. As the interview with a former commissioner revealed, 
CADE should concern itself with the substantive aspects of regulation, and the judiciary 
should only “observe due process and the rationality of penalties” because “the Judiciary is 
not equipped to discuss the merits”. As the same commissioner affirmed, “[d]ifferently from 
the US, in Brazil our Judiciary has many problems, and there is no specific judicial area for 
economic law”. A similar view can also be seen in how lawyers perceive this relation, as 
exemplified by the opinion of another former commissioner, who sees antitrust as “a subject 
that is not known by judges, first because it involves economic issues, and second because it 
is not usual for the courts”. 
In Brazil as elsewhere, the field of competition policy, its institutions and agents, have 
not only affirmed its jurisdictional monopoly over the merit of antitrust regulation, but 
conducted a series of initiatives to both delimit its boundaries and infuse antitrust expertise 
into the Judiciary364. These initiatives compose what can be seen as a sort of “judicial reform” 
agenda propelled by transnational organizations, governmental institutions, and agents 
connected to the antitrust field. Examples can be found both internationally and locally.  
At the international level, for instance, the International Competition Network has 
historically conducted debates and produced advocacy instruments related to the judiciary, 
such as the “Working with Courts and Judges Project. Another example can be found in a 
proposition elaborated by the OECD and the World Bank named “A framework for the design 
and implementation of competition law and policy” (World Bank 1998). In this document, 
besides defining key-concepts of competition policy, these institutions offer a model of a 
competition act to serve as a reference for countries to create their own legislation. Within this 
legal model there are clauses concerning the relationship between competition policy and the 
Judiciary with a special focus on “developing economies” such as Brazil, in which the authors 
state that: “because the judiciaries in transition and developing economies are inexperienced 
in dealing with free market problems, it may be advisable to set up specialized courts to hear 
competition cases”. According to them, “concentrating these cases before specially trained 
																																																								
364 In the study of the “Reagan revolution” in American antitrust, Eisner (1991, p. 207-210) also identifies 
several measures adopted by the DOJ to “shape the courts doctrine”, such as, for instance, strategic litigation and 
legislative reforms to infuse Chicagoan standards into the judicial activity and thus reduce what was perceived as 
the courts’ “discretion” in analyzing antitrust cases. 
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judges should speed up the acquisition of expertise and produce more consistent, predictable 
decisions” (World Bank 1998, p. 147). 
Similar initiatives have also been noticed in Brazil. For instance, as can be observed in 
CADE’s annual reports, commissioners have participated in meetings organized by 
associations of federal judges (CADE 2005), and in seminars dedicated to the debate about 
the relationship between the judiciary and competition policy (CADE 2007b). In 2010, CADE 
has also published a brochure entitled “Competition defence in the Judiciary”, which targeted 
judges, prosecutors among other legal professionals and aimed at “diffusing, in an easy and 
pleasant way, concepts about the competition defence law” (CADE 2010, p. 5). 
Based on these findings, it is thus possible to visualize that the field of competition 
policy has facilitated the expansion and concentration of financial capital in Brazil through 
different means: in consonance with the trends identified in MR, it has not imposed structural 
restrictions on either the financialization of productive sectors, or the concentration among 
financial institutions and, more importantly, in practice it offered an “antitrust exemption” for 
bank concentrations at the historical moment in which the sector was restructured. On the 
“regulatory” dimension, the active deconstruction of the field’s control over the financial 
sector, often based on a dual expertise – affirmed with respect to the Judiciary, but retreated in 
face of BACEN –, indicates that the politics of jurisdictional definition leans in favor of a 
neoliberal approach to the financial sector. 
 
6.5.3 The society constituted through competition 
 
 In Chapter 2, I argued that together with the empirical assessment of the economy 
regulated by the field of competition policy, a more complete understanding of the field’s 
outcomes must include the investigation of the roles it exercises in a social dimension. In 
section 6.4 I thus described how the social categories of “consumers” and “workers” are 
incorporated in regulatory production, and hence what society is constituted by competition 
policy. 
The general conclusion that can be extracted from the data presented in this section is 
that competition policy deals with these social groups in considerably distinct ways. On the 
one hand, it was possible to observe from interview extracts, as well as from the quoted 
decisions, that “consumers” constitute the main category mobilized in the field as the subject 
protected by regulation – in consonance to mainstream narratives described in Chapter 1, and 
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to the struggles in the construction of the field detailed in Chapters 4 and 5. On the other, the 
inclusion of aspects related to “workers” (or “employees”) in regulation is much more 
nuanced: when not entirely excluded as a group that deserves protection, “workers” are 
incorporated selectively. Often, the alleged lack of “competence” of CADE to protect jobs, as 
well as the unavoidable “trade-off” between economic efficiency and employment are 
arguments mobilized to sustain the priority of “consumers” over “workers” as the social 
category that should interest and guide economic regulation produced in competition policy. 
Although the agents of the field, as well as official narratives such as those presented 
in CADE’s annual reports often argue that Brazilian competition policy has historically 
attempted to “attenuate” the impacts of economic concentrations to employment, the data 
presented indicates that this concern has been largely limited in both quantitative and 
qualitative terms. In other words, not only are cases in which discussions about employment 
were present a minority of CADE’s decision-making, but the alleged protection of workers 
has also been translated into measures that are far from incompatible with what is described 
as an inevitable trade-off between economic efficiency and dismissals. 
As described, the “attenuation” of the effects implied by corporate restructurings on 
labor have mostly been articulated as the “retraining” and “reinsertion” of workers, and even 
as an attempt to transform employees into businessmen. Both in interviews and in decisions, 
these measures were explicitly made compatible with dismissals, not to hinder them. When 
“employment level” was to be protected, TCD were often dated from the period in which 
CADE was criticized as not very “technical”, and/or as the protection of an asset to be sold. 
Moreover, the resort to “employment level” as a criterion to be taken in the evaluation of the 
legality of concentrations was also mobilized more incisively as a corporate strategy than as 
an imposition of the antitrust authority. 
Besides being present in an extremely low amount of MRs, labor-related issues were 
also more frequent in APROs than in TCDs. As such, they meant the protection of 
employment as an asset of corporations: as “human capital” to be guaranteed while CADE 
decided if it should be part of future de-investment conditions or not. As interviews indicated, 
these measures also frequently sought to protect specific types of jobs: “key-positions” in a 
corporation, those that were seen as necessary to assure the functioning of the firm. Hence, 
the presence of “employment level” in antitrust practice is more often linked to the goal of 
guaranteeing the economic feasibility of corporate assets, than to a social objective of 
competition policy, even though mainstream narratives frequently emphasize the European 
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inspirations of Brazilian antitrust legislation, and thus its supposed inclination toward 
objectives of such type. Not by chance, the very language that appears in cases and interviews 
treats labor as an asset. As described, “people” are to be “saved” just as money, and 
“employees” are to be acquired like any other assets, such as liabilities, and contracts. 
If interpreted in light of what in Chapter 2 I described as the defining features of 
neoliberalism in a societal dimension, the outcomes of competition policy embedded in how 
the social categories of “consumers” and “workers” are incorporated into the field thus fit 
both sides of neoliberalism’s “social agenda”. On a “positive” dimension, competition policy 
consolidates a model of society predominantly organized around “consumers”, which are seen 
as the main beneficiaries of a free economy established through antitrust regulation. The 
social correspondent of the market economy is, in this sense, a market individual, whose 
activity, as suggested by Rose (2004, p. 165-166), “is to be understood in terms of the 
activation of the rights of the consumer in the marketplace”. As the main or even sole 
objective to be pursued by competition policy in a social dimension, “consumer welfare” is 
thus the translation of the consumer or market citizenship (Clarke 2004; Rose 2004; Barnett 
2010; Schneiderman 2008) advanced by neoliberalism in antitrust regulation.  
As described in Chapter 2, this positive program is accompanied by a negative agenda, 
i.e. the deconstruction of other forms of societal organization that are not functional to the 
market logics. In the field of competition policy, this dimension is reflected in how regulation 
repulses the protection of employment and thus of the social category of “workers” as goals to 
be pursued through antitrust regulation. However, the assessment of how labor-related issues 
appear in antitrust regulation evidenced other facets beyond the direct exclusion of worker 
protection as a regulatory objective that are nevertheless equally functional to neoliberalism’s 
social project. For instance, the official discourse of transforming dismissed workers into 
businessmen through retraining measures, such as that observed in CADE’s annual report of 
1998, is consistent with what Ong (2006) identifies as a characteristic feature of the neoliberal 
“regime of citizenship”: an ethos of self-governing embedded in entrepreneurialism.  
Also, the predominant resort to “Retraining and Reinsertion” measures can be seen as 
yet another form of engendering a neoliberal subjectivity (McWorther 2012): the replacement 
of collectivist ideas such as that of a social class inscribed in “employment” by ideas of 
individual responsibility (Ireland 2011; Lemke 2001). This is because the regulatory 
responses to the effects of economic concentrations on workers are individualized into 
training programs that end up transferring the responsibility of reinsertion in the labor market 
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to individuals. The protection of work is limited to training the individual, who becomes 
entitled to search for a new place in the market after the unavoidable dismissal promoted by 
higher economic efficiency. 
These are empirical indications of what in Chapter 2 I defined as the constitutive roles 
of the field of competition policy. By dissolving the conceptual dichotomy capital-labor as 
not proper to the field, and replacing it by the tension capital-consumer, competition policy 
redefines what Edelman and Suchman (1997, p. 483) call the “basic typologies that identify 
the legally cognizable components of the social world”. While workers and employment are 
pushed outside of the field as a normative goal to be pursued, or at most incorporated 
selectively as an asset, consumer welfare is established as the backbone of regulation. In 
doing so, as Santos (2005, p. 36-37) suggests, the capital-labor dichotomy of “social actors”, 
which was a marker for the state to institutionalize disputes in the model of industrial 
capitalism, disappears. This shift is precisely the outcome that indicates the field’s connection 
with neoliberalism.  
Moreover, the constitution of consumers as the legitimate social group to be protected 
through the modern field of economic regulation, and the removal of workers from an arena 
that deals with one of the cores of capitalist relations parallels the precarization of work and 
the increase of unemployment in Brazil (Filgueiras 2006, p. 186-189; Pochman 1995, p. 245; 
Pochmann 2004; Antunes 2005). For instance, in the period of implementation of several 
reforms in Brazil, including that of competition policy, the unemployment rate that in 1992 
reached 7.2% in Brazil raised to 10.5% in 2003365. Hence, the restructuring of the Brazilian 
economy induced by privatizations, liberalization and deregulation, which paved the way for 
the phenomena of private capital expansion, and concentration regulated by competition 
policy was accompanied by an increase of unemployment in the country. Nevertheless, the 
field itself has actively expelled the topic from its jurisdiction, although recognizing that 
dismissals were directly connected with the actual process of economic concentration it 
regulated. 
The deconstruction of the capital-labor relation, and its reconfiguration in terms of 
capital-consumer interaction has been affirmed in the field through both legal and economic 																																																								
365 This rate corresponds to the so-called “open unemployment”, i.e. the percentage of people that searched for a 
job and couldn’t find one in the period researched. The source of data is IPEA. The increase of unemployment 
rates throughout the 1990s is supported by several authors, such as Filgueiras (2006), Pochmann (2004) and 
Antunes (2005). Filgueiras (2006, p. 188), for instance, maintains that in Brazil’s most important metropolitan 
area, in São Paulo, the unemployment rate (“open” and “occult”) reached 19% of the economically active 
population in 2003. 
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categories. The division of regulation into different legal domains enables dislocating “labor” 
from the field through the “competence” argument, which suggests that labor is to be 
protected or regulated by labor law or other sub-fields. Also legally, the “consumer” is the 
subject entitled to the rights protected by competition policy. Economic science, in turn, 
offers the foundations for legitimizing the exclusion of labor concerns as inevitable, 
especially due to the repeatedly affirmed trade-off between economic efficiency and 
employment protection. Conversely, in economic terms, consumers are the beneficiaries of a 
regulation that promotes economic efficiency. 
Formally, the protection of the “employment level” as a normative goal to be observed 
in economic concentrations was enabled by the law of 1994. However, as was illustrated in 
section 6.4, its actual implementation was timid, if not entirely absent in some periods. 
Moreover, the latest reform of competition policy, which resulted in the competition act 
12.529 of 2011, institutionalized the field’s practice in respect to mentioned social groups: the 
reference to “employment level” was entirely removed from the new legislation. Hence, since 
2011, the sovereignty of consumers in antitrust regulation has been completely legalized in 
the field. 
Through this practice, as noticed by Türem (2010, p. 257) in the study of competition 
policy’s connection with neoliberalism in Turkey, the replacement of the “citizen” by the 
“consumer” promoted by antitrust policy implies a “general pattern” in which “society is 
imagined as a unitary entity, which can gain, as a whole, from the implementation of 
competition laws”. In this sense, the worker that legitimately (according to the field’s 
standards) loses her job due to the increased efficiency promoted by an economic 
concentration, can be simultaneously seen as a consumer benefiting from the very same 
operation. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 As described in the Introduction that opens this work, the core objective of the 
dissertation was to evaluate what I perceive as “cacophonies” and “incoherencies” present in 
the “rational lines” and “forthright statements” about regulatory reform and economic 
globalization and to offer a distinct account of this relationship. In Part I, I mapped these 
narratives and pointed to the theoretical and methodological shortcomings that underlie them, 
which as I maintained obfuscate the linkages between regulatory reform – in the case here 
analyzed, of competition policy reform – and neoliberalism. Also in Part I a conceptual 
framework to circumvent these shortcomings was proposed, and then translated into an 
empirical inquiry about the construction of competition regulation in Brazil informed by the 
tools of the sociology of law, economic sociology, and critical political economy. 
In contrast to what I defined as mainstream narratives about competition policy 
reform, and based on the empirical application of those tools, in Part II I presented an 
alternative narrative about the connections between the construction of competition regulation 
in Brazil and neoliberalism. The main hypothesis affirmed throughout the work is that the 
reform of competition policy is both rooted in the neoliberal ideology of market sovereignty, 
economic liberalization, and privatization, and functional for the facilitation of the economic 
phenomena characteristic of neoliberal globalization, as well as for the constitution of a 
societal model compatible with it.  
The detailed findings of the empirical study that support this hypothesis were 
discussed in each chapter that composes Part II of the dissertation, and hence it is not 
necessary to restate them at this point. I would rather take the space of the thesis’s Conclusion 
to exercise an appraisal of the overall findings of the research in three respects: its broad 
implications for the mainstream narratives mapped in Chapter 1 as a form of studying 
regulatory reforms, for the conceptual framework from which I departed to undertake this 
inquiry, and for what was silenced or unanswered in this work. As Jorge Luis Borges affirms 
in the quote that serves as the epigraph of this work, “every rational line” implies “leagues of 
cacophony”. Thus, if the narrative here proposed is to be taken as a “forthright statement” 
about regulatory reform and neoliberalism, it has also its own amount of “cacophonies”, 
which will now be addressed. 
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Politics of regulation and neoliberalism 
 
Four indicators were provided in support of the narrative proposed about the roots and 
roles of competition regulation in neoliberalism. In Chapter 4 I showed that a group of 
corporate lawyers and mainstream economists designed reform in a way that institutionalized 
prospects for the regulation of competition in consonance with the expectations of neoliberal 
theory and politics. As I maintained in that Chapter, this was a process marked by struggles 
within government, and outside of it, and involved a series of political compromises that 
shaped the field of competition policy. In Chapter 5, I described how the production of 
competition regulation by the reformed field was historically monopolized by lawyers and 
economists who, as reformers, were mostly ideologically aligned to neoliberalism. They 
comprised a group of often highly internationalized and Americanized corporate lawyers and 
sociologists of law, as well as new institutional and Chicagoan economists, frequently with 
close social ties among themselves, which hegemonically conducted the practice of the field 
for nearly 14 years.  
Finally, in Chapter 6, I depicted how the actual practice of the field by those agents 
reflects its constructed nature and dynamics, and has hence produced outcomes that enable 
and legitimize neoliberal globalization. In the economy, Brazilian competition policy has 
facilitated the concentration of capital in accordance with the expectations already articulated 
in the early 1990s, the expansion of foreign capital into a recently liberalized economy, and 
has kept protected the sovereign reign of financial capital. In society, the field’s practice has 
contributed to yet another defining trace of neoliberalism: the selective exclusion of labor 
concerns from policy-making, and the parallel constitution of a model of consumer 
citizenship. 
In general lines, both the strategy and the main goal of research were to put politics at 
the core of competition regulation, and to analyze the construction of this regulatory arena, its 
practice and the products it generates through a political (or politicizing) lens. In this sense, 
reform became the construction of a regulatory field by concrete and often conflicting agents 
who made institutional choices, and shaped it according to their backgrounds and views of the 
state and the market. Not only did reform not occur in an evolutionary and consensual way, 
but its consolidation was directly affected by the idiosyncrasies of the context where it 
happened, and was actively disputed over time. The practice of the field and the regulatory 
products it generated in many senses reflected the political disputes that underscored its 
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creation and institutionalized dynamics. Determining what is a correct decision, how should 
decisions be made, and what is the reach of competition policy’s jurisdiction over the 
economy and society were questions whose answers were constructed through disputes 
between the agents who were capable of entering the field and influencing it. Moreover, the 
institutional contours and decision-making parameters that were actively constructed in the 
field established the boundaries of the substantive decisions made by CADE, which in turn 
facilitated certain economic phenomena, while restricting others. 
These findings therefore confront the descriptive frameworks and explanatory models 
offered by mainstream narratives to study competition policy in Brazil and regulatory reforms 
in general, as mapped in Chapter 1, and their understanding of the rationale of reform, the 
ways in which it takes place, and the roles it exercises. The conceptual and methodological 
framework mobilized in this dissertation problematized the assumptions often endorsed by the 
epistemological perspectives available to understand regulatory reform, which generally 
depoliticize reform and its roles. This was a framework that enabled going beyond the 
formalism often endorsed by legal scholarship, economic science, and diffusion studies in 
describing reform, and its agentless accounts. Here lies what I see as a theoretical and 
methodological contribution of this dissertation to study economic regulation: the 
combination of a focus on agency to understand the process of legal and institutional 
construction of a regulatory arena, with a “law in action” approach that highlights the politics 
of practice that takes place in this environment. It was only through the articulation of such an 
actor-centered approach with a “law in action” perspective that the depoliticization of 
regulatory reform and its roles was circumvented, and hence its connections to neoliberalism 
could be investigated and identified. 
In this work, politics is said to be central to understanding regulatory reform not in a 
purely abstract sense. By dissecting how the construction and practice of the field, as well as 
regulatory production, happen, I showed that competition policy has been connected with a 
specific political project: that of neoliberalism. This contrasts with mainstream narratives that, 
even though they do not entirely neglect the political dimension embedded in regulatory 
reform, end up obfuscating its linkages to neoliberalism, or explicitly denying it. At an 
epistemological level, the approach that underlies this research has thus served to infuse 
politics into the study of a technocratic object that has been frequently interpreted through a 
technocratic lens. With respect to those narratives that see the parallel enactment of 
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competition laws to economic globalization as evidence of the analytical misplacement of 
neoliberalism, this dissertation hence represents a contesting hypothesis. 
In this way, this research has added to what can be seen as a growing literature that 
problematizes the dominant perspectives about economic regulation and regulatory reform 
through the politicization of the object of study: a body of scholarship about the “politics of 
regulation”. These are studies that have also pointed to the connections between competition 
policy and neoliberalism by exploring the construction of economic regulation through an 
actor-centered approach, and/or deploying a political economy perspective to analyze its 
roles. As I see it, this dissertation contributes to the hypothesis assessed by other researchers 
that since the 1980s – and most intensely in countries of the global South and in Europe since 
the 1990s – competition policy has been increasingly functional for neoliberal globalization. 
Moreover, it expands this hypothesis geographically, as the empirical domain of competition 
policy has not been assessed in such terms in Brazil, corroborating findings observed in other 
contexts such as the US (Eisner 1991, Davies 2010), Europe (Buch-Hansen and Wigger 2011, 
Wigger 2008), and Turkey (Türem 2010). 
 
Theoretical and methodological bridges 
 
This dissertation can be seen not only as a contrasting narrative and alternative 
conceptual framework with respect to the dominant scholarship on regulatory and competition 
policy reform, but also as an exercise of construction of bridges between different theoretical 
and methodological traditions. In the empirical inquiry developed throughout this work, I 
sought to combine, on the one hand, the conceptual and methodological tools offered by a 
reflexive sociology (present in both the sociology of law and economic sociology) for the 
study of lawyers and economists as agents of neoliberalism, to, on the other, the insights 
offered by the approach of a critical political economy for the analysis of the “law in action” 
produced by those agents. 
Taken together, these tools resulted in a framework that enables the empirical study of 
who produces the law and how, and what law is produced and why. In doing this, I bridged 
two distinct and yet complementary emphases about the mutual influence between political 
and economic phenomena such as neoliberalism, and legal and institutional constructions. 
From the perspective of the actor-centered approach built on the contributions of the 
sociology of law and economic sociology, this bridge opens the way for the infusion of 
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substantive elements about the law produced by the agents that constitute and structure the 
regulatory field analyzed. As was developed in Part II of the thesis, in describing the 
construction and practice of the field of competition policy through the trajectory study of the 
agents that compose it, I sought to permanently connect the actor-centered approach to 
concrete institutional choices and decisions made by these agents. It was through this 
articulation that it was possible to visualize how agents with a certain profile shape the field 
and its regulatory roles, and more importantly, how the outcomes it generates, as described in 
Chapter 6, are consistent with the neoliberal ideology identified in most of their trajectories. 
In turn, from the point of view of the critical political economy of neoliberalism, the 
insights of the sociology of law and economic sociology from which I departed bring in a 
detailed account of the institutional and legal contours that both reflected and legitimized the 
economic phenomena that it emphasizes. This articulation promotes attention to how law and 
institutions were affected by neoliberalism, and also to how the regulatory field they compose 
and the series of particular struggles that take place within the professional fields that operate 
regulatory arenas affect and condition neoliberal globalization. In this research, I showed that 
neoliberalism, like the very reforms it promoted, has not diffused straightforwardly, but was 
mediated through local agents, the institutional battles in which they engaged, and the legal 
and economic traditions present in the context in which neoliberalism became hegemonic. In 
doing so, it was possible to circumvent the risks of an economicist interpretation of 
neoliberalism, immersing an eminently economic phenomenon in a sociological perspective. 
The cross-fertilization promoted by the merging of these two emphases into a single 
framework increases its descriptive and explanatory strength to study regulatory reforms and 
neoliberalism. As such, it can be replicated for the assessment of the construction and practice 
of other regulatory arenas or fields of practice, be it under neoliberal globalization, or in other 
historical moments and political and economic contexts. For instance, the combination of an 
actor-centered approach, informed by the reflexive sociology of law and the economy, with 
the “law in action” perspective embedded in a critical political economy can be mobilized to 
evaluate what a growing literature has been arguing to be a recent shift from neoliberal 
policies to a new model of state activism, or the recasting of the new developmental state in 
Brazil. 
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An epilogue of prologues 
  
Despite what I see as contributions of this dissertation both in respect to mainstream 
narratives and to the conceptual and methodological framework it mobilizes, an appraisal of 
its results does not exclude the perception of limitations. One set of these limitations can be 
noticed in the research herein presented, all with a common root: the eminently exploratory 
character of the inquiry developed. As such, the other side of the coin of these limits is thus 
that they constitute an indication of possible venues for expanding and unfolding this research 
in distinct directions. 
A first example that can be mentioned is the circumscription of the analysis to a single 
case study, both thematically and geographically: the construction of competition regulation 
in Brazil. This research strategy implies the limitation of the findings that were presented in 
terms of its generalizability to other regulatory domains or countries. Although in evaluating 
these findings I frequently connected them to other studies, the linkage between competition 
policy reform and neoliberalism here affirmed is confined to the empirical universe analyzed. 
The resort to such a strategy was motivated by the perceived need to construct an in-
depth study about a universe that was not explored through the lens herein proposed 
beforehand. Hence, the case study on Brazil could now be taken as the basis for a systematic 
comparative approach, through which it would be possible to assess if and how the agents and 
struggles that underlie the construction and practice of competition policy in that country, as 
well as the roles it performs in the economy and society can be observed in similar ways 
elsewhere. On the other hand, if the process of regulatory reform as well as its outcomes 
differ, an interesting research question would be to explain why. Such a comparative 
approach could be especially fruitful if applied to other Latin American countries or other 
countries of the global South who shared similar stories concerning neoliberalism. This venue 
of research would constitute a strong test for the hypothesis hereby sustained, and for the 
literature on the “politics of regulation” in general, especially given that the mainstream 
narratives that encompass the Brazilian case can often be identified in other contexts. 
A second example of a limitation that can be turned into a new agenda of inquiry 
concerns the analysis of the outcomes produced by competition policy in the economy and 
society. Since in the Brazilian case systematic empirical studies about decisions and 
regulatory practice in competition policy are scarce, in this respect this dissertation was 
mostly focused on producing data about the concrete practices of the field and identifying 
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regulatory trends. The task of generating exploratory data in such a way implies many 
limitations. Several potentially interesting debates with respect to CADE’s decision-making, 
most notably in decisions on MRs and APs, were left aside, in a trade-off between a more 
qualitative analysis of decisions and the construction of a general overview about regulation.  
Although such a trade-off posits a limitation on the validity of the quantitative study, 
the empirical material generated offers first hand insights into the actual profile of 
competition regulation in Brazil through descriptive statistics, which may now be explored in 
detail and through inferential instruments. A statistical inferential study could take advantage 
of the database constructed for this study in order to evaluate decision-making in an 
explanatory form, even incorporating new variables, such as the analysis of the voting in each 
decision and its possible dependence on the political context, and on the profiles of decision-
makers.  
Still within the idea of developing the research into the Brazilian case, the quantitative 
study could also incorporate decisions from the period that is often characterized as that of a 
“politicized” or “interventionist” phase of CADE, which fits in with what has been described 
as the emergence of a new developmental state (e.g. by the most recent Law & Development 
literature). In incorporating those cases, notably from 2011 onwards, which were not available 
at the time of data collection, an inferential study could empirically assess if and how the 
practice of CADE has changed over time, and if it is connected, for instance, with the 
presence of regulators with a distinct profile or with other political and economic factors. The 
comparative approach mentioned earlier could also include the analysis of concrete decisions, 
using the database produced in this research, and the variables it generated, as a framework 
for analyzing what economy is regulated by competition policy and how, in a cross-country 
perspective. 
A third example, connected to the former, also implies expanding the research herein 
presented chronologically. This is because in 2012 a new competition act was enacted in 
Brazil, imposing substantive institutional changes to CADE and to the SBDC as a whole. 
Since the study of the 1990s reform was the core object investigated, and it alone was time 
consuming, I was not able to address the latest reform in this dissertation. However, this 
recent reform can serve as another parameter for evaluating the linkages of competition 
regulation and neoliberalism, most notably eventual ruptures, given the recent political and 
economic shifts in Brazil. Incorporating into the analysis the construction of the 2012 
competition act and the production of competition policy since then would provide indicators 
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for assessing a phenomenon only marginally explored in this work: if and how what 
mainstream narratives define as the “politicization” of antitrust in Brazil has occurred, and 
what it means in practice. 
A fourth limitation that underlies this work concerns the very focus of the research, 
i.e. the dimension of analysis it has privileged. As an exploratory study, I deliberately focused 
the dissertation on what can be seen as the “hegemonic” side of economic globalization, as 
embedded in the construction of competition policy regulation in Brazil. I tried to describe 
what defines the neoliberal character of competition policy reform, how its hegemony was 
built in time, and what are its roles in economy and society. In doing so, this work falls into 
what Santos and Garavito-Rodríguez (2005, p. 2-3) characterize as a paradox of sociology of 
law scholarship: while focusing on the “most visible, hegemonic actors” of neoliberal 
globalization, it fails to “register the growing grassroots contestation of the spread of 
neoliberal institutions”.  
Like the literature they criticize – which includes the reflexive sociology of law that I 
mobilized throughout this work –, my dissertation is an attempt to “unveil[...] the power 
struggles and alliances between and within legal elites in the North and the South through 
which the hegemony of transnational capital and Northern states is reproduced”, but has not 
addressed the potentials of the “role of law in counter-hegemonic globalization and the 
challenges that the latter poses to legal theory and practice” (Santos and Garavíto-Rodríguez 
2005, p. 5). In this dissertation, such a paradox is more the result of what I perceive as a need 
imposed by the nature of the object researched, and of the time and space limitations of the 
thesis, than an unconscious relegation of contestation as a relevant aspect of neoliberal 
globalization. Unveiling the connection of competition policy reform with the construction of 
neoliberal hegemony was privileged because I understand it as a necessary step given the 
scarce availability of critical accounts of the topic, even more so in Brazil. 
The role of law in such counter-hegemonic movements is far from incompatible from 
the theoretical framework mobilized throughout this research, although the reflexive 
sociology of Bourdieu, as Villegas (2004, p. 67) suggests, often “obscures the emancipatory 
potential which occasionally arises in the discourse on rights”. The institution of a field of 
practice such as competition policy does not mean that it necessarily and permanently works 
within the logic that is hegemonically imprinted in it. That law is a relatively autonomous 
field and that the enforcement of the law is indeterminate and open for politics, means that it 
is so for both sides: hegemonic and counter-hegemonic. As Thompson (1990, p. 266) puts it, 
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“the forms and rhetoric of law acquire a distinct identity which may, on occasions, inhibit 
power and afford some protection to the powerless”. 
In conducting research, some of these “occasions” were identified, even though not 
directly approached. As in the other cases already mentioned, although the silence in respect 
to these potential counter-hegemonic impulses in the field of competition policy constitutes a 
limitation of this work, it also indicates venues for further inquiry. One of the occasions in 
which resistance to neoliberal globalization can be spotted is in the dispute of the construction 
and practice of competition policy in Brazil by social movements and NGOs. For instance, in 
a MR of 2007, two NGOs in the areas of consumer and social communication rights 
petitioned CADE to oppose an acquisition between two companies in the communication 
sector that would result in a monopoly in certain regions366. Following the petition, CADE 
concluded an APRO with the corporations, and in August 2009 the Council approved the 
operation with the imposition of structural restrictions.  
The example involving a consumer rights NGO also illustrates how what I highlighted 
as a characteristic contribution of the Brazilian field of competition regulation to 
neoliberalism – the constitution of a market society based on a regime of consumer 
citizenship – may also be a site of resistance. As Schneiderman (2010, Chapter 7) suggests, 
consumption can be politicized and transformed by collective action, and turned into a means 
to confront hegemonic globalization. Hence, assessing if and how the very transformation of 
consumers into the main subject protected by a field hegemonized by neoliberal ideology has 
opened a way for disputing this regulatory arena constitutes a valuable form of grasping the 
degree to which economic globalization embedded in regulatory reform has thrived smoothly, 
or if it has faced opposition and eventually some defeats. 
Another set of such opportunities for potential resistance entails several protests 
mobilized by labor unions against MRs analyzed by CADE and its decisions in cases that 
implied the dismissal of workers. In many cases involving dismissals mentioned in Chapter 6, 
unions protested against CADE’s decisions, holding it accountable for the loss of jobs implied 
by the operations. Tensions related to labor recently gained new contours, when a prosecutor 
connected to the Labor Attorney General’s Office (MPT) initiated a legal battle to oblige 
CADE to disclose information about MR that generated dismissals367.  																																																								
366 MR number 08012.013152/2007-20, in which Grupo Abril S.A. acquired Fernando Chinaglia Distribuidora 
S.A. The NGOs that acted in the process were IDEC (Instituto de Defesa do Consumidor) and Intervozes – 
Coletivo Brasil de Comunicação Social. 
367 The judicial procedure was initiated in October 2013, as revealed by an article published at Consultor 
Jurídico on October 8th 2013, titled “MPT processa Cade por não entregar documentos em inquérito”. 
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In the first case, while legitimating the field by joining it and disputing its stakes 
through the institutionalized boundaries, NGOs were also contesting concentration, and 
advancing a demand external to it – the democratization of mass communications – but 
through the language of competition law. Apparently, this was a successful initiative. On the 
other hand, in the second set of cases, the pressures exercised by social movements for the 
protection of jobs seem not to have achieved the same results. Analyzing the degree of 
success of such forms of mobilization of competition policy, its impacts on regulation, the 
strategies adopted by social movements, and the responses given by the field constitutes a 
research agenda that might illuminate the functioning of this regulatory arena, and thus 
complement the view herein presented about the roots and roles of antitrust in advancing 
neoliberal globalization – be it to corroborate, or to nuance it. These “cacophonies”, however, 
are to be solved elsewhere. 
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ANNEX I 
List of Brazilian Presidents 
 
Getúlio Vargas (1930-1945 / 1950-1954) 
Vargas was elected president in 1930, and stayed in office until 1945. The years between 
1937 and 1945 are often defined as the dictatorial period of the Estado Novo, during which 
there were no direct elections. Vargas was deposed in 1945, but was again elected in 1950, 
being in office from 1951 to 1954, when he committed suicide. 
 
Jânio Quadros (1961) 
Elected president in January 1961, Quadros stayed in office for less than 7 months, resigning 
in August of the same year. The vice-president, João Goulart, took office in his place. 
 
João Goulart (1961-1964) 
Goulart initiated a period of intense interventionism and reforms, and was eventually deposed 
by the military coup of April 1964, which installed a dictatorship that lasted for more than 20 
years. Only in 1989 the first direct elections for president since 1961 took place. 
 
José Sarney (1985-1989) 
Sarney was elected vice-president of Tancredo Neves in January 1985, through an indirect 
election. Neves died before the presidential commencement, hence Sarney was the first non-
military president of Brazil since 1960. 
 
Fernando Collor de Mello (1990-1992) 
Collor was elected in 1989, in the first direct presidential elections since the military 
dictatorship. He took office on March 15th 1990, and on October 2nd 1992 the national Senate 
started an impeachment procedure to revoke his mandate, due to a corruption scandal. Collor 
resigned on December 29th 1992. 
 
Itamar Franco (1992-1994) 
Franco was elected Collor’s vice-president in 1989. Once the president was driven out of 
office after the Senate initiated the impeachment procedure on October 2nd 1992, Franco took 
office temporarily, and was later confirmed president on December 29th 1992, when Collor 
resigned. Franco stayed in office until January 1st 1995. 
 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) 
The former Minister of Finance of Franco and a member of PSDB, Cardoso was elected 
president in October 1994, and stayed in office from January 1995 to December 2002. 
 
Luís Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010) 
A leader of PT, which since the early 1990s became the major oponent of PSDB in Brazilian 
national politics, Lula was in office from January 2003 to December 2010. 
 
Dilma Rousseff (2011-present) 
Rousseff, a member of PT and former minister of Lula, was elected president in 2010, and 
took office in January of 2011. 
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ANNEX II 
 
List of Interviewees 
 
# Name Positions Date (dd/mm/yy) Location 
Length 
(minutes) 
1 Alberto Venancio Filho Lawyer / Reformer 09/07/13 Rio de Janeiro 20 
2 Alessandro Octaviani Lawyer / Commissioner 26/06/13 Brasília 55 
3 Amadeu Carvalhaes Ribeiro Lawyer 09/07/13 
Rio de 
Janeiro 48 
4 Ana de Oliveira Frazão Lawyer / Commissioner 27/06/13 Brasília 63 
5 Anonymous Lawyer 2012 N/A 119 
6 Anonymous Economist 2013 N/A 67 
7 Anonymous Lawyer  2013 N/A 54 
8 Arthur Barrionuevo Filho 
Economist / 
Commissioner 11/06/12 São Paulo 71 
9 Arthur Sanchez Badin Lawyer / SDE / CADE's President 15/06/13 São Paulo 71 
10 Bolívar Moura Rocha Lawyer / SEAE 17/06/13 Brasília 101 
11 Carlos Emmanuel Joppert Ragazzo 
Lawyer / SEAE / 
Commissioner 12/07/13 
Rio de 
Janeiro 54 
12 Carlos Francisco de Magalhães Lawyer / Reformer 03/12/13 São Paulo 157 
13 Celso Campilongo Lawyer / Commissioner 28/05/13 São Paulo 156 
14 Claudio Monteiro Considera Economist / SEAE 11/07/13 
Rio de 
Janeiro 101 
15 Cleveland Teixeira Economist / Commissioner 03/10/12 São Paulo 80 
16 Clóvis de Vasconcelos Cavalcanti Economist / Reformer 22/01/14 
N/A 
(Email) N/A 
17 Cristiane Landerdhal de Albuquerque CADE Staff 28/06/13 Brasília 32 
18 Daniel Goldberg Lawyer / SDE 11/06/13 São Paulo 78 
19 Elvino de Carvalho Mendonça 
Economist / SEAE / 
Commissioner 27/06/13 Brasília 72 
20 Fernando de Magalhães Furlan 
Lawyer / CADE's 
President 24/06/13 Brasília 66 
21 Francisco Ribeiro Todorov Lawyer 21/06/13 Brasília 20 
22 Hebe Teixeira Romano Pereira da Silva Lawyer / Commissioner 21/06/13 Brasília 37 
23 Helcio Tokeshi Economist / SEAE 22/07/13 N/A (Skype) 83 
24 José Del Chiaro Ferreira da Rosa Lawyer / Reformer 17/09/12 São Paulo 59 
25 José Inácio Gonzaga Franceschini  Lawyer / Reformer 01/10/12 São Paulo 117 
26 Lucia Helena Salgado e Silva 
Economist / Reformer/ 
Commissioner 08/07/13 
Rio de 
Janeiro 173 
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27 Luiz Fernando Rigato Economist / SEAE / Commissioner 22/05/13 São Paulo 62 
28 Mariana Tavares de Araújo Lawyer / SDE 08/07/13 
Rio de 
Janeiro 47 
29 Mário Roberto Villanova Nogueira Lawyer 28/05/13 São Paulo 90 
30 Mário Sérgio Rocha Gordilho Júnior CADE Staff 21/06/13 Brasília 67 
31 Mauro Grinberg Lawyer / Reformer / Commissioner 04/09/12 São Paulo 84 
32 Neide Teresinha Malard Lawyer / Reformer / Commissioner 28/06/13 Brasília 107 
33 Neil Montgomery  Lawyer 20/05/13 São Paulo 74 
34 Paulo Furquim Azevedo Economist / Commissioner 15/06/12 
N/A 
(Skype) 46 
35 Pedro Dutra Lawyer 21/09/12 São Paulo 104 
36 Ricardo Machado Ruiz Economist / Commissioner 18/06/13 Brasília 100 
37 Roberto Augusto Castellano Pfeiffer Lawyer / Commissioner 11/10/12 São Paulo 74 
38 Ronaldo Porto Macedo Lawyer / Commissioner 23/05/13 São Paulo 94 
39 Ruy Afonso de Santacruz Lima 
Economist / SEAE / 
Commissioner 08/07/13 
Rio de 
Janeiro 61 
40 Ruy Coutinho do Nascimento 
Lawyer / Reformer / 
CADE's President 18/06/13 Brasília 98 
41 Tércio Sampaio Ferraz Jr Lawyer / Reformer 30/07/13 São Paulo 90 
42 Tulio Freitas do Egito Coelho Lawyer 14/06/13 Brasília 66 
43 Ubiratan Mattos  Lawyer 29/05/13 São Paulo 51 
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ANNEX III 
 
Interview Guide: Basic Axis 
 
 
Topics 
 
Elements 
 
Questions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) Trajectory 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Personal, academic and 
professional trajectory 
 
 
“Can you please tell me about your 
academic and professional 
trajectory until you became 
[engaged in reform, a 
commissioner, a competition 
lawyer, etc]? 
 
“What kinds of jobs and activities 
have you had since you 
[participated in reform, left CADE, 
etc]?” 
 
“How did your appointment [to 
engage in reform or to CADE] 
occur?” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) CADE’s composition and 
decision-making 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Views on the appointments to 
CADE, and on its decisions 
 
 
“How do you find the appointments 
to CADE in a historical 
perspective? Do you see any 
variations?” 
 
“How do you evaluate CADE’s 
decisions in a historical 
perspective in merger reviews?” 
 
“How do you evaluate CADE’s 
decisions in a historical 
perspective in administrative 
procedures?” 
 
“Do you perceive any variations in 
CADE’s decision-making 
throughout time?”	
	
 
 
 
(c) Boundaries of competition 
policy 
 
 
 
Normative stances on 
judicialization of competition 
policy, regulation of the financial 
sector, and labor issues 
 
 
“How do you perceive the 
judiciary’s control over CADE’s 
decisions?” 
 
“Have you ever worked in a case 
involving the financial sector?” 
 
“Have you ever worked in a case 
in which the issue of the impacts 
for the workers of the involved 
corporations was raised?” 
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ANNEX IV 
 
Interview Guide: Specific Axis to Reformers 
 
 
Topics 
 
Elements 
 
Questions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) Reform process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Disputes around reform, 
development of reform, foreign 
influences 
 
 
“Who mobilized the reform agenda 
and supported its advancement?” 
 
“Who, if anyone, opposed reform of 
competition policy and why?” 
 
“Were there disagreements among 
the individuals involving in the 
draft of the bill?” 
 
“Were there disagreements 
between those individuals and 
government?” 
 
“Did any foreign individual or 
institution contributed to reform?” 
 
“Did you resort to the international 
experience in producing a new 
competition act? If so, to what 
countries and in what subjects?” 
 
“After your work in producing a 
draft ended, how did reform 
evolved?” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) Institutional choices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Definition of criteria for 
submission of merger reviews, of 
the post-merger review system, 
CADE’s composition 
 
 
“How was the criterion of 400 
million Reais as the threshold for 
submitting merger reviews to 
CADE defined?” 
 
“How was the criterion of  20% of 
market share for clearing economic 
concentrations defined?” 
 
“How was the composition of 
CADE’s plenary (lawyers and 
economists) defined?” 
 
“Why was a post-merger 
notification system established, 
instead of a pre-merger system? 
Was a pre-merger review system 
ever considered?” 
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ANNEX V 
 
Interview Guide: Specific Axis to Producers 
 
 
 
Topics 
 
Elements 
 
Questions 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) Institutional structure 
 
 
 
 
Conditions of work, staff 
composition 
 
 
“How was the [CADE, SDE or 
SEAE] structured when you got 
there in terms of staff and 
conditions of work?” 
 
“How was your cabinet staff 
composed?” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) Decision-making 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Important cases, controversies 
within the SBDC, use of economic 
methods and theories 
 
“What were the most important 
cases in which you worked while 
in [CADE, SDE, SEAE]?” 
 
“What were the most 
controversial cases in which you 
worked while in [CADE, SDE, 
SEAE]?” 
 
“Were there disagreements 
between CADE, SDE, and SEAE 
in decision-making?” 
 
“What kinds of economic methods 
and theories did you use to 
analyze merger reviews?” 
 
“Did all commissioners in CADE 
had similar approaches to 
competition policy while you 
served the institution?” 
 
“If not, were there controversies 
motivated by these different 
approaches?”  
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ANNEX VI 
 
Interview Guide: Specific Axis to Professionals 
 
 
 
Topics 
 
Elements 
 
Questions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) Law firm organization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Areas of practice, number of 
lawyers, presence of economists 
 
 
“In what areas does your firm 
provide legal services?” 
 
“How many lawyers work in the 
firm, and how many are dedicated 
to competition policy?” 
 
“Are there any economists in the 
firm? If not, to what economists do 
you resort in antitrust cases?” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) Competition lawyering 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Profile of legal practice, legal 
strategies 
 
“What are the origins and sectors 
of you clients in the area of 
antitrust?” 
 
“How do lawyers and economists 
interact in defining the legal 
strategy of a case?” 
 
“How do you chose an economist 
as a consultant for an antitrust 
case?” 
 
“What were the most important 
Merger Reviews in which you 
worked as a lawyer?” 
 
“What were the most important 
Administrative Procedures in 
which you worked as a lawyer?” 
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ANNEX VII 
 
Letter of Presentation for Interviewees (Portuguese) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	
CARTA	DE	APRESENTAÇÃO	
	
	
Estimado(a)	Senhor(a)	
____________________,	
	
	
Desenvolvo	 pesquisa	 de	 doutorado	 sobre	 a	 política	 de	 defesa	 da	 concorrência	 no	
Brasil,	 e	 escrevo	 para	 aventar	a	 possibilidade	 de	 entrevistá-lo	 no	 âmbito	 deste	 trabalho,	
tendo	 em	 vista	 a	 sua	 atuação	 como	 Conselheiro	 do	 Conselho	 Administrativo	 de	 Defesa	
Econômica	 (CADE).	 A	 pesquisa	 está	 sendo	 realizada	 junto	 à	 Faculdade	 de	 Direito	 da	
Università	 degli	 Studi	 di	 Milano,	sob	 orientação	 dos	 Professores	 Sol	 Picciotto	 e	 Luigi	
Cominelli,	 e	 é	 financiada	 pelo	 Ministero	 dell'Università	 e	 della	 Ricerca	 da	 Itália	 e	 pelo	
Instituto	Internacional	de	Sociologia	Jurídica	de	Oñati	(IISJ).	
	
PROPOSTA	 DA	 PESQUISA:	 Esta	 pesquisa	 tem	 por	 objetivos	 estudar	 o	 papel	 de	
advogados	 e	 economistas	 na	 estruturação	 e	 reforma	 do	 Sistema	 Brasileiro	 de	 Defesa	 da	
Concorrência	e	na	produção	da	regulação	nesta	área,	e	a	interação	entre	o	direito	e	a	ciência	
econômica	nos	processos	de	tomada	de	decisão	no	âmbito	do	CADE	e	na	prática	profissional	
no	campo	concorrencial.	
	
FINALIDADE	 DA	 ENTREVISTA:	 A	 entrevista	 tem	 por	 finalidade	 prover	 informação	
sobre	a	atuação	do	entrevistado	no	direito	concorrencial.	Busca-se	reunir	informações	sobre	
a	 trajetória	 pessoal	 e	 profissional	 do	 entrevistado	 e	 coletar	 as	 suas	 percepções	 e	
experiências	sobre	a	reforma	e	a	prática	do	direito	concorrencial	brasileiro.	Entrevistas	estão	
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sendo	 realizadas	 com	 servidores,	 conselheiros	 e	 presidentes	 CADE,	 bem	 como	 com	
advogados,	economistas	e	acadêmicos	que	atuam	na	área.	
	
USO	DA	ENTREVISTA:	O	conteúdo	da	entrevista	será	utilizado	estritamente	para	fins	
acadêmicos,	a	saber,	a	tese	de	doutorado	que	resultará	da	pesquisa	e	eventuais	publicações	
científicas.	 Confidencialidade:	 Trechos	 das	 entrevistas	 poderão	 ser	 classificados	 como	
confidenciais	 pelo	 entrevistado	 ao	 longo	 da	 entrevista.	 Se	 assim	 for	 manifestado	
expressamente,	será	garantida	a	sua	confidencialidade	no	texto	do	trabalho.	Anonimato:	A	
identificação	 do	 entrevistado	 também	 poderá	 ser	 resguardada.	 Se	 assim	 for	 manifestado	
expressamente,	 as	 transcrições	 e	 citações	 indicarão	 apenas	 dados	 genéricos	 do	
entrevistado,	 que	 não	possibilitem	a	 sua	 identificação.	Conservação	 dos	 dados:	Os	dados	
coletados	 –	 gravações	 da	 entrevista,	 transcrições,	 anotações	 e	 qualquer	 documento	
oferecido	pelo	participante	–	serão	armazenados	exclusivamente	pelo	pesquisador.	
	
Coloco-me	 à	 disposição	 para	 encontrá-lo	 no	 local,	 dia	 e	 horário	 que	 julgue	 mais	
convenientes,	 bem	 como	 para	 prestar	 qualquer	 informação	 adicional	 que	 entenda	
necessária.		
	
Agradeço,	desde	logo,	a	sua	atenção	e	consideração.	
		
Cordialmente,		
	
Iagê	Zendron	Miola	
Doutorando	
International	PhD	Programme	in	Law	and	Society	“Renato	Treves”	
Università	degli	Studi	di	Milano	
iage.miola@unimi.it	
(11)	98855-6181	
http://lattes.cnpq.br/7508223637108048	
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ANNEX VIII 
 
Interview Consent Form (Portuguese) 
 
 		
	
	
	
	
TERMO	DE	CONSENTIMENTO	
	
PARA	ENTREVISTA					
PROPOSTA	 DA	 PESQUISA:	 Esta	 pesquisa	 tem	 por	 objetivos	 estudar	 o	 papel	 de	advogados	e	economistas	na	estruturação	e	reforma	do	Sistema	Brasileiro	de	Defesa	da	Concorrência	 e	na	produção	da	 regulação	nesta	 área,	 e	 a	 interação	entre	o	direito	 e	 a	ciência	econômica	nos	processos	de	tomada	de	decisão	no	âmbito	do	CADE	e	na	prática	profissional	no	campo	concorrencial.			
FINALIDADE	 DA	 ENTREVISTA:	 A	 entrevista	 tem	 por	 finalidade	 prover	 informação	sobre	a	atuação	do	entrevistado	no	direito	concorrencial.	Busca-se	reunir	 informações	sobre	a	trajetória	pessoal	e	profissional	do	entrevistado	e	coletar	as	suas	percepções	e	experiências	sobre	a	reforma	e	a	prática	do	direito	concorrencial	brasileiro.				
USO	DA	 ENTREVISTA:	O	conteúdo	da	entrevista	será	utilizado	estritamente	para	 fins	acadêmicos,	 a	 saber,	 a	 tese	 de	 doutorado	 que	 resultará	 da	 pesquisa	 e	 eventuais	publicações	 científicas.	 Confidencialidade:	 Trechos	 das	 entrevistas	 poderão	 ser	classificados	como	confidenciais	pelo	entrevistado	ao	 longo	da	entrevista.	Se	assim	for	manifestado	 expressamente,	 será	 garantida	 a	 sua	 confidencialidade	 no	 texto	 do	trabalho.	Anonimato:	A	identificação	do	entrevistado	também	poderá	ser	resguardada.	Se	 assim	 for	 manifestado	 expressamente,	 as	 transcrições	 e	 citações	 indicarão	 apenas	dados	genéricos	do	entrevistado,	que	não	possibilitem	a	sua	identificação.	Conservação	
dos	 dados:	 Os	 dados	 coletados	 –	 gravações	 da	 entrevista,	 transcrições,	 anotações	 e	qualquer	documento	oferecido	pelo	participante	 –	 serão	armazenados	 exclusivamente	pelo	pesquisador.		
	
DÚVIDAS	E	COMENTÁRIOS:	Quaisquer	dúvidas	ou	comentários	sobre	a	entrevista	e	a	pesquisa	 podem	 ser	 encaminhados	 por	 meio	 do	 endereço	 iage.miola@unimi.it	 e	 do	telefone	(11)	98855-6181.	Os	docentes	que	supervisionam	a	presente	pesquisa	podem	ser	 contatados	 nos	 seguintes	 endereços:	 s.picciotto@lancaster.ac.uk	 e	luigi.cominelli@unimi.it.	 O	 Programa	 de	 Doutorado	 Internacional	 em	 Direito	 e	
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Sociedade	da	Università	degli	Studi	di	Milano	pode	ser	contatado	por	meio	do	endereço	phd@fildir.unimi.it	e	do	telefone	(+39)	02-50312138.	
	
CONSENTIMENTO:	 Assinando	 este	 termo,	 o	 entrevistado	 manifesta	 o	 seu	consentimento	em	participar	da	pesquisa	e	declara	haver	recebido	uma	cópia	 idêntica	assinada	pelo	pesquisador.		
CONFIDENCIALIDADE:	 Determinados	 trechos	 da	 entrevista	 são	 confidenciais?		
[				]	Sim			[				]	Não		
ANONIMATO:	 A	 identidade	 do	 entrevistado	 deve	 ser	 resguardada?		
[				]	Sim			[				]	Não	
		 			Assinaturas:			___________________________________			 	 	 																	________________________________									 	 		 	 IAGÊ	ZENDRON	MIOLA	
	
	 		 Location,	Date.		
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